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THE

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

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BOOK THE FOURTH.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

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THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

THE WAR FROM ITS OUTBREAK TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES.

THE blessings of the years of peace which the Athenians owed to Pericles contained at the same time the germ of an inevitable war. The confederate communities could not reconcile themselves to the annihilation of their independence; the splendor of Athens was an abomination to the Megareans and the Bœotians; and not less so to the Peloponnesians, and particularly to the Spartans (whose jealousy, it will be remembered, had already been so vehemently provoked by the first rise of the Athenian power, after the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ). With what feelings, then, must they now have glanced across the sea upon Athens! They confined themselves, however, to wrath instead of deeds; and although they bitterly resented the changes by which they were constantly driven further back from their position of prominence, yet this resentment on their part resulted in no resolutions for action. Athens, on the other hand, most carefully avoided giving any occasion for hostilities; and since the time when Pericles had the disposal of the

pecuniary resources in his hands, he is even said to have expended an annual sum of ten talents, with the view of counteracting the influence of the war-party at Sparta. However incredible it may appear, yet it is not improbable that he in this way took advantage of the weak sides of the adversary. Pericles, though unwilling to purchase peace, yet wished to retain in his hands the power of determining the commencement of the war; it was, therefore, necessary for him to possess influence at Sparta, where public feeling was in a continual state of flux and reflux. Corinth alone among all the enemies of Athens, possessed an independent, definite and active policy of her own.*

The position of Corinth.

Corinth was a trading city, which could not exist without a navy and colonies. She was necessarily jealous of every state which disputed the rule of the sea with her, and endangered her lines of communication by water. In order to humiliate Ægina, the Corinthians had formerly supported Athens (vol. ii. p. 262). Their dissatisfaction was in consequence doubly great, when they saw the beginnings of the Attic navy, which they had originally despised, grow to an importance which soon left far behind that of the Corinthian navy. In vain they had during the Persian wars endeavored to place obstacles in the way of Athens' triumphal career (vol. ii. p. 320); in vain protested against the building of the walls (vol. ii. p. 360); the condition of their affairs only became worse and worse. For, since the foundation of the Attic alliance, they not only saw themselves excluded from all the glory and all

* Theophrastus' statement as to the bribes sent year by year to Sparta (Plut. *Pericl.* 23) is probably founded on the circumstance that Pericles introduced into the budget of state the rubric, εἰς δέον, εἰς τὸ δέον. This was a secret service fund, as to the expenditure of which the confidence of the citizens excused the statesman managing foreign affairs from giving any account. Cf. Bœckh, *P. E.* p. 195, note (E. Tr.).

the fruits of Hellenic naval victories; but their own colonies, Potidæa in particular, fell into the hands of Athens, their influence in the Archipelago was annihilated, and their trade with Asia at an end. When, finally, Megara and Achaia opened their ports to the Athenians, and Naupactus (through the Messenians) became an Attic naval station (vol. ii. p. 442), they were no longer the masters even in their own waters. Nor had the Messenians any intention of remaining inactive, but immediately made their town a harbor of war; and directly after their settlement, undertook an expedition of conquest in a western direction, into the country of the Achelous, distinguished by its fertility, where they could inflict the greatest damage upon the powers of Corinth (vol. i. p. 290). It was, doubtless, in consequence of an understanding with Athens, that they chose Œniadæ as the goal of this enterprise, a city fortified by walls and morasses in the lower valley of the Achelous, which had always shown itself faithful to the Corinthians and hostile to the Athenians. They took the city and maintained themselves in it for the space of a year, until an army, composed of the neighboring tribes of Acarnania, forced them to evacuate it. Immediately afterwards, an Attic fleet under Pericles appeared at the mouth of the Achelous (vol. ii. p. 442); and although his attempt to recapture Œniadæ resulted in failure, the Corinthians saw themselves continually threatened in their most necessary colonial territories, and were reduced to a regular state of blockade.*

Aims and measures of her policy.

The Thirty Years' Peace at last restored freedom of operations to them; and they took breath once more. But they were well aware that Athens would seize upon

* Pausan. iv. 25. C. H. Plass has brought out the extent of the Attic empire in the Western Sea as one of the main causes of the war. *Ueber d. Ursachen d. archidam. Kriegs. Stader Program.* 1858–9.

the first opportunity to recover a position of power in the Western Sea. Moreover, the cities of Achaia were not to be relied upon; Acarnania also, over whose coasts Corinth wished to rule, was unfavorable to her, and inclined towards the Athenians; the island of Zacynthus had always proved itself an enemy to the Peloponnesian confederation; Naupactus still lay like a sentry at the entrance of the gulf; and it was known what was to be expected from the unquiet Messenians, venturesome by land and by sea alike, the deadly foes of Sparta and her allies, and at the same time unreservedly devoted to Athens. Accordingly, as was clearly perceived at Corinth, everything depended upon attracting more closely to her the coast-towns and islands which had remained true to the Peloponnesian interests, and upon resuming an intimate intercourse with her colonies. In short, Corinth was the single state whose watchful eye pursued the course of Athens, and which was in secret unremittingly engaged in maintaining a good understanding with Delphi and Thebes, as well as with the maritime towns of Argolis. Corinth attached Megara (which had been estranged from her for fifteen years) as closely as possible to herself; encouraged the intercourse of her own citizens with Elis and the Ionian Islands; and endeavored to secure herself in any case a reserve in Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederation. Corinth could be actuated by no other motive than that of founding a naval power by uniting these scattered forces—a power which in the Western seas at all events would be capable of opposing the Attic; and her measures were naturally directed towards the establishment of a hegemony in these regions, and towards preserving her western colonies and allies free from the contact of all interference on the part of other states. For this reason, in the Samian war (vol. ii. p. 519), the Corinthians voted against the intervention of the Peloponnesians, because they wished to see the principle of non-

intervention, which the Athenians had asserted on their own account, acknowledged also in all matters concerned with the policy of Corinth.

The Corinthians were not without important supports in the prosecution of this policy. In the first place, the populous and warlike city of the Ambraciotes faithfully adhered to Corinth, and together with the island of Leucas (*Santa Maura*) and Anactorium commanded the Ambracian Gulf (*Bay of Arta*). In Acarnania, besides Anactorium, Œniadæ was faithful, and of the other peoples of the mainland the Ætolians and Epirotes. On the other hand, no state was a greater obstacle in the way of the Corinthian policy than Corcyra, which had early attained to a high degree of independence in its contests with Epirotes and Illyrians, so that since the memory of man it had always obstinately opposed itself to the Corinthians. Corcyra had revolted against Corinth first in the time of the Bacchiadæ (vol. i. p. 460), and again after the flourishing age of Corinth under Periander; she had long renounced all the pious duties of a daughter-city, and, with her navy of 120 triremes, was at any moment prepared to assert her absolute independence.

Relations between Corinth and Corcyra.

The Corcyræans enjoyed small popularity in the Greek world. In consequence of their rapid success and acquisition of wealth, they had become arrogant and proud of their financial prosperity; they treated foreign vessels seeking a refuge in their port with arbitrary harshness, while their own ships rarely made their appearance in foreign harbors. Their selfish commercial policy kept a jealous guard over the maritime domain in the centre of which their city lay; they had no consideration for national interests, and deemed an armed neutrality the most favorable attitude for taking advantage of their fortunate position in the midst of the Greek, Illyrian, Italian, and Sicilian coasts. As soon, then, as Corinth

more openly displayed her intention of advancing her maritime and colonial dominion, a renewal of the ancient feud was inevitable. Moreover, several coast-towns had formerly been founded in common by Corinth and Corcyra, and the mixture of population had already given rise to several quarrels. Thus, in particular, a dispute had arisen with reference to the claims of either city to metropolitan rights in Leucas, which dispute Themistocles, when chosen umpire, had settled in favor of Corcyra. More serious complications were inevitable; and arrived sooner than had been expected.*

The revolt of Epidamnus.

Fifteen miles to the north of the Acroceraunian promontory, which forms the boundary between the Ionian and Adriatic seas, lay on a projecting tongue of land the city of Epidamnus (afterwards Dyrrhachium, and at the present day *Durazzo*), founded by Corcyra, at the time of Periander's accession to power (vol. i. p. 297). Epidamnus had become great and wealthy by means of the trade with Illyria (vol. i. p. 460), and was full of slaves and an industrial population of foreigners. The noble families had, notwithstanding, maintained themselves in power, and formed a strictly exclusive aristocracy, out of which a chief of the state was chosen, who ruled over the whole administration with an authority little short of regal. This municipal hereditary aristocracy itself carried on the land and sea trade, in the form of a mercantile company, which, through a commissary, managed the sale of wine, manufactures, &c. in the interior for the common account. The wholesale trade was accordingly a monopoly of the aristocratic families; the manufacturing industry was carried on by public slaves; while the citizens were confined to agriculture, coast-navigation, and retail trade; the intention being in this way to keep them more easily in a

* Plut. *Them.* 24; Thuc. i. 136.

state of political tutelage and dependence. This state of affairs continued to exist for a long time, and was probably not shaken, until the foreign relations of the city were endangered by hostilities on the part of the Illyrians, on account of which the whole community had to be called upon for greater exertions in the public service. The first innovation was the establishment of a wider council, the aristocratic class being thus deprived of its exclusive rights of government. Such isolated concessions, however, failed to bring about a pacification; the city suffered under a mixture of aristocratic and democratic institutions which could not possibly endure; and finally a revolt broke out, in consequence of which the noble families were expelled from Epidamnus. The families joined the Illyrians, in order, with the assistance of the latter, to reconquer their native city; and the civic community, under its new institutions, was involved in great trouble. Help was accordingly sought from abroad, in the first instance from Corcyra. But here the public feeling was extremely unfavorable to the applicants. For Corcyra itself, like most Greek states at this time, suffered from over-population and political agitation; the governing families, who were anxiously active in opposing the growing claims of the popular body, disapproved of the revolution in Epidamnus; and the envoys, in obedience to the bidding of the Delphic god, repaired to Corinth.*

At the latter city it was immediately determined to take advantage of the opportunity; for no conjuncture could have been more favorable for restoring the hegemony of Corinth in the Ionian Sea. Under cover of the authority of Delphi, a Hellenic civic community, deserted by its mother-city, might be protected against the

* As to the constitutional difficulties at Epidamnus, see Plut. *Q. Gr.* 29.

barbarians and the native partisans allied with them: at the same time, it was hoped that Epidamnus would offer a strong position of the highest value; and, therefore, aid was promised only on condition of the Epidamnians giving admittance to Corinthian settlers and to a Corinthian garrison. Furthermore, an army was immediately sent by land by way of Apollonia to Epidamnus, so as to strengthen the popular community and succor the city in its dangerous position.

This step was the signal for the outbreak of the war; for the Corcyræans had no intention of allowing their colony to pass into the hands of the enemy. Forty Corcyræan vessels took up a position off Epidamnus, and threatened every conceivable measure of force, unless the new settlers were at once dismissed. But the city placed her reliance upon Corinth; which manned thirty ships of war, and issued a proclamation to all the inhabitants to take part in a larger settlement in Epidamnus either personally or by a pecuniary contribution. Corinth further called to arms all her allies, and obtained advances of money from Thebes and Phlius; so that the Corcyræans, surprised by this display of energy, made serious overtures for a pacific solution of the difficulty. They were, for their part, extremely disinclined to seek foreign aid, and went so far as even to offer to submit the settlement of the dispute to Delphi. At the same time, they gave the Corinthians to understand that, in case of a refusal of their offers, they would take steps which must prove disadvantageous to either state.

Naval battle of Actium. Ol. lxxxvi. 2. (B. C. 435-4.)

But it was no longer possible either to frighten or to restrain Corinth. She declared war, and despatched a fleet of seventy-five ships, which sailed along the coast up to Epidamnus. The inlet of the Ambracian Gulf the Corcyræans regarded as the boundary of their domain: at this point they accordingly once more called

upon the fleet to return; and when all their representations remained ineffectual, put to sea with all the ships they had in port, and completely defeated the Corinthians. On the same day Epidamnus capitulated; so that the Corcyræans were now masters of the whole Ionian Sea: and in consequence the shores of the hostile allies were plundered as far down as Elis. These events happened Ol. lxxxvi. 2 (autumn of 435 or spring of 434 B. C.).

Corinthian and Corcyræan envoys at Athens.

Thus the civic dispute within the walls of an Illyrian city had ended in the outbreak of a Hellenic war, of which the limits could no longer be confined within the frontiers of any definite territory. For neither of the belligerent states had any thought of giving way; and neither of them could calculate, with its present resources, upon coming forth victorious from the war. The space of two entire years was consumed in levies, armaments, and foreign negotiations; for the Corcyræans without delay carried out their threats; and the Corinthians, for their part also, were now obliged to send envoys to their worst enemies, in order to prevent a union between the latter and Corcyra. Thus the question at issue between the two belligerent parties came before the civic assembly at Athens.

Speech of the Corcyræans.

The envoys of Corcyra spoke with great openness. Their principles, they said, would have made them prefer to abstain from all combinations with other states, nor had anything short of necessity brought them before the civic assembly of the Athenians. But as matters lay at the present moment, no situation could be conceived more favorable to Athens. For the latter it would doubtless be best if no navy except the Attic existed; at the present moment the second naval power of Hellas was ready voluntarily to join Athens, to whom thus the greatest extension of her

power offered itself without any danger whatsoever. But at the present time an increase of her power must be doubly welcome to Athens, since all the world knew very well that the outbreak of the general war had to all intents and purposes taken place. And if the rights of states were to be considered, no question could arise as to their having been violated by Athens, in case she should support the Corcyræans. For their filial relations to the mother-city had long ago been dissolved by sanguinary feuds; and even the most sacred right was forfeited by its abuse. Corcyra was completely the mistress of her own actions, and might ally herself with whomsoever she preferred.

Speech of the Corinthians.

While thus the Corcyræans, in accordance with their own policy, sincerely urged the motive of advantage, the Corinthians were proportionately desirous of insisting upon the principle of colonial rights. They declared that the loyalty of their other colonies proved, that the blame of the bad state of relations existing from the very first between Corcyra and Corinth could not attach to the latter city. The turbulent spirit of the Corcyræans was known to all the world; and the proposals of a settlement advanced by them at the last hour could not possibly have been accepted, as in the meantime the Corcyræans would have retained possession of all the advantages. These considerations could exercise but little effect upon Athens; nor could the claims upon her gratitude put forward by Corinth create any impression. Of greater importance was the appeal made by the latter to the existing treaties. Corinth, as a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy, asserted herself to be implicitly connected by federal relations with Athens; and although these relations were doubtless at the present moment in a condition of extreme difficulty and distrust, yet it was still possible to avoid the worst, and to prevent endless suffering. Moreover, let the

Athenians remember that in the end no course but that of justice ever proves to be the expedient one.

Alliance between Athens and Corcyra.

Thus the two naval powers of the second class sought the favor of that of the first; one of the two asking for an alliance, the other for nothing beyond neutrality. If the policy of Athens was to be dictated only by her interests, her choice could not be doubtful for a moment. The fact that, notwithstanding, the Athenians wavered in their decision, and that the first meeting of the popular assembly was even favorable to the Corinthians, shows how much the Athenians shrank from taking the decisive step which would at once put an end to peace. Doubtless they would have preferred to allow the two states to fight out their dispute themselves, had it been possible to depend upon the exhaustion of the forces and pecuniary resources of both sides in the struggle. But her alliances and armaments seemed at the moment to place Corinth in a more promising position; and the Athenians could not tolerate the idea of a Peloponnesian naval power, by any possibility, forming itself through the annihilation of the independence of Corcyra—a power which might be able to oppose the Athenians on equal terms, and in the first instance to prevent any extension of the latter to the West. This consideration decided the citizens; and in the second assembly they resolved—not indeed formally to admit the Corcyræans (as the latter had proposed) into the Attic alliance, and to make common cause with them against Corinth—but to conclude an alliance of mutual defence with them, by which either state undertook to unite its forces with those of the other in case of any attack upon the latter, or upon its allies. Thus the Athenians thought to have taken up the most advantageous position in the war which had broken out, without rendering themselves guilty of a violation of the peace. For the caution which characterized their operations in

this respect is further proved by the circumstance, that after the departure of the envoys, not more than ten ships were sent into the Ionian seas; nor was it probably unintentional that Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimon (vol. ii. p. 410), was placed in command of this squadron, since from him it might be expected that he would be least inclined to premature measures against the Peloponnesians.*

Battle of Sybota. Ol. lxxxvi. 4. (B. C. 432).

The alliance, however, had been concluded, by which the relations between the Greek states had undergone an essential change; and the Corinthians now armed with additional energy in order to be a match for the increased danger. At last they had assembled a considerable fleet, of one hundred and fifty triremes, which sailed forth in the spring of B. C. 432 (Ol. lxxxvi. 4), full of confidence in its success, in order to seek out the enemy in his own waters. This time they sailed, without meeting with any resistance, past the inlet of the Ambracian Gulf, along the coast of Epirus; and in front of the entrance of the sound of Corcyra, near the promontory of Chimerium, where the country population sent them an additional body of men and other aid, they pitched a camp, within the protection of which lay the ships. The Corcyræans halted with forty triremes off the rocky island named Sybota, situate opposite the southern extremity of the island of Corcyra, in front of the coast of the mainland. In this sound the battle was fought—the greatest battle which had up to this time taken place between Greek ships. The Corinthians had placed the smaller contingents of their allies in the centre; the Megareans and Ambraciotes on the right wing; themselves, with their ninety practised triremes, composing the left, where they were confronted by the Corcyræans, and, in addition, by the Attic vessels, which had received strict orders not to

* See Note I. Appendix.

quit an attitude of simple observation, and only to interfere vigorously in case of its becoming necessary to preserve the island itself from immediate danger. With this intention they remained alongside of the Corcyræans, as lookers-on in a conflict which offered to them an unexpected sight. For the Western Greeks still practised the ancient inartistic style of naval combat, and were ignorant of the rapid movements of the triremes, which made it possible to disarm the enemy's vessels without bloodshed, and to cripple them effectually. Ship pressed hard upon ship; standing on the opposite decks, the hoplites archers, and javelin men fought against one another as in a battle by land, and in this chaotic confusion the ships were unable to extricate themselves from one another. At last the right wing of the Corinthians was forced to give way in a body, and was hereupon incautiously pursued by the Corcyræans as far as Chimerium; so that the victorious ships, whose crews were solely intent upon plundering the camp, moved entirely away from the field of battle. Here their services were doubly wanted, since the left wing of the Corinthians had meanwhile achieved the most decisive success, and was pursuing it with such energy as in the end to make it impossible for the Attic vessels, to remain any longer mere impartial spectators. They engaged with the Corinthians, and thus retreated with the Corcyræans before the superior force of the enemy, to the coast of the island. The Corinthians, who believed themselves completely victorious, cruised about the sound, endeavoring in the blindness of their fury to kill as many of the enemy's sailors as possible and in the melee attacking their own vessels also; and then sailed back to the shore of the mainland, whither the land-army of the Epirotes had marched up, who were already lying in wait for the overthrow of haughty Corcyra. Hereupon, after securing their dead and fragments of ships, the Corinthians made a fresh onset, being determined, if possible, to end the

matter before the close of the day. For the second time, both fleets, with all their vessels remaining fit for battle, were sailing full upon one another; and the battle-cry was raised on either side—when suddenly the Corinthians retreated and gave up the battle. The reason was that they in this moment beheld a squadron arriving, in which they recognized Attic triremes. For, when the Athenians had received information that the Corinthians had set sail, the former had sent twenty ships in the wake of the first ten, the insufficiency of which had been already made a matter of reproach against Pericles. The mere sight of these twenty vessels sufficed utterly to discourage the Corinthians. Thus the fleet of the Corcyræans was saved in the extremity of danger; and on the ensuing morning they advanced, accompanied by the whole body of the thirty Attic triremes, upon Sybota, in order to offer another battle. The Corinthians, however, avoided any further conflict; and, as the Athenians decisively refused to make any attack upon them, departed home unmolested. Accordingly, this sanguinary battle in itself remained undecided; and either party deemed itself justified in erecting trophies of victory: and yet the consequences of the battle were of the very greatest importance. For in the sound of Corcyra the first conflict in arms had taken place between Attic and Peloponnesian ships; the peace was now virtually broken, and the rage of passions unchained. The Corinthians could henceforth never forgive the Athenians for having torn from their hands their hard-won victory; and as against a declared enemy, the Athenians for their part also were henceforth obliged to act with greater resolution, and with less regard or consideration for the interests of others.

Revolt of Potidæa. Ol. lxxxvii. 1. (B. C. 432).

Further complications hereupon ensued on the opposite side of the mainland of Hellas, in Thrace; where, opposite the coast of Macedonia and Thessaly, the long

peninsula of Pallene projects into the sea. On the small isthmus which connects Pallene with the mainland of Thrace lay Potidæa, washed by two seas, like her mother-city, Corinth;—a community of courageous men, who had, immediately after the battle of Salamis, revolted against the Persians, warded off the attack of Artabazus, with the help of the sea protecting their walls, and subsequently fought by the side of the Corinthians at Platææ. Potidæa had afterwards entered the Attic alliance, but without dissolving her connection with Corinth; for she annually received thence a superior officer (ἐπιδημιουργός), who was placed in an honorary position at the head of the community. After the day of Sybota, an ambiguous position of this kind could no longer be tolerated; the less so, inasmuch as the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, was hostile to the Athenians, and incited the Corinthians to act in opposition to Attic interests. At the most sensitive point of the dominions of the Attic power, Potidæa threatened to become a centre of hostile operations. Hence it was no time for hesitation. The fleet, whose duty it was to secure the coasts of the Thracian Sea against Perdiccas, was immediately commissioned to call upon the citizens of Potidæa to level their walls, to send hostages, and to dismiss the Corinthian officers. The terrified men of Potidæa sent envoys at the same time to Athens and to the Peloponnesus: in the former they pleaded in vain, in the latter a certain prospect of support was held out to them. The consequence was an open revolt, which was joined by the many small seaports of the Chalcidice (vol. i. p. 456), and by the Bottiæans on the Thermæan Bay (now the Bay of Thessalonica). Perdiccas caused the Chalcidians to relinquish their ports, which could not be singly maintained against Athens, and to found a common city further inland, near Olynthus, a mile and a half above Potidæa. Corinth developed the most eager activity; for, in forty days after the revolt of

Potidæa, Aristeus, the son of Adimantus, arrived there, in order to defend the city, to which personal relations specially attached him. A multitude of volunteers had joined him, so that he stood at the head of an army of 2,000.

Meanwhile, neither was there any delay on the part of the Athenians. On receiving the news of the revolt they had sent a further detachment of forty ships with 2,000 heavy-armed troops into the Thracian waters. The squadrons waited in Macedonia. But the forces were insufficient to act in a double scene of operations. When, therefore, the arrival of Aristeus became known, the Athenians had no choice but to come to an understanding with Perdiccas, and to evacuate Macedonia, so as to have their hands free against Potidæa. The season of the year made haste necessary; and, after they had made a futile attempt to surprise Strepsa, an important central point of the main routes between Macedon and Thrace, the troops marched along the coast, parallel with the advance of the fleet, upon Potidæa.

Perdiccas had immediately broken the truce whereby he had rid the country of the Athenians. And, in order to be able to devote himself entirely to the Chalcidian war, to which he attached a critical significance for the development of affairs in Thrace, he had established his confidential friend Iolaus as Regent in Macedonia, and was himself in command of the cavalry of the revolted towns. The infantry was commanded by Aristeus. Thus the troops defending Potidæa stood in front of the town, on the peninsula, awaiting the Athenians, and intending to hinder them from passing through the narrow inlet into the peninsula of Pallene. The Athenians were placed between two hostile forces. For in their rear lay Olynthus, a second strong position, which was connected by a system of signals with Potidæa. Yet, nevertheless, they ventured on an attack; for the danger was hourly on the increase. The contest was an unequal one. The

Corinthians fought with distinguished bravery: they were victorious in their part of the battle, and drove their adversaries close under the walls of Olynthus. But on the other wing the Athenians gained a complete victory; the Potidæans and Peloponnesians opposed to them took refuge under the walls of Potidæa; and thus it came to pass, that, when Aristeus returned from the pursuit, he found himself entirely cut off from either city. He rapidly resolved to force his way through to Potidæa, and actually succeeded, by a heroical effort, in passing along the narrow mole of the sea, through the surge of the waves and the missiles of the enemy, and thus barely contriving at last to reach the gates of the city. The conflict had been so rapidly decided that the Olynthians had found no opportunity of taking part in it. Nevertheless, the Athenians had suffered a loss of 150 men in this sharp fight, among them their general, Callias; but without delay they threw up a wall for the purpose of shutting off Potidæa against the isthmus and Olynthus. And when new aid arrived under Phormio, they built a second cross-wall, in the direction of Pallene; so that now, as the fleet in two divisions guarded both the sides of the sea, the blockade was complete. There was no help to be hoped for, except from without. Accordingly Aristeus slipped out through the guard-ship, in order, by cruising about, to inflict damage upon the Athenians, and to rouse the Peloponnesians by a succession of messages; while Phormio employed the vessels which he could spare from the blockade for the punishment of the revolted towns.*

Warlike measures of Corinth.

Thus the second sanguinary war had broken out, in which Peloponnesians and Athenians stood in arms against one another. Yet in Greece the pretence of peace was still kept up; and it was thought that the Attico-Corinthian feud might

* Strepsa, according to the emendations of Pfluggers in Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* p. 382. Cf. Classen's note *ad loc.*

be regarded as a quarrel confined to the two states, contemporaneously with which the existing treaties might continue; so that now the Corinthians had no more important task than that of putting an end to this sham peace In two seas they had heroically fought for their colonial rights; and each time they had seen the results obtained by them lost again, because the separate contingents of the allies had not held out firmly. Hence they needed a stronger support against the ever prompt power of Athens. It was necessary to arouse the whole Peloponnesian confederation out of its listless repose and to summon it to arms; it was necessary that the cause of Corinth should become the cause of the confederacy; for nothing but a general war could save Corinth.

Confederate meeting at Sparta.

Accordingly, the winter was employed in working upon Sparta, where great excitement already prevailed in consequence of recent events; and the first thing that Sparta did, the first measure whereby she roused herself out of her sleepy policy, and asserted herself as an arbitress in the general affairs of Hellas,—and at the same time her first act of hostility against Athens,—was a public proclamation, wherein she required all those who had accusations to make against Athens to bring forward their complaints; as to which a resolution should be formed, and proposed to the allies for their acceptance. The proceedings before the civic body of Sparta occurred in November or December, immediately after the blockade of Potidæa.

Complaints of Ægina and Megara.

The principal complainants were the Æginetans and the Megareans. The former in secret messages, accused the Athenians of withholding from them the independence promised to them in the treaties; while the latter charged them with having decreed an embargo, excluding them from all the ports and markets of the Attic domin-

ion, and with having thereby completely destroyed their national prosperity. This measure was probably decreed by the Athenians in the summer of B. C. 432, immediately after the battle of Sybota, and was owing to the personal influence of Pericles, who thought it appropriate to inflict humiliation and punishment upon the little state of Megara, after it had openly espoused the side of Corinth, notwithstanding its vicinity to, and dependence upon, Athens. Those who had fought against Athens, without having been provoked by her, were not to be allowed to appear day after day, and make money, on the Attic market; while it was probably hoped, at the same time, that by these means might be brought about the fall of that party which now guided the policy of Megara, and which was in the highest degree an obstacle in the way of Attic interests. Lastly, it also seemed to be a duty enjoined by common caution, to anticipate all hostile intrigues and traitorous combinations there, while it was yet time. In neither case could there be any question as to a definite violation of right; for the expressions occurring in the documents of earlier treaties, as to the independence of the Hellenic states and mutual freedom of intercourse, were of far too general a nature to make it possible to prove against the Athenians a violation of their treaty-engagements.*

Speech of the Corinthian deputies.

Hence the Corinthians (who were everywhere stirring up the fire, and who, on the day when the complaints were heard, had reserved the concluding speech to themselves), instead of attaching much value to the single points, were only anxious to represent the general situation of Hellas in such a light as would show that honor and duty demanded from Sparta a resolute movement in advance. Not without irony they eulogized the good sim-

* Ullrich *d. Megar. Pseph.*; Vischer, *Ben. d. alt. Kom.* p. 18. *Sauppe, Gött. Nachrichten* 1867, p. 180.

ple character and the straightforward honesty of the Spartans, who quietly went their way, and had no notion of what was taking place in the world without. And yet, to every one who would consent to use his eyes, it was evident that Athens was mightily extending her power, and from day to day assuming a more menacing attitude against the Peloponnesus. Hence it would be ridiculous to waste time in demonstrating on particular heads, whether the Athenians were inflicting damage on the Peloponnesians or not. Surely there was no longer any doubt as to the character of the Athenians. They were always intent upon some new design; and, when they came to execute it, never failed to exceed the limits of their original plan. While it was impossible to move the Spartans out of their city, the Athenians actually preferred a foreign soil to their own. With them there was no real difference between planning and carrying out a scheme, between coveting and securing a possession; the quiet of inaction they hated worse than any exertion or trouble, and were continually appropriating new resources for war and victory; while in Sparta all things had become antiquated. The nature of the Athenians was to be incapable either of remaining quiet themselves or of leaving others in peace; and if matters continued to proceed in this way, all Hellas would beyond a doubt fall under their dominion. Meanwhile the Spartans, the proper guardians of the liberty of Hellas, remained in a lofty calm; but, as a matter of fact, this calm was nothing better than stolidity and laziness. "If you Spartans," thus they concluded, "adhere to your policy of hesitation, you dissolve the confederation whose members you fail to protect, and force us to search for other combinations."

Speech of the Athenian envoys.

The speech of the Corinthians amounted to a frank vote of censure on Sparta's leadership of the confederation, in the presence of its members. None would have

dared to express their opinion so openly, except those whom the confederation could not afford to spare, and whose intellectual superiority in commanding a view of the state affairs it was impossible to gainsay. Moreover, they had long possessed a body of firm adherents among the officials. Hence no considerable influence could be exercised on the decision by the circumstance, that envoys from Athens, who happened to be present, requested to be allowed to speak before the citizens: they were men who were thoroughly initiated into the principles of the policy of Pericles, and who now thought it their duty to make an open, and at the same time a serious, declaration. "Power falling into the hands of the unworthy," they said, "may justly provoke indignation and envy; but we have honestly acquired our position by our courage in the van during the Persian wars, and the hegemony at sea we assumed, because Sparta voluntarily retired. Both our honor and our safety demand the maintenance of that hegemony. At the same time it is impossible thus to maintain it, without employing means which are not always agreeable to the minor states. But who can call upon us, in case the single states happen to be annoyed, to dismiss them in pure good-nature from a combination, for the purpose of leading which we have made our city such as it is? To do this would be to renounce our own-selves. Under the Persians the towns made no complaint when they were given up to unlimited arbitrary force: with the Athenians they are displeased, because they raise claims of equality with them. Our moderation they refuse to recognize, and only complain of the loss of a free control over their own affairs, which is unavoidable in the case of the hegemony; and precisely the same lot would be yours, if you had retained the supremacy at sea. All this we tell you, not in order to give an account of ourselves in this place, for you are not our judges; but only in order to instruct the ignorant, and to warn you,

lest by breaking the treaties you force us to enter upon a struggle with you for our very existence."

Sparta resolves upon war. Ol. lxxxvii. 1 (B. C. 432).

Hereupon all strangers withdrew, and the citizens remained with their officials. If the proposed resolution were now negatived, the whole matter would be at an end, and would not be brought in any way before the confederates. But men's minds were excited to such a degree, and the Ephors were so greatly interested on behalf of Corinth, that a peace-party proper was utterly unable to assert itself. Even those who were for peace merely uttered a warning against premature resolves, demanded preliminary negotiations and pointed out the inadequacy of military preparations. Their spokesman was the old king, Archidamus (vol. ii. p. 406). As the *xenos* of Pericles, it behooved him to be cautious, but being candid by nature, and untouched by the prevailing tendency, he, notwithstanding, defended the previous policy of Sparta, and urgently called upon the citizens to take heed before they prematurely began a war the end of which it was utterly impossible to foresee. The solemn warnings of the king did not wholly miss their effect. But it was then that the Ephor Sthenelaidas hastily rose, in a passionate speech declared every delay of this just war to be nothing better than an unwarranted tardiness; and then resorted to the unusual proceeding of dividing the citizens into two bodies for the purpose of taking the vote (which was ordinarily taken by acclamation), intending thus to force them to a more determined demonstration. By this device many of the cooler heads were frightened into abstaining from resistance, and a considerable majority declared for the opinion, that the treaties had been broken by the Athenians.*

* For the speech of the Corinthians in the civic assembly at Sparta see Thuc. i. 68-71. Speech of the Athenians accidentally present: *ib.* 73-78. Archidamus: *ib.* 80-85. The voting: *ib.* 87. Delphi: *ib.* 118. Corinth and the confederates: *ib.* 120-124. Decree of war: *ib.* 125.

Thus was passed in Sparta the resolution which was to decide the fate of Greece, under the influence of an impassioned party and of a momentary excitement. What Sparta had done since the second Persian war amounted to nothing. She had gained neither possessions nor allies; had opened up no new resources; had effected no improvements in her political institutions: she had simply gone back; for she had suffered losses by earthquakes, revolts, and wars, and yet a greater loss of national authority, by the policy which she had pursued for several generations. If we recall such events as the expedition of Anchimolius (vol. i. p. 399), as the two campaigns of Cleomenes, as the disgrace of Pausanias, the loss of the hegemony, the third Messenian war, the fruitless battle of Tanagra, the disgraceful return of Plistoanax, the refusal of support to the Thasians, Æginetans, and Samians, we can easily understand how the review of such a past necessarily summoned up a passionate indignation in the hearts of those who cared for the honor of the state. Now, all was suddenly to be made good; now, it was asserted that Sparta had never resigned her privileges, and had in principle renounced nothing. As in the case of the transfer of the maritime hegemony to Athens, so in the subsequent negotiations Sparta had never done more than concede a preliminary recognition of existing circumstances. Now, according to more ancient states' law, Sparta was of a sudden again to be the sole great power in Hellas, and the supreme court of appeal in all Greek affairs. As Sparta had long forgotten how to pursue a firm and reasonable policy, she now showed herself devoid of all power for maintaining a consistent attitude; and, urged forward by Corinth, precipitately changed from a timid and calculating state, anxiously careful to keep up the semblance of legality, into one eager and ardent for war, which would keep no measure,

The policy of Sparta.

listen to no argument, and respect no legal obligation; for assuredly it was an unwarrantable instance of precipitation, that an inquiry into the questions of law, such as the treaties demanded, was never so much as thought of. In the very form in which the Ephors put the question, "Whether Athens was inflicting damage upon the Peloponnesians and had broken the treaties?" there lay an intentional obscurity. For while certainly the first part of the question could be negatived by none who remembered Potidæa, Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Megara, the second could *not* be proved. For no one could by an appeal to the treaties deny to Athens the right of punishing revolted towns in her confederation: and equally unopposed to any treaty was the alliance with Corcyra; inasmuch as that island was not a state which had revolted from the Peloponnesian confederation.

Real motives actuating the war-party at Sparta.

While, then, the violations of engagements imputed to Athens were in no way capable of proof: the treaty-obligations of Sparta were manifestly being broken by the latter, when she allowed herself to accuse an allied state of this very wrong; and asserted this to be a fact, without having previously attempted a discussion of the points at issue with the accused. But a satisfactory discussion was not what was desired; the war-party pushed forward the rest, and eagerly urged measures which made any conciliatory change of policy impossible. And, if we inquire into the causes which at this particular moment called forth so unprecedented a zeal for war, there is no doubt that the main cause lay in the combination between Athens and Corcyra; for this was an event which left no peace to those who hated Athens, who regarded Sparta as the only legitimate head of Hellas, and who looked upon the entire development of the Attic power as nothing better than a disorderly interruption of Greek history. If Athens and Corcyra annihilated the

naval power of Corinth, no protection was left for the Peloponnesian coasts, and no prospect of ever humiliating the arrogance of Athens. At the same time Corcyra was the threshold of the Sicilian sea; and, in proportion as the influence of Athens extended in this direction, the connection with the Dorian colonies on the other side of the sea was endangered, and the Peloponnesus surrounded on all sides by the growing power of Athens. These fears formed the real motive of the war-party, which had virtually gained the day, when the Spartan citizens held themselves bound by its resolution, and proceeded to summon the members of the confederation at an early date; in order, at a general diet, to come to a collective resolution on the subject of the war.

The Peloponnesian confederation resolves upon war.

Meanwhile the Corinthian envoys journeyed from town to town, to dispose the civic communities in favor of their wishes; and the speech which they held in the assembly of the deputies shows with sufficient clearness, that they had still to meet a great disinclination to war, especially on the part of the inland towns, which were unable to understand why they should take the field on behalf of the colonies beyond the sea. Accordingly the Corinthians endeavored to prove to them, that the interests of the inland states, as well as their own, were endangered by the growth of the Athenian power; inasmuch as the prosperity of the mountain-districts depended on the commerce between the high-lying country and the coast, which advantageous commerce would be disturbed if the Athenians obtained the dominion in the Peloponnesian sea. Such was the language held by the Corinthians in the interest of their city, as the first mercantile and export town in the peninsula. In direct contradiction to the policy of Pericles, they described Athens as insatiable in conquest: hence, they declared, there could be no juster or more necessary war than one undertaken to liberate

one part of Hellas out of servitude, and to preserve the other from falling into it. At the same time they endeavored to remove all anxiety as to a successful termination of the war, by pointing to the insecure foundations of the Attic power, which was based on money, and accordingly by money could also be overthrown. Now, money could be obtained by a loan on the temple treasures of Delphi and Olympia; while by an offer of higher pay the sailors of the Athenians might be tempted to desert their masters; and the downfall of the Attic power would be finally consummated by the secession of its allies. Whereas the power of the Peloponnesians rested, not on mercenaries, but on the free-will of native warriors: hence, nothing was needed but readiness to make the necessary sacrifices, and concord in action, in order to ensure the most glorious of victories in this unavoidable contest. Meanwhile the Spartans had further obtained from the Delphic oracle a decided declaration in favor of the Peloponnesian cause, —an acquisition which, in regard to public opinion, was not without its importance; and thus, by means of a combination of Sparta and Corinth at the Peloponnesian diet, a majority of votes was obtained for war. This vote was immediately followed by a resolution to commence a general armament; and as soon as the deputies returned home, all Peloponnesus was astir at once. The towns, large and small, became military stations; the shepherds and peasants were called in and drilled. The Corinthians did their utmost to hasten the general armament; for their fears as to Potidæa were rising from day to day.

Negotiations between Sparta and Athens.

After the Spartan motion, to the effect that all the forces should be held in readiness, had been adopted as a federal resolution, Sparta as the head of the confederation opened the negotiations with Athens. That these were not conducted with any real desire for peace is

evident, if from nothing else, from the fact of their not having been begun till the war had been resolved upon; hence the only object of the negotiations was to give rise to specious occasions for the commencement of hostilities. It was intended to provoke Athens, who quietly adhered to her position, to move out of it. A quarrel was sought, though there was no intention of causing an immediate outbreak of war; for Sparta wished to gain time for her preparations. Accordingly, envoys were sent backwards and forwards; demands and complaints were urged, which partly had no connection either with one another or with the previous charges; one element only being common to all, viz., that Sparta again urged her own claims to the position of a federal capital against Athens, claims which were not even due to her from the Peloponnesian states, and which had at all events long become obsolete and been utterly abolished by later treaties.

Sparta demands the expulsion of the Alcmæonidæ from Athens.

Thus the Spartans first sent ambassadors, who raised against Athens the charge of having violated the sacred laws, and of being a city polluted by guilt, because the community suffered the house of the Alcmæonidæ to remain amongst it after doing a deed of impiety against citizens who were suppliants to the gods (vol. i. p. 337). For when Athens was in the hands of King Cleomenes, the latter had expelled the Alcmæonidæ (vol. i. p. 412). This fact was held to support the new demand for their expulsion, and it was pretended that the duty was incumbent upon Sparta of providing for the preservation of sacred law in the whole of Hellas. In truth, however, this religious zeal sat very ungraciously upon the Spartans; inasmuch as they had themselves committed far worse misdeeds against the suppliants of Posidon (vol. ii. p. 406); while the guilt of blood resting upon the Alcmæonidæ had long been expiated. A personal object underlay Sparta's arrogant demand—an object which it

was not hard to divine. The man on whom the power of Athens in the main depended was an Alcmæonide by the mother's side; and the most ardent admirers of Pericles could furnish no more brilliant testimonial to his greatness than that now supplied by the Spartans, when they directed their first demands against him, and thus made it manifest that they were not afraid of Athens, if Pericles were removed from the helm of state. At the same time an insidious secondary design was contained in this demand: viz. that of exciting to action the adversaries of the great statesman, and of giving them an opportunity for attacking him as the disturber of peace.

The Spartan ultimatum.

After this demand had been sufficiently answered by the counter-demand, that Sparta should first expiate the deeds of guilty impiety committed in her own land, new messengers of state arrived, who demanded that the blockade of Potidæa should be raised, Ægina freed, and liberty of commercial intercourse restored to the Megareans. The circumstance that the last of these points was so strongly insisted upon, that the whole question of war was made to depend on it, is again to be attributed to no other motive than that of causing the overthrow of Pericles. For the revocation of the "Megarean decree of the people" would have been a defeat inflicted upon his policy; and he was to be placed in an invidious light, as having on account of so unimportant a matter kindled the flame of civil war throughout all Hellas. These demands also were simply refused; the measures against Megara being justified by the violations which Athenian territory had suffered from that state. Finally, an embassy arrived which announced itself as the last; three men of high dignity presented Sparta's ultimatum. After a conciliatory exordium, wherein a genuine love of peace was spoken of, it was demanded in so many words that Athens should restore to her allies their independence. It was this demand which the Spar-

tans hoped would be most popular among the Hellenes—a demand which necessarily appeared as the most unselfish and high-minded; and for these reasons they chose it as their war-cry in this critical hour.

Debates in the Athenian assembly.

Thus, then, the decision was now unavoidably approaching; the citizens were assembled; in a full meeting the conflicting views were once more to find expression, in order that the Athenians might clearly realize the situation of affairs. Assuredly it was known at Athens what the blessings of peace were worth; and it was felt that in the first instance nothing could accrue but loss: moreover, all those who were against Pericles were for peace; for his power could not but be increased when times of trouble and danger more than ever necessitated the guidance of public affairs by the hands of one man. Accordingly, the opinions of the citizens were divided, and even the peace-party found speakers for its views, who at least declared themselves for sacrificing the Megarean decree, in order to avoid the horrors of civil war, and for attempting once more to effect an amicable understanding on this basis. Last of all Pericles addressed the citizens: *

Speech of Pericles.

"He was well able," he said, "to appreciate the serious nature of the situation; nor was it fitting lightly to resolve upon a war, the chances of which lay beyond the reach of human calculation. But, on the other hand, it ought not to be imagined that this was a question of choice between one or the other decree. Suppose us," he said, "to have given way in one point: another demand will be made—one equally unjust, but at the same time more stringent; and we shall then have renounced our rights. And why are we to submit? From fear, or weakness? For what purpose do we possess our treasure, our navy, our walls?

* From Thuc. i. 139 one might be inclined to assume that Pericles only assembled the community for a final discussion.

The adversary opposed to the Peloponnesians is assuredly no contemptible foe; and they have never been fit for carrying on lengthy wars beyond their seas. Their war-taxes, levied for each particular campaign, cannot hold out for long; the whole constitution of their confederation is thoroughly defective, and ill-adapted for vigorous action. Of its many members, each single one thinks that it is not he more than any other, upon whom everything depends; and thus the whole machine halts; but all success in war is conditioned by a rapid use of the moment. The sea is ours, a fact of vast significance in Hellas; and though the Corinthians may pretend to their allies that it will be an easy matter for them to withstand us on the sea, we need not be greatly afraid of such a rivalry on the part of Peloponnesians, who are for the most part tillers of the land and keepers of cattle; for a naval power cannot be created as a mere matter of secondary interest. Your land they are able to desolate; but you stand in no need of it; nay, it is only an obstacle in the way of your perfect security: and if you would follow my counsel, you would yourselves devastate your fields, in order to show them that you will not sacrifice your liberty for the sake of fields and farms. Thus, then, your weapon, the navy, is much more dangerous to them than their land-army is to you. For that which is of the greatest importance to them—their territorial possessions—is at the mercy of your attacks, while, of our possessions, only those which are of no importance to us are within their reach. But if your situation is so favorable, what advantage can there be in timidly deferring a war which is inevitable? For the question is, whether we are ready of our own accord to submit, or rather for the preservation of our independence courageously to confront the dangers of war? Therefore, let us once more declare, that we are ready on all points at issue to submit to the decision of an arbitrator, according to the clear meaning of the treaties. We will

not do any man's bidding; but, as is usual between states of equal rights, we bring forward one demand to meet the other. If the Lacedæmonians will do away with the closing of their frontiers and ports, we also are ready to admit the Megareans amongst us. We further consent to restore their independence to all those among our allies who were independent at the time of the Thirty Years' Peace; but, in that case, neither shall any state in Peloponnesus be forced to accommodate itself to the principles in vogue at Sparta. Let this be our answer. We have no wish to begin war, but whosoever attacks us, him we mean to repel; for our guiding principle ought to be no other than this: that the power of that state which our fathers made great we will hand down undiminished to our posterity."

The Athenian answer to Sparta.

No one was able to urge a word against the wisdom and the convincing power of this speech. An answer was resolved upon, agreeing in every point with that proposed by Pericles: it was a final answer; and, in conformity with the wish of Pericles, all further negotiations by ambassadors between Sparta and Athens were broken off. Private intercourse between the citizens of the towns continued for a time, but only under anxious precautions. The treaties were held to be at an end; there was no longer any federal law in Hellas.

Peloponnesian plans of war.

It is true that this advantage had accrued to the Spartans from the frequent interchange of messages to and fro; that they had been able at their leisure to complete their armaments; and thus the question might arise, why the Athenians, who had been long prepared for war, conceded this advantage to their adversary; why they did not at an earlier date insist upon decisive declarations, and, if war was actually unavoidable, hurry on its commencement?

Pericles attached the greatest weight to the fact, that the right was manifestly on the side of the Athenians. All Hellas was to bear witness, that they, who were always decried as the innovators and originators of troubles firmly clung to the treaties to the last; they wished to be the assailed, and not the assailants, although by this they might lose advantages in the war. Nor was this any pedantic perversity on their part, but the most effective and sagacious policy, as the event proved. For, if the imposing beginning of the attempt made by Sparta to accomplish at the present moment all that she had hitherto omitted to accomplish:—to create a sequel to the most glorious period of her earlier history, and, as she had then overthrown the Tyrants, so now to overthrow the tyrannical state whose despotic power was now keeping down so many Hellenic states:—if this energetic beginning found a very meagre answer in the subsequent conduct of the war, and if none of these great projects was carried into execution; a main cause of all these results is to be found in the wise conduct of Pericles. If Athens had allowed herself to be driven to premature expressions of indignation and measures of hostility, the war-party in Sparta would have been greatly benefited, which was annoyed by nothing so much as by the unimpassioned attitude of the Athenians, who quietly insisted on the legal basis of the treaties. Thus the blame of the rupture of peace was thrown upon the adversary; the party of those who still hesitated,—a very numerous party in Sparta, with King Archidamus at its head,—who, in opposition to the hot-headed Ephors, had demanded an adherence to the constitutional track of law, could not reconcile itself to the fact that the war was, on the part of Sparta, an unjust war. Thus the national ardor in the execution of the war-plans was damped from the first: that courage was wanting, which a good conscience alone can bestow.

The plans of Sparta.

The Lacedæmonians, from whom the attack proceeded, must, it is true, have long before formed a plan of operations. As to this, they had the choice, whether they intended to content themselves with their existing resources of war and their traditional method of conducting it, or whether they would attempt entirely new modes of procedure. The latter was the view of the Corinthians, who alone among all the Peloponnesians had a conception of the power of Athens. They knew, that by sea only could a successful contest be waged against Athens; hence, even at the risk of suffering defeats at first, it was by sea that she must be opposed: for thus alone would it be possible to encourage the allies to revolt, and to cut off from the Athenians money-tributes as well as provisions. By degrees a navy would be formed capable of successfully encountering them.

For this purpose, nothing ought to be left untried, not even the treasures of the temples spared, nor aid refused in any shape or form. Had not even King Archidamus in Sparta openly expressed his opinion: that, in order to overcome a state like Athens, one ought not to shrink even from asking support from the Persians? a proceeding, it is true, strangely in contrast with Sparta's national professions, and with the political principles of a Dorian state. But, above all, it was necessary to attempt to enlarge the confederation, and to extend it beyond the limits which it had occupied since the last treaties, *i. e.* since the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace. An endeavor was made to revive the ancient relations of common descent, and to induce the colonies beyond the sea to unite with the Peloponnesus; treaties were concluded with the towns in Sicily and *Magna Græcia;* the subsidies and contingents to be furnished by each member of the confederation were fixed; 200 ships were confidently looked for from that quarter; and already the total naval force

of the Peloponnesians was calculated to amount to 500 ships of war.*

A second method of attack, from which successful results might be looked for, was the establishment of a fortified place in Attica, whence a constant pressure might be put upon the enemy, while his fugitive slaves were attracted and communications opened with the discontented party in the capital. This method of making war was not strange to the Dorians, whose ancestors had after this fashion themselves overcome the earlier states of the peninsula (vol. i. p. 134). But even for this kind of undertaking the Lacedæmonians failed to manifest the requisite determination; and since even the treaties with the allies beyond the sea were not carried out, the Spartans, after the fiery blaze of their first military ardor, after all their extensive armaments and high-flown designs of ambition, fell back upon relying in the main on their own land force, and flattered themselves with the belief that, by a succession of annual summer campaigns, they would be able to overcome Athens' power of resistance. They could not imagine that the Athenians would calmly sacrifice their annual harvests, and tranquilly remain within their walls, whilst, if they marched out for the purpose of defence, the Spartans calculated on beating them, and hoped that a defeat of the Athenians in their own land would inevitably result in the desertion of their allies.

The confederates of Sparta.

On the other side, Pericles had clearly surveyed the situation, nothing was further from his thoughts than a conceited overestimation of his own power; and doubtless he took a more serious view of the position of Athens than he allowed to appear in his speeches, because in these he was

* Cf. Thuc. ii. 7, and Classen's note; Diod. ii. 41. For the numbers of the land-forces (60,000) as given below, see Plut. *Pericl.* 33; cf. Sintenis, p. 226 ff.

above all desirous of animating the citizens with courage and self-confidence. In spite of all her tardiness, and in spite of the palpable defects of her federal constitution, Sparta was a powerful foe. The whole of the Peloponnesus stood on her side, with the exception of Argos and Achaia; and even among the Achæan cities, Pallene, the neighbor of Sicyon, with her brave citizens joined the Spartan side. The Spartans were still regarded in all Greece as heroes upon whom the spirit of Leonidas had descended, and ancient custom made the name of the Peloponnesians a title of honor. Outside the peninsula, the Bœotians were the irreconcilable foes of Athens. On account of their inferiority in culture and less active disposition of mind, they were despised and derided by the Athenians; but they were a sturdy race, of great vigor of action and fitness for military service; a people whose history had not yet begun, when in the Persian wars their land earned nothing but misfortune and dishonor. For this purpose Thebes sought to unite the forces of the country; and the bold plans of her oligarchs found a strong support in the universal indignation prevailing in all parts of the country: on account of Platææ, on account of the Attic occupation of Oropus and Eubœa, and on account of the earlier attempts at conquest on the part of Athens. Such was particularly the case in the towns of Tanagra, Orchomenus, Copæ, and others, where a strong government by the nobility had maintained itself. True, the Bœotians were without any common military organization, but the contingents of the individual towns had distinguished themselves while fighting in serried ranks; the physical vigor of their citizens had been highly developed in the gymnasia; and the noble families supplied chosen bands of warriors, composed of pairs of inseparable friends, who fought one by the side of the other. These Bœotians, like the Opuntian Locrians (in whom the memory of the despotic sway of the Athenians

yet survived), were resolved from the first to adopt the cause of the Peloponnesians as their own. By them Attica was menaced in the rear; and not only Attica, but also Eubœa: they were moreover able to supplement the Spartan forces by means of their cavalry. Phocis, too, notwithstanding her enmity against Delphi, adhered to the Peloponnesians, probably, from hatred against Thessaly, which was allied with Athens. Lastly, neither were the Peloponnesians without the necessary materials for the establishment of a naval power; since Corinth, with her colonies, Ambracia and Leucas, and further Megara, Sicyon, Pallene, Elis, Epidaurus, Trœzene, and Hermione, were able to furnish vessels and crews; while the Spartans themselves put their docks at Gytheum into new order, and recommenced the building of ships of war, after they had, since the treason of Pausanias, renounced all ideas of naval supremacy, and, according to the principles of Hetœmaridas (vol. ii. p. 374) abstained from all interference in the affairs of states beyond the sea.

Advantages on the side of the Peloponnesians.

But their real strength lay in the superior numbers of their land army. For, upon the whole, the Peloponnesus numbered more inhabitants than at any previous time; and, notwithstanding the neutrality of Argos and Achaia, was able, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, to send 60,000 heavy-armed troops into the field. The Peloponnesians, moreover, enjoyed these advantages: that a leading state of their confederation, at once so powerful and so pre-eminently active as Corinth, lay in the immediate vicinity of the portal of the peninsula, as a chosen place for the assemblage of the forces; and that they had in their hands the passes of the mainland. But the worst danger of all for Athens consisted in her being not only surrounded on all sides by declared enemies, but everywhere in her own camp threatened by treason and faithlessness. The Peloponnesian states had no other centre

than Sparta; nature directed them to hold together in good and in evil fortune, and they were indissolubly knit together by a long history and by a community of interests, manners, and race. The allies of Athens, on the contrary, were eagerly awaiting an opportunity of shaking off her burdensome yoke: incapable of real independence, they were yet unwilling to obey the stronger. As Hellenes, they could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their independence, and insidious agitation had raised their indignation to fever heat. While some were eager to attempt their own liberation, others thought it necessary at the last moment to secure their menaced independence. Nowhere was a just and equitable judgment of existing circumstances and of their causes to be met with. No one recalled what Athens had done, in war and in peace, to glorify the Greek name; all grateful recognition had been changed to hatred; the splendor of the capital, which was to mollify the disinclination to subordination, was merely a source of annoyance; and in proportion as the universal disaffection was obscure in its motives and fanciful in its expression, the difficulty of overcoming it increased. The ancient dislike of the Dorians against the Ionians, the hatred of the aristocrats against popular government, the envy of the poor against the rich, the jealousy of intellectual narrowness against an eminent culture and brilliant deserts—all these motives co-operated with one another. And it was in this that the main element of the power of Sparta consisted, that she was so strongly supported by the general sentiments of the Hellenes. The victory of Sparta was universally desired. Every success of her forces, every mishap of the Athenians, would give to Sparta new allies among the number of those who were still timidly refraining from openly taking her part. Everywhere this easily moved nation was filled by the foolish hope, that Sparta would restore a new happy time of liberty to all Hellenes. The great

mass completely deceived themselves as to Sparta, which was totally unknown to them; and they were equally ignorant, how the state of Lycurgus had more and more changed into a self-seeking aristocracy, whose policy was dictated by narrow-minded family interests; they either did or would not see, that in her sphere of action the conduct of Sparta was as despotic as that of Athens; that she regulated the affairs of the confederation only for the sake of her private advantage, and hindered the free development of constitutional life. All that Sparta had lacked for establishing a dominion like that of Athens had been spirit and intelligence. But the circumstance that the Spartans demanded no tribute sufficed to make them appear as the representatives of liberty against the despotism of Athens. Of this deceptive notion they now took full advantage for their own benefit. There was to be no question of a war in which two powers of equal rights stood opposed to one another; but the cause of Sparta was declared to be the national cause, the sacred cause of Right; while Athens was the revolutionary power which had overthrown Hellenic law. Hence Sparta could regard the support of her cause as a duty; whosoever opposed himself to it committed a national crime, and incurred a share in the guilt of the destruction of the nation's rights. Not Sparta, but Hellas, under the leadership of Sparta, was warring against Athens. Thus political contrasts were proclaimed very similar to those of the times of the Wars of Liberation; there again existed a national or patriotic party and the opposite. But their positions had been reversed. Those who had then been the leaders of the national party were now the "traitors," while those states which had given up the soil of Greece to the barbarians now stood on the side of the "liberators" as champions of Hellenic rights, without having changed their convictions. For wherever families of the nobility had still retained authority—in Megara, in

Bœotia, in Thessaly, &c.—these formed the closest junction with Sparta, because they loathed Athens as the hearth of democracy. Thus the Peloponnesians had on their side both the unintelligent dreams of freedom on the part of oppressed civic communities, and the ambition and love of power which animated the aristocrats.

The resources of Athens.

Despite of all these considerations, Pericles was fully determined that Athens should not purchase peace by cowardly concessions. For, unless the city would assent voluntarily to descend from her lofty position, war was inevitable; nor was there any prospect of an increase of the resources and defensive power of Athens. Three hundred swift-sailing triremes were in readiness—sufficient, when divided into squadrons, to cover the importation of necessaries by sea, to keep a watch on the allies, and to disturb the tranquility of the hostile shores. Transports and light boats were at hand in corresponding numbers. 1,200 cavalry and 29,000 foot-soldiers stood under arms; 16,000 for garrison duty, and 13,000 for service in open field. The army was used to active service and in excellent condition; nor was the naval force (as the Corinthians frequently chose to pretend) composed in the main of hired mercenaries; but the triremes were commanded by citizens, who defended the deck of their ship as if it had been a piece of their native soil. The resident aliens (who performed their share of service) were to be relied upon, and their interests were mixed up with those of the state. Athens numbered among her citizens a large body perfectly qualified to assume independent posts of command, while Sparta had never had any opportunity of training generals and admirals. The finances of the state were in perfect order. On large blocks of stone, which were set up near the temples on the Acropolis, were seen the list of tributary cities and the sums of their tributes, which, after the expiration of the quadrennial periods of assessment, were

revised anew. Exact control over this department was the most important point in Attic political wisdom, and only recently Pericles had, with regard to the expected war, been actively endeavoring to place the financial resources of the country more and more at the absolute disposal of the state (vol. ii. p. 633). Of the surplus of the tributes, after the completion of the *Propylæa* and other works of magnificence, and after the expenditure on account of the siege of Potidæa, there yet remained 6,000 talents (1,462,500*l.*) in the treasury. In this estimate were not included the dedicatory gifts deposited in the citadel—above all, the golden robe of Athene Parthenos, the value of which amounted to 400 talents of silver. To these had to be added the annual revenues, from the domains, duties, taxes, &c., amounting to at least 400 talents, which were collected in Athens itself, as well as the 600 talents of tribute furnished by the towns; the total accordingly amounting to 1,000 talents (243,730*l.*). Provision had been made for war—supplies of every description; the armories were filled with weapons, missiles, and machines; and the navy was more universally feared after the subjection of Samos than at any previous period. The Athenian navy had become familiar with all parts of the sea, with all its sounds and harbors; and by the structure and equipment of the vessels no less than by the long practice of the crews was far superior to all other navies, even in case of an equality of numbers. The limits of the Athenian supremacy included more than 300 cities, partly of considerable size, many of which paid tribute in conjunction with other smaller places not named in the list; so that the sum total of the dependent towns probably was from twice to thrice as large as that known to us. Within these wide limits, when necessity demanded it, a levy was also made of sea and land troops. The independent allies of Athens, besides the faithful Chians and the Lesbians, consisted of Corcyra and Zacynthus.

With the Acarnanians and with Cephallenia her relations were friendly; so that the Athenians were secure of the Ionic as well as of their own sea, and in the west occupied military positions of great importance against Peloponnesus. Lastly, in the north they had renewed their ancient alliance with the Thessalians, who were able to support them with cavalry. If, then, this abundance of resources was by the unanimous confidence of a patriotic community entrusted to the wisdom of such a statesman and general as Pericles, the future might be met with calm tranquility, even against a terrible enemy. With a small army the Peloponnesians could not dare to arrive, and with a large army they could not long maintain themselves in Attica, if flocks and herds and provisions had been previously secured. The city of Athens had been purposely rendered capable of being for a time independent of the country around. A siege was out of the question, as the Peloponnesians were unable to cut off the supplies. The frontiers were secured by fortresses which could receive the peasantry into the shelter of their walls. Pericles had completed his great works of peace and his armaments for war; and delay could bring with it nothing but loss. For, in the first place, no more favorable opportunity could present itself of carrying on a just war of defence; and again, every sign of fear of itself constituted a defeat, and an encouragement for the foe. Lastly, indications were not wanting which made any further procrastination appear dangerous, even if the war could have been delayed without damage to the honor of Athens. For Pericles was both justified in confessing to himself, and forced to recognize, this fact: that a successful result of the war in a great measure depended upon the extent to which the citizens would bestow their full confidence upon himself, and to which he should retain the physical and moral force necessary to lead them according to his will.

The political position of Pericles.

As to the former point, the opposition against Pericles had never been wholly removed, but merely temporarily driven into the background. The landed proprietors found themselves damaged by the one-sided encouragement of the maritime and mercantile interests; the old party of the aristocrats had remained implacable; and equally little could the zealous friends of democracy be satisfied with a man, who practically defeated the principles of the latter. The former indulged in a secret hope that together with Pericles would fall the democratic system on which he had founded his power, while the latter hoped that not until then would the democracy be fully and really established. If both these parties united in order to accomplish what was the immediate object of either, there must necessarily be great apprehension as to the consequences. As yet, the authority of Pericles was unshaken; his successful measures of foreign and domestic policy, and the resolute and clear consistency of his statesmanship, exalted him above any attack. Nor was a lively recognition of these wanting; even new honors, such as had previously not fallen to the lot of any citizen (as, *e. g.*, the wreath of olive bestowed upon him by the state) adorned his head—a symbol of triumphant gratitude towards the statesman glorious on account of his service to the Goddess of the State,—towards the hero of peace.

His enemies, and their attacks upon him.

But the same man was also subjected to unfair judgments, to slander, and to mockery. His own sons laughed at his fondness for sophistic exercises in speculation; his pride was offensive, and his authority burdensome, to the citizens. The less men ventured to oppose him openly, the more they found fault with his measures; and his purest intentions were shamefully misinterpreted. Such was, *e. g.*, the case in the affair of Corcyra; the fleet of ten ships was ridiculed, and then the explanation of this

"half-measure" sought in the assumption, that it was merely intended by way of an annoyance to Lacedæmonius, and as a method of artfully bringing the latter into disfavor with his own party, which was well-disposed towards the Lacedæmonians (p. 13). Personally, Pericles afforded his opponents no handle for attack; but, unfortunately, his surroundings were not always of the most unexceptionable description. He was so decidedly the first man in Athens, that men of independent character were not always ready to act as the instruments of his policy. With all the greater eagerness, men of an inferior kind thronged around him, hoping while renouncing all independent action to secure for themselves a variety of personal advantages. Among these were Metiochus or Metichus, a rhetor and architect, who also shared the office of general with Pericles, and who, contrary to the fundamental law of the democracy, simultaneously filled several of the lesser, but at the same time influential, offices of state; so that in the streets these verses might be heard sung in mockery of him;—

> "Metichus commands our armies, Metichus lays down our streets,
> Metichus controls our breadstuffs, Metichus our corn and meal.
> Here and everywhere is Metichus: so let Metichus beware." *

Among these followers of Pericles were also Charinus, the author of the Megarean decree, and Menippus, whom Pericles on several occasions employed as his second in command. Still less popular was the wealthy and luxurious Pyrilampes, who had established an aviary, which was one of the curiosities of Athens, and which on the first day of every month was exhibited to natives and strangers. He was particularly proud of his peacocks, a species of bird hitherto wholly unknown in Greece, and, as the story went, supplied Pericles with specimens, which

* See Note II. Appendix.

the latter bestowed as love-gifts upon his courtesans. Such-like town-scandal was seized upon by the writers of comedy, to whom nothing could afford a more welcome chance of satisfying the risible tendencies of the Athenians, than the chance of bringing before their eyes the lofty Olympian, astray in the paths of human frailty. Accordingly, they spiced their plays with allusions, more or less open, to the aviary of Pyrilampes, and to the wife of Menippus (who was said to have helped her husband to the dignity of general), as well as to other fair Athenian ladies, of whom it was rumored that they might be met with in the workshops of Phidias, where they occasionally made the acquaintance of the head of the state, that eminent patron of art. Hermippus called Pericles a "prince of satyrs," in allusion to the unworthy dependents surrounding him; the nickname of "the new Pisistratidæ" was another invention of the comedians, by which the following of Pericles was compared to the court of a tyrant. Nor was Cratinus (vol. ii. p. 592), whose sentiments were in favor of Cimon, sparing of the person of Pericles. The extreme recklessness to which these derisive attacks were carried may be gathered from the fact, that a limitation of the liberty of the stage appeared necessary in the interests of public order; a measure which was assuredly only passed in conformity with the wish of Pericles. As early as the Samian war a popular decree was carried, by which the comic writers were prohibited from exposing individuals, indicated by name or portrait mark, to the laughter of the public;—a law which was published under the name of Antimachus, but only remained in force for a period of three years, up to Ol. lxxxv. 4 (B. C. 427). Of a far more serious nature than these passing quarrels with the public and the stage were the attacks upon his policy, proceeding from its old and new enemies. The ancient charges were once more revived: of waste of the public money, of the support of free-thinking, and of other per

nicious tendencies opposed to the traditions of the ancestors of the Athenians. In the first instance, however, these attacks were not directed against Pericles in person, but against those who were regarded as the most prominent representatives of these tendencies, and who were at the same time most intimately connected with Pericles: viz. against Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia.

Phidias at Olympia. Ol. lxxxvi. (B. C. 436 and foll. years.)

After the completion of the Parthenon, Phidias had come to be universally recognized as the greatest master of plastic art among the Hellenes; and it was a triumph of the Periclean policy, to have caused Athens to be regarded as the high school of Hellenic art. In this intellectual domain the hegemony of Athens was so incontestable, that all dispute as to comparative claims was at an end; and even foreign states, which in other respects grudged any pre-eminence to the Athenians, applied to Athens, in order to enable themselves to execute works satisfying the demands of the times in sacred architecture and sculpture. In the domain of art a certain reconciliation was undeniably effected between the mutually jealous and hostile sentiments of the several states. Thus Phidias himself aided the Megarean Theocosmus with his figure of Zeus; and his scholars worked in Peloponnesus and in Bœotia:—Thrasymedes for the Epidaurians, Agoracritus for Coronea, and Colotes for Cyllene. Attic artists were summoned to Delphi, in order to decorate the sanctuary of Apollo with groups of statuary on the pediment; and the official authorities of Elis, whose duty it was to provide for the Peloponnesian federal sanctuary (vol. i. p. 255), summoned Phidias, who with his brother Panænus, with Colotes, Pæonius, Alcamenes, and a whole colony of Attic artists, migrated to Olympia, there to undertake the mightiest task which could be imposed upon plastic art—a task which was confided to him with absolute confidence and lofty liberality. It

greatly resembled that which he had recently accomplished in Athens. For, as in the Parthenon, so now in the sanctuary of the Olympian Zeus, was to be executed with all the resources of art, with gold and jewels, with ivory, ebony, and the brilliant decoration of colors, a statue of the god, not for the purpose of worship (for Zeus was worshipped at Olympia without an image), but as a gorgeous spectacle, as a dedicatory offering to the god, which was eventually executed on a scale of incomparably greater magnificence than even that of Athene Parthenos. The creation of Phidias was a figure of Zeus in a sitting posture, a statue of colossal dimensions, for which even the mighty temple seemed too confined a space. In the head of the god Phidias combined the characteristics of power and grace, of majesty and gentleness: the looks were those of the Homeric Zeus, at the motion of which Olympus trembled. The golden robe, which covered the lower limbs, left free the mighty breast; on his hand the god bore the figure of the Goddess of Victory, as did the Athene *Parthenos*. For he, too, was in this representation conceived of not only as a crowned conqueror who had overthrown all his enemies, but also as the giver of victory; because in his immediate presence, and in his name, were distributed the Olympian olive-wreaths, the highest prizes of Hellenic valor.

Prosecution of Phidias.

Relatives of Phidias remained at Elis, and were there invested with the hereditary office of perpetually preserving in good repair the statue of Zeus; while the sculptor himself returned to Athens, crowned with the fulness of artistic fame. Here he found a dangerous change to have supervened in public opinion. After the completion of the Propylæa, Pericles, as it appears, had to present an exact account of the expenditure on the buildings on the citadel; and this opportunity his enemies had selected for an insidious attack. An inferior artist, Meno by name,

was made to sit down before the altars on the market (as those were wont to do who placed themselves under the protection of the community, in order to be able, without any danger to themselves, to make a charge against persons in a position of power). He was promised this protection: whereupon he accused Phidias of having retained for himself a part of the gold supplied to him for the golden robe of Athene Parthenos. The plot was clumsily devised; for, by the advice of Pericles, the golden robe in question had been purposely contrived so as to admit of being taken off again: it was weighed, and found to have its proper weight.

But the hostile party would not allow itself to be discouraged. A second charge was brought, a charge of impiety. In the battle of the Amazons, represented on the shield of Athene, two figures were discovered which bore the features of Pericles and Phidias. Himself the artist had represented as a bald-headed old man, lifting a block of stone with both his hands, but Pericles in the noble figure of a warrior hurling a spear, who was made to cover the middle of his face with his own hand, but not so as to prevent the likeness from being undeniable. In this, it was asserted, lay a self-seeking vanity, violating the sanctity of the temple: the citizens demanded the personal arrest of the artist—a sign that it was contrived to give the subject of the charge the character of a plot endangering the safety of the state. While the mendacious accuser was rewarded by the bestowal of privileges as a public benefactor, and recommended as a martyr of liberty to the especial protection of the generals of the city—Pericles among their number—Phidias, who had established the glory of his native city with more brilliant and undisputed success than any other of his contemporaries, was sent to prison as a criminal. Here he died, according to the usual tradition before the inquiry had terminated,

Death of Phidias. Ol. lxxxvi. I. (B. C. 432.)

broken by old age and grief. Not even then was the poisonous tongue of scandal hushed; but, on the contrary, the rumor was spread that Pericles himself had caused his friend to be made away with, in order to prevent further inquiry and anticipate awkward disclosures.

Prosecution of Anaxagoras.

The object of the second attack was Anaxagoras, who had for many years led a peaceable existence at Athens, in blameless seclusion and without ambition, entirely devoted to his philosophical and mathematical studies, and not even busying himself with becoming the founder of a school. But he was the most intimate friend of Pericles, whom it was impossible to hurt more deeply than by persecuting his Anaxagoras. For this purpose a combination was effected between men of the most opposite parties: between honest adherents of ancient religion and morality on the one hand, whose sentiments attached them to a Cimon and a Thucydides, and on the other hand the earliest champions of an unlimited democracy, such as Cleon, whose only real object was the overthrow of Pericles. The organ of religious fanaticism was Diopithes, a priest and popular orator of passionate temperament, who, by assuming the madness of one divinely inspired, drew the eyes of the multitude upon himself, delivered oracles in a shrill voice, and excited the people. He procured the passing of a decree, by which all who denied the national religion, and who philosophized on matters appertaining to the gods, were to be indicted as state criminals. Thus a weapon had been obtained against the philosophical friends of Pericles. Damon (vol. ii. p. 483) was banished, and Anaxagoras involved in most serious legal proceedings; so that Pericles was obliged to recognize the impossibility of obtaining the acquittal of his friend. He loyally declared himself in favor of the latter; but had to congratulate himself on being able to save so much as the life of Anaxagoras, whom he was forced personally to

advise to quit Athens; and to his deep sorrow he saw the aged philosopher take his departure for Lampsacus. Encouraged by this success, the hostile party advanced with still greater boldness against Pericles; and directed their next attack against Aspasia, who on the comic stage had often been ridiculed as the Here of the Olympian Zeus, and as the new Omphale or Deianira, who had imposed her fetters upon the weighty Heracles. The jest was now changed into solemn earnest. The comic writer Hermippus appeared as public prosecutor, and called the proud Milesian lady to account before the jury for her impiety, and for her sins against good and honest morality; charging her with tempting free-born women into her house for vile purposes. In this matter Pericles could not give way. He laid his entire authority into the scale of her cause; with her he was determined to stand or fall. He appeared as her advocate before the people; but he was no longer the proud statesman, calm in the consciousness of victory: with tears he entreated the judges to spare him such an insult as this: and thus he obtained her acquittal from the dangerous charge which had been brought against her from motives of hostility against himself, and which was accordingly treated as a party question.

Prosecution of Aspasia.

Finally, an immediate and personal attack was made upon the person of Pericles himself; and on the motion of Dracontides it was resolved that he should be obliged to hand in before the Prytanies a complete account as to the public moneys which had passed through his hands, and that a solemn judgment should be held as to his guilt or innocence on the citadel at the altar of Athene. This mode of procedure was, however, on the motion of Hagnon (vol. ii. p. 537) again altered, and it was determined that the matter should be decided before a court of 1,500 jurymen, to whom it was left to decide

Prosecution of Pericles himself. Ol. lxxxvii. 1. (B. C. 431.)

whether the matter should be treated as a prosecution for misappropriation of the public money, or for corruption, or in general for damage done to the interests of the commonwealth.*

Pericles' reasons and motives for desiring war.

Although this time the attack of the enemies failed, yet these proceedings sufficiently prove how dangerous and threatening the situation of Pericles had become, since the conservative party of the old aristocrats made common cause against him with the new democratic party which had formed itself during the years of peace, while priestly fanaticism endeavored ceaselessly to heighten the ill-feeling against him. These endeavors did not fail to exercise a certain influence upon the citizens; for, notwithstanding all his sagacity, Pericles had been unable to prevent his whole position in the state, and particularly his association with the artists, philosophers, and Ionic women, from awakening a vivid reminiscence of the style of Tyrannical rule, and thereby affording various occasions of offence. These conflicts, which Pericles had to sustain on his own and his friends' behalf, belong to the first and second year of the 87th Olympiad (431 B. C.), *i. e.* to the same time as that in which the Lacedæmonians sent their embassies to Athens; nor can we doubt that the great change which had taken place in the sentiments of the Athenian citizens was well known in Sparta, and that probably the demand urging the expulsion of the Alcmæonidæ was made with the co-operation of the aristocratic party in Athens. Pericles himself issued forth victoriously from all personal attacks; but he could not refuse to recognize the difficulties of his position; for the parties of his opponents had proved their strength, and might at any time unite for another onset. Hence, with regard even to himself personally, he was of opinion that the war, which was in any

* See Note III. Appendix.

case inevitable, could not break out at a more favorable moment: he might expect that the common danger would divert public attention from home affairs, render harmless the power of his adversaries, strengthen patriotic feeling, and make manifest to the Athenians the need in which they stood of his services. Although, then, the accusation which the comic poets made against him was unjust, when they placed the whole war to the account of Pericles, who, in order to extricate himself out of his difficulties, "cast the Megarean decree like a spark upon Hellas, which was filled with combustible materials;" yet the connection between the war and the political trials enumerated above is undeniable: for the latter not only encouraged the enemies of Pericles in Sparta, but also determined him more thoroughly himself to accept war. The heavily charged atmosphere could not be better purified than by a just war, although Pericles could not for a moment fail to perceive, that the war itself would involve him personally in new dangers. For, as his speeches prove, he divined with perfect clearness, that any unexpected mishap in the war would cause his fall; he was well acquainted with the inconstancy and impatience of the Athenians; he knew that he could not carry out his system of operations which was the only safe one, without imposing the greatest sacrifices upon the citizens. They would have to master their own feelings sufficiently to give up their lands calmly to the foe; for only thus could the Peloponnesians be made to exhaust themselves in fruitless exertions, and at last to find themselves forced to make peace. In order to carry out this plan of operations, there was needed a man of immovable calm and of proved authority —a statesman and commander, who was incontestably the first among his fellow-citizens. Pericles knew that success was bound up with his person; accordingly he necessarily wished, not from any selfish, but from the most purely patriotic motives, that the war might begin while

he yet retained the full vigor requisite for the leader of Athens.*

Thus the two states lay face to face, ready and resolved for war; but neither as yet struck the first blow. Athens desired, on principle, to remain on the defensive; and Sparta hesitated before taking the decisive step. The whole nation was meanwhile anxiously waiting the events which the immediate future would bring with it; some in impatient anticipations, the others full of dark forebodings. For the younger generation capable of bearing arms, which in large numbers and vigorous health filled the ranks on either side of the Isthmus, and which had grown up in times of peace, unacquainted with the terrors of a civil war, felt a vague longing for change from an insupportable state of things, a desire for the hour of final decision, which would enable them to prove their powers and do mighty deeds. They thought it better that the opposing parties should fight out their differences in open war, than that they should continue, like a secret poison, to consume the vitals of the nation.

On the other hand, the men of greater experience and thoughtfulness took into anxious consideration the incalculable consequences which the first sanguinary meeting between the two great states would necessarily bring with it, and their anxious foreboding found expression and confirmation in the dark and cheerless oracles which passed from mouth to mouth among the people: evil omens of all kinds were sought and found; terrific natural phenomena made their appearance, particularly an earthquake on Delos (according to accurate inquiry

* The view in the text as to the connection of the war with the public law-suits is based upon Ar. *Pax*, 603; *πρῶτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς* (the reading already of Diod. xii. 40; *παντός* Sauppe) *ἦρξε Φειδίας πράξας κακῶς, εἶτα Περικλέης φοβηθεὶς, μὴ μετασχοι τῆς τύχης—ἐξέφλεξε τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλὼν σπινθῆρα μικρὸν Μεγαρικοῦ ψηφίσματος, καξεφύσησεν, τοσοῦτον πολεμόν.* Cf. Sauppe, p. 186.

the first visitation of the kind upon the Holy Island, which men believed to be immovably fixed in the depths of the sea).*

Outbreak of the war. Ol. lxxxvii. 1. (B. C. 431.)

The war was to break out after a wholly unexpected fashion, neither from Sparta, nor from Athens, but from Thebes. The latter stood at the head of a confederation of ten cities, and, being full of ambition, aimed at a wider dominion. The most influential personage at Thebes, the leader of the oligarchic government, was Eurymachus, the son of Leontiadas, a sworn foe to the policy of Pericles. He wished to make his native city the capital of all Bœotia; a plan which nothing seemed to him to obstruct so much as Platææ. The Platæan land had been recognised as sacred territory by the treaties (vol. ii. p. 343); Platææ was most intimately connected with Athens, and stood under a democratic government; at the same time it separated the Thebans from the territory of the Peloponnesian confederation, which commenced on the further side of the Cithæron, and, in short, in every respect constituted a thorn in their side. For since the Wars of Liberation a peculiar halo surrounded the name of the Platæans; they kept up the most honorable family connections with Sparta and Athens; and although the national institutions founded by Aristides, particularly the federal assemblages at Platææ, had never been actually carried out, yet the citizens of the town had dedicated noble temples and offerings out of their share in the spoils; Phidias and Polygnotus had embellished for them their sanctuary of the war-goddess of Athene (vol. ii. p. 599), the festivals of Zeus the Liberator, as well as the annual celebration in memory of the dead heroes, preserved the fame of the city fresh and blooming; and even

* Thuc. ii. 8, in express, and probably intentional, contradiction to Herod. vi. 98; as is correctly judged by Classen ad Thuc. Cf. Kirchhoff, *Abfassungsz d. Herod. Geschichtwerks*, p. 19.

after the Wars of Liberation her citizens had always stood at the side of the Athenians, wherever there was any deed of glory to be done.

Here were reasons enough to supply the envy and hatred of the Thebans with constant fuel. As long as the two great states held together, it was believed that no change of territorial relations was possible. But now a favorable opportunity seemed to have arrived for overpowering the hated neighbor. If the other treaties were dissolved, why should the Platæan continue to be respected? The sooner the attack was carried out, the better chance there appeared to be of its success; and when the blow had once been dealt, the approval of Sparta would follow as a matter of course, since nothing could be more advantageous to the latter in her conduct of the war than the establishment of a friendly military station on the Attic frontier, such as she had herself already intended to found at Tanagra (vol. ii. p. 439).

Surprise of Platææ.

Accordingly Eurymachus placed himself in communication with oligarchical partisans in Platææ; secretly got ready his army; and one evening (in the beginning of April shortly before the new moon) sent 300 heavy-armed soldiers in advance to Platææ, whose gates were traitorously opened to them; and before the citizens, who had peaceably laid themselves down to rest after a public festival, had any suspicion of this shameful violation of the peace, their market-place was occupied by the hostile troops. When the Thebans thus believed themselves to be in possession of the city, they wished to give a more suspicious coloring to their bad cause; they accordingly refused to accede to the desire of the traitors and seize upon the heads of the democracy, and rather attempted the line of persuasion, in the hope of immediately obtaining from the terrified citizens a declaration to the effect that they consented to join the

(Early in April.)

confederation of Bœotian cities under the hegemony of Thebes. Thus, as they hoped, in view of the small number of their troops, the accession of Platææ would appear voluntarily; and the matter might then be represented, as if the Platæans had been only waiting for an opportunity to dissolve their unnatural connection with Athens. Negotiations were actually commenced with the hostile invaders. But during the progress of these negotiations it was for the first time observed, how trifling was the force of the Thebans; and a struggle was quickly resolved upon. The citizens broke through the walls of their houses in order to be able to unite for a general attack; and while the Thebans felt absolutely certain of success, they suddenly, after standing through the whole night in pouring rain, towards the break of day found themselves attacked with such vehemence, that, after an obstinate resistance, they had to seek safety in flight. It was then that their troubles really began: for they lost their way in the narrow and muddy lanes, which were in addition barricaded with wagons; and they were chased about the city in which they were shut up, since even the gate through which they had effected their entrance, and which was the only open one, had been in all haste bolted by the Platæans. The majority of the unhappy band was slain; a few saved themselves by leaping down from the city walls; 180 had to surrender at the pleasure of the victors. All this had taken place before the arrival of the Theban army, which was delayed by the rise of the river Asopus. The Thebans now attempted to make captives in the Platæan territory, in order to exchange them for their fellow-citizens; but subsequently retired, after, as they affirmed, the restoration of the prisoners had been promised them under a solemn oath. Meanwhile, the Platæans hasted to bring all who remained outside the walls into safety within, and, as soon as this had been effected, put all the Thebans who were in their power to

death. The messenger despatched by Pericles to warn them most seriously against taking any unconsidered steps arrived too late; the terrible deed had been done. The Platæans, for their part, denied that they had given a promise regarding the prisoners unconditionally binding or confirmed by oath; and possibly no calm agreement had actually been arrived at. But, in any case, the deed was as inhuman as it was unwise; for, while the Thebans, if kept alive, would have been an invaluable possession for Platææ and her allies, the only consequence of their death was, that no idea of reconciliation could be ever henceforth entertained. Treason and murder, in that night of horrors, opened the war in Greece. Its beginning showed every intelligent spectator what was to be expected from its course.*

First campaign of the Peloponnesians. (B. C. 431, June.)

As soon as the events in Bœotia became known at Sparta, the messengers went forth to summon the Peloponnesian army and the rest of the confederates, two-thirds of the whole military force, to the Isthmus. There Archidamus assumed the supreme command of the troops: it was the most considerable force which had ever yet assembled for an advance across the Isthmus. Archidamus remained true to his character. His intention was not to inflame the ardor of war; rather, he was anxious to tone down the high hopes of his troops; for even at this season he would not hide his opinion as to the dangerous power of the adversary, nor deny the ill-will with which he still shrank from actually commencing the campaign. Not until Melesippus, whom he sent as the last messenger of peace to Athens, had been refused admittance within the gates of the city, did Archidamus commence his slow advance through Megaris.

It was now that the first occasion arose for actually

* See Note IV. Appendix.

applying the system of defence devised by Pericles, who at the same time himself as commander-in-chief of the state, together with his official colleagues (who were merely the instruments of his will), assumed a more vigorous and unlimited guidance than ever of the affairs of state: extraordinary measures had become necessary, the energetic execution of which would have been possible to no other man but himself. A levy was ordered upon the allies; a hundred vessels were made ready for sea in the Piræeus; the military stations in the country were furnished with the requisite means of defence, and the troops drilled, particularly the cavalry, which, together with the Thessalians, was to be employed in the open field. The citizen-cavalry had been increased to ten squadrons of a hundred each, who were annually selected out of the noblest and wealthiest families, and who formed the only standing body of national troops belonging to the Athenians,—the flower of their youth, the ornament and pride of the city, and therefore a force to which Pericles attached great importance. At the same time orders were issued to the inhabitants of the rural districts, to seek a secure refuge, with their wives and children. As at the time of the Persian troubles, all the inhabitants of the country quitted their houses and homesteads; but not on the present occasion for the islands and the coasts beyond. Athens herself served the purpose of a safe island-refuge for the great majority; and in dense swarms the peasants, laden with their goods and chattels, during several successive days thronged through the gates of the city into its narrow lanes, while the flocks and herds were shipped across the sea, chiefly to Eubœa. It was a heavy sacrifice for the landed proprietors, used to country independence, to have to bid farewell to their carefully cultivated farms, homesteads, fields, and vineyards—to all their prosperity which, since the Persian wars, had but shortly before been

Preparatory measures of Pericles.

completely restored; they had to part, at the same time, from their holy places and sepulchres, and from all their happy ways of life. It was a bitter and humiliating feeling, to have to give up all these without striking a blow on their behalf. Within the city walls as much space as possible was cleared; and hospitality used its best endeavors to alleviate discomfort. But under the pressure of these troublous days it became necessary to make use of sacred as well as profane localities; and, in spite of warning oracles, the so-called *Pelasgicon* under the citadel was used for purposes of habitation. Well-to-do country proprietors had to find room with their servants in the towers of the walls; between the three walls leading to the port, and wherever else vacant space existed, tents, huts, and bivouacs were arranged as best they might. Archidamus, as Pericles was aware, still continued to speculate on his fall. The last embassy had only been sent with the intention of giving the party of his opponents at Athens one more opportunity of rousing itself to action. Some new insidious device was to be apprehended. Archidamus might take up the notion of sparing the lands of Pericles, with whom he was connected by a mutual bond of hospitality, in order in this way to create suspicion against him. Accordingly Pericles declared that, if his lands were spared by the enemy, he would present them to the people. In the city itself he took care that the strictest order should be maintained; all assemblages of citizens were prohibited; and, before the enemy had shown himself, Athens was in a state of siege. Only a single will was now to prevail; for the enemies at home, who availed themselves of every trouble, of every difficulty, of every violation of ancient usage, for the purpose of damaging Pericles, were even more dangerous than the enemy outside the walls, and the objects of either foe were identical. Pericles had passed through many troubles and many dangers in his stormy

career; but the hardest task of all was now before him.*

Archidamus in Attica (B. C. 431, June.)

The delay on the part of the hostile commander facilitated the preparatory measures of Pericles. This delay is explained by the circumstance, that Archidamus was in the first instance acting in concert with the Thebans. For while the latter were devastating the territory of Platææ, the Peloponnesians advanced along the other side of the Cithæron and laid siege to Œnoe, the frontier fortress of Attica, which lay at the base of the mountain range close to the sources of the Cephissus, which flows down to Eleusis. On this occasion the Spartans again followed a previous tradition. As early as the time of King Cleomenes (vol. i. p. 418), an assault upon Œnoe had been concerted with the Bœotians because this place lay on the road to Thebes, and was accordingly equally well adapted for maintaining a connection with Peloponnesus and for commanding the Eleusinian plain. However, the measures which Pericles had taken for its defence proved efficacious; and the fortress successfully resisted the most strenuous attempts of Archidamus; so that the latter relinquished the whole undertaking, and led his troops out of the mountains upon the plain, where meanwhile the June sun had ripened the corn. Eleven weeks had passed since the surprise of Platææ, when the troops, eager for booty, poured over the well-cultivated fields. Eleusis, strongly fortified, remained unendangered. Then an advance was made in the direction of Athens itself, but not on the straight road through the gorge of Pythion, but further to the north, through the broader indentation which separates Mount Ægaleus from Mount Parnes, and

* Τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον, Thuc. ii. 17. Acc. to Just. iii. 7, the landed property of Pericles actually remained untouched; Thuc. (ii. 13) merely says that Pericles protected himself against suspicion in view of this occurring.

leads to the upper division of the Athenian plain, of which Acharnæ was the principal place. This was the most densely populated district of Attica, capable of furnishing 3,000 heavy-armed soldiers, and noted for a sturdy and vigorous breed of inhabitants, partly charcoal-burners (who carried on their labors on Mount Parnes), and of wine-growers. Upon these Archidamus hoped to produce a strong effect by his method of carrying on the war. For at this distance it was possible to see from the walls of Athens the camp-fires of the troops which lay among the fields and vineyards; and even the bravest among the inhabitants were forced to remain inactive spectators, while their houses and farm-buildings were destroyed by the flames. At the same time, the damage was not as great as we might be inclined to suppose, judging by the standard of modern times. Even the houses of the city were for the most part of clay, and all the private dwellings, modestly furnished. But peace had given a certain stimulus to ideas of luxury and comfort; and in many quarters tasteful villas and pleasant country-houses had risen up; so that Archidamus found his measures answer their purpose. The citizens murmured and became turbulent, particularly the landed proprietors, who in any case had to bear the heavy burdens of war, and who now saw ruin staring them in the face. Had Pericles permitted an assembly of the people to be held on the Pnyx, the most ill-considered resolutions would have been passed. Instead of this, the people might be seen collecting in knots and bands in the public streets and places, to heap abuse upon Pericles, the author of these troubles, the cowardly traitor. Was it not, they asked, to fill to overflowing the measure of tyranny, that one man should have it in his power to coop up the whole people within the wall, and to deprive the citizens even of the right of defending their own fields? A specimen of this abuse is preserved in the fragment of a comedy of Hermippus:

"Thou prince of satyrs, wilt thou then never raise thy lance for the fight? Didst thou not erst with brave words assert thyself as leader in war? Whither has thy courage now fled? Thou gnashest thy teeth in fury when thou hearest any one sharpening his knife on a stone, since Cleon, the wild fellow, gave thee a dressing." Cleon, the leather manufacturer, Simmias, Lacratidas, and others, made the most of the opportunity for achieving a leading position as spokesmen of the discontented party. Pericles allowed no person, with the exception of the cavalry, to quit the city; and it was doubtless an additional reason for annoyance, that only the members of this aristocratic body were allowed the honor of measuring themselves with the enemy, and of protecting by successful skirmishes the fields in the immediate vicinity of the city. At the same time Pericles manned a well-equipped fleet of 100 vessels with chosen troops, but himself remained at home at his more arduous post, where none could supply his place. Firmly and steadily he held the helm of the state in his hand; and stood calm in the midst of the agitated multitude.

About the same time that the fleet sailed out of the Piræeus, Archidamus quitted the Attic territory, after his army had, after a period of from four to five weeks, laid waste the entire north of the country as far as Eubœa; like a swarm of locusts the Peloponnesians now departed, after eating up all the fruits of the fields. Probably the movement was partly owing to the spectacle of the Athenian fleet, which came into view sailing towards Peloponnesus, and thus reminded the troops of their unprotected villages and families at home.*

* The Lacedæmonians invade Attica, ἐν δεξίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸ Αἰγάλεων ὄρος Thuc. ii. 19. As to the excitement against Pericles, see *ib.* c. 21. As to Hermippus, Plut. c. 33. That the departure of the fleet had an effect upon that of the army is in itself highly probable, and is expressly stated by Diodor. xii. 42. Grote, vol. vi. p. 180, is of a different opinion.

Retaliatory expeditions of the Athenians. Ol. lxxxvii. 2. (B. C. 431.)

The remainder of the fair season belonged to the Athenians. Their fleet circumnavigated Peloponnesus and made an attack on Methone (Modon), an important port, situate at the southern point of the Messenian peninsula (vol. i. p. 243), opposite the island group of the Œnussæ. The attack was frustrated by the presence of mind of Brasidas, who rapidly threw himself into the threatened place. The Athenians, who had been joined by fifty Corcyræan vessels, sailed along the west coast of Peloponnesus, where the wealthy landed proprietors of Elis had to suffer for the devastation of Attica. They then captured two Corinthian places on the coast of Acarnania, and succeeded in securing the voluntary accession of the island of Cephallenia, which, with its four towns, joined the Attic alliance. A squadron of thirty ships had simultaneously passed through the Eubœan channel northwards, with the intention of taking revenge upon the Locrians. Two of their towns were destroyed, their coasts plundered; and entrenchments were thrown up on the little island of Atalante, where an Attic garrison was established, to keep a watchful eye on the Locrians. Finally, it was resolved to expel the Æginetans in a body from their island; since they, above all, had contributed by secret accusations to excite the Peloponnesians against Athens. Moreover, Pericles stood in need of more land to distribute among the citizens, as a means of quieting them; and, lastly, strategical considerations induced him to deem it indispensable to possess himself of the island, whose situation, halfway between Peloponnesus and Athens, might become either highly advantageous or equally dangerous to the latter. Accordingly the lands were without delay distributed among Attic citizens, and the native Æginetans transported with their families to the Peloponnesian coasts.

Next to the Æginetans, the Megareans, as the accusers

of Athens, were most odious to her. To chastise the Megareans, Pericles himself set out at the head of an expedition composed of 10,000 heavy-armed citizens, 3,000 resident aliens similarly armed, and a large body of light-armed troops. He welcomed the occasion of leading into the field the Attic land army in full force, and at the same time of showing the world how ill those fared who trusted in the protection of Sparta. The Peloponnesian contingents had long returned into their towns and villages; and even the Corinthians remained listless lookers-on, while the land on their borders was being devastated, root and branch, to such an extent that all garden-plantations were destroyed up to the very walls of the city. A new popular decree was even at this time passed with reference to the Megareans, on the motion of Charinus (for Pericles himself preferred to take no part in measures of a decidedly invidious character), in which an irreconcilable feud was declared for ever against Megara. The penalty of death was pronounced against any Megarean found on Attic soil; and the obligation imposed upon the Attic generals in their oath of office, to invade Megaris twice in every year. By means of these measures it was intended at the same time to avenge the death of the herald Anthemocritus, who had been sent with a message of state to the Megareans, and put to death by them. Finally, the decree probably had at the same time a strategical object: viz. that of placing obstacles in the way of the future campaigns of the Peloponnesians, by means of a thorough devastation of the frontier territory.

Athenian alliance with Sitalces. Ol. lxxxvii. 2. (B. C. 431).

For a similar purpose yet other measures were taken. Careful watch was established over the whole country, and extended as far as Salamis, whence every movement on the coast of Megaris was to be observed, and communicated by signals to the Piræeus. It was resolved not to

put aside the old triremes, as had hitherto been the custom, but to reconstruct them as transports, thus making possible more effective incursions upon hostile territory; and it was decreed, that, for the defence of the country, the hundred best triremes, with their appointed trierarchs, should always remain in readiness for protecting Athens and Attica in case of an attack by sea; and, for the same purpose, 1,000 talents were set apart as a reserve fund; while the penalty of death was imposed upon any attempt to persuade the people to touch this portion of the treasury for any but this particular object. By this means Pericles hoped to induce the republic, as it were, to impose a restraint upon herself against any reckless proceeding, even beyond the period of his own power and life. Finally, diplomatic action was not left untried; the more distant towns of the allies, which stood in friendly relations with foreign kingdoms, being employed for the purpose. Abdera, on the south side of Thrace, proved particularly useful, where dwelt a rich citizen of the name of Nymphodorus, who had married his sister to Sitalces, the king of the Odrysæ. This Thracian sovereign had advanced the frontiers of his kingdom into the vicinity of the sea coast; and was anxious to raise his power and influence by means of Hellenic connections. For the Athenians, on the other hand, it was doubly important, to strengthen in any way their position in these regions; since Potidæa continued to resist their besieging forces, and the towns of Chalcidice remained in a state of revolt. Nymphodorus was named *Proxenos* of Athens, and he actually succeeded in inducing the powerful Thracian king to become her ally; while his mediation, at the same time, brought about a reconciliation with Perdiccas, to whom Therma, (afterwards Thessalonica) was restored; and thus Athens at once regained freedom of action in the regions containing her most important colonies, and might hope for a speedy termination of the most dan-

gerous of all the conflicts which had hitherto broken out.*

Speech of Pericles at the burial of the citizens fallen in war. Ol. lxxxvii. 2. (B. C. 431.)

Towards the end of the first year of the war, feelings of depression could not but befal the Peloponnesians. On them rested the responsibility of the outbreak of the accursed civil war, the traces of which had already deeply impressed themselves upon the soil of the common country; their intentions as to the overthrow of Pericles had resulted in failure, and their whole conduct of the war had proved inefficient. The unapproachable position of their adversaries' city, her command of the sea, and the energy of her policy, had been again made manifest. The accession of Cephellenia to the Attic alliance had more fully exposed to the attacks of the latter the coasts of Peloponnesus; the Corinthians had to renounce all their hopes in Thrace; and, although their ships had, after the departure of the Athenians, obtained certain advantages on the coasts of Acarnania, yet in the main their expectations had been bitterly disappointed. Pericles, on the other hand, after all the personal attacks to which he had been subjected, was now compensated by being, as the proved statesman, entrusted with the honorable duty of pronouncing, in the name of the state, the funeral oration on the occasion of the solemn burial of the citizens who had fallen in the first year of the war. These were only a few in number. Hence Pericles was the more easily able to depart from the common course of such orations, to pass from the dead, whom the state already honored by the funeral itself and by the care it took of their relicts, to the community of the living, and to depict the state itself, on whose behalf the citizens had joyously courted death. Nor in truth, could any

* Methone, &c., Thuc. ii. 25.—Ægina, *ib.* 27. Megara. *ib.* 31. Charinus, Plut. (*Reip. ger. praec.* c. 15) διὰ χαρίνου τὸ κατὰ Μεγαρέων ἐκύρωσε ψήφισμα Sitalces, Thuc. ii. 29.

spectacle exceed in grandeur that which we may picture to ourselves, of the Attic citizens assembled in full numbers by the tombs of the Ceramicus, and of Pericles in their midst addressing them from a lofty scaffolding. As yet the unspeakable troubles of the war were fresh in their memories—around them lay the desolated fields and farms in ashes; a similar calamity must be expected to return in the course of a few months; and during this time of heavy losses for all they had to renounce not only all those things which add a charm to life, but even the enjoyment of their dearest rights and liberties. And yet they listen with enthusiasm to the speech of Pericles, as he places before their eyes the glories of their city, hailing her an example in the eyes of all the Hellenes. With lofty simplicity he extols her constitution, popular in the fullest sense, by having for its object the welfare of the entire people, and offering equal rights to all the citizens; but at the same time, and in virtue of this its character, adapted for raising the best among them to the first positions in the state. He lauds the high spiritual advantages offered by the city, the liberal love of virtue and wisdom on the part of her sons, their universal sympathy in the commonweal, their generous hospitality, their temperance and vigor, which peace and the love of the Beautiful had not weakened, so that the city of the Athenians must, in any event, be an object of well-deserved admiration both for the present and for future ages.

Such were the points of view from which Pericles displayed to the citizens the character of their state, and described to them the people of Athens, as it ought to be. He showed them their better selves, in order to invigorate them and raise them above themselves, in order to arouse them to self-denial, to endurance, and calm resolution. Full of a new vital ardor, they returned home from the graves, and with perfect confidence confronted the destinies awaiting them in the future. And when Archidamus for

a second time invaded Attica, they had already better reconciled themselves to the inevitable necessity. The fields which had been devastated a year before had been left untilled; and thus the Spartans were forced to march rapidly through the most fertile lands, in order to find the requisite forage in the eastern tracts of the country as far down as Cape Sunium. The public confidence in the system of Pericles rose higher and higher, and men learnt to disregard what no more than a year ago they had deemed intolerable.

Second invasion of Attica. Ol. lxxxvii. 1. (B. C. 430, May.)

Of a sudden a new calamity supervened, trouble beyond all human calculation.

For some time reports had been received of noxious diseases, which raged in Egypt and the Asiatic satrapies, and had advanced as far as Lemnos. In the West also, in Sicily and Italy, the mortality was terrible about the same time; the cause being, as was afterwards thought to admit of demonstration, a succession of wet winters, during which great quantities of water had collected on, and under, the surface of the earth. Thus, it was held, the air was tainted and the fruits of the field were ruined. Moreover, the annual north winds (the so-called Etesian winds), which purify the atmosphere, were said to have failed to make their appearance. Thus at the time when the war broke out, which broke up the social order of the Greek world, the order of nature was said to have been equally disturbed; for it was believed that never had so many terrific natural phenomena occurred as since the beginning of the war.*

* Thuc. i. 23. As to the causes of the epidemic, Diod. xii. 58 (Grote vi. 207). As to similar pestilences in Italy, Niebuhr, *Rom. Hist.* (*Engl. Transl.* ii. 278); id. *Lectures on Ancient Hist.* (*Engl. Transl.* ii. 53). The causes of the epidemic given in Diod. xii. 58 refer, not to Attica, but to the countries where the disease first developed itself.

Attica, at other times distinguished above all other districts for salubrity and freshness of air, now for the first time underwent an experience of the dangers to which a busy sea-port was exposed. For scarcely had navigation been opened, when the first cases of death began to excite public fears. These cases occurred in many other places in Greece; but there they remained exceptional and disappeared again. In Attica, on the contrary, the disease found an arena in readiness, over which it spread with unexampled fury. The whole population had very recently taken refuge within the walls. A multitude of human beings was closely packed together, who had been torn out of all their habits of life, who lived in care, excitement, and troubles of all kinds, sleeping in the open air, and unable to take proper care as to exercise, good food and cleanliness. In the Piræeus which was particularly densely packed, the waterworks were as yet unfinished; there was no other water but that in the cisterns; and now the heat of the sun added its effects. The consequence was, that soon, in the lower town, the epidemic became completely dominant; all other forms of disease disappeared; all classes, without any distinction of age or sex, fell a prey to the disease, the symptoms of which were everywhere the same. It was a typhoid fever, exactly resembling the fevers which made their appearance in camps and towns in consequence of the deprivations and sufferings attendant upon times of war. The pains began suddenly with a feeling of heat in the head, and inflammation of the eyes. Next, the inner organs were seized; the tongue and hollow of the mouth swelled; a painful cough ensued, accompanied by vomitings of bile and by a protracted and extremely painful retching. On the skin appeared an eruption of pustulæ and tumors. To the external touch the body appeared to retain its ordinary temperature; but within raged so burning a heat, that the sufferers cast off every article of clothing, while some

even madly threw themselves into the wells. This internal heat destroyed most of the sufferers after seven or nine days, without any external falling away of the body having taken place. Others survived the first attack, and then perished in consequence of diarrhœa and total loss of strength. Yet others, while saving their lives, failed to regain a sound and healthy state of mind, or survived indeed, but with the loss of one or the other of their limbs.

Science was not idle. Hippocrates* himself (vol. ii. p. 560) inquired into the disease, and, at all events at a subsequent stage of the epidemic, gave the Athenians the benefit of his experiences, particularly by his attempts to purify the atmosphere by fire (an idea said to have suggested itself to him from observing that the smiths were most rarely seized by the disease). But at first all remedies obtained from priests and physicians proved utterly ineffectual. In dull despair, the people allowed the evil to take its course. Such was the violence of the contagion, that the sick were deserted by their friends and relatives, and that even the usage of burial, generally held so sacred among the Greeks, fell into disuse; the dying and the dead lay in masses round the wells, where they had sought for a last relief; holy places were for the first time polluted by corpses. While other kinds of trouble were wont to unite the people, this calamity dissolved the bonds of domestic affections as well as of public duties. Men became callous as to law and order, deaf to the claims of honor and duty, and full of wrath against both gods and men. According to the diversity of their moral constitution, some gave themselves up to a deep gloom, and believed themselves the victims of the vengeance of implacable powers; while the others with

* For Hippocrates, see *Philologus* iv. 24. For Sophocles and Asclepias, Soph. ed. Bergk, p. xx. The possibility of perfect restoration to health is evidenced by the case of Thucydides.

unrestrained impiety gave the rein to every evil impulse, and in the measureless search of pleasure endeavored to deaden or forget their woes.

Effects of the plague.

The situation of the Athenians was in truth a terrible one. While at other times, whenever a disease prevailed, it was customary to avoid it by a change of air and an escape into the mountains; now, though the heat was increasing, all the inhabitants were caged within the walls; the Peloponnesians marched about the country, in order to destroy the last remains of rural property; while within raged a yet worse enemy, to whom men succumbed like defenceless victims in the shambles. Trade was entirely at a standstill; the prices of necessaries rose; and the sufferings of the poor were redoubled, while the wealthy found no aid in their wealth.

Naval expedition of Pericles against Epidaurus, Argolis, &c. Ol. lxxxvii. 2. (B. C. 430.)

Party fury deemed no means vile enough to prevent their employment for the overthrow of a hated opponent; and thus even this new calamity was used as a weapon against Pericles. The Spartan party traded on the superstition of the multitude, and declared the hand of Apollo to be visible in the pestilence,—of Apollo, who had not in vain through his oracle proclaimed himself the ally of Sparta; he was now aiding the good cause, and accordingly the whole Peloponnesus had remained untouched by the disease. After all, they said, the ancient guilt of the Alcmæonidæ, which rested on the first man in the state, was not a matter to be treated lightly. And even where such views found no admittance, it was yet murmured that the pestilence was the consequence of the war, and the war the fault of Pericles. Thus, it was averred, the same man who had deprived the citizens of all their liberties, who held lofty orations in praise of that democracy which he only used for an unconstitutional despotism of his own, was also the author

of the present calamity, and was probably well content to see the community dwindle under the trials of pestilence and war, so that he was enabled more completely to accomplish his ambitious designs. The opponents of Pericles availed themselves of the opportunity of his departure as general with a fleet of 150 triremes to Epidaurus. The latter city successfully withstood the attack, but the entire coast of Argolis, as far as it was in alliance with Sparta, the rich districts of Trœzene and Hermione, were laid waste, and Prasiæ captured, in order to serve the Athenians as a fortified position on the Laconian frontier. When the fleet returned home, the Peloponnesians had already taken their departure, after a stay in the country of forty days. Their own fears had in the end driven them away, when they heard of the constant rise in the rate of mortality, and saw the dense smoke from the funeral pyres hanging over the ill-fated city. The command of the fleet was assumed by the two colleagues of Pericles in the generalship, Hagnon and Cleopompus; as for himself, he remained in the city, where now the most arduous task awaited him.

Pericles justifies himself before the assembly.

He found the situation of affairs utterly changed; the intrigues of his adversaries had been only too successful; his irresistible influence over the people was gone. Secret jealousy had changed into open contradiction; nay, in defiance of his orders, assemblies of the citizens had been held, and the party of his opponents, who now advocated peace at any price, had carried a motion for the despatch of envoys of Sparta to open negotiations. At Sparta this opportunity was allowed to pass by; probably the fall of Pericles and the ruin of Athens were regarded as accomplished facts, and the demands made upon the latter were allowed to exceed all measure; in short, the negotiations were protracted, and the public feeling of bitterness now turned against Pericles in the form of open

attacks. He was obliged to summon an assembly, in order to defend himself and his statesmanship. This he did: but instead of fawning upon the people, or displaying any readiness for concession, he confronted them with a pride and firmness, a severity and self-consciousness, even surpassing those of his previous bearing. On no other occasion had he proved to his fellow-citizens his superiority and his personal mission as their leader, with so perfect a simplicity and dignity, and with so perfect a freedom from all false modesty, as in the hour of extremest danger; they were to feel that they were vilifying and misjudging him, because they were no longer worthy of him. "With what have ye to reproach me?" he asked them. "I have remained the same; it is you who vacillate: not the courageous man is blameable, but the timid and short-sighted. If it was an error to have resolved upon war, you are equally at fault with myself; but it was your duty to act thus, and not otherwise. It is folly and blindness thoughtlessly to break a happy peace; but to make a voluntary sacrifice of such a dominion as yours is not only disgraceful, but even impossible, without exposing yourselves to extreme dangers. Why are ye afraid? The sea is yours, and all its coasts and harbors; it is in your own power, if you wish, to extend your rule yet further; for no king, and no nation of the earth, dares to meet your triremes. And you are troubled about your little few fields and farm-buildings! True, a new and unexpected calamity has supervened upon that of war, for which we had to be prepared, and has put your firmness to a severe test. Your grief I honor; but your want of spirit is not justifiable; nor ought you to allow any calamity to bend you so low as to make you sacrifice shamefully what your fathers honorably acquired; rather is it your present duty to bear your domestic misery in mindfulness of the flourishing state of the commonwealth; for if you allow the latter to fall away, a state of happi-

ness is assuredly inconceivable for each one of you, even as a private person."

Prosecution and condemnation of Pericles. Ol. lxxxvii. 2, ad fin. (B. C. 430.)

Once more Pericles, by his power of speech, succeeded in raising to his own level the community which had become estranged to him. They resolved to break off all negotiations, and courageously to carry on the war according to his plan; probably it was also about this time that he was again nominated commander-in-chief for the coming year. Meanwhile, his enemies continued active, and used their utmost endeavors to prevent the excitement which they had called forth in the public mind from passing away without any results. The slight success of the naval expeditions operated in their favor: from Potidæa the fleet which Pericles had resigned to his colleagues returned to Athens in a melancholy plight; instead of at last taking the city, it had merely spread the contagion among the troops engaged in the siege; of 4,000 soldiers, in a few weeks nearly 1,000 had perished. Accordingly, when Pericles at the expiration of his year of office had to give a public account of his administration (an obligation which in his case was generally a mere formality), his adversaries, amongst whom Cleon, Simmias, and Lacratidas are mentioned, instituted a new suit against him. He was accused of criminal neglect in the administration of public moneys; the College of the Thirty found the documents of his accounts not in perfect order; and accordingly under their presidency a jury was summoned, by which Pericles was found guilty. In consequence of this verdict, his nomination as general was cancelled; other generals were named; and for the first time after many years Pericles was again a simple citizen, deprived of all authority, and even a debtor of the state; for he had been sentenced to a heavy fine. He retired entirely to private life. But here new sufferings awaited him; for though full of years and near

the close of a life unwearyingly devoted to the public good, he was not to be permitted to find consolation and compensation for the fickleness of the multitude in his family, or in the closest intimacy of faithful companions The pestilence made fearful havoc in this circle. His eldest son died, without having been reconciled to his father; his sister, with whom he was on affectionate terms, was torn away; and, besides these, a number of men died who were the instruments of his statesmanship and the confidential participators in his administration. A melancholy feeling of solitude came over the sorely-tried old man; but he remained unshaken and vigorous, and his temper calm and equable; nor could his enemies prove one hour of weakness against him. But of a sudden the pestilence seized upon his younger son, whom he had called Paralus —a Heroic appellative alluding to Athens' sway of the sea; and as the father bound the son's temples with the funeral wreath, the paternal heart broke; and for the first time the Athenians saw their great fellow-citizen overcome by the weight of grief, and breaking out into loud wailings over the evil fortunes of his house.

Pericles re-elected Strategus. Ol. lxxxvii. 3. (B. C. 430-29.)

Meanwhile the new generals endeavored to guide the helm of the state, but without success; impotent and irresolute, they drifted without design or plan. On every occasion when they appeared before the people, the latter became more fully conscious of the difference between these men and Pericles, whose vigorous will it had accustomed itself to obey; and thus it came to pass that the murmurs against Pericles were changed into a longing after him. The people felt, as it were, forlorn and orphaned; and the first consolation which his friends brought to him after his sufferings was the news of a reaction in the sentiments of the citizens, of their repentance and longing after him. For a time he remained in shy retirement, till the voice of the citizens rose to a higher and

higher pitch. The vessel of the state was swaying hither and thither without safe guidance; and at last the aged statesman was once more prevailed upon to take the helm. His honor was most thoroughly satisfied by a public declaration; and the office of general-in-chief was again entrusted to him, coupled with an extensive authority. He reappeared before the people with solemn and gentle mien, free from anger or petty exultation, or ignoble desires of revenge; instead of which, he displayed an anxiety generously to pardon the instability of the multitude. As a guarantee of the restoration of mutual confidence, he demanded the adoption of a resolution whereby his own law, according to which only the offspring of a legitimate wedlock between citizens should be accounted as the sons of citizens (vol. ii. p. 540,) was abolished. It was well known that in this matter his thoughts were in the first instance of his own house, and that he desired the legitimization of a son of his own by Aspasia; for the heaviest calamity which could befal a Hellene was to see his house die out. Meanwhile, it may probably be assumed, that, after the devastations of the pestilence, Pericles thought a change and relaxation of the law in question advisable on public grounds.*

Fall of Potidæa. Ol. lxxxvii. 3. (B. C. 430-29.)

He had the advantage of an unexpected event, which had added new fuel to the popular hatred of Sparta. Towards the end of the summer, a Peloponnesian embassy was sent to Persia, in order, through the mediation of Pharnaces, the satrap in Asia Minor, to induce the Great King to offer effective support to the Peloponnesian cause. At the head of this embassy stood Aristeus (p. 16), to whose exertions, undertaken with the primary object of saving Potidæa, its despatch was doubtless principally due; for the Corinthians themselves were so closely

* See Note V. Appendix.

blockaded by Phormio, that their ships could pass neither in nor out. Aristeus was officially accompanied by three Spartans and one Tegeate. On the road it was their intention to induce Sitalces, the most powerful barbarian prince next to the Great King, to secede from the Athenian alliance; instead of which the Athenians, through Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, and an honorary citizen of Athens, contrived to procure the capture of the embassy when it was about to cross the Hellespont. The prisoners were delivered into the hands of the Athenians, and brought to Athens. They were received with an uncontrollable outburst of rage by the citizens; and in particular the hatred of Aristeus—the most dangerous of all Peloponnesians and the author of the revolt of Potidæa—caused them to be hurried to execution untried, on the very day of their arrival. The Lacedæmonians recognized in this terrible event the curse of Talthybius, who was still angry with them because they had once put to death the envoys of King Darius. Xerxes had disdained to take vengeance for it upon the two heralds which had been delivered up to him; they had returned uninjured, and now upon their sons, Nicolaus and Aneristus, the Nemesis was fulfilled. Although this measure might find an excuse in the national treason involved in the purpose of the embassy, and still more in a series of similar acts of violence on the part of Sparta, it is scarcely credible that it could have been carried out after the restoration of the authority of Pericles. But henceforth it seemed as if all hopes of peace were for ever at an end; and the adherents of Pericles were proportionately successful when they urged the most energetic prosecution of the war. In the following winter, Potidæa had at last to capitulate. The courage of her brave citizens had been broken by the extremity of famine, after they had held out for more than two years: even the besiegers, in this inclement season of the year, found themselves in so intolerable a

plight, that, in order to make an end of the matter, they, to the great annoyance of the Athenians, allowed the citizens to depart unhurt. The city was peopled afresh with Attic settlers. A great advantage had been obtained, but at a heavy price. The allies had been made aware of the possibility of a successful resistance; and it was out of the question that even the Attic finances could support many sieges of the kind.*

Third summer of the war. Ol. lxxxvii. 3-4. (B. C. 429.)

In the spring of the third year of the war, the Peloponnesians evinced no anxiety to pay another visit to Attica, devastated as it was by war and pestilence; instead of which they appeared under Archidamus before Platææ; while at the same time an Attic fleet sailed to Thrace, where the tribes above Potidæa continued in a state of revolt, and where Olynthus in particular had remained a dangerous fortified position. In the neighborhood of Olynthus lay Spartolus, before the walls of which a battle was fought, in which the Athenians met with considerable losses.

Acarnania. Naval battles in the gulf of Corinth.

A third theatre of war was Acarnania, a country regarded by either party as a favorable and important arena on which to carry out its policy; a land of great fertility, and abounding in strongholds, but devoid of any advanced municipal life, and of any firm cohesion and obedience to one common headship. Acarnania was composed of a group of independent communities, divided in their sympathies between Sparta and Athens, although the sentiments of the majority were Attic. The impulse to war in this instance proceeded from Ambracia, the most enterprising of all the daughter-cities of Corinth. Ambracia saw in the political situation a favorable opportunity for

* Curse of Talthybius: Herod. vii. 134. Thuc. ii. 67—Fall of Potidæa, *ib.*, 70. The garrison departed uninjured (after τινὲς καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγεγένυντο.)

subjecting to herself the territory of her neighbors, the Acarnanians. For this purpose the Ambraciotes combined with the tribes of Epirus, and marched with a powerful force down the valley of the Achelous against Stratus, the capital of the Acarnanians; while, according to a preconcerted plan, the Peloponnesians supported the undertaking by land and sea; for it was hoped not only to tear Acarnania out of the Athenian alliance, but also to capture the islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus, and even Naupactus, and thus once more to free the gulf of Corinth. For this purpose, one thousand heavy-armed troops from Sparta, under the admiral Cnemus, had united with the Ambraciotes for an assault upon Stratus. But this assault resulted in a failure, on account of the want of efficient guidance, and because of the senseless lust of booty on the part of the northern allies; although Phormio found himself unable to come to the rescue of the city, for a Corintho-Sicyonian fleet of thirty-seven ships was approaching, and endeavored to cross the gulf unobserved. Not only was this endeavor frustrated by the sagacity and vigilance of Phormio, but he even made an unexpected attack upon the enemy's fleet in the open sea, and displayed so great a superiority of naval tactics, that, without any loss on his own side, he involved the hostile ships, whose number doubled those of his own, in confusion, captured twelve triremes, and carried off a large number of captives. It was the most brilliant victory which the Athenians had achieved in the course of the war.

But Phormio was to gain no lasting result from his victory; for the Lacedæmonians, indignant at the double frustration of their plans, speedily assembled a new fleet of seventy-seven ships; while on the other hand the twenty additional triremes urgently demanded by Phormio failed to reach him, because the Athenians were deluded by vain anticipations into sending them in the first instance to Crete, for the purpose of capturing Cydonia (vol. ii. p. 227).

This undertaking resulted in utter failure; in addition to which the north winds beset the squadron, and thus caused the waste of precious time. For, meanwhile, Phormio was in a situation of extreme difficulty, the hostile fleet not only nearly quadrupling his own in numbers, but on this occasion being also commanded by sagacious leaders. For Cnemus was accompanied by Brasidas (p. 62), who contrived very skilfully to use his numerical superiority. In order to avoid a conflict on the open sea, he, by means of a pretended attack upon Naupactus, placed the Attic triremes in a position close by the shore, where, deprived as they were of freedom of movement, they were suddenly surprised and nine of them cut off, while the remaining eleven effected their escape to Naupactus. However, the nine triremes were in part saved by the marvellous courage of the Messenians, who followed the Athenians by land, and notwithstanding the weight of their armor stepped into the water, climbed up the ships, and defended them. The vessels which had made good their escape directed a new and resolute attack from the harbor upon their pursuers, and were so successful, that they not only completely put to flight the pursuing division of the hostile fleet, but also recaptured their own ships, took many of the enemy's, and forced the whole Peloponnesian fleet to retire into their harbor of Panormus. Soon afterwards, the squadron which had been delayed at Crete also made its appearance; and the summer season being now nearly at an end, all the undertakings of the Peloponnesians both by land and by sea had been utterly frustrated, the victorious power of the Attic ships had admirably asserted itself, and, notwithstanding all the exertions of the enemy, the Corinthian gulf was, more securely than ever before, under the dominion of the Athenians.*

In all these conflicts in the eastern and western waters

* Cydonia: Thuc. ii. 88.—Conflicts in the bay: *ib.* 80 f.

Pericles had taken no personal part, nor was he even at home, in Athens, what he once had been. The unwise expedition against Cydonia proves that things might be done in distinct contravention of his public policy. But a Periclean guidance of public affairs needed perfect health of body and mind; and his vigor was broken and his vital power affected. The disease continued to rage in Athens; and after his house and the circle of his friends had wasted away under its attacks, it seized upon himself. Not suddenly did it prostrate him, but like a secret poison it slowly consumed the sap of his life, and at last prostrated him on a bed of sickness. Even the lofty power of his will had been broken; and, as if to show his friends to what an end the great Pericles had come, he pointed out to them the amulet which superstitious women had hung round his neck as a protecting charm. There he lay, surrounded by the best among his fellow-citizens, who, with glances bespeaking their inconsolable grief, asked of one another what was to become of Athens, when she had lost Pericles. When they, believing him to have already lost his consciousness, spoke of his glorious deeds and works, thus as it were paying a tribute to his memory, he raised himself once more on his bed, and demanded why they had passed over what was best of all: that no Athenian had on his account been forced to wear the garb of mourning. Thus it was not his lofty intellect, not his commanding eloquence, not his success as a general, which he prized most highly among his qualities, but his moderation, his self-command, and calm prudence; and he was able to say of himself with truth, that even the most venomous attacks against his person had never tempted him in a moment of anger to wreak his vengeance on his enemies.

Death of Pericles. Ol. lxxxvii. 4. (B.C. 429, Autumn.)

The war had lasted for two years and six months, when Pericles died. He was buried in the outer Ceramicus, to the right of the main road leading to the ports, in the vicin-

ity of the vast resting-place of the Athenians who had fallen in the service of their country. His personal aspect was preserved to posterity in excellent representations; the best being by the hand of Cresilas, who proved himself a true artist by representing a great man in accordance with actual life, and yet conveying his spiritual individuality more clearly than his bodily features would have themselves been able to express it. The depth of moral purpose, the indomitable courage of the statesman and commander, and the royal calm of the sage, are unmistakably brought before us even in the copy which has come down to us; while on the delicately-formed lips a trace seems to linger of the beauties of the eloquence which once flowed from them.*

Review of the administration of Pericles.

Of Pericles it cannot be asserted, that he established entirely new points of view for the administration of the Attic state; for he was not, like other statesmen of genius, an innovator desirous of marking out new tracks for the progress of the nation; instead of which he in all essential points based his policy on the previous history of the city, while all his endeavors were directed towards preserving Athens great on the foundations which he found already in existence, towards establishing her upon them, and towards placing her before the world in the most dignified aspect. In adding his efforts to free the civic community more and more from the influence of privileged classes, and to advance the participation of all the citizens of the state in public affairs, Pericles only followed in the track of Solon and Clisthenes, to whom the republic owed her distinctive constitution. Again, the view from which he proceeded, that on the sea would be decided the question as to which was to be the ruling state in Greece, and his

* As to Cresilas, see Bergk, *Z. f. Alt.* 1845, p. 962; and Brunn *ubi supr.* i. 262, *Arch. Ztg.* 1860, p. 40. *Conze*, 1868, p. 1 f.

demand upon the Athenians to sacrifice their territory and defend their city as if it had been an island, merely reproduced the ideas of Themistocles, whose penetration had first discovered the real foundations of Attic dominion. At the same time, Pericles differed vastly from Themistocles in the choice of means and in the many-sidedness of his statesmanship. For in his moral conception of his calling he was the most faithful successor of Aristides; and the great historian of his times, who is at the same time the sternest and the most truthful judge of morality, has found himself able to acquit Pericles of every reproach of selfishness. In the next place, he sought the real greatness of Athens not in her walls and docks, but in the eminent intellectual culture of his fellow-citizens. Therefore, in making Athens the home of all the higher tendencies of a generous culture, and securing an undisputed pre-eminence in this field to his native city, he recurred to the ideas of Solon, which the Pisistratidæ had subsequently pursued with so praiseworthy a zeal. Nor was he loth to adopt from other states what deserved imitation; as, *e. g.*, in the foundation of cities beyond the sea, he took for his model the political intelligence of Corinth. In short, the greatness of Pericles essentially consists in his uniting in himself all the great and productive ideas of earlier times—ideas refined and regulated by him, and made to form one grand system; and the greatness of Athens, for which he worked to the last, without allowing either good or evil fortune to divert him from the pursuit, was no greatness imagined by him, no ideal formed out of philosophic theories, but the goal demanded by the past, a goal which Athens must reach, or prove untrue to herself and her mission in history. None will care to assert, that he pursued his task in life wholly without thoughts of self; but no low craving, no love of money, or of personal ease, polluted his public life; and in the midst of a community distracted by parties he never allowed himself to be tempted to an

abuse of power. And if he sought for dominion, that dominion was in the highest degree both blameless and his due; for whoever in mental power and judgment stands as superior to his fellow-citizens as Pericles stood is in truth not only justified in employing his royal gifts for the guidance of his fellow-citizens, but it is his duty thus to employ them. It was his duty to rule, as long as he could rule without violating the constitution; and his sway was not based on the humiliation of the citizens before him, but on their rising to his level, and being by him continually guided in the pursuit of the highest objects of life. He might hope that, in proportion as his proved itself the true policy in the time of the greatest dangers, the Athenians would the more willingly give themselves up to him; for they could not but recognize the necessity of an undivided guidance of public affairs by one hand. Athens had become the centre of an empire. The government of a dominion like this could not without the greatest disadvantages and dangers be left to an assembly of citizens, unable in their collective capacity to form a correct judgment of the mass of political complications. After, then, the most difficult task had been accomplished, viz., the union of a large body of Hellenic population in one collective state, in which even the old distinctions of tribes became equalized, these results could only be secured to the Athenians by extraordinary means, *i. e*, by the guidance of city and state under *one* vigorous will, supported by the confidence of the civic community. But, it is asked, how could a rule of this kind be permanently maintained? how could it be assumed by another after the death of Pericles? Assuredly the latter had taken thought of this emergency for many years before his end; and among the intimate friends who surrounded him until he was left desolate by the pestilence, there were, doubtless, men who appeared to him adapted to carry on his work. But even if he could in no way calculate upon the permanency of

the greatness of Athens, was this to prevent him from expending the fulness of his powers upon the realization of the end which he proposed to himself? Rather, it was imperatively necessary with determined energy to employ the present, which would nevermore return under the same conditions. He was aware that the true greatness of an epoch is not dependent on the time of its endurance; he knew that the realization of the loftiest ideal of a Hellenic community in Athens would be a possession for ever to his city and people. His endeavor was an effort of lofty daring, but it was at the same time supported by the deepest reflection; and accordingly, notwithstanding the sadness of his own end, the work of his life was crowned with immortal success. This success, indeed, did not at once become evident; for never, probably, was a great statesman more unjustly judged, and even by the best of his people more seriously misunderstood than was Pericles. The voices of his contemporaries show how reluctantly his greatness was acknowledged, and how men sought to withdraw themselves from the burdensome feeling of unqualified admiration, by means of malicious criticisms and calumnies. In the excited times which preceded the war, an impartial estimate of his services was impossible. All parties were against him, and detraction of his character was the one thing in which aristocrats and democrats agreed. While, however, in other cases, after the death of eminent men, a true estimate is usually formed, this was not the case in regard to Pericles. For times of misfortune came on, for which he was held responsible; abuses and evils appeared in public life which were regarded as consequences of his policy; there followed leaders of the citizens with whom he was classed without seeing the chasm which lay between him and the later demagogues. In this he has been misunderstood by historians and philosophers, even by Plato and Aristotle.

So much the more thankful are we to the one man who

makes it possible for us, in spite of all distortions, to discern again the original features of the picture; so much the more delightful is the task of following with admiration, from the hand of Thucydides, all the traces which that mighty spirit impressed upon the history of his people.*

* As to the judgments passed on Pericles by his contemporaries, and by men of subsequent generations, cf. Sauppe, *Quellen Plut. im Leben d. Perikl.* p. 6., Cf. Rühl, *Quellen d. plut. Perikl. in Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1, § 68, p. 657.

CHAPTER II.

THE WAR TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS.

DURING the whole course of the war no more fatal event happened than the Attic pestilence, and the death of Pericles which it superinduced. For, although the position of Athens towards foreign states remained for a time the same, yet the city had at home undergone essential changes.

Changes in the civic body.

The flower of the citizens had perished; many families, in which ancient discipline and usage had maintained themselves, had died out; and thus the living connection with the age of Aristides and Cimon had come to an end. The demoralization occasioned by the pestilence was not merely a passing effect; for the war, which continued to burn with increasing vehemence, and which not only severed the nation of the Hellenes into two irreconcilably hostile camps, but also broke up every single community into parties-could have no other influence than that of everywhere exciting the passions and unchaining selfish impulses. The moral and religious bonds which had united the Greeks as members of one body and as citizens of a common country had been broken, and, together with them, the virtues based upon Hellenic patriotism had gradually become obsolete. Hence the general complaints as to the demoralized younger generation and the degenerate sons of the leading citizens of the state. Pericles was not the only father who had to undergo an experience of this kind in his own house: the descendants of Themistocles, Aristides, and Thucydides the son of Melesias offered other sad

examples of the decay of morality; and, similarly, the sons of the great sculptor Polyclitus, who had emigrated to Athens. The wealth which it had taken their ancestors a long time to collect was wasted in frivolous pleasures; and thus the noblest families of the city fell into decay and dishonor. One of these was the illustrious house in which the office of the heralds and torch-bearers in the Eleusinian mysteries was hereditary, to which belonged Callias, the haughty opponent of the Pisistratidæ (vol. i. p. 379), whose grandson, Callias, fought at Marathon, and went as ambassador to Susa; his successor was Hipponicus (vol. ii. p. 507), whose ceremony held together the increasing wealth of the house, who commanded at Tanagra in the year 426, and who was the last to uphold the honor of the family. For his son, the third Callias, soon after the death of Pericles commenced an utterly spendthrift life in his father's house, and in a brief space of time wasted his inheritance upon courtesans, Sophists, and worthless parasites; so that he, the bearer of the most sacred priestly offices, could be held up on the comic stage as a type of degenerate Athens.*

Moreover, in consequence of the great loss of population occasioned by the pestilence, the strictness previously observed in reference to the civic franchise of Attica had been relaxed. Pericles had himself occasioned the first instance of such a relaxation (p. 75), and the result was that a multitude of foreign elements invaded the civic community, while family life was shaken more and more by the admittance of many illegitimate children. Furthermore, the troubles of war and sickness had caused the gymnastic exercises to fall into disuse, which had so largely contributed to maintain the young men in a vigo-

* With regard to the frequent instances of degenerate sons, cf. Plat. *Protag.* pp. 139 (with Sauppe's note) and 328; Bergk, *Rel. Com. Att.* 351; Plat. *Laches* (ed. Jahn), pp. xxii. xxviii. Concerning Callias, see above, vol. II. p. 410; Stein *ad Herod.* vi. 121. Generally as to the φορὰ ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν, Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 15.

rous state of bodily and mental health. The public practising-grounds outside the gates became more and more desolate and empty, while the market-place was densely thronged from morning to evening by a babbling crowd. For many citizens, whom the war had torn from their ordinary occupations, had accustomed themselves to an idle and frivolous town life; and the relations between town and country had undergone an entire change.

The Athenians of previous generations loved the air and life of the country; and those who were able to suit their inclinations felt more at ease and at home in the country, on their little country-seats, than within the city walls. For this reason also the rural dwellings were far more comfortable and pleasant than the houses in town; and many citizens scarcely came into the city even on the festivals. Now, all this had changed. The Athenians saw the lands destroyed, which they had inherited from their fathers, and improved from year to year by prudent management, together with all their walks and other resources of comfort and recreation. The proprietors would never again take pleasure in their ancient usages and enjoyments of life; for how was it possible to recover confidence in the future? Many husbandmen never again returned to the plough, but remained in the city; where, in the constant succession of different pleasures, and in the excitement of market and party life, they endeavored to forget the uneasy conditions of their existence. Thus, a discontented and turbulent multitude was formed in Athens—a kind of mob, such as had been unknown to Athens in her earlier days. The love of work, which Pericles was still able to praise as one of the most eminent virtues of his fellow-citizens, grew weak; and the personal interest in public affairs, which was at once the right and the duty of every citizen, changed, in the unhealthy atmosphere of the blockaded city, where all most important undertakings had suddenly come to a standstill, into an over-busy and over-curious

idleness, and an indolent love of babbling, which all the enemies of the democracy were soon able to regard as a characteristic of an Attic citizen.

Thus, in a short space of time, the civic community of Athens became an unsteady multitude which allowed itself to be swayed by uncertain feelings, a multitude which vacillated between arrogance and cowardice, between infidelity and superstitious excitement. The principles of the older citizens, which had opposed a vigorous resistance to the free-thinking of the Sophists (vol. ii. p. 480), had lost their power; and thus it came to pass, that the citizens fell away with irresistible rapidity from the religion of their fathers, and gave themselves up to the love of doubt and mockery, and to contempt of the gods. On the other hand, the feeling of the existing spiritual void induced men once more to seek consolation from religion; and in this case the public institutions of divine worship were considered insufficient, and refuge was taken in abnormal usages pretending to beneficial effects, sought out from forgotten traditions, or introduced from abroad; and associations for the purpose of private mysteries were formed, in which new modes of purification and ceremonies were employed for the tranquilization of the mind. Accordingly, fanatical enthusiasts, soothsayers, and wandering oracle-mongers acquired a very important influence.

Changes in the leadership of the people.

The moral change which had thus befallen the Attic community had, it is true, even during the lifetime of Pericles, manifested itself by means of sufficiently clear premonitory signs; but Pericles had, notwithstanding, up to the days of his last illness, remained thecentre of the state; the people had again and again returned to him, and by subordinating themselves to the personal authority of Pericles had succeeded in recovering the demeanor which befitted them. But now the voice was hushed, which had been able to sway the unruly citizens, even against their

will. No other authority was in existence—no aristocracy, no official class, no board of experienced statesmen—nothing, in fact, to which the citizens might have looked for guidance and control. The multitude had recovered absolute independence, and in proportion as, in the interval, readiness of speech and sophistic versatility had spread in Athens, the number had increased of those who now put themselves forward as popular speakers and leaders. But as, among all these, none was capable of leading the multitude after the fashion of Pericles, another method of leading the people, another kind of *demagogy*, sprung into existence. Pericles stood above the multitude. He ruled by arousing the noble and active impulses in the minds of the citizens, who by the earnestness marking his treatment of them, and by the moral demands which he made upon them, were raised above their own level; they were ashamed to give voice in his hearing to their weaknesses and low cravings. His successors were obliged to adopt other means; in order to acquire influence, they took advantage not so much of the strong as of the weak points in the character of the citizens, and achieved popularity by flattering their inclinations, and endeavoring to satisfy the cravings of their baser nature. Thus, the demagogues, who had formerly been the leaders and solemn counsellors of the people, now became its servants and flatterers. And as in this system of demagogy not a small number might emulate one another, each had rapidly to give way to his successor; a quick change of influential personages ensued; whereby, at the same time, a consistent conduct of public affairs according to definite political principles of action was rendered impossible.

This new phase of affairs is intimately connected with another momentous change.

The Attic aristocracy had indeed been long overthrown as a power in the state; nor was the nobility any longer in possession of any privileges, so far as the institutions of

civil society were concerned. At the same time, it cannot be said that the aristocracy had lost all actual influence upon public life; and it is only necessary to review the names of the men who during the fifth century B. C. most brilliantly distinguished themselves in art and science, both at Athens and elsewhere—such men as Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Parmenides, Pindar and Æschylus, Herodotus and Thucydides—in order to attain to a conviction, that the ancient families of the nation still continued especially productive of eminent talents, and that hereditary wealth, as well as the superior degree of culture and intellectual aspirations which prevailed in civic families of repute, still continued to exercise their effects in the happy development of innate gifts, and to produce individualities prominently distinguished among their contemporaries. The statesmen who had succeeded one another in the guidance of public affairs at Athens equally belonged to ancient families; nor was Pericles himself ever false to his aristocratic birth and instincts, although he knew how to base his right of nobility upon other claims than that of descent.

Henceforth, all this was changed. Now, for the first time, men belonging to the lower class of citizens thrust themselves forward to play a part in politics,—men of the trading and artisan class, the culture and wealth of which had so vigorously increased at Athens. Yet the ancient prejudices were by no means removed on this account; and the adherents of ancient usage continued to take offence, when they saw men who pursued the occupation of an ordinary citizen, whose youth had been passed in workshops, and who were devoid of a liberal training in the music and gymnastic arts, taking the lead in the public assemblies, and aspiring to fill influential offices of state. These men, for their part, were placed in an advantageous position as against the aristocrats, since it was infinitely more easy for them to deal with the multitude, and to arrive at an under-

The new class of demagogues.

standing with it; they stood far nearer to the common crowd, and had no intention of raising it above its ordinary views and feelings: the multitude accordingly met them with confidence, and was ready to make excuses for them, as it delighted in leaders who made no pretence of being superior to the great body of the citizens, and who awakened no painful feeling of inferiority, such as that which was natural in the presence of a Pericles. And since the civic community had itself in the course of the war undergone an essential change, and since the leaders issuing forth from that body were anxious to accommodate themselves to its habits and humors, the mode of dealing with public affairs necessarily underwent a simultaneous change. The civic assemblies grew larger, louder, and less orderly; the business was carried on after a more passionate and tumultuous fashion, because the guidance of a superior spirit was absent, and because the entire multitude accordingly took a more direct part in the proceedings, and unhesitatingly displayed its momentary feelings,—its favor and disfavor, its satisfaction and its impatience. At the same time, all the bad sides of Attic constitutional life so openly manifested themselves, that the more reflecting citizens, who considered moderation and calm the first requisites for political life, were seized with disgust at public affairs, and that both the name and the reality of democracy fell into contempt. The citizens of superior culture retired, and refrained from participation in the assemblies, because their principles prevented them from applying the only effective means of success. Thus the new demagogues attained to a still more complete command of the field, and the commonwealth was deprived of the services of many excellent citizens.

The demagogues no longer military commanders.

The new demagogues, however, were not equally useful for every kind of public service. For, although their talents secured to them a successful command of the ora-

tor's tribune, yet they were, as a rule, neither inclined nor qualified for military commands. For the latter, a different training and different qualities were requisite. Moreover, most of them shrank from the personal dangers of the office, from the responsibility and the various sacrifices which were connected with it, without any hope at the same time offering itself of corresponding advantages. Thus one of the most important changes which occurred at this time consisted in the separation of the office of general from the position of popular leader. Hitherto, it had been impossible to conceive of a statesman who had not at the same time proved himself in the field; and Pericles had presented the illustrious type of a leader powerful in word and in deed, by his speech and by his sword, on the fleet and on the Pnyx. Henceforth, even men who had won no honors in war, and who had never risked their life for the state, were permitted to address the people upon the conduct of wars, and to subject to their criticism, and call to account, the men who were undergoing deprivations and dangers abroad. Moreover, the generals were obliged to maintain strict discipline, and thus made themselves unpopular among a community, which was endeavoring more and more to escape all forms of discipline and subordination, particularly as in the course of the war even the citizens of the lowest property-class, the Thetes (vol. i. p. 354), served as heavy-armed soldiers. Thus a multiplicity of disputes was inevitable, and the demagogues were generally ready to take part against the generals. Hence the separation of the two most influential of all public positions necessarily resulted in a state of hostility between the occupants of either; and this adverse relation between the generals and demagogues became the germ of the greatest misfortunes for Athens. The office of general frequently became a post of martyrdom; and the bravest men felt that the prospect of being called to account as to their campaigns by cowardly demagogues, before a capricious

multitude, disturbed the straightforward joyousness of their activity, and threw obstacles in the way of their successes.

The Athenian generals: Phormio.

The Athenians had no lack of proved military commanders. Phormio, the son of Asopius, was still in the full vigor of his age, who had taken an important part in the Samian war, by the side of Pericles, commanded at the siege of Potidæa, and latterly gained victories in the bay of Crisa, which belong to the most brilliant successes in Attic military history. He was a soldier of the ancient stamp, short of speech, resolute and severe, a model of temperance and blamelessness of life. And yet he too had already been subjected to a persecution, resulting in his condemnation by the popular tribunal to a fine of 10,000 drachms, which he, whose unselfishness had left him a poor man, was unable to pay. In consequence, he was stripped of all public honors, and retired into the country. When the Acarnanians applied for aid against the allies of Corinth, and requested that the celebrated Phormio might be placed in command of the Attic auxiliaries, he refused to accept the office, until the citizens absolved him from his fine, and gave him full satisfaction for the heavy injury inflicted upon his honor. Like Phormio, the other eminent commanders, who with or after him led the Attic troops, Lamachus, Laches, Charœades, Pythodorus, Paches, and Demosthenes, had, almost without exception, to pass through similar conflicts with the popular orators.*

The demagogues as orators;

In the matter of military commands, the place of Pericles could be to a certain extent filled by men of the ancient school of war; although in the field also the consistent execution of definite strategical plans ceased, being in fact only possible

* As to the remission of fines, see Bœckh, *P. E.* vol. ii. p. 125 (*E. Tr.*) As to the position of the σώφρονες (p. 92, *infra*), cf. Thuc. iii. 43. Even the τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντες have to pursue crooked courses.

as long as the office of commander-in-chief was for a period of several years entrusted to one man. On the orators' tribune the contrast was more striking. Here the first prominent successor of Pericles was a certain Eucrates, a rude and uneducated man, who was ridiculed on the comic stage as the "boar" or "bear of Melite" (the name of the district to which he belonged), a dealer in tow and mill-owner, who only for a short space of time took the lead in the popular assembly. His place was taken by Lysicles, who had acquired wealth by the cattle-trade. That Lysicles was no ordinary man is evident from the circumstance that Aspasia married him after the death of Pericles; and his intercourse with her is said to have first made him an eminent speaker. He also appears to have wished to re-unite the military command to the leadership of the people, after the fashion of Pericles; for in the year after the death of the latter he was general in Caria, where he fell. It was not until after Lysicles, that the demagogues attained to power who had first made themselves a name by their opposition against Pericles, and, among them, Cleon was the first who was able to maintain his authority for a longer period of time; so that it is in his proceedings during the ensuing years of the war that the whole character of the new demagogy first thoroughly manifests itself.*

Eucrates.

Lysicles.

Cleon.

* For Eucrates and Lysicles, cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* v. 131, Schol. As to the connection between Aspasia and Lysicles, cf. Plut. *Pericl.* 24; Harpocr. s. v. 'Ασπ. Are we to assume a connection between them already before the death of Pericles? Otherwise the anecdote of her influence as an instructress must be rejected. The entire story of this connection was, according to Cobet, *Prosopogr. Xenoph.* p. 81, an invention of Æschines (as to whose dialogue, *Aspasia*, cf. K. Fr. Hermann, *de Æsch. Socr.* p. 16 f.); according to Sauppe (*Quellen Pl.* p. 13), an invention of the comic poets.

Aristocratic circles.

Of course, the change which took place in the conduct of public affairs was not effected without incurring opposition at Athens itself. As yet, some of the distinctions between the different classes of society remained uneffaced. Many felt themselves by their birth, wealth, and superior refinement of culture placed in a necessary opposition against the multitude, which was well pleased to give itself up to its new leaders; and the religious institutions, as well as military service, contributed to keep alive aristocratic tendencies in the midst of the perfected democracy. For not only did all the most sacred priesthoods of the state remain a hereditary privilege of certain families, upon whom they conferred a special distinction before the rest; but none except daughters and sons of noble and wealthy houses were chosen to perform those religious functions, the performers of which annually changed (as, *e. g.*, the office of the *Arrephori*, who administered the worship of the city-goddess on the citadel, under the superintendence of the priestess, as it were as the representatives of the entire community; and the choral dance of the *Oschophori*, or vine-bearers, who were to call to mind the Attic youth saved by Theseus from Crete). To represent the city abroad, again, men of noble family continued to be chosen. Finally, while ordinary military service had lost in estimation, cavalry service had gained in importance. The horsemen were the only standing body of troops in Athens; in consequence of the very method after which they were levied, they formed an association, wherein an aristocratic spirit of class could not fail to be kept alive. The numbers of the Attic cavalry had been raised to 1,000 before the war; and there are good grounds for assuming that Pericles favored and encouraged this body of troops (which he caused to be represented in stone on the Parthenon in so splendid a style), in order to obtain in them a counterbalance against the multitude.

The thorough aristocrats.

The resistance which these aristocratic circles opposed to the democracy was of a twofold character: for, in the first instance, there yet existed in the noble families enemies on principle of the constitution, who believed the salvation of the state to be impossible, except on condition of a complete return to the past. These either withdrew in deep discontent from all participation in public affairs, or endeavored to establish their political principles by means of secret associations, and to prepare themselves for open action when the proper opportunity should occur. This was the revolutionary party, which in the days of Marathon, of Platææ, and Tanagra (vol. ii. pp. 251, 366, 440) had shown itself ready to betray the city to the enemy, as long as the latter would help to overthrow the democracy; a party which, for the purpose of overthrowing Pericles, had combined with the multitude and its leaders, and which even now continued, under the sham pretence of religion and higher principles of policy, to attack the legally established constitution. The errors and exaggerations of the latter were not unwelcome to this party, whose hopes were constantly revived by the troubles which came upon the city from abroad, and by the confusion into which it fell at home.

The Moderate party.

Considerably more numerous, however, was the other party, which, far from calling into question the constitution itself, was merely anxious to oppose its abuses, and to counteract the unlimited influence of the new demagogues. The position of this party was an uncommonly difficult one; inasmuch as its task was above all to temper and restrain, and to raise the voice of moderation, while the demagogues put forward bold projects, dazzled the multitude with the promise of brilliant successes, and with passionate warmth pursued particular ends corresponding to the wishes of the crowd. In proportion as the citizens were accustomed to

the flatteries of the new orators, the leaders of the Moderates found it difficult to acquire influence. They were forced, like the others, to sue for the favor of the multitude; surrounded by jealous enemies, they had anxiously to avoid everything of which advantage could be taken for casting suspicion upon them; they had to prove their character as munificent benefactors and friends of the people, and to attempt to gain their ends by all manner of circuitous paths. Finally, the existing state of things itself made it impossible for those whose common object it was to prevent evil effects arising from abuses of the constitution to possess such definite principles of political action, as are necessary for keeping a party firmly and permanently together for the purpose of united operations; a large number of the members of the Moderate party, the well-to-do and quiet citizens of Athens, were by nature ill-adapted for becoming active party-men; and such personages as Diodotus, the son of Eucrates, although of courageous spirit and high oratorical gifts, only transitorily took an active part in public affairs. Such were the difficulties surrounding the position of this party; the question as to its leadership was therefore of infinite importance.

Nicias.

There was, however, no difficulty as to choice; for among the well-to-do and moderate citizens Nicias, the son of Niceratus, was at that time so eminent a personage, that after the death of Pericles he became the centre of all who perceived the dangerous turn public affairs had taken. Nicias was the wealthiest man in Athens. He was the owner of great possessions in Laurium (vol. ii. p. 260), where 1,000 slaves labored for him in the silver-mines. At the same time he was a perfect master of Attic culture, experienced in political knowledge, and moreover endowed with the gift of speech, though he was no born orator: a man of blameless honor and proved efficiency, whom even the comic stage generally treated with respect. He had been a colleague

of Pericles in the generalship; and had on several occasions been distinguished and recommended by him. The fleet could be entrusted to no safer hands; accordingly, Nicias was *strategus* for five successive years after the death of Pericles. He was liberal and munificent after the example of Cimon, adorned the city with splendid dedicatory gifts, and when his turn arrived, took advantage of the Liturgies to delight the people with the most unusual spectacles. Upon the poor he bestowed profuse largesses, not only from kind and charitable motives, but also from anxious timidity and caution; it being his endeavor, not only to foster the ardor of his friends, but also to gain over those who disliked and might possibly damage him. He could not conceal his intentions; but the people was pleased notwithstanding, since it saw from his conduct how much depended, even for the powerful Nicias, upon public opinion. In his public life, also, he was anxious to surround himself with a certain semblance of importance; like Pericles, he kept apart from social intercourse; and his adherents were busy to spread the fame of his unceasing labors, and to motion officious visitors away from his doors. His bearing was measured and solemn; without ever denying his convictions, he was averse from expressing them, because he was by nature shy, and always afraid of injuring his own dignity by word or deed; he lacked the necessary courage for incurring any personal risk. He was, moreover, devoid of ambition, and had been placed in a prominent position by circumstances, rather than by any wish of his own. When he first rose to it, he was weak in health, and past his youth; he could no longer overcome his inborn want of resolution; and even as a general sought his chief strength in the avoidance of any mishap. And as he lacked the power of resolutely determining his own conduct, he was doubly anxious to find support elsewhere. Instead of, like Pericles, confronting the people in independence of spirit, and crushing all influences of su-

perstition, wherever they made their appearance, he was himself in a high degree dependent upon such influences; the dislike of modern free-thinking had led him to the other extreme; for he timidly attached importance to premonitory signs of all kinds, as well as to the declarations of the soothsayers, of whom one always dwelt under his roof. Thus, men of contemptible character, such as Diopithes, succeeded in establishing an influence over him. As to his political opinions, he was thoroughly loyal to the constitution, and animated by kindly feelings towards the people, and by an aversion from all secret intrigues. He wished, as against Sparta, to preserve the honor of Athens intact; but he regarded war as a misfortune, and considered an honorable peace possible.*

The power of money at Athens.

It is easy to perceive, that Nicias was not the man to remove the great difficulties against which the party of the Moderates had to contend. The citizens, however, were still possessed of sufficient judgment, to recognize the high value to them of such men as Nicias, by the side of the new demagogues; the people after all felt a desire for men who inspired in them an involuntary esteem, and therefore never refused their confidence to Nicias, and always honored him as a faithful counsellor. Nor was there any other man who could easily dispute with him his position in the state; since nowhere else existed a similar combination of character and merit with noble birth and wealth. The power of money was very great in Athens; and notwithstanding the equality upon which the democracy plumed itself, brave generals like Lamachus were on account of their want of means unable to attain

* As to the treatment of Nicias by Comedy; C. Fr. Hermann, *De personæ Niciæ apud Aristophanem*, 1835; Schmidt, *De vita Niciæ*, p. 10, sq., Aristotle on Nicias, *Plut.* c. 2. For Diopithes, cf. Hermann *ubi supr.* p. 25; Meineke, *Comm. Att.* i. 87; Droysen, *N. Rhein. Mus.* iii. 180; Roscher, *Klio*, p. 216.

to any permanent authority. Nicias himself regarded his wealth as the foundation of his power, and was exceedingly conscientious in its administration; he declined no means of profit, and let out his slaves to other persons for hire, as day-laborers. By reason of his wealth he had become the head of a party; and the distinction between the poor and the rich at Athens now manifested itself more sharply than ever; for those who had much to lose were most deeply interested in opposing a reckless conduct of public affairs. This division constituted a new germ of discontent and suspicion; for as soon as the party of Nicias opposed itself to reckless schemes of war, it was immediately suspected, that selfish motives induced them to prevent an energetic prosecution of the war, because the burdens of the latter rested principally on the members of this party. The orators who represented the multitude took every possible advantage of these feelings of distrust, and, by attacking the wealthy minority of the community, endeavored to increase their own popularity.

Progress of the war.

While these changes befell the inner life of Athens, the war proceeded without interruption and with increasing vehemence. The belligerent states, which in the first years of the war had contented themselves with endeavoring to discover at what points, and in what manner, they might most successfully attack one another, now began to make use of their experiences for more effective undertakings.

The Peloponnesians had already attempted to assert their power against the Athenians by sea; and since they were unable to force the latter to a battle by land, and to gain a victory after the ancient Spartan fashion, they had, against their usual custom, commenced a regular siege, in order to chastise the most faithful allies of Athens, the Platæans, and to gain a strong military position in the rear of the foe. The calamities which had

befallen Athens encouraged them to adopt a more vigorous method of warfare; and such personages as Brasidas (p. 62) had already found opportunities for distinguishing themselves by their efficient conduct of operations.

Extension of its limits.

At the same time a wider extent of country had gradually come to participate in the war. For, besides Attica and Bœotia, Acarnania also had now become one of the scenes of war; and, furthermore, the tribes of the north, which had hitherto remained wholly apart from the history of the Greek states, were now for the first time involved in its complications; and upon the chieftains of these tribes the idea first dawned: that the division among the Greek cities furnished the tribes with a chance of obtaining influence and plunder. Thus Epirote tribes, under their chieftains, had descended from the neighborhood of the Adriatic down the valley of the Achelous, in order to assist the Ambraciotes against the Acarnanians (p. 78); the King of the Odryse had already offered very effective aid to the course of Athens; for the crafty Perdiccas constantly lay in wait for taking advantage of the course of events, and unhesitatingly, while he was still in alliance with Athens, despatched auxiliaries to succor her enemies in Acarnania. Excitement prevailed among the allies, both on the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor, and the ambitious schemes of Pissuthnes, who had Arcadian mercenaries in his service, were no secret (vol. ii. p. 520). In Hellas itself the feeling of mutual enmity, both between the parties opposed to one another in the particular communities, and between the belligerent states, increased in bitterness; so that their redoubled eagerness to inflict damage upon the enemy drove them to continue the war even during the winter season.

Thus the Peloponnesians, after the conflicts in the Gulf of Corinth, undertook late in the year B. C., 429 (Ol. lxxxvii. 4), an expedition under Cnemus and Brasi-

das, which in boldness surpassed any previous enterprise upon which they had ventured. The crews of forty ships were landed in the vicinity of Corinth; each sailor took with him his oar, his seat cushion, and his strap; and with this equipment the men marched straight across the Isthmus in all speed, manned forty vessels from the magazines at Nicæa, and then sailed directly upon the Piræeus, which was known to be open towards the sea. The ships were on their way, and all circumstances seemed to promise success, when the Peloponnesians took fright at their own audacity, and, instead of seizing upon the favorable moment, landed at Salamis, captured the ships there, three in number, and devastated the island. Hereupon the alarm was given to the Athenians by fiery beacons; an awful terror came upon them, to find themselves thus suddenly surprised in their own waters; but this terror remained the only result of the expedition, and the Athenians learnt in future to keep a better watch over their port.

Peloponnesian expedition across the Isthmus. Ol. lxxxvii. 4. (B. C. 429.)

In the north of the Ægean also the commencement of winter was accompanied by new doings of war. Perdiccas had failed to perform the promises made by him when he joined the alliance of the Odrysæ and the Athenians; accordingly Sitalces assembled an army of 100,000 foot and 50,000 horse for an invasion of Macedonia. All the country as far as Thermopylæ trembled at the approach of the barbarian hosts, which included the most warlike tribes of the North; and the enemies of Athens were fully persuaded that *their* subjection was the object of the march. The immediate intention of Sitalces was to establish the pretender Amyntas on the throne of Macedonia; in effecting which he reckoned upon the support of the Athenians, at whose instigation he had first entered upon his undertaking. With irresistible numbers he fell upon

Expedition of Sitalces. Ol. lxxxvii. 4. (B.C. 429–8.)

the Chalcidian cities, and advanced as far as the river Axius; but no Attic ships arrived, and the whole situation of affairs was suddenly reversed. The party hostile to the Athenians, headed by Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces, prevailed; the hardships of winter supervened; and Perdiccas hastened to take advantage of these circumstances for proposals of peace, which were immediately accepted. Seuthes became the brother-in-law of the king; the vast army of the Thracians was disbanded; and thus the promising combination between Athens and the kingdom of the Odrysæ was for ever at an end. Probably the non-arrival of the Attic ships was merely due to negligence or to the want of a proper understanding; unless, indeed, we prefer to assume that the first unfolding of their new ally's power awakened feelings of jealousy against him in the Athenians, and that they intentionally left him in the lurch. In any case, the event already proved a want of energy at the right moment, such as occurred on several occasions after the death of Pericles. Lastly, the war continued during the winter season in Acarnania also. Immediately after the disbanding of the Peloponnesian fleet, Phormio landed in Astacus, expelled the party hostile to the Athenians out of several cities, and was about to take Œniadæ, the chief seat of this party, when the Achelous, whose waters had risen and surrounded the city like a lake, was found to render any attack impossible. Phormio therefore returned to Naupactus, whence, when spring set in, he conducted the captured vessels and the prisoners to Athens.*

Fourth year of the war. Ol. lxxxvii. 4. (B. C. 428.) Summer.

The next summer (that of the fourth year of the war) matured an event which had been preparing for years. For already, before the first outbreak of the war, the Lesbians (who, besides Chios, were the only

* Events of the winter: Thuc. ii. 95–103. Diod. xii. 49 f.

free allies of Athens remaining) had come to a secret understanding with Sparta, the negotiations being carried on from Mitylene, the largest among the five cities of Lesbos. Situate nearly opposite the coast of Asia Minor, Mitylene lay on a height jutting out towards the sound of the sea, and enclosed by two harbor bays, one to the north (Malœis) and one to the south, the latter constituting the harbor of war proper. The two bays were connected by means of a canal flowing through the middle of the town. By a rare combination, Mitylene united beauty and strength of situation to all the advantages of maritime trade.

But in a far higher degree than the mere structure of their city her history gives evidence of the grandeur of her citizens' ambition. For, instead of remaining content with the prosperity of a flourishing seaport, they had established a dominion beyond the limits of their territory, primarily on their own island. Here they had successively subjected Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha, and incorporated the three towns in their dominion. Next they had, like Samos and Thasos, further contrived to acquire and maintain considerable possessions on the mainland opposite. Here all the most important places had once been founded from Lesbos (vol. i. p. 141), particularly Assus and Gargarus; and the passionate desire of the Mitylenæans was now directed to a further pursuit of their ambitious policy on island and mainland. On either Athens stood in their way.

All the differences which agitated the Greek world exercised their effects in this instance. For, in the first place, Mitylene was governed by an exclusive body of noble and wealthy families; they had made their city great by their energy and sagacity, had held fast to their privileges as against the body of the citizens, and accordingly hated democratic Athens. It was against their will that they sent their ships to serve the Athenian power,

and they were constantly afraid of sooner or later seeing their native government endangered from the same quarter. Moreover, the cities of the mainland, the ancient colonies of the Lesbians, had for the most part become tributary towns of Athens.

Revolt of Mitylene.

On this soil an ancient rivalry prevailed between Athens and Lesbos, which had led to sanguinary conflicts as early as the times of the Pisistratidæ (vol. i. p. 384). These events had not been forgotten; and all schemes of the Mitylenæans for extending the limits of their possessions on the mainland were now more than ever rendered futile by the power of Athens. But far more susceptible and critical was the third point where Mitylene saw herself hard pressed by Athens—viz., the command of the island of Lesbos itself. For the union of the latter as one territory and collective state had for years been obstructed by the resistance of Methymna, in size the second city in Lesbos, situate on the north coast of the island, opposite to the Troad, and under her democratic government a faithful adherent of Athens, in whose alliance Methymna saw the sole pledge for the maintenance of her independence.

Lastly, these differences, due to political principles and schemes, were heightened by the ancient opposition of the races, which the present war had everywhere revived. As on the mainland among the Bœotians, so in the Archipelago among the Lesbians, the ancient jealousy of the Æolic race against the Ionians of Attica broke forth again; it amounted to a simultaneous attempt to establish an independent power on the ancient territory of the Æolic race, in Asia as well as in Europe. Moreover, the endeavors in either quarter were directly connected with one another. The oligarchical principles prevailing both in Thebes and in Mitylene had occasioned an approximation between the two states, a revival of the common feelings of race, and a combined political action. After,

then, the first overtures made at Sparta by Mitylene, before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War had remained without result, the Thebans, after the war had commenced, opened fresh negotiations; they clearly perceived that the Peloponnesian confederation could scarcely meet with a new adherent of greater importance than Mitylene; they also hoped now to find greater readiness and determination on the part of Sparta; and at the same time the Mitylenæans were ready themselves to take the decisive step. To proceed without delay was their own interest; they could not tell how long the present system could be maintained against the democratic party on Lesbos itself, and thought that to wait any longer must impair, and could not improve, their situation.*

The governing families were aware of the losses Athens had suffered in the pestilence, of the exhaustion of her finances by the siege of Potidæa, and of her being forced to employ her navy in several places at once. The bold attempt of Sparta to attack Athens on her own coasts had raised the courage of the Mitylenæans; they reckoned upon the discontent existing in Æolis and Ionia; and had probably also arrived at an understanding with Pissuthnes. They determined to prepare for the revolt with all possible caution and energy. They built new ships, threw up moles which secured their harbors, filled their corn magazines, and took Scythian bowmen into their pay.

But although the Mitylenæans proceeded with extreme caution, it was impossible for them to keep their plans secret. The jealousy of Tenedos and Methymna, as well as the division of parties in the city of Mitylene itself, where political life was in a very critical state, operated advantageously for the Athenians. Doxander, a citizen of Mitylene, who had asked the hand of two noble heiresses for his sons, and had been contumeliously rejected,

* See Wilh. Herbst, *Der Abfall Mitylene's*: Cologne, 1861.

took vengeance upon the aristocrats by betraying their schemes to the Athenians, with whom he stood in relations of mutual hospitality. Here, again, the importance of these *Proxeni* (vol. ii. p. 546) for Athens was made manifest; who secretly and without any official orders observed the state of public feeling in the allied cities, and sent due notice of dangerous movements to Athens. Thus, at the time when Archidamus was for the third time advancing upon Attica, *i.e.*, towards the commencement of the fourth summer of the war, certain news was received at Athens that a new and dangerous naval war was inevitable.

Athenian measures against Mitylene.

After the Athenians had for a long time refused to credit the news, they attempted by means of embassies to persuade the Mitylenæans to desist from their undertaking, but in vain; and thus it became at last necessary to take serious steps. Accordingly the Lesbian ships present in the fleet were immediately seized, and forty triremes sent out under Cleïppides. But there was an absence of such energy as that which Pericles had displayed on the occasion of the revolt of Samos. For not only was the surprise frustrated, to effect which it had been intended to take advantage of a suburban festival of Apollo, but the authorities of the revolted city even succeeded by cunning negotiations in restraining the Attic admiral from a rapid assault, and in employing the truce thus obtained for the completion of their armaments and for the despatch of an embassy to Sparta. Fortunately for Athens, the Spartans displayed still less resolution. For instead of acting rapidly on their own responsibility, while the menaced city still remained accessible, they bade the envoys of the Mitylenæans appear at Olympia, where the great festival chanced to be at hand, which the war had reduced to a purely Peloponnesian meeting, and which was therefore made use of for the settlement of confederate business.

In Olympia the Mitylenæans made a speech, highly

creditable to their courage and determination. Instead of complaining of the bad treatment to which they had been subjected, and by which they had been forced to seek for aid abroad—instead even of inveighing against the tyranny of Athens—they simply declared that their independence was apparent rather than real, being in truth insecure and conditional upon the grace of Athens. This state of things they declared themselves unable to bear; they refused to belong to a confederation which had so completely changed its original character, or, on the other hand, to serve as instruments to Athens for the support of her selfish dominion. This was the haughty language of an aristocracy to which dependence upon the citizens of Athens was intolerable. Nor did the Mitylenæans appear in the character of suppliants with nothing to offer; but, as in the case of the Corcyræans and Athenians, so the Mitylenæans proved to the Peloponnesians that the latter ought to regard an alliance with them as an invaluable advantage, inasmuch as it furnished the Peloponnesian confederacy with a fortified station in a most favorable situation, as well as with money and ships, and enabled it to attack Athens not only in Attica, where least harm could be inflicted upon her, but at her most vulnerable points. The Mitylenæans declared that, at the instigation of the Bœotians, they had commenced the revolt sooner than they had originally intended, and that they therefore had a double claim for prompt assistance on the part of the confederation; while the amount of energy with which that assistance was given would decide the measure of authority which Sparta would continue to enjoy.

The Lesbians at Olympia. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B.C. 428.) July.

The immediate effect of this speech was complete. The Mitylenæans were admitted as members of the Peloponnesian confederation, and speedy federal assistance promised. A fresh attack by sea and land was immediately to

be executed against Athens: and in the shortest possible time the Spartan army stood at the Isthmus, and prepared to transport the triremes lying in Lechæum to the harbor opposite. But the other Peloponnesians failed to make their appearance; they were occupied with the harvest, and extremely unwilling to undertake a second campaign in the same summer. The Athenians, on the other hand, fully realized the importance of the crisis. Now was the moment for them to show that their power was unbroken, and that they were ready, at points most widely apart from one another, to meet their enemies. To their amazement, the Spartans saw a fleet of 100 triremes appear off the Isthmus, all plans of crossing which were thereby immediately undone, while at the same time the news arrived that a second Athenian fleet was levying forced contributions upon the coasts of Laconia. Besides these, 30 triremes were sent to Acarnania, and instead of the vessels at Mitylene being called off, as the enemy had expected, their numbers were reinforced. Meanwhile the Mitylenæans had employed the interval in increasing their preparations for war on the island. An attack directed by them against Methymna had failed, but the dependent cities were newly fortified, and it was determined to maintain possession of each single place. But towards the beginning of the autumn Paches arrives with 1,000 hoplites; the rebellious city was walled in from the land side, and when the winter came, the blockade was complete, and all possibility of aid cut off.*

Paches arrives off Mitylene.

Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B. C. 428.) Autumn.

Meanwhile the undertaking against Platææ, commenced in the third year of the war, at the time when the pestilence was raging in Athens, had by no means pro-

* Events of the latter part of the summer of B. C. 428: Thuc. iii. 8 ff.

ceeded according to the expectations of the Spartans. For when they appeared before the little city with the whole army of the confederation, they hoped to accomplish their object by means of negotiation; and when the Platæans appealed to the solemnly-guaranteed inviolability of their territory, they received the deceitful answer, that it was solely intended to accord to them the perfect independence which was their due; at the present moment they were neither free nor independent; let them therefore quit the Attic alliance, and remain perfectly neutral. The Platæans hereupon referred to their situation, which made it necessary for them to attach themselves to a larger state; moreover, they added, their alliance with Athens, which was now interpreted as a crime against them, had been concluded by the express directions of Sparta (vol. i. p. 415). To sever their alliance with Athens would be to deliver up their city to their worst enemies. Archidamus broke off these discussions, which could not but be painful for every Spartan who yet retained a spark of honorable feeling; he pointed out to the Platæans the dangers which in any case surrounded them, and proposed to them that they should emigrate, and for the entire remainder of the war hand over the territory of their city to him; their immovable property should be accurately catalogued, and restored to them in full after the termination of the war, together with the land itself.

Archidamus besieges Platææ. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B. C. 428.)

There can be no doubt that the proposal was honestly meant on the part of the king; and there was the more reason for offering it, since the women and children, and the whole population with the exception of 400 citizens, had already emigrated to Attica; Sparta promising to undertake the obligation herself of providing for the support of the citizens during the period of

Circumvallation of Platææ. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B. C. 428.) September.

their exile. It is easy to understand why the Platæans met their proposal with no direct refusal, but submitted it to the Athenians for their opinion. The latter rejected it, and promised active aid. Hereupon the Platæans no longer hesitated for a single moment; from the walls they declared to their enemies, that they were resolved, under all circumstances, to remain true to their alliance with Athens, and made ready for the most determined defence. Nothing remained for Archidamus but to proceed to extremities. After he had endeavored by a solemn invocation of all the Gods and Heroes of the land to appease his conscience, and to throw the whole guilt of the war upon the Platæans, he caused all the timber to be cut on the declivities of Mount Cithæron, beneath which the city lay, palisades to be erected, and with the help of these a wall to be built, from the height of which the defenders of the city wall might be attacked. It was the wish of the Spartans at any cost to avoid a long and expensive siege; and the soldiers were therefore ordered to work day and night at the wall. In seventy days it was finished. The Platæans, however, raised the height of their walls over against it by means of bulwarks; by subterraneous passages destroyed the enemy's earthworks; and behind the threatened portion of their own wall built another, to serve as a retreat. Furthermore, they contrived to disable the machines intended to break their wall by crushing their heads or catching them in nooses at the moment of their approach. Finally, the besiegers employed the power of fire, by filling up the space between the city wall and their own with combustible materials, and causing a conflagration, the smoke and heat of which threatened to destroy the entire city and its defenders, till, as it is related, a storm of rain at the last moment unexpectedly preserved them.

Hereupon Archidamus, who, like an ancient Spartan, had only with great repugnance consented to build a wall

and employ siege-machines, was obliged to relinquish finally the idea of overcoming the little band of Platæan citizens by force; he was obliged to adopt the tedious method of surrounding the entire city with a wall, so as to wear it out by famine. The precipitous situation of the city made this task extremely difficult of accomplishment. But no labor was deemed excessive; for the conflict had become more desperate as it proceeded; and the Thebans exerted themselves in every way to prevent the work from coming to a stand-still. A double wall was now built round the entire city, with a trench facing both towards the latter and towards the outer side of the walls, which, at regular intervals, were furnished with turrets; the passage between the walls, sixteen feet in breadth, was covered, and formed, as it were, a large guard-house surrounding the hostile city. Towards the middle of September the immense work was finished; it was possible to dismiss the majority of the troops; the watch on the wall was divided between Peloponnesian and Theban soldiers, each body having its appointed place; and a band of 300 was kept in reserve for unforeseen cases.

The Platæans run the blockade. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B. C. 428.) December.

For one whole year the Platæans had held out in their prison, cut off from all intercourse, without hope of relief, surrounded by foes athirst for their blood. Provisions began to fall short. Accordingly, the bravest among the besieged determined to hazard an attempt to break the blockade. After they had furnished themselves with scaling-ladders of the height of the enemy's walls, they took advantage of a rough and stormy December night, when the sentinels might be supposed to have retired into the towers which served them as sentry-boxes.

Two hundred and twenty men left the city; they were lightly armed, and shod only on the left foot, so as to have a firmer support in the case of a fight; the right foot

was bare, in order to facilitate the march through the mud. Each man holding himself at a moderate distance from his neighbor, in order to avoid any clash of arms, they cross the trench, climb the wall, man after man reaching up his shield to his predecessor; the sentries in the nearest towers on the right and left are put to death; everything proceeds successfully and without noise; the Platæans are masters of a piece of the wall surmounted by two towers, which they occupy; and most of them have mounted the wall. Suddenly the fall of a tile from the top gives the alarm to the garrison. Seven Platæans begin to retrace their steps, thinking everything is lost. But while the enemy remains wholly in doubt as to what is taking place, and no man dares to quit his post, one after another of the brave band descends from the outer wall; and at last even those who had kept watch in the towers quit their post and succeed in reaching the outer trench. This they find full of water, and overlaid with a thin coating of ice. Hence arises a delay in crossing, and before all have passed over, they see troops with torches approaching;—it is the reserve of 300, which comes up to them at the trench. But the torches, by dazzling the eyes of the pursuers, hinder their movements, and are of assistance in the struggle to the Platæans. A single archer is taken prisoner. The others make good their escape, and take the road to Thebes, presuming that the pursuit will be made on the road to Attica. On reaching Erythræ, and not before, they turn to the right into the mountains, and in the morning arrive at Athens, at the same hour in which their comrades are sending heralds to the besieging force, to ask for the bodies of their brethren, all of whom they deemed lost. Never have bravery and determined skill met with a more glorious reward.* Even those

* Archidamus and the Platæans: Thuc. ii. 72. Break of the blockade: Thuc. iii. 20, 21; Diod. xii. 56.

remaining behind were gainers, having now a chance of holding out longer with their provisions.

Thus in the beginning of the fifth year of the war the general interest centred in two sieges; both of which involved the heaviest sacrifices on the part of the besiegers, while in both the promised relief continued to be looked for, and to be looked for in vain.

In the spring, indeed, the Peloponnesian fleet had at last completed its preparations, and Alcidas, with forty-two sail, set out from Gytheum for the Ægean. It was the first time since the establishment of the Attic naval alliance that Peloponnesian men-of-war made their appearance in the waters which Athens regarded as her own domain. In order to give additional effect to this naval expedition, the land army of the Peloponnesians simultaneously invaded Attica under Cleomenes, the uncle and guardian of Pausanias, the son of Plistoanax, and successor in the command of the army to Archidamus (who had died shortly before, after a reign of forty-two years). This fourth invasion was particularly disastrous for the Athenians, because the Spartans endeavored to maintain themselves in the country as long as possible, in the hope of receiving during their stay in Attica, news of victory from Alcidas. But these expectations soon proved utterly fallacious; for the Spartan admiral's unskilfulness and cowardice did everything possible to frustrate the object of his enterprise. He timidly cruised among the Cyclades, while the situation of Mitylene was becoming extremely critical. The Mitylenæans were unable to wait any longer; and accordingly the Spartan Salæthus, who had contrived to enter the city a few months previously, in order to announce the approach of relief, advised the government, as a last resort, to attempt a sally. For this purpose all the suits of armor in the possession of the city were distributed, even among the poorer classes of citizens,

Fourth invasion of Attica. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B.C. 427.)

who had hitherto only served as light-armed troops. But scarcely had this been done, when the people declared against the government, and demanded that all the corn-magazines should be opened, threatening at the same time to enter into immediate negotiations with the Athenians. Under the circumstances, nothing remained for the governing families but to act in concert with the people, and to open negotiations with Paches; otherwise they alone would have been delivered up as the authors of the revolt. Paches promised, until the supreme decision at Athens had been referred to, neither to imprison, nor enslave, nor put to death, a single individual. Notwithstanding this promise, when the Athenians entered the city, the oligarchs sat trembling on the steps of the altars; for they deemed their lives safe at the hands neither of their fellow-citizens nor of the enemy. They were eventually taken into custody and carried to Tenedos.

Capitulation of Mitylene. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B.C. 427.)

Seven days had passed since the surrender of Mitylene when Alcidas arrived and anchored opposite Lesbos, in the neighborhood of Erythræ. He came too late for his principal purpose; yet it remained an extraordinary event for a Peloponnesian fleet to be lying off the Ionian coast. And since such a demonstration had been actually made, it was necessary to attempt to accomplish what remained feasible. Nor were there wanting among those admitted to the presence of the admiral, counsellors who fully recognized the importance of the present conjuncture. Teutiaplus, the Elean, demanded that the Athenians should be without delay surprised in Mitylene, before they were prepared for an attack. And, furthermore, Ionian fugitives and Lesbians arrived in the fleet and urged Alcidas to take some decisive step. They bade him take up a position in some Ionian city or in Æolic Cyme, gather all discontented persons around him, carry into effect the policy announced by Sparta, and proclaim

the independence of the Hellenic cities in Ionia and Æolis.

No Attic fleet was at hand, and the agitation was universal. The Persians were busily engaged in taking advantage of the excitement everywhere prevailing against Attica, and restoring their power at certain points of the coast; with the aid of a party in the city, Colophon had again fallen into their hands in the summer of B. C. 430 (Ol. lxxxvii. 3); and from Notium also, the port of Colophon, the citizens favorable to Athens had been forcibly expelled. By means of his Arcadian mercenaries, Pissuthnes had aided in this transaction—the same satrap who had already, in the Samian war, given proofs of his animosity against Athens and of his readiness to interfere in the affairs of Greece. If, then, the Spartan general were to effect an understanding with Pissuthnes, Athens might be threatened with the most dangerous combination of forces. But Alcidas would listen to no advice of the kind. He timidly sailed along the coast, and accomplished nothing beyond seizing and putting to death certain harmless Ionians, until he was reminded by the Samians that these proceedings would surely not tend to recommend him as a liberator of Hellas. But as soon as he had the slightest ground for believing himself to be pursued by a force from Athens, his aimless cruisings changed into craven flight, and he hurried home straight across the sea.

Thus, without any exertion on their own part, the Athenians saw themselves delivered from all danger, and were enabled immediately to employ their fleet for restoring their authority to its full height in Asia Minor. The town of Notium—where for a time the two hostile parties among the citizens, those respectively favoring the Athenians and the Persians, had, with nothing but a wall to separate them, carried on their doings side by side—was by stratagem and violence

brought back under the power of Athens. Finally, Paches easily accomplished the subjection of the island of Lesbos; and sent the Lesbian aristocrats, together with the Spartan Salæthus, whose hiding-place had been discovered, to Athens, there to receive their sentence.*

Debates at Athens as to the doom of Mitylene.

When the unhappy men were landed in the Piræeus, the citizens were in a state of feverish excitement, and the trial which now commenced affords clear evidence of the changes which the last few years had produced in public life at Athens. The causes of this excitement may be easily traced: the siege of the revolted city had demanded extraordinary sacrifices; the treasury had been exhausted, with the exception of the reserved fund; and for the first time it became necessary to levy a property-tax, in order to procure a sum of 200 talents for the purposes of the siege. This measure by itself having caused great consternation, since at the beginning of the war the hope of victory had been principally based upon the treasure, the exasperation against the revolted allies was doubly bitter. The Athenians had recived a terrible warning of the dangers attaching to the situation of their state. Persia threatened the towns in their alliance; a hostile fleet had made its appearance in Ionia; and to nothing but the utter incapacity of the leader of the latter could it be ascribed that the revolt of Lesbos had not been followed by a rising on the Ionian and Æolian mainland. To this fear on behalf of their possessions beyond the sea was now added wrath at the devastation of their own country and anxiety on account of Platææ. In this period of manifold excitement the citizens were without any leader able or willing to calm it; but their orators merely desired to encourage these feelings, and to add vehemence to the passions of the people: above

* Fourth invasion: Thuc. iii. 26.—Fall of Mitylene: *ib.* 27 f.

all, Cleon, who at this time exercised a commanding influence.*

The political position of Cleon.

Cleon's father, Cleænetus, had been the owner of a manufactory, and employed a large number of slaves in the tanning of hides and manufactory of leather wares; a branch of industry which flourished exceedingly in Athens, but at the same time enjoyed no high repute. The sphere in which Cleon grew up was not likely to secure him a higher degree of culture; his personal appearance was rude and vulgar, his voice rough, and his manner of speech blustering. In the consciousness of rude vigor, he prided himself upon being nothing but a man of the people; and when the multitude expended its fury upon those who confronted it with superior culture, he was in his right place as the people's mouth-piece. Thus he had directed his invectives against Pericles, and even combined for an attack upon the philosophic friends of the latter with such men as Diopithes (p. 48). The satisfaction which the citizens afterwards accorded to the offended statesman amounted to a defeat for Cleon, in consequence of which he remained somewhat in the background during the next few years. He then came forward anew; and after the removal of Eucrates, and the death of Lysicles at the time of the siege of Mitylene (p. 95), was warranted in regarding himself as the first man in the state.

The Sycophants.

Among the means employed by Cleon for securing so large an amount of popular favor, the most effective was doubtless that of raising the pay of the jurymen, which, on his motion, was trebled (vol. ii. p. 499). By this change the significance of the institution in question was completely altered. For a pay-

* First εἰσφορά: Thuc. iii. 19; cf. Boeckh, *P. E. of Ath.*, ii. p. 228. [Eng. Tr.]

ment of three obols, or half a drachm (3½*d.*), per sitting, was sufficient to constitute a tempting gain for the poor Athenian. For such a sum they were ready to let their tools remain idle, and to hurry to the courts. This was particularly the case with the more aged, who were unable any longer to perform military service, and who welcomed this easy method of making money. Of the country people also, many found in this a compensation for the income from their fields, of which the war had deprived them; and thus it came to pass that the great majority of the jurymen was composed of persons without means. As jurymen they sat out the best hours of the day, most agreeably entertained by the excitement of listening to the trials, in a comfortable self-consciousness and full enjoyment of the power given to them by the authority of the Attic tribunals over the life and property of so many thousands; and when the sitting was over (the length of which probably depended upon the patience of the jurymen), their three obols would furnish them with a bath and a meal by way of refreshment after their public duties. It is easy, therefore, to understand the gratitude displayed by the Athenians towards the author of this increase of pay. Cleon was the hero of the day, the favorite and benefactor of the people, the honored patron of the law-courts; and in proportion as the Athenian love of litigation, which Cratinus had already laughed at, increased, the power of Cleon rose. For the discovery had long been made of taking advantage of the law-courts for party purposes, by subjecting eminent men to capital indictments. But not until now did the activity of the '*Sycophants*' attain to its full height; a class of men arose who made a regular trade of collecting materials for indictments, and of bringing their fellow-citizens before a legal tribunal. These denunciations were particularly directed against those who were distinguished by wealth, birth, and services, and who therefore gave cause

for suspicion; for the informers wished to prove themselves zealous friends of the people and active guardians of the constitution. But as the defects of the latter became more and more glaring, and the tone of the assemblies more and more unruly—as the Moderate party continued to separate itself farther from the multitude, and the educated class to withdraw from public life—the people's suspicions were heightened, as well as the fear of treason and the terror of anti-constitutional attempts; intrigues and conspiracies were suspected in all quarters, and the popular orators persuaded the citizens to put no confidence in any magistrate, envoy, or commission, but rather to settle everything in full assembly, and themselves assume the entire executive. The Sycophants made their living out of this universal suspicion, and took advantage of it to raise their own importance. Young and unknown men, partly not even of Attic descent, ventured unblushingly to attack the most venerable men in the city, who had fought against the Persians, and had grown gray in faithful service of the state. Thus Athens lived to see the disgraceful sight, that Thucydides, the son of Melesias, who after the dissolution of his party had renounced all political conflicts and loyally served the state of Pericles—that this venerable veteran of the Athens of Cimon was, in the decline of his old age, brought before the popular tribunal and sentenced; an event which aroused the just ire of the poet Aristophanes. The trade of the Sycophants was moreover carried on from motives of shameless love of gain: they threatened prosecutions in order thus to extort money from guilty and innocent alike; for even among those who felt free from guilt were many who shunned a political prosecution beyond all other things, having no confidence in a jury, since it was so often influenced by passion, and generally decided according to its own interest.

Of this Sycophantic art Cleon was himself a master,

The power of Cleon.

and it served him as one of the most effective means for establishing his power. It furnished him with opportunities for removing all who appeared dangerous to his ends, for driving away orators of opinions opposed to his own, and disgusting them with political life. By means of his power over the people, and his entire want of consideration for any one else, he continued to make himself so universally feared that none dared to confront him. The most precious possession of the Athenians, liberty of speech, was virtually taken away from them. By honest means Cleon was not to be opposed; but he was open to the influence of money, and contrived to employ his power so as to acquire considerable wealth.*

His policy.

When he felt himself to be perfectly sure of his power, he altered his behaviour in a few points. He retired from all association with his previous companions, and thus acquired the right of inveighing against all secret combinations for political purposes with double vehemence. Nor was his own political action of a nature to need this description of aid for making it popular; for, instead of pursuing remoter objects, which were only to be gained by a close association of the members of one party, he rather endeavored to attach the majority of the citizens more and more closely to his own person, and for this purpose most skilfully to take advantage of every single question of the day. If we are at all justified in speaking of any *policy*, in the higher sense of the word, as having been pursued by Cleon, it was no other than this, that he endeavored to create an irresistible succession of difficulties in the way of a

* As to the date and effects of the increase in the rate of judicial pay, see Meier u. Schœmann, *Att. Proz.* p. 136; Bœckh, *P. E.* vol. i. p. 313 (E. Tr.). As to the case of Thucydides: Sauppe, *De Caus. Magnit.* &c. p. 22; Droysen ad Ar. *Ach.* 702. As to Cleon's mode of enriching himself: Meier, *Op. Acad.* i. 192.

peaceable termination of the war with Sparta, and of the filling up of the breach between the Greek states. But while a statesman devoted to such political principles should have above all been careful to strengthen in every possible way the powers of the state, to economize its resources of war by means of a prudent administration, and to add security to the foundations of its power, Cleon was careless as to the performance of any such duties as these. Nay, he to such a degree weakened Athens by raising the pay of the dicasts in the midst of the heaviest pressure of the war, that an annual public expenditure of about 150 talents (£ 36,570) was hereby occasioned, necessitating the employment for this purpose of part of the tributes. Thus the finances fell into worse and worse confusion; and the consequence was, that less and less regard was paid to a just and kind treatment of the allies. Instead of their leader, Athens had become their mistress, and now became their despot. When Cleon cast all considerations to the winds in this matter, and helped to make arbitrary forced levies of money more frequent, until, when money was wanting, actual predatory expeditions were even undertaken into the territory of the allies, the real foundations of the Attic power were shaken for the sake of obtaining momentary advantages, and the state was at the same time more and more deeply involved in the dangers of the disastrous war. Cleon was assuredly aware of the real situation of affairs; but, far from expounding its dangers to the citizens and claiming corresponding exertions and sacrifices, as was the duty of a conscientious public leader, he deceived the citizens as to the power of the state, and tempted them to enjoy its revenues, and the advantages of their absolute sway. He kept alive their enthusiasm for the war by representing the defeat of the enemy as certain, and a new increase of their advantages and enjoyments as equally sure. Prophecies were communicated to them which spoke of the

conquest of the entire Peloponnesus, and of a judicial pay of five obols, as destined to be derived by the Athenians from Arcadia.* Such was the policy of Cleon, in the pursuit of which he stood in no need of the assistance of political associations, since his ideas were in themselves eminently to the taste of the multitude.

Contrast between Pericles and Cleon.

But the circumstance that Cleon broke up his former political connections was also due to a wish on his part of appearing before the people with superior self-assurance and consciousness of power, and of marking the difference between himself and those who had formerly been his equals as the opponents of Pericles. He had himself caught more than one peculiarity of Pericles, which he now imitated after his own fashion. On the orators' tribune, indeed, he was in all respects the perfect antitype of Pericles. For while the latter had confronted the people with immovable equanimity, and in the full fervor of his eloquence preserved harmony of voice and perfect composure, so as even never to allow the folds of his cloak to become disarranged, Cleon, when speaking, was seen to move vehemently up and down the tribune, and to gesticulate with both his arms, throwing his robe in all directions, and exerting the strength of his loud voice to the utmost of its powers. Pericles presented to his fellow-citizens a type of calm, because in all questions he called upon them calmly to reflect; Cleon felt most at home when the populace was in a state of feverish excitement, to stimulate and increase which he employed all the means at his command. Pericles always kept in view the question itself, while Cleon's art consisted in advancing his individual authority by means of personal attacks and passionate vituperation. Pericles' endeavor was to influence his hearers by reason alone, and to remove the

* Ar. *Eq.* 797, Schol.

influence of vague sensations; Cleon took advantage of the credulity of the multitude for vehemently agitating it by means of exciting announcements of every description, particularly prophecies, fictitious oracles, &c. The more deeply the passions of the populace were roused, the surer was the influence he wielded over it, the more fully he realized his position as the born representative of the multitude, amidst whose shouts his own voice made itself heard with the consciousness of triumph.

But, in spite of this contrast between himself and Pericles, Cleon was sagacious enough to make use of those means also, of which he had himself observed the effectiveness in the case of his predecessor. Herein he proved his extraordinary skill, that, instead of always speaking as the people wished, like a crafty slave, ignorant of any other way of ruling his fitful master, he now and then told them very plain truths, and occasionally contrived with great success to strike the note of the eloquence of Pericles. For this he found a particularly favorable opportunity in the affair of Mitylene.

The debates as to Mitylene.

When the prisoners were brought in, the multitude was actuated by no other feeling than that of a thirst for vengeance, which rendered all rational reflection impossible. The chief object of its resentment was Salæthus, with regard to whom no man dared to urge a word of pity, or a consideration of reason, although it would have been extremely advantageous to detain this noble Spartan as a hostage, the more so as he even held out hopes of saving the Platæans, if his life were granted him. He was immediately put to death. The fate of the Mitylenæans was discussed in the civic assembly, and various proposals were put forward. Some advised a gentle method of treatment; others demanded that all the male inhabitants of the island capable of bearing arms should be put to death, and the rest of the inhabitants sold into slavery.

The former of these opinions was advocated by Diodotus, the son of Eucrates, and the spokesman of the Moderate party, and it is unintelligible how, notwithstanding the passionate anger which possessed the Athenians, the consideration that at Mitylene the governmental party had alone excited the revolt, while the majority of the population had taken no part in it, and had even from the moment when they had arms in their hands forced the government to treat with Athens, could fail to impress the Attic community and determine their resolution. But the contrary was the case. Cleon had given out the word of order, that martial law ought to prevail with absolute severity. A second similar revolt might annihilate the dominion of Athens, and the advantages thence accruing to the citizens. Hence a terrible example must be made, and all the Mitylenæans treated with equal severity. This motion was passed, and without further delay the trireme, which lay in readiness in the Piræeus, was despatched with the necessary instructions to Paches.

Summary judgment decreed.

Scarcely had the assembly separated, when a reaction became observable in public opinion. Many, who during the full and turbulent meeting had lacked courage or power to follow the voice of their own conscience, were now, when taken singly, accessible to calm considerations, and terrified at their participation in so dreadful an act. The leaders of the minority took advantage of this reaction of feeling; the Mitylenæans present at Athens as envoys zealously co-operated with them; and they thus succeeded in persuading the Prytanes to summon another assembly on the following day, although it was against the principles of Attic political law to take a second vote on a subject once settled by a decree of the people. This re-opening of the discussion at the same time constituted an attack upon the omnipotent

Reaction in the public feeling.

Speech of Cleon.

influence of Cleon; who was, accordingly, obliged to bring into play the whole force of his eloquence, in order to maintain in force the first decree, and at the same time to take advantage of this favorable opportunity for asserting himself as the defender of the laws; representing the reaction against his motion as mere weakness and vacillation, and decrying those who laid special claim to the character of more highly educated persons as misleaders of the people. Here, he cried, was a fresh proof of what he had so often stated, that a democracy was utterly incapable of ruling over other states; for nothing could be more absurd than to treat foreign affairs in the kindly fashion habitual in the intercourse of fellow-citizens. The people ought to have sufficient courage to renounce all good-natured delusions. The dominion of Athens in the Archipelago was a dominion of force, while the so-called allies were nothing else but enemies lying in wait for their opportunity; in this case compassion and consideration would fall on a sterile soil; and the worst of all qualities were weakness and vacillation. The laws, he continued, wisely forbade the re-opening of discussions once closed—but what did the Athenians reck of usage and laws? For that they were, forsooth, far too clever and highly educated.

On the other hand, it would be the state's gain if its citizens manifested less cleverness and more obedience to its laws; it was better to have imperfect laws and obey them, than the best laws and leave them unexecuted. "I am always the same," he said—(evidently appropriating to his own use a phrase which had frequently created a strong impression when proceeding from the lips of Pericles)—"but ye Athenians allow yourselves again and again to be unsettled as to what ye have already rightly perceived, because ye listen to the speeches, as if ye were sitting in the theatre; and it is the art of the orators, and not the situation of affairs, which engages

your attention. The Mitylenæans have without any cause ventured upon the most pernicious revolt. Hence annihilation would befall them as a well merited punishment. Kind-hearted compassion will only result in a second revolt and a fresh loss of life and money; and if in this they prove victorious, your most deceitful enemies will make you an evil return for your kindness."

Speech of Diodotus.

This well-calculated speech, which apparently lectured the people, but in reality only flattered its savage thirst for vengeance and its feelings of hatred, was manfully and firmly answered by Diodotus. Not in phrases borrowed from the eloquence of Pericles, but in the spirit of that statesman, Diodotus, rising with his subject, declared the salvation of the state to be based upon moderation in speech, and those who urged the people to unreflecting acts to be the foes of the commonwealth: inasmuch as their counsels were of such a nature as to shun any closer examination, and as they had recourse to insolent calumniation and cunning detraction in order to drive from the tribune all statesmen opposed to them. Diodotus declared himself to have no intention of defending the Mitylenæans, or of working upon the tender emotions of the people. Nor was the affair to be looked upon as a case of law, but as a political question, into which hatred and passion should not be allowed to enter. The point at issue was not an isolated case, but the entire policy of the state, and an agreement as to the best line of conduct which it could adopt in future. Cleon's theory of creating terror was absurd and impolitic. Unmeasured severity, instead of preventing farther revolts, would only tend to make resistance more desperate, repressive measures more costly, and the ruin of the allies, upon whose prosperity the Attic power was after all founded, more complete. By allowing hatred and passion to sway the policy of the state, the party now favorable to Athens would be everywhere

estranged from her; justice and generosity alone could prevent further revolts.

Victory of the Moderates.

Amidst immense excitement the vote was taken by show of hands, and a small majority decided in favor of Diodotus. The Moderate party had this time broken the terroristic influence of the vehement demagogue, and freed the conscience and honor of the city from a tremendous burden of guilt. But it was now all-important that the new popular decree should not fail to take effect in favor of the condemned Mitylenæans. The danger was great; for the vessel bearing the sentence of death had a start of twenty-four hours. Everything that could be done was done. The Mitylenæan envoys furnished the crew of the second ship with supplies, promised them large pecuniary rewards, and thus induced them to row without stopping during the entire journey to Lesbos. The weather was favorable; the crew of the first ship had fortunately been less eager; and thus the message of grace succeeded in arriving in time, and saving the life of a multitude of many thousand innocent Mitylenæans. Even as it was, the war ended sanguinarily enough; for the number of those executed as guilty amounted to more than a thousand.* It included every one of those who as a limited body of citizens had held the government of the city in their hands; and by it perished the entire aristocracy. The island was treated as the prey of victory; all ships of war were delivered up, the fortifications destroyed, the landed property of all the towns of the island, with the exception of Methymna, was confiscated and partitioned into 3,000 lots of land, 300 of

The punishment of Mitylene. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B.C. 427.)

* Cf. Herbst *ubi supr.* p. 13. The severity of Cleon (Thuc. iii. 37, f.) is based on the principle that every Demus is responsible for its government. The noble-hearted Diodotus is known to us from his speech (Thuc. iii. 42–48), in which the historian has established an everlasting monument for him. Doom of Mitylene, *ib.* 50.

which were assigned as a tithe to the gods, the remainder being distributed among Attic citizens. The former proprietors, however, remained on their ground, and paid to the new proprietors an annual rent of two minæ (over 7*l.*). Part of the Athenians remained in the island as a garrison; the rest returned to Athens, and there drew the rents of their lands beyond the sea.

Platææ.

The only thought which consoled the Peloponnesians for the fall of Mitylene, and the humiliation thence befalling themselves, was the expectation of the imminent capture of Platææ. Two hundred Platæans and twenty-five Athenians had remained in the city, and held their ground for part of the summer. But now their last provisions threatened to come to an end, nor was there any prospect of relief. It may, indeed, well be asked, why the Athenians did nothing to save the brave Platæans who, trusting solely to the promise of federal aid, had rejected all the advantageous offers of Archidamus? The Athenians could dispose of a land-force of 13,000 heavy-armed troops, and were every year able to invade Megara: could it have been impossible for them at all events to have saved the citizens, even if forced to leave in the hands of the enemy the territory of the city? In point of fact, the inactivity of the Athenians can only be accounted for by the circumstance, that they were turning their attention more and more exclusively to the sea, and had thus wholly outgrown the habit of making any resolute attempts by land. No standing land-army, it must be remembered, was in existence; hence for every expedition a favorable state of public feeling and urgent necessity were requisite; moral obligations, as they existed in the case of Platææ, coming to be less and less regarded in democratic Athens. To this must be added the effect of the unfortunate experiences made in Bœotian campaigns; and doubtless the Thebans, for their part, had done everything in their power to throw obstacles in the

way of a rescue, and to secure the victims in their grasp. Finally, the Athenians may have felt convinced that after the capitulation of the city they would find a speedy opportunity of ransoming the brave Platæans out of the hands of the Spartans; for on what grounds could they assume that the Platæans would be dealt with otherwise than as prisoners of war? At the same time it admits of neither explanation nor excuse, that in the treatment of the Mitylenæans, and particularly of Salæthus (p. 117), no regard whatsoever was paid to the fate of the Platæans, who for a period of ninety-three years had with unexampled fidelity and self-sacrifice under the most difficult circumstances adhered to the Attic alliance.

Meanwhile the enemies who thirsted to slake their vengeance after capturing the city had, during the protracted siege formed plans of a kind which had been hitherto thought impossible even in these times of war. These plans were now to be carried into execution.

Surrender of Platææ.

An assault upon the walls convinced the besiegers that the starved-out garrison was incapable of offering any resistance. At the same time they abstained from effecting an entrance by force, but sent a herald to demand surrender; for even now the pretence was to be kept up of the city having voluntarily joined the Peloponnesian cause. It was intended to make sure of the possession of Platææ, even in the event of future treaties imposing the restoration of all towns taken by force of arms. A solemn promise having been given that no harm should be illegally done to any person, the city surrendered. A judicial court was hereupon actually set up, consisting of five Spartans, sent from Sparta for the purpose: among them was Aristomenidas, whom we know to have been a partizan of the Thebans. The others were probably much the same. For the entire judicial procedure amounted to nothing but a base mockery of all principles of right, an un-

worthy farce, which Thebes and Sparta had insidiously agreed to play with the lives of the unfortunate prisoners. Instead of being examined, as according to martial law, they were simply asked whether during the course of the war they had conferred any benefit upon the Peloponnesians and their confederates—the well-known question of the Spartans (p. 24), based upon the principle invented by them, that whosoever was against Sparta must be accounted guilty of treason against the common country.

Negotiations as to the fate of the Platæans.

This method of examination of course completely undeceived the Platæans. Yet they still attempted the influence of speech.

Speech of Lacon.

Lacon (whose very name recalled the intimate family relations existing between Sparta and Platææ, and dating from the time of Pausanias) and Astymachus were their spokesmen. They were able not only to insist upon the services rendered by their city to the common country, but also to refer to the aid which they had afforded to the Spartans in the war of the Helots; they reminded the Spartans how it was in accordance with the directions of the latter that the Platæans had concluded their alliance with Athens; while their state of enmity with Thebes had originated in a Theban attack, undertaken in the midst of peace and, which was worse, during a festive season. They pointed out to their judges the graves of the ancestors of the Spartans, who rested in Platæan ground, and who were annually honored by sacrificial offerings of fruits of the Platæan soil. These sacred services would be abolished and the graves of the heroes desecrated, if the allies of the Medes were to hold sway within the Platæan boundaries. They urged upon Sparta the duty of preserving her good name among the Hellenes: and lastly, they recalled the memory of the last solemn agreement; for if, instead of being judged in accordance with

the treaties, they were to be sacrificed to the vengeance of their foes, they would prefer to return behind their walls and there die of hunger.

Speech of the Thebans.

Never probably was a just cause more worthily pleaded; and although the sentence had been settled long before this mock judicial procedure was commenced, the Thebans were notwithstanding afraid that the speech might not fail to make an impression. Accordingly after their enemies, contrary to the original agreement, had been allowed to speak, they demanded the same concession, and put forward a speaker who was to prove the claims and charges of their adversaries equally worthless. The Theban attack upon Platææ, he was made to say, had been proposed by eminent citizens of that state, and had been merely intended as a pacific mode of recalling the rebellious community to its duty. For the subordination of Platææ under the capital of the country was the normal condition of affairs; Platææ being a daughter-city of Thebes (thus in this instance also colonial obligations were insisted upon), and her secession accordingly an act of revolt. By their unnatural adherence to a foreign city the Platæans had become dependent upon Athens; hence their conduct during the Persian war had been no merit of their own: and equally little could the Thebes of the present day be made responsible for the conduct of the Thebes of the past. All these events belonged to other times, since which the entire state of affairs had been inverted. For since, in the place of the Persians, the Athenians had come forward as the enemies of Greek liberty, the Platæans had consented to associate themselves with Athens in every act of injustice against Greek states, against Ægina, &c. The honorable deeds the Platæans had performed under compulsion, their deeds of shame of their own free will; while the Thebans were making every sacrifice to withstand the Attic policy of

conquest, and had at Coronea restored the independence of Central Greece. Sparta, the guardian of legal right, would be able to appreciate this, and, undisturbed by oratorical phrases, without feeble weakness, accord to the one state the acknowledgment she had deserved, and inflict upon the other the punishment incurred by her conduct.

This speech is particularly remarkable, because in it no recognition is made of the existence of two parties in the war with equal rights; the Peloponnesian theory of the war is thus in this instance carried out to its logical consequence; viz., that a voluntary accession to the Athenian alliance is punishable as an act of revolt against Hellas and of treason against federal obligations. Federal loyalty towards Athens is simply interpreted as participation in her guilt.

Execution of the Platæans. Ol. lxxxviii. 2. (B. C. 427.)

This speech completely effaced the impression created by its predecessor. The Spartans had no intention of rejecting a view of the relations between the different states so advantageous to, and yet not advanced by, themselves; and they assumed the responsibility of the deed of blood which Thebes' desire of vengeance cast upon them The entire judicial procedure recurred to the first question; whether the accused could prove that they had conferred any advantage upon Sparta and her confederates· and as it was impossible for any one of them to answer this question in the affirmative, all the 200 Platæans, together with the 25 Athenians, were put to death before the eyes of their foes. The women were sold as slaves. The city and its territory were delivered up to the Thebans, who for the present settled in it members of their party from Megara, or who had formerly been citizens of Platææ.* Later, the entire city, excepting the sanctuaries, was razed to the ground, and travellers who

* Thuc. iii. 52-68.

passed that way, found in the desert region no other dwelling than an inn connected with a temple of Here.

The Spartans determine upon intervention at Corcyra.

Meanwhile the Spartan fleet, on its flight (p. 117) from before the Attic guard-ships, had drifted as far down as Crete, and only gradually reassembled on the Peloponnesian coast, where a new task awaited it. The Spartans were desirous of taking advantage of the armaments now at hand, to throw themselves, at a time when the attention of Athens was directed to the regions of Asia Minor, with great rapidity upon the opposite side of the sea, which was momentarily free from the presence of any hostile power, with the exception of a squadron of twelve men-of-war at the naval station of Naupactus. For this purpose Brasidas was joined in command with the incapable admiral at the head of the fleet. It was beyond a doubt Brasidas who had persuaded the authorities at Sparta to resolve upon these measures, and who had, for the same purpose, effected an understanding with the Corinthians. For the latter again proved themselves the only Peloponnesian state which pursued a definite policy with energy and sagacity, and which contrived to make use of every advantage previously gained. They still had in their power as prisoners, from the time of the Epidamnian war, 250 Corcyræans of note; and far from sacrificing these, after the fashion of the Spartans and the Thebans, to a savage desire of vengeance, they had used every endeavor to secure the adhesion of these men, to foster in them sentiments of aversion to Athens, and to point out to them the community of interests between the Corcyræans and Peloponnesians, and as soon as they had felt certain that the prisoners would serve them as instruments of their policy in Corcyra, had dismissed them unhurt. At the same time, the Corinthians had apprised Sparta of the political revolution imminent at Corcyra, and had urgently demanded its support by means of the fleet.

Party conflicts at Corcyra. Ol. lxxxviii. 2. (B. C. 427.)

In Corcyra, in the meantime, the conclusion of an alliance with Athens had been accompanied by the rise to power of the democratic party: a state of things which increased the energy of the dismissed prisoners-of-war, who belonged to the families of the wealthy capitalists formerly in power, and with whose class-interests those of the Peloponnesians coincided. They went from house to house, in order to gain over their fellow-citizens; the whole community became violently agitated; in all the streets and squares of the city political questions were eagerly debated; and when an Attic and Corinthian trireme simultaneously arrived in port, both with deputies of their respective states on board, it was resolved, in the presence of these emissaries, that, although the treaties with Athens should be kept up, at the same time amicable relations should be resumed with the Peloponnesians. The fate of Mitylene had naturally awakened serious fears, and the citizens of Corcyra were accordingly extremely anxious to secure the most independent position possible between the belligerent parties. The measure resolved upon, however, remained nothing but a half-measure, which neither admitted of being carried out, nor was capable of satisfying the partizans of Corinth. They were accordingly obliged to resort to more stringent proceedings for overthrowing the party in power. The latter was headed by Pithias, the *proxenus* of Athens, who was a member of the council, and the most influential statesman at Corcyra. He was accordingly indicted of treasonable intrigues with the Athenians, to whom he wished to deliver up the island; but he contrived to clear himself of all suspicions. Nor was he content with this, but hereupon in his turn attacked five of his wealthiest fellow-citizens, the leaders of the opposite party, charging them with having caused timber to be cut in the sacred woods to serve as poles in their private vineyards. The

five were sentenced to a fine, and the mitigation for which they prayed in its payment was refused to them. This event amounted to a defeat of the entire party, of which Pithias was resolved to take advantage for the conclusion of a thorough alliance with Athens, in place of the previously existing treaties, before the time had arrived for him to resign his seat in the council. Hereupon his opponents resorted to measures of violence; armed with daggers, they took possession of the council-hall, put Pithias and a great number of his official colleagues to death, and then appeared before the people to justify their deed as a necessary way of preserving Corcyra from imminent servitude. The ancient policy of neutrality was now to be revived, and foreign vessels were henceforth only to be allowed to enter the ports one at a time; and, simultaneously, the government despatched envoys to Athens, who were there to give the most favorable coloring to the events which had taken place.

But this rule of terror on the part of the aristocrats, whose courage rose on account of the presence of the Corinthian trireme, was of a very brief duration; their deed of blood could be neither palliated nor buried in oblivion. The entire civic community separated into two hostile camps. The nobles occupied the market-place, which was surrounded by their dwellings and warehouses, as well as the harbor lying opposite the mainland, whence they expected the arrival of auxiliaries; while the people occupied the citadel and the other harbor. Either side secured the services of the slaves, the majority of whom, however, joined the popular party; while the nobles strengthened their ranks by mercenaries from Epirus; and even the women in fanatical frenzy took part in the conflict which burst forth in the midst of the city. For the multitude advanced upon the market-place, which, together with its vicinity, the aristocrats in self-defence set on fire. A large amount of mercantile goods was con-

sumed by the flames, and when the popular party gained the upper hand, the Corinthians took their departure, and the mercenary troops retired.

In their place, Nicostratus now arrives with the twelve triremes and 500 Messenians from Naupactus. By his desire the civic feud stands still; the ten instigators of the revolution, who had already taken flight, are sentenced to death, and Corcyra received into the Attic alliance. In order to give security to the democratic government, Nicostratus declares himself ready to leave behind five of his ships, taking with him in their place five Corcyræan vessels. To man the latter, citizens of Corcyra are selected, every one of them being known as hostile to the Athenians. These citizens refuse to go on board, in the firm belief that nothing is intended short of delivering them up to the vengeance of the Athenians. They fly from one sanctuary of religion to another. The fury of the populace rises day by day, and the interference of the Athenians alone prevents another massacre.

Alcidas.

At the moment of this terrible crisis the fleet of Alcidas and Brasidas at last appears in sight, intended, according to the plan of the Corinthians, to co-operate in the overthrow of the government of Corcyra (p. 136). In uncontrollable terror, the citizens rush on board the ships; without having duly prepared them for battle, and without a definite plan of operations, deaf to the advice of the Athenians, they sail out, ship by ship, to meet the enemy. The consequence was, that the battle ended unfortunately for them; thirteen vessels were captured, and the rest saved only by the fearlessness and imperturbable calm of Nicostratus, against whom the Spartans could effect nothing, notwithstanding their vastly superior numbers. The whole city was filled with terrible apprehensions, and its situation was indeed critical, in case Alcidas had sufficient spirit to follow the advice of Brasidas and immediately attack the city. Instead of adopting

this course, the admiral uselessly landed troops on the southern part of the island, thus losing his golden opportunity; for in the following night the fiery signals became visible which heralded the approach of a large fleet. It was the fleet under Eurymedon; who immediately upon the receipt of the news of the events at Corcyra had set sail from Athens with sixty ships. Hereupon, the sole anxiety of Alcidas was directed towards safely effecting his escape, and his hasty retreat finally decided the affairs of Corcyra.

End of the feuds at Corcyra.

The terrors through which the citizens had passed now changed with furious rapidity into the most cruel desire of vengeance. Of the aristocrats who had fled into the Heræum, fifty were persuaded to appear at a conference, and hereupon immediately killed; those who had remained on the sacred ground put one another to death. For seven days the unchained fury of party hatred raged upon the island, and rose higher and higher as the effusion of blood continued; the savage nature of the islanders displayed itself in all its grossness, and the participation of so many liberated slaves helped to bring about a spectacle of horror such as Greece had never before seen. All the evil passions of human nature were let loose. On the pretence of punishing anti-popular attempts, all were massacred upon whom it was possible to cast suspicion; debtors rid themselves of their creditors, and children laid hands upon their fathers. Domestic ties were no longer of avail, and all religious restraints were at an end. And yet the popular party was unable to achieve a complete victory. Five hundred resolute members of the opposite party entrenched themselves on the mainland, cut off the supplies of the city, and afterwards even made their way back to the island, burnt the ships, and established themselves on the hill of Istone, whence they levied blackmail upon the flat country around.

The results of the war for Sparta.

Thus, even this enterprise upon Corcyra, so cunningly prepared by Corinth, had resulted in failure in the hands of the Peloponnesians, no less than the naval expedition in aid of Mitylene; on either occasion the right moment had been missed; in either case nothing but shame had befallen their arms, and the party upon which Sparta had founded her hopes had been involved in the utmost misery, nay, even, to all intents and purposes, annihilated. Neither had six campaigns on land, notwithstanding the extraordinary losses inflicted upon Athens by the pestilence, effected aught beyond the destruction of the little town of Platææ. The Spartans had merely incurred a loss of reputation, and impaired the confidence placed in them; all their promises had remained unfulfilled, and all their exertions ended in failure.*

Moral results of the war.

One result alone of the war admitted of no doubt, and this was the horribly rapid progress of the demoralization of the Hellenic nation. All the evil elements of human nature, hitherto kept in bounds by religion, conscience and reason, broke forth without restraint or shame. For as the Hellenes knew of no universal code of humanity, their morality was principally based upon their political and national obligations. The feeling of a fraternal tie united all who spoke the same language, followed the same usages, and worshipped the same gods, and every Hellene was justified in expecting nothing but kindness from every member of his nation. The rupture of this bond undermined the entire morality of the nation, and took away the basis of the due observance of duty. The feelings of enmity which had provoked the war had been fearfully heightened

* As to the Corinthian party at Corcyra: Thuc. iii. 70. Nicostratus: *ib.* 75. Eurymedon: *ib.* 80. Moral effect of the party struggles: *ib.* 82 f. (*πᾶσα ἰδέα κακοτροπίας, καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη*).

during its course. The pious abhorrence against shedding Hellenic blood had been as it were extinguished. Even when no motive of profit or advantage existed, prisoners were sacrificed to a pitiless lust of revenge; and, contrasted with the acts of the Spartans, who on their inglorious passage along the coast of Asia Minor put to death defenceless inhabitants, and then after full deliberation destroyed the entire remnant of a Hellenic community, and who even endeavored to conceal their shameful violation of their oaths under the hypocritical forms of legal and religious proceedings—contrasted with such acts, even the exasperation of the Athenians at the traitorous revolt of their allies assumes the character of an act of human weakness, while their speedy repentance deserves a kindly appreciation.

But henceforth the feelings of mutual enmity extended in a constantly widening sphere, and the great division among the Hellenic nation repeated itself in every community. For although at the beginning of the war the position of the Spartans was a very favorable one, yet they had been anything but successful in securing the full sympathies of the Hellenes; while, on the contrary, in every community where any political activity existed, a Lacedæmonian and an Attic party confronted one another with increasing bitterness. Nor was this opposition confined to political matters alone, but it attracted into its sphere every other element of hatred, envy, and malice existing in the communities. all selfish craving, all discontent arising from the ruin of domestic relations; the upper and the lower classes, the poor and the rich, opposed themselves to one another; and the rupture penetrated deeper and deeper into relations of both a public and domestic nature, till the parties, formed from motives so manifold, obscure and half-understood, were arrayed against one another in so bitter an enmity, that the interests of the commonwealth were completely disregarded in compari-

son with those actuating each particular party. The citizens lost their patriotism; and as the virtues of the Hellenes were rooted in the public life of the state, the character of the entire nation underwent a radical change —all the more so, inasmuch as the sense of family and religious obligations was unable to prevent the dissolution of civil life. Free vent was given to the passions, and gradually the standard of morality came to be utterly changed. The virtues of the Hellenes fell into disregard; and what had formerly been admired was now decried.

Peaceable and cautious habits of mind were now regarded as stolid imbecility, moderation as cowardice and intellectual indolence, reflection as selfishness, conscientiousness as foolish simplicity; but reckless hatred, on the other hand, as manly courage. Men were esteemed according to the success attending their undertakings: hence the violation of promises and deceit met with approval so long as they advanced the interests of the party; the use of any and every means was allowed to ambition, and party association was regarded as a stronger bond of union than many years of friendship, or than the ties of gratitude or blood.

Of this demoralization of society the events at Corcyra offered a warning example; here the symptoms of the disease which had seized upon the national life of the Greeks, and spread like an epidemic from city to city, manifested themselves in all their fulness; and reflecting minds among the men of the age were horrified to realize to themselves the crisis which the history of their nation had reached. Herodotus* left his work incomplete at this period since the hopes with which it was undertaken were so little fulfilled. Thucydides, with firmer spirit, with-

* After the close of B.C. 428 Herod. added nothing more to his work; Kirchoff, *Abf. dt Herod. Gesch.* 29.

stood the sad experiences, and did not shun the melancholy view which the history of the time was compelled more and more to present.

Sixth year of the war. Ol. lxxxviii. 2. (B.C. 426.)

After the slow course of military and naval operations in the first five years of the war, signs began to show themselves in its sixth summer of more extensive undertakings and of more decisive events. Either party sought for new bases of operations, and in either state characters of superior vigor attained to positions of greater influence. Sparta recognized the value of Brasidas: Athens gradually recovered from the effects of the pestilence, after the latter had once more (in Ol. lxxxviii.. 2: B. C. 427) lain heavy upon the city; and the representative of the new and bolder spirit which arose was Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes.

Attica owed the fact of being herself spared another invasion to an earthquake which frightened back the Peloponnesians already assembled at the Isthmus. These agitations of the earth affected the whole of Central Greece, and, particularly in the narrow sounds of the sea, along the shores of Eubœa and the opposite coast, inflicted manifold damage by causing inundations. The Peloponnesians, therefore, endeavored to compensate themselves for the abandoned invasion of Attica by another undertaking.

Foundation of Heraclea. Ol. lxxxviii. 3. (B.C. 426.)

The ancient city of Trachis, situate by Mount Œta, in front of Thermopylæ (vol. ii. p. 308), had been destroyed by the Œtæan tribes. Her inhabitants applied for aid to Sparta, as connected with their home by primitive traditions (vol. i. p. 127). Their application was accompanied by a similar one on the part of the Dorians dwelling between Mounts Parnassus and Œta, who were exposed to a similar danger. In Sparta, the citizens dis-

tinguished by superior foresight, among whom Brasidas was doubtless the leading spokesman, perceived and appreciated the extraordinary advantages of the situation of Trachis. It offered a military position than which no better could be desired, and important in two different directions; on the one hand towards Eubœa, and the possessions and naval stations of the Athenians on that island, on the other towards the Thracian colonies, to which Brasidas devoted particular attention. The Delphic oracle bestowed its blessing upon the undertaking, although this military station was by no means in agreement with its ancient policy of colonization; and thus a vigorous effort was made without further delay. A proclamation was issued to the entire Greek population, with the exception of the Ionians and Achæans, inviting them to take part in the re-foundation of Trachis; and the city was accordingly, under the name of Heraclea, re-built, surrounded with walls, and provided with fortified naval docks. The power of the Dorians seemed to regenerate itself in the ancient seats of their race, and the Athenians found themselves seriously threatened at the most dangerous points of their foreign dominions Meanwhile the young city was beset by difficulties. It was exposed to a continuous series of hostilities on the part of the Thessalians, while the Spartans, by abuse of their official authority and by generally unskilful conduct, helped to injure their own creation, so that the Athenians were spared the necessity of exerting themselves to meet the danger threatening them from this quarter.*

Athenian victory at Tanagra. Ol. lxxxviii. 3. (B. C. 426.)

They were thus enabled to execute with a double measure of vigor their own plans for extending their power by both land and sea. Nicias, whose influence had after the fall of Mitylene been increased by the victory of the

* Trachis: Thuc. iii. 92; Diod. xii. 59.

Moderate party, had in the course of the same summer successfully carried out an expedition to the island of Minoa, which together with Nisæa formed a coast-station of the Peloponnesians, and had to be carefully watched from Salamis. For the sake of greater security Nicias wished to have in his power the port of Megara itself, and for this purpose built a fort on Minoa. In the following year (Ol. lxxxviii. 3; B. C. 426) he led a squadron of sixty ships to Melos, in order to force this island, important on account of its situation and harbors, to join the Attic alliance; for since the Peloponnesians possessed a navy, it appeared doubly necessary to allow no hostile power to exist in the Ægean, and to round off more completely the limits of the naval dominion of Athens. But it was found impossible to force Melos to join the alliance, and Nicias rapidly turned to the Sea of Eubœa, disembarked his 2,000 hoplites near Oropus, and in the territory of Tanagra effected a junction with the Attic land-army, which was invading Bœotia under Hipponicus (p. 87) and Eurymedon. The Tanagræans, together with the Theban auxiliary troops, were defeated. This was an act of vengeance against Thebes for Platææ, which rudely disturbed the Bœotians in the midst of their fancied security.

Schemes of Demosthenes.

Less confined in their scope were the plans pursued by Demosthenes and his squadron, who had set sail at the same time as Nicias. Demosthenes was a man who seemed well adapted for supplementing the operations of his colleague in office. He was distinguished by a bold and far-reaching intellect; he was equally spirited as a general and statesman, inexhaustible in counsel and full of new ideas. He clearly realized the fact that Athens could never conquer by means of her citizen-soldiers alone, but that she must learn to put her allies to a better use. His warlike ardor was directed equally against Thebes and against

Sparta; he was the first Athenian tactician who understood how to take advantage of the different circumstances of the ground, of the seasons of the year, and of the various component parts of an army; he was the first who learnt how to make good use of light-armed troops, and who in his strategical plans displayed a talent for combinations, such as war alone could mature. Unaffected by occasional mishaps, he was able to inspire the troops with his own courage, and to acquire their confidence; and the private soldier felt that he had far more in common with Demosthenes than with Nicias and his reserved grandeur.

The thoughts of Demosthenes were bent upon the western scene of war. Following the example of Phormio, and by means of the good understanding existing with the brave and enterprising Naupactians, as well as of a combination with the Acarnanians and Corcyræans, he intended to destroy the power of the Corinthians in the western regions, and to secure to Athens a body of allies on the mainland, which she had lost since the Thirty Years' Peace. Thus it was Demosthenes who revived the ancient policy of Myronides and Tolmides (vol. ii. pp. 439–450); and we are probably justified in assuming, that the shameful fall of Platææ aroused, in the breasts of many patriots to whom the honor of the city was dear, the thought that an urgent necessity existed of strengthening the power of Athens on land, and that the army composed of her own citizens was no match for the enemies on her borders. In order to oblige the Acarnanians, Demosthenes in the first instance, with the aid of the other western allies, made war upon the Leucadians, whose sentiments were favorable to Corinth, and whose territory, half island, half mainland (for by cutting through the land the Corinthians had in former ages converted Leucas into an island), very seriously endangered the political position of the Acarnanians. The island was devastated, and the population forced to

crowd within the walls of the fortified city. The Acarnanians hereupon demanded that a siege should be immediately commenced, the city being incapable of holding out. But Demosthenes had no wish to throw up trenches and walls, particularly as the Acarnanians must have been disinclined to allow an Attic garrison to establish itself here. Instead of entertaining this proposal, his ardent mind was attracted by the scheme suggested to him by the Messenians, of reducing to submission the Ætolian people, by whom the safety of Naupactus was continually endangered.*

This great people had hitherto taken no part whatever in Greek conflicts, and its country had remained, or rather had become, perfectly strange to the Hellenes. For originally, it will be remembered, the Ætolians belonged to the same race as the Locrians and inhabitants of Elis (vol. i. p. 133); but immigrations from the north had barbarized them, and utterly estranged them from Greek civilization: they spoke an unintelligible dialect, and dwelt in a loose union of districts devoid of walled cities, in habitations scattered from the banks of the Achelous up to the vicinity of Thermopylæ. Demosthenes hoped by means of a rapid advance to prevent any combination on the part of the tribes, and the scope of his plans went far beyond the object immediately in hand; for he calculated upon the favorable sentiments of the Ozolian Locrians and their neighbors the Phocians; and in his mind's eye saw himself already at the head of a vast army of hosts of the mainland, formed by the populations of a united Western Greece, with which he thought he would be able from the direction of Parnassus to invade Bœotia, where he might without a levy of Attic citizens, overthrow the power of Thebes.

* Enterprise of Nicias and Demosthenes: Thuc. iii. 94 f.

Demosthenes in Ætolia. Ol. lxxxviii. 3. (B. C. 426.)

Demosthenes very greatly undervalued the difficulties of an Ætolian campaign; his trust in the fortune of his arms was so blind, that he would not even wait for the arrival of his Locrian auxiliaries, nor take warning from the fact that the Acarnanians, incensed at his disregard of their wishes, withdrew their aid from him. After obtaining a few successes he advanced as far as Ægitium, which lay at a distance of nine miles from the sea. Here already his troubles commenced. The Ætolians, who displayed signs of a far more united action than had been expected from them, had occupied the heights with large numbers of soldiers, and inflicted most serious damage upon the Athenians without entering into a regular battle with them. Demosthenes stood in need of light-armed troops for defending himself against the enemy's archers. In the end, nothing remained for him but to beat a speedy retreat. This, however, involved him in further calamities. The Naupactian who had acted as guide had fallen. After passing through morasses, trackless, hilly country, and burning forests, Demosthenes effected his return to the coast. His colleague in office, Procles, together with 120 citizens, had thus been uselessly sacrificed. The sole result of the whole campaign was this, that the Arcananians were dissatisfied with Athens, while the entire Ætolian people, in a state of hostile agitation, immediately effected an understanding with Corinth and Sparta. It was probably the Corinthians who were here again quickly at hand, in order to turn the condition of things to their own advantage. They, we may believe, stirred up the Ætolians, and made hated Naupactus the goal of an undertaking which was called into life with great rapidity. For, before the summer had come to an end, a Peloponnesian force of 3,000 heavy-armed troops, including 500 from the newly-founded city of Heraclea, assembled at Mount Parnassus. A proclamation issued

from Delphi summoning the Locrians to join the Peloponnesian confederation; the Locrian towns sent hostages; and the power of Sparta in the heart of Central Greece was greater than ever. The mighty confederate army advanced in the direction of the Gulf of Corinth, and the safety of Naupactus hung in the balance. Fortunately, Demosthenes had remained behind in that port, having very prudently hesitated to show himself at Athens, after the failure of his Ætolian campaign. The Acarnanians once more became his allies, and thus Naupactus was saved.

When the summer was drawing to a close, the great Peloponnesian army stood on the banks of the Achelous, without any object or plan of operations to determine its further movements. But its presence served to kindle into new flames the party divisions prevailing in the surrounding districts. The Ambraciotes thought it incumbent upon them to take advantage of this opportunity for striking a blow against their ancient enemies, the Amphilochians and Acarnanians (p. 74). They occupied Olpæ, a fortified point on the coast in the Amphilochian territory with 3,000 hoplites, directed 2,000 men to follow on, while the mercenaries of the neighboring mountain tribes were called out. Simultaneously the Spartan general Eurylochus crossed the Achelous, and successfully effected a junction with the army of the Ambraciotes, so that the scene of war had now been suddenly transferred to the shore of the Ambracian Gulf.

Battle of Olpæ. Ol. lxxxviii. 3. (B.C. 426--5.)

The Acarnanians rapidly summoned their troops to arms, and named Demosthenes commander-in-chief. Burning with the desire of making good his previous defeat, notwithstanding that the winter had already commenced, he arrived before Olpæ, with twenty triremes and Messenian hoplites, immediately after Eurylochus. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes considerably outnumbered

the forces of Demosthenes; but his superior military genius enabled him to take so full an advantage of the locality, that he completely defeated the Spartans in open battle. Eurylochus himself fell in the fray, and utter discouragement seized upon the Peloponnesians, who were thus together with the Ambraciotes caught in a net; and they now thought of nothing but saving themselves.

Separate treaty between Demosthenes and Menedaïus.

Of these feelings Demosthenes took advantage, and concluded a separate treaty with the Spartan general Menedaïus, by which the latter and his troops were allowed to depart unharmed. Demosthenes thought it impossible to obtain a greater advantage than by depriving the Ambraciotes, who had so insolently begun this contest, of the aid of their allies, and at the same time letting all the world see how selfishly Sparta sacrificed her confederates. Nor could the honor of the Spartans have in point of fact suffered more from any defeat than from the event which now took place. In consequence of this dishonorable compact, the Peloponnesians took their departure, one by one, from the blockaded fortress; they stole away from their brethren-in-arms, and then, when pursued by the latter, ran away in open flight.

End of the war on the Ambracian Gulf.

Meanwhile auxiliaries arrived from Ambracia, advancing upon the coast through Amphilochian territory. Demosthenes availed himself of the circumstance of the Amphilochian troops being at his disposal, and laid an ambush in the pass of Idomene, which completely answered his expectations. The entire body was destroyed; and the blow of their double defeat and betrayal by their allies fell so heavily upon the Ambraciotes, that their strength was utterly exhausted, and their power of resistance at an end. Demosthenes wished to take Ambracia itself, in order once for all to destroy the influence of Corinth on

the shores of this important gulf. But the Acarnanians prevented him. After the power of their ancient enemies had once been broken, the Acarnanians preferred these as neighbors to the Athenians.

A further proof of the jealousy with which the Western Greeks resisted the encroachments of the influence of Athens is to be found in the speed with which they hastened to settle their affairs without foreign interference. For, after Ambracia had resigned all claims to the Amphilochian territory, a peace, to last for a hundred years, was concluded between the Acarnanians and Ambraciotes. All border-feuds were to be at an end; either people was to assist the other in case of an attack; this one condition being added, that the Acarnanians were in no case to be obliged to send assistance to the Ambraciotes in the event of a war against Athens, while similarly the Ambraciotes were not to be forced to assist the others against the Peloponnesians. Thus the ancient relations were, after all, maintained on either side, and thus it could come to pass that, subsequently, the Corinthians again placed a garrison in Ambracia. And yet the effect of the recent successes in the war was immense. The Attic troops had once more given brilliant proofs of their excellence as land-soldiers; and before the winter was at an end Demosthenes returned to Athens, and hung up on the walls of her temples the resplendent suits of armor captured by him in his victorious campaign.*

Second purification of Delos. Ol. lxxxviii. 3. (B. C. 425.) Spring.

In the meantime the minds of the citizens had been further cheered by a religious celebration. For in the midst of the losses and turmoil of the war it had been deter-

* The Messenians at Naupactus represent to Demosthenes, *μεγα μέν εἶναι τὸ μέγα μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας*, &c., Thuc. iii. 94 f.—Defeat of the Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes, *ib.* 100 f., 105 f. ch. Ullrich, *d. Kampf um Amphilochien*, (Hamburg, 1863).

mined to offer a solemn testimony of homage to Apollo on Delos,—a homage doubtless connected with the complete cessation of the pestilence, which had lasted as long as the fifth year of the war.

The solemnity consisted in the renewed consecration of the entire island to the divine Giver of grace; all the coffins containing human remains being removed from Delos, and Rhenea appointed to be henceforth the sole burial-place. This solemnity supplemented the act formerly performed by the orders of Pisistratus (vol. i. p. 383), and it was doubtless in the present instance also intended, by means of a brilliant renewal of the Delian celebration, to strengthen the power of Athens in the island sea, to give a festive centre to the Ionic world, at present excluded from the Peloponnesian festivals, and thus to attach the Ionians more and more closely to Athens. But the main purpose was clearly one of morality and religion. It was intended to calm and edify the minds of the citizens. The solemn purification of Delos was, like that of Athens in the times of Solon (vol. i. p. 343), after a period of disturbed and disjointed times, to herald a new and better era; accordingly, the festive celebration of Apollo was reorganized, and a new festival instituted, to be solemnized every four years; the ancient games of Homeric memory were revived; and the horse-race added to them in honor of the god. It was doubtless the Moderate party which interested itself at Athens in this matter of Delos, intending vigorously to revive the ancient traditions of the people, which had been allowed to be more and more disregarded, as well as the sense of religion. We accordingly find Nicias taking a prominent part in the Delian festival, and it is extremely probable that it was at the first celebration of the latter that Nicias distinguished himself as the leader of the Attic festive embassy (vol. ii. p. 525) by extraordinary magnificence. He caused the arm of the sea between Rhenea and Delos

(vol. ii. p. 162), four stadia in breadth, to be bridged over in a single night; so that on the following morning the multitude stood amazed to behold a road for the procession spread out before their eyes, and adorned with tapestry, wreaths, pictures, and costly furniture, along which the Athenians passed across to the island. He moreover bestowed gifts of land, dedicated new votive offerings, and exerted himself to the utmost to prove to the Hellenes that neither had the reverence towards their gods died out in Athens, nor were the means wanting for honoring them worthily.*

Seventh year of the war. Summer.

While Nicias sought to quiet the minds of men by peace-festivals, Demosthenes was unceasingly busied with schemes for giving the war a powerful direction; to him its tardy progress, in which the strength and resources of the city uselessly consumed themselves, was intolerable; and he sought for new methods of attack for invading the very heart of the enemy's power. In this search the experience which he had acquired in his western campaigns was of considerable service to him. He had on these occasions specially proved the efficiency of the Messenians, as well as their spirit of enterprise and unextinguishable hatred against the Spartans. These emigrants had not forgotten their dialect, nor had they forgotten their home. In old Messenia remnants still continued to exist of the same race; the country was for the most part desolate, for the Spartans had not known how to turn their conquest to account; the entire west coast was devoid of inhabitants, and the harbor of Pylus (Bay of Navarino), the best in the whole peninsula, neglected, uninhabited, and unused (vol. i. p. 243). The idea of

* These solemnities were celebrated in Thargelion. (Bœckh, Abh. d. B. A. 1834, p. 6; Schmidt, *De Vita Nic.* 9.) Undertaking against Melos, Thuc. iii. 91.

using these circumstances in favor of Athens accordingly suggested itself naturally; and the intercourse of Demosthenes with the Messenians had doubtless matured in him the design of proceeding to measures of force, which should place that port in the hands of the Athenians; the domestic power of Sparta being thus attacked at its most vulnerable point, and the province of Messenia excited to revolt. Demosthenes kept his plan secret. But when in the ensuing spring Eurymedon and Sophocles were despatched with forty vessels to the Sicilian sea, and at the same time commissioned to assist the Corcyræans, who were still subject to dangerous attacks from the aristocrats (p. 132), Demosthenes obtained from the people permission to accompany the fleet, and during the voyage to suggest the occupation of suitable points on the coast. When, accordingly, the ships had rounded the southern promontories of the peninsula and were sailing along the mountainous coast of Messenia, Demosthenes addressed himself to the commanders of the fleet and pointed out to them the deserted harbor of war with its two narrow inlets, and the promontory of Coryphasium, which rises above the northern entrance to a height of 800 feet, with precipitous rocks commanding the entire country around. He proposed to the commanders to occupy the heights, which might be fortified with little trouble and defended with ease; the garrison would find spring water on the hill; and he offered himself with six vessels to fortify and hold the place. The commanders refused to halt. For the daring Demosthenes and his adventurous schemes were by no means popular with the aristocratic party, to whom he was at the present moment doubly odious, inasmuch as he occupied a position assigned to him, contrary to all previous usage, as it were, in the character of the trusted favorite of the people. The fleet passes on. But a storm breaks out, and against their will the commanders are forced to re-

turn, and to wait for better weather in the probably safe harbor of Pylus. Demosthenes renews his proposals, but in vain. It would be a troublesome task in sooth, he was told, to occupy every desolate point on the coast of the peninsula. Nor was his proposal supported by the inferior officers or the men. But the stress of weather outside continues, and, fortunately for Demosthenes, time hangs heavily on the hands of the crews. Suddenly they offer of their own accord to fortify the hill, and an occasion arises for a full display of Athenian activity and handiness. For as they lacked all tools requisite for cutting and transposing the blocks of stone, they diligently sought among the ruins of the rocks and previous edifices for all the necessary materials, placed the wet loam upon their backs, holding it fast there with crossed hands, merrily ascended and descended the precipitous crags, and under the superintendence of Demosthenes worked so industriously at the wall, that in six days the height of the ancient citadel had been made capable of defence. The fleet hereupon took its departure for Corcyra, Demosthenes being left behind in the enemy's country with five ships.

Demosthenes at Pylus. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.)

The Athenians very soon became aware of the salutary effects of this bold enterprise: for King Agis, who had very recently again invaded Attica (this was the fifth Spartan invasion of the country), in consequence of the news from Messenia, returned into Peloponnesus after a brief stay of a fortnight; while at the same time the fleet, which had been about to make one more attempt to support the Peloponnesian party in Corcyra, received orders to return in order to put a speedy end to the insolent attempt at Pylus. Demosthenes from his solitary castle by the sea beheld forty-three ships of war entering the harbor, while the entire shore filled with troops hurriedly sent over from Sparta. But, instead of being overcome by fear, he acted with resolute presence of

mind. After despatching two out of his small squadron of ships to summon the Attic fleet to his speedy relief, he distributed his little band on the fortifications, and himself, with sixty chosen soldiers and a detachment of archers, descended to the shore, where alone danger threatened him. For the points favorable for a landing were sufficiently entrenched; and it was therefore only necessary to secure the point where on account of the shallows it had been thought unnecessary to raise a wall higher than that already standing. At this point every attempt at landing needed to be warded off; for as soon as the enemy could establish a footing on the hill, the citadel and its defenders were irretrievably lost.

The Peloponnesians in the first instance occupied the island of Sphacteria, extending between the northern and southern inlet of the harbor; with 420 Spartans, in order thus to establish a complete command over the entire district of the harbor: and then eagerly rowed towards the unfortified point on the shore, where the little band of Athenians was drawn up in battle array, full of zeal to have these intruders quickly punished for their boldness. But here they were met by unexpected difficulties. For only a small number of ships were able to approach at the same time, and even these were incessantly exposed to the danger of running aground on the rocky bank. The awkwardness of the Peloponnesians and their fear of the water contributed to frustrate their chance of success. In vain Brasidas inveighed against the timidity of his men, in vain he drove his own vessels upon the rocks of Coryphasium, and in order to give an example himself, descended from the gangway into the surf. Struck by the missiles of the Athenians he fell back in a state of unconsciousness. The Athenians stood firm as a wall; and after the expiration of two days their adversaries instead of continually advancing fresh bodies of troops and thus tiring out the little band, gave up the fight,

and sent to Asine for timber for siege machines, to enable them to renew the attack at places more favorable for a landing.

Battle in the harbor of Pylus.

The critical opportunity had thus been missed. For, during the interval which ensued, the Athenians arrived from the Ionian Islands with fifty vessels of war—among them four Chian ships; the guard-ships at Naupactus having also eagerly joined the expedition to Messenia. Hereupon the Athenians offered battle in the open sea, and then, penetrating into the harbor by both its inlets, set upon the ships of the Peloponnesians before these had fallen into line of battle, and drove them up to the shore. The Peloponnesians hereupon made one further advance—an advance executed with unprecedented ardor, for they had of a sudden realized the fact that the lives of all the Spartans landed on the island were at stake. A terrible naval battle ensued in the harbor, which in the end was held by the Athenians; and, although the land-army was continually increased by the arrival of fresh troops from every part of Peloponnesus, yet there was no possibility of relieving the Spartans, who were so near at hand and yet utterly cut off from their friends, or even of carrying provisions to the desolate rocky island.*

Spartan embassy of peace at Athens. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.)

When the news of this state of affairs arrived at Sparta, it was resolved to send the authorities of the city themselves to Pylus, where they were to treat with absolute powers. They found nothing remaining for them but to conclude a truce under conditions incredibly hard and humiliating for the Peloponnesians, whose military and naval forces were present in large numbers on this, the shore of their own peninsula. All the Spartan triremes, sixty in number, were given up to

* Demosthenes at Pylus: Thuc. iv. 3.—Fight in the harbor: ib. 14.

Athens for the term of the truce, no concession being obtained in return, except the permission of daily supplying the Spartans on Sphacteria with fixed rations of provisions; while the island itself was to remain under strict blockade until the question of peace or war had been decided at Athens.

Infinite was the surprise of the Athenians when the ships entered the Piræeus with the news of the successes obtained at Pylus, and bearing the supreme authorities of Sparta as suppliants for peace. The Spartans really desired peace, and had no doubt of being able to obtain it. In this hope alone they had consented to the conditions of the truce. They had come to recognize with increasing conviction the endless character of the war; in point of fact, they had reaped from it nothing but shame and harm; nor was there much prospect of any compensating advantages to be obtained from its future course. With their allies they were on bad terms; recently, all their calamities by sea had been followed by the rout of their land-troops; and when at the present moment the irreparable loss of 420 true-born Spartans was imminent, no further hesitation held them back. Moreover this unfortunate event seemed to offer the most honorable occasion for consenting to sue for peace: they therefore acted without consulting their confederates, being desirous of rapidly accomplishing their purpose.

The speech of the envoys was impressive and convincing. They showed how the Athenians could not conclude peace under circumstances more favorable to them. A sincere and honest peace, they declared, was soonest brought about, if no desire were allowed to prevail of forcing intolerable conditions upon a defeated enemy, which might force him to the resistance of extreme despair. The power of Sparta was not broken; yet she desired peace, and would feel sincerely bound to observe the obligations of a faithful ally to the Athenians, accord-

ing as the latter acted with generosity and moderation. Let them reflect upon the mutability of the fortune of war, which they had themselves frequently experienced.

Unfavorable reception of the Spartan proposals.

The result failed to answer the expectation of the speakers. For the Attic people was so intoxicated with its good fortune that it deemed all negotiations superfluous, and believed the decision of everything to rest in its own hands. A measureless insolence of success had seized upon the citizens; and before rational orators could find time to resist its effects, Cleon thrust himself forward to take advantage of this state of public feeling, and fully to re-assert his personal authority; for he had after all been unable to establish a permanent and undisputed hold on the guidance of public affairs.

Cleon and the opposition.

Notwithstanding the terrorism exercised by Cleon in the public assembly, an irrepressible opposition against him existed in Athens, which found its most undiluted expression on the comic stage. For while Tragedy remained true to her vocation of elevating the minds of the citizens above the troubles of the past into the domain of the ideal, Comedy in these years first attained to her full importance, by scourging the foibles of the day, and in the theatre preserving to the Athenians the freedom of speech which had grown dumb on the orator's tribune. On the comic stage Aristophanes spoke out nobly as the champion of the highest interests of the state, and not only preached against the decadence of morality, by contrasting with one another the ancient and modern education of the Athenians, but also attacked Demagogy, as it had developed itself in Athens since the death of Pericles, directing his onslaughts specially against the very root and origin of the policy of Cleon. The want of reflection, the frivolous manner of dealing with affairs of the highest importance, the abuses of the law-

Aristophanes.

courts, the arbitrary conduct of the officials, the shameful oppression of the allies (whom in his *Babylonians* he represented in the character of millers' men),—these were the evils of degenerate democracy, against which he inveighed with so serious an energy that we should have to regard him as an equally bad poet and unconscientious man and citizen, were we not to believe his pictures to have been based upon the reality of facts. His love of truth obtained for him the admiration of the allies, who, when at Athens, crowded to see the poet who was courageous enough at public civic festivals "sincerely to tell the Athenian people what is right," and for the same reason he was bitterly hated and persecuted by Cleon. After the abolition of the law of Antimachus (p. 43) the people would not again consent to forego the license of comedy; and Cleon was therefore obliged to find other means of revenging himself upon his adversary. Immediately after the production of the *Babylonians* (March 426; Ol. lxxxviii. 2), Cleon indicted Aristophanes before the council, of having, at the great state festival of the Dionysia, in the presence of many strangers and allies, in an unpatriotic and dangerous manner exposed and derided the political course of Athens. But this prosecution failed as utterly as a second, in which the demagogue endeavored to dispute the poet's descent from citizen parents; a form of accusation much practised by the Sycophantic craft of the day. Cleon was accordingly unable to rid himself of this burdensome opposition. He was doubly glad to seize upon the new opportunity, viz., the arrival of the Spartan envoys, for once more asserting himself as the first man in the state, and deciding its resolutions. He was ready with an answer for the envoys according with the prevailing state of public feeling. He demanded that the men on Sphacteria should one and all be brought as prisoners of war to Athens, and that the former possessions of the Athenians in the Peloponnesus and in Megaris, Nisæa,

Pegæ, Trœzene, and in the whole of Achaia, should be immediately restored to them. After this had been done, the Spartans might fetch home the prisoners and make proposals as to a truce, to extend over any period they might prefer.

Rejection of all the Spartan proposals.

It might be thought, that in consequence of this answer all further negotiation would have been brought to a close on the spot; for even a complete defeat could not have imposed worse terms upon the Spartans.* Yet the envoys, instead of absolutely rejecting even this answer, asked that men might be chosen to continue the negotiations with them. For, although the Spartans had no intention of regarding the interests of their allies, yet they could not possibly in the public assembly agree to concessions which in the case of failure would have immediately embroiled them with all their confederates. Nothing therefore remained for them but to propose the appointment of a commission, to which they would communicate their offers towards a settlement. Of this proposal Cleon took advantage for the most violent invective. At last, he exclaimed, the truth was palpable of what he had so often pointed out, viz., that nothing which the Spartans had brought forward was meant in good faith. Their only intention was to effect a secret understanding with some of the aristocratic gentry at Athens, in order to deceive the simple-minded people; proposals honestly meant, and in accordance with law, need not shun the light of publicity. Thus Cleon thoroughly achieved his object. The envoys took their departure: and thus the opportunity of concluding an honorable peace and utterly dissolving the entire Peloponneso-Bœotian confederation had passed away. The voice of the moderate citizens had failed to obtain a hearing, and this most important ques-

* Spartan embassy: Thuc. iv. 16. Aristophanes' *Babylon*, acted a year before the *Acharn*; cf. Ar. *Acharn*, 427.

tion had been settled after the most brutal fashion, and with unwarrantable recklessness.

Renewal of the conflict at Pylus. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.)

The war accordingly recommenced in the bay of Pylus, after a pause of twenty days. Its first event was the refusal of the Athenian commanders to restore the ships delivered up to them. But, notwithstanding this act of violence, which it was scarcely possible to excuse on the pretence that the Peloponnesians had equally violated the conditions of the truce, the advantageous position of the Athenians soon underwent a very perceptible change. For the surrender of the blockaded Spartans, though expected from day to day, failed to take place. They had saved a larger quantity of provisions than was supposed, and the Helots, induced by tempting promises, contrived with great boldness and skill secretly to make their way to the island. On the other hand, the Athenians began to feel a most painful scarcity of spring water; the duty of mounting guard along the whole circumference of the island wore very heavily upon them; the bad season was at hand, their ardor had changed into discontent, and, instead of the news and full spoils of victory hourly expected at Athens, messages arrived which made the success of the whole undertaking at Pylus appear questionable, and called for fresh troops.

Cleon appointed to the command at Pylus.

Thereupon a complete revulsion occurred in public feeling at Athens. The citizens were overcome by the bitterest repentance on account of their irrational conduct, and Cleon had to use every exertion in order to escape a complete defeat. In the first instance he disputed the truth of the news from Pylus; but when he was called upon by the people to obtain information as to the condition of the fleet in his own person, accompanied by Theogenes (probably a member of the aristocratic party), he replied, with much reason, that missions of that kind were a pure

loss of time; if the generals were men, they would easily be able by one bold blow to put an end to the danger of their position at Pylus. This was merely an insinuation directed against Nicias, who filled the office of *strategus*. Nicias hereupon thought it well to take advantage of this opportunity of making the hateful demagogue pay the penalty of his boastings, and accordingly, in his own name and in that of his colleagues, renounced all rights to the command, proposing at the same time that it should be transferred to Cleon. The latter attempted to evade the responsibility; but the assembly, amused by these unusual proceedings, held him fast, so that in the end he was obliged to submit; whereupon he very speedily recovered his old audacity, promising to bring the Spartans to Athens from Sphacteria, or to put an end to them there, within the space of twenty days. Cleon caused himself to be authorized to take Demosthenes as his colleague, whom he knew to have long urged the capture of the island by force.

Fortune favored Cleon in an extraordinary manner. For, when he arrived at the fleet, the wishes of the troops, who as besiegers had themselves to undergo all the deprivations of a besieged army, were decidedly in favor of a determined assault; in addition to which, the woods on Sphacteria, which had hitherto rendered an attack extremely dangerous, had in the interval been burnt to the ground. Demosthenes had long ago thoroughly prepared the plan of the assault: when he therefore, through Cleon, acquired perfect liberty of action, and when moreover fresh troops, especially light-armed soldiers and archers, had at the same time arrived, no further delay was allowed to intervene.

Surrender of the Spartans on Sphacteria. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.) August.

The Spartans had disposed themselves on the island as in a fortress. On the shore they had placed their outposts; their headquarters were in the central incline, which

is watered by a small spring. From this part the ground rises to the north to the strongest point, the apex of the entire island, where with the aid of previous fortifications they had thrown up a special entrenchment. After the outposts had been overpowered, the troops of Demosthenes, distributed in small bands, advanced to the central height, plying the pent-up band of the enemy on all sides with arrows, stones, and javelins. Resistance was exceedingly difficult, by reason of the effects of the fire which had recently consumed the wood, and at the same time of the intolerable dust of its ashes.

The Spartans at last retreated to the summit, determined for the sturdiest struggle. This point proved impregnable. The best part of the day was over, and the Athenians were exhausted by the heat of the sun and by thirst; and even Demosthenes was at a loss how to proceed. But in this difficulty he was aided by the sagacity of his Messenian friends. The latter had discovered a spot beneath the vertical rock of the northern summit where it was possible to climb up even without a path. In this way they suddenly took the Spartans in the rear; and when the latter saw themselves attacked in both rear and front, they consented to the proposals of Cleon and Demosthenes, and surrendered, 292 in number, among them 120 Spartan citizens, after having been blockaded in the island for a period of seventy-two days. They were taken as prisoners to Athens, it being announced that they would be put to death in case of any invasion of Attica. On the other hand, a body of Messenians was established in Pylus, whence they undertook highly successful raids through the surrounding country. In addition to the sufferings arising from these devastations, the Spartans were troubled by the insecure condition of their own country, and the fear of rebellions at home. The Helots began to desert to the enemy, and all the troubles of the Messenian wars seemed about to be

renewed. Moreover, the entire fleet had been lost; and, with a view to the safety of the prisoners at Athens, it was impossible vigorously to employ the land-troops; so that Sparta was restricted to a defensive war which promised no glory and no results. But what affected her most deeply of all was, that she should forfeit so much of the esteem she had hitherto enjoyed among the Hellenes. That the descendants of Leonidas could surrender, arms in hand, had been hitherto accounted an impossibility; the confidence of the confederates had been already thoroughly shaken by the traitorous act of Mendaïus (p. 141), and the narrow-hearted selfishness of the Spartan policy was now a fact manifest to all the Greeks.

Cleon at the height of power and honors.

Under these circumstances, Sparta was herself so weary of the war that she opened new negotiations with Athens. But in the latter city the power of Cleon was greater than ever; he was the hero of the day and the benefactor of the city, which he had freed from the pressure of war endured through so many years. In memory of his military success a statue of the goddess of Victory was dedicated on the citadel, and to himself was decreed the highest honor which the state could bestow—the right of dining at the public cost in the Prytaneum during the remainder of his life; about the same time (from the year 426) he was also superintendent of the public revenues (vol. ii. p. 457); in short, he had attained to the height of power and honor, was admired and feared by the multitude, and surrounded, in Tyrant fashion, by a crowd of flatterers: he was even allowed to treat the citizens with insolence, and, *e. g.*, on one occasion dared, on account of a banquet, to adjourn the discussions of the citizens when already assembled in public meeting. On the other hand, the authority of Nicias had undergone a corresponding diminution, not only among his opponents, but also among

his political friends. For the latter could not forgive his having so inopportunely resigned his office as general, thereby himself occasioning the recent rise of the power of Cleon. The party of the Moderates was divided in itself and powerless. Sparta's proposals for peace were met by a continuous rise in the demands of Athens, and the negotiations had to be broken off. *

Expedition under Nicias against Corinth. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. c. 425.)

On the other hand, the military and naval undertakings of the Athenians proceeded with increasing energy, attempts being made to continue the system of operations so brilliantly commenced by Demosthenes, and to make conquests in Peloponnesus, and establish fortified military positions there. It was the same system by which the Dorians had formerly effected the conquest of the peninsula; and the first point chosen had actually been the station of a Dorian camp. This was the hill of Solygeus, situate between Corinth and Epidaurus, at a distance of rather more than two miles from the Isthmus. An unwalled Corinthian village lay on the height, which might easily be entrenched and connected by walls with the neighboring sea-shore. Thus it was intended to attack the second power also of the peninsula, which had been restricted to more and more narrow limits on the sea, in its own territory. The plan was bold, and, with a state as rich and full of slaves as the Corinthian, promised great gain. Nicias landed near Cenchreæ with eighty triremes; special transports brought over Attic cavalry, which very eagerly took part in the enterprise. Meanwhile a warning had reached the Corinthians from Argos, and they had hereupon occupied Solygeus. A sanguinary conflict ensued in the precipitous country between the village and the sea. The victory fell to the Athenians through the valor of

* Cleon as superintendent of the public revenues: see Ar. *Eq.* 479, Droysen, *Introd.* p. 291. Cf. Boeckh, *P. E. of Athens*, vol. i. p. 225 (E. Tr.).—Cleon at Pylus: Thuc. iv. 30.

their cavalry, but the undertaking itself had failed. They found a compensation in occupying the volcanic peninsula of Methone, which projects from the country of Trœzene towards Ægina, and is only connected with the mainland by a narrow isthmus. The latter was walled off by the Athenians, who thus obtained an excellent military position against Epidaurus and Trœzene, at a point lying opposite to the Piræeus and admitting of easy communication with it by means of fiery signals.

New massacres at Corcyra. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.)

Meanwhile the fleet of Eurymedon and Sophocles (p. 144) had continued its voyage to Corcyra, and, combining its action with with the Corcyræans, who were still exposed to much danger from the garrison of Istone, had taken that robbers' nest. The aristocratic partisans who had held themselves there surrendered to the mercy of the Attic people. But as the naval commanders, who at Pylus had been obliged to resign all the glory and honor of their victory to others, were unwilling to allow the captured aristocrats, the bitterest foes of Attic policy, to be brought in triumph to Athens by other hands (for the generals were themselves obliged to continue their voyage to Sicily), they encouraged the revengeful guile of the Corcyræans, who feared nothing so much as the possibility of their fellow-citizens being pardoned at Athens, and who therefore deceitfully lured the captains to attempt their escape. This attempt was hereupon betrayed to the Athenian commanders, and taken advantage of by them to declare the sworn agreements to be at an end and the protection of Athens forfeited. The entire band of these unfortunate men was sacrificed to the fury of the people, and put to death, in a massacre surpassing in relentless vengefulness all which had previously occurred on the island. The wives of the murdered men were sold into slavery, and, party fury having spent itself upon its last victims, quiet was restored—the quiet of exhaustion and

glutted revenge. These events at the same time extinguished in the Corinthians the last hope of ever restoring their dominion in the Ionian Sea; and in order to complete this overthrow of the Corinthian power, the Athenians before the end of the year, in conjunction with the Acarnanians, took possession of the important city of Anactorium at the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf. The city was colonized anew by settlers taken from all the towns of Acarnania.*

Eighth year of the war. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425.)

In proportion as the Spartans and their confederates were crippled and restricted in their resources, the Athenians steadily advanced; they alone now conducted the war on the offensive, and were able freely to dispose of their forces, because they had nothing to fear at home; and the idea that it was possible utterly to overcome Peloponnesus encouraged them in the full vigor of their activity to attempt undertakings of an ever-widening scope, which at the same time proved them to be well acquainted with the enemy's country.

Cythera.

The island of Cythera (*Cerigo*), the southern continuation of the Peloponnesian range of mountains, had always been the part of Lacedæmon on which the Spartans could least surely rely, because its favorable situation as a commercial country, and the mixture which had from ancient times prevailed in its population, offered the most obstinate resistance to the strict ordinances whereby the Doric system attempted to prevent foreign influences from passing the frontier. Cythera was always kept under like a conquered country, by means of a special governor and a Spartan garrison. The wise Chilo had for this reason declared to the Spartans that the gods could confer no greater benefit

* Solygeus: Thuc. iv. 42: cf Curtius, *Peloponnesus*, ii. 548.—Corcyra Thuc. iv. 46.

upon Sparta than by causing Cythera to be swallowed up by the sea; and Demaratus could give no better advice to Xerxes than to let the first step in his war against Sparta be the occupation of Cythera (vol. ii. p. 349). This dangerous coast-island became yet more dangerous, when, during the Peloponnesian war, a democratic party arose in it, which entered into negotiations with Athens, and with Nicias in particular. Accordingly, when, in the summer of the eighth year of the war, Nicias landed on Cythera with sixty triremes and 2,000 heavy-armed troops he succeeded without difficulty in taking possession of the two towns of the island, establishing a garrison there, and admitting the whole island into the Attic alliance. Immediately afterwards the defenceless coast towns of Laconia were plundered, and hereupon a landing effected in Cynuria, the boundary land between Sparta and Argos, which gave rise to great bloodshed. After their expulsion from their own island (p. 62) the Æginetans had been settled at Cynuria, and to them the Spartans had handed over the city of Thyrea, intending it for a frontier post of their own country. For seven years the Æginetans had dwelt here, and were now occupied, with the aid of the Lacedæmonian troops, in fortifying a well-situated place on the coast, ten stadia distant from Thyrea. In the midst of these operations they were surprised by the Attic fleet, and as the Spartans lacked the necessary courage for aiding in the defence of the position on the coast, and instead retreated into the mountains, Thyrea was taken without difficulty, and the Æginetans were put to death, or dragged away into captivity. Nicias returned home laden with rich spoils, having added an important and wealthy island to the maritime dominion of Athens. The Æginetan prisoners were arraigned before the people, and condemned to death as irreconcilable foes of the city. This was a bloody act of vengeance for the execution of the

Platæans, and gave the first example of the punishment of political opponents as criminals. The Spartan Tantalus, who had been taken prisoner together with the Æginetans, was placed in the same custody as the captives from Sphacteria. The members of the Oligarchic party, whom Nicias had brought to Athens from Cythera, were distributed among different islands, and for Cythera itself an annual tribute fixed of four talents (£975). Minoa, Pylus, Methone, and Thyrea having thus been occupied, a complete blockade had been established over the entire Peloponnesus.*

Athenian schemes of war in Central Greece.

After the Athenians had for a time carried on war against Peloponnesus with unvarying success, their plans extended in scope; they gave ear to the assertion of their bold counsellor Demosthenes, that the time had now arrived for making a new energetic advance against their enemies in Central Greece, and for establishing themselves here, as they had done in Peloponnesus, in strong positions, whence they might strike decisive blows against the allies of Sparta.

Three successive attacks upon Bœotia. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424.)

Bœotia was at the present moment the most dangerous, nay, the only dangerous power. It was extremely important to isolate this country from all connections with Peloponnesus, and to use the strength which Athens possessed in Western Greece for proceeding from different sides, and with all the forces at command, to humiliate the hated Theban state. For this purpose, a favorable opportunity offered itself, in the first instance in Megara. This unfortunate little country, among all the different parts of Greece, had to suffer most terribly under the scourge of the civil war; and it is in truth impossible to understand how this small state could contrive to exist

* Cythera: Thuc. iv. 53.

after the devastations to which it was annually exposed, and under the unceasing blockade of its coasts. But notwithstanding all these sufferings, notwithstanding the absence of the most necessary provisions of life (for Megara had even lost its salt-works since the occupation of Minoa), a new conflict of parties arose in Megara itself, in consequence of which a number of the most vehement aristocrats were driven into banishment. They seized upon the western port of Pegæ, and hereupon prevented the entrance of supplies from this quarter also, and themselves helped to devastate the exhausted little country. The result was, that a party formed itself which entered into negotiation with the two *strategi* of Athens, Demosthenes and Hippocrates the son of Ariphron; for they preferred to see the Athenians in their city to re-admitting the exiles. The betrayal of the city was prepared with extreme caution; Attic sailors landed unobserved, and, led by Demosthenes, penetrated through the gate opened to them in the long walls connecting Nisæa and Megara. The land-army arrived at the right moment from Eleusis; the Peloponnesian garrison was forced to surrender; and the capital itself would have fallen, had not Brasidas (who was engaged in collecting troops in the vicinity of the Isthmus) with great rapidity assembled an army of 6,000 Peloponnesians and Bœotians. The two armies confronted one another on the plain, but the Athenians were unwilling to venture a decisive land-battle for the sake of acquiring possession of Megara. The city thus fell into the hands of the exiled party, who opened their Oligarchic reign of terror by causing one hundred members of the party favorable to Athens to be condemned to death, a sanguinary sentence which they were able to bring about by means of a public vote. Nisæa, which lay little more than a mile away, remained Attic; but the plan of occupying Megaris, and thus shutting off the Isthmus, had ended in failure.

Nevertheless, Demosthenes continued his bold undertakings with unabated courage, and in the latter part of the autumn, together with Hippocrates, commenced an attack on the largest scale upon Bœotia. It was intended simultaneously, in the first place, to effect a landing from Naupactus on the coast of the country; again, proceeding from the direction of the Parnassus (where the support of the Phocians might be reckoned upon), to occupy Chæronea; and lastly to establish a fortified position on the coast of the Eubœan Sea, in order thus to surround the whole of Bœotia with Attic military positions, and gradually wear out Thebes' power of resistance, as had been successfully done in the case of Sparta. For this purpose, negotiations had been opened with the democratic partisans, and with all the adversaries of the Theban hegemony; and these seemed to offer a sure pledge of success. But it was precisely in these party intrigues, and in the treasonable combinations whereby it was now more and more attempted to decide all undertakings in the war, that the weakness of the plan lay, because they made it necessary to communicate the secret to a large number of strangers and untrustworthy persons. Thebes had received notice of her danger; and when Demosthenes appeared with the Acarnanian allies before Siphæ, the port-town of the Thespieans, he found it fully prepared for defence. The surprise of Chæronea was similarly frustrated. Moreover, a wrong calculation had been made as to time. The indefatigable Demosthenes had arrived too soon; so that the Bœotians were able, before being attacked on the east side, to defend their frontiers against him, and then to direct all their forces against Hippocrates.

Delium fortified. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424.)

The latter had meanwhile summoned to his standard all men capable of bearing arms at the disposal of Athens, including resident aliens and foreigners, with the intention of advancing by way of Oporus into the territory

of the Tanagræans, and there, on the coast opposite Eretria, occupying Delium. Here stood a Temple of Apollo close to the shore; and the place afforded equal facilities for communication with Eubœa and for establishing a command over the valley of the Asopus. Besides the heavy-armed troops, Hippocrates probably had under him 20,000 men, equipped with implements for trench-work. All Athens was astir, to aid in striking a decisive blow in the long and bitter struggle against Bœotia, and to obtain for the Attic power the mastery over the important coast districts of the Asopus. As Delium and its temple had fallen into utter neglect and decay, no impiety seemed to be involved in its occupation, particularly inasmuch as this act of violence admitted of subsequent expiation by a restoration of the sanctuary. On the third day after the departure of the troops from Athens the work of fortification was commenced; and on the fifth a strong position was in readiness, capable of defence, and surrounded by wall and foss. Hippocrates remained in Delium, in order to superintend the completion of the works; the army returned, and everything seemed to have succeeded according to wish. But meanwhile the Bœotians had assembled near Tanagra; and although most of their leaders were averse to seeking a battle with the Athenians, who had already reached the frontier on their march home, yet the voice of Pagondas prevailed, whose turn it was among the eleven Bœotarchs to hold the command. He was a Theban aristocrat of resolute energy and forcible eloquence. He succeeded in convincing the troops that the Athenians ought not to be allowed to quit the land before paying the penalty of their insolent invasion. He contrived at the same time to take advantage of this favorable opportunity for surprising the army on its homeward march by a flank attack.

Hippocrates hurried to the army, which had halted at half an hour's march from Delium. In the gorges of the

Defeat of the Athenians at Delium. (B. C. 424.) Autumn.

mountains the armies met. The Attic forces were numerically equal to the 7,000 heavy-armed Bœotians; but the main body of the light-armed Athenian troops was already far away on the way to Athens. Moreover, the advantage of the offensive lay with the Bœotians, who were able to prepare the attack in secret. A terrible battle ensued. One side remembered the victory of Coronea, the other that of Œnophyta. The Athenians succeeded in driving back the left wing of the enemy, but on the other side the ponderous onset of the Theban phalanx, drawn up twenty-five deep, obtained a complete victory, so that the general flight drew into its vortex even the victorious wing of the Athenians. The Bœotians made a most effective use of their cavalry, and although the battle had not begun till the afternoon, and night favored the fugitives, yet Hippocrates and nearly a thousand citizens lay dead on the field. For seventeen days they remained there unburied—an unexampled event in the history of the war; for however deeply the Greeks had become demoralized, yet the rights of the dead had remained sacred in their eyes, nor had any conditions ever been attached by the victor to the permission granted for their burial. But the Bœotians, who were in possession of the battle field, refused to give up the bodies until Delium had been evacuated, raising the sudden pretence of sensitive piety, and deeming themselves justified in making this demand in the name of Apollo. This loathsome quarrel was terminated by the conquest of Delium by the Bœotians, aided by Corinthian auxiliaries. The greater part of the garrison escaped from the burning fortress to the ships; but two hundred were made prisoners. Thus the strategical plan against Bœotia* had failed at every point, and the triumphant pride of the Athenians had met with the most decisive rebuff in the shape of a

* Bœotian war: Thuc. iv. 76.

disastrous defeat; for they now perceived what hostile powers still remained for them to overcome.

And now Sparta also recovered courage. The beginning of her misfortunes dated from the moment when Brasidas was struck down in the harbor of Pylus (p. 156); a change came over her fortunes when that hero recovered, with no other thought henceforth in his mind than that of avenging his native city upon her insolent foes.

Brasidas and his war-policy.

Brasidas, the son of Tellis, was, like Demosthenes, one of the men whom the war itself had matured into generals, and who had formed their strategical policy on the basis of the experiences through which they had passed. He was a fervent patriot, and inspired with a belief in the mission of his city to stand at the head of the Hellenes; but, in direct contrast to other contemporary Spartans, he was as resolute and full of energy as they were impotent and heavy. His high sense of honor and his rectitude were those of an ancient Spartan, and for this very reason he was a decided opponent of the Oligarchic circles out of which the Ephors were chosen, and whose policy, equally dishonest, irrational, and unmeaning, allowed Sparta to waste away in failure and shame. He perceived that the only mode of conquering a powerful foe was by learning from him, and by acquiring those among his qualities which ensured success: he was at once a statesman and general, like the foremost men among the Athenians, and at the same time exercised a command over Hellenic speech such as scarcely any Lacedæmonian before him had possessed. Although, wherever an opportunity had offered itself, he had given brilliant proof of his capacity, although he had saved Methone and Megara, and even placed the fleet of Athens in a situation of great peril (pp. 62, 171, 186), yet in narrow-minded Sparta, as may easily be believed, no work had been assigned to him befitting his eminence; he had been only able to be of

service on isolated occasions, and in a subordinate capacity: yet he ardently longed to put an end to the miserable do-nothing policy of Sparta, and to lead her into the true path.

His plans were very clear and simple. Sparta must come forth from the state of blockade in which she lay, and must again advance on the offensive, if she was to recover her military honor. Athens itself it was impossible to attack, on account of the imprisoned Spartans; and this circumstance was in favor of Sparta, who was thus forced to adopt a more effective method of attack. It was necessary to attack Athens on the territory of her allies. This was the lesson taught by the case of the Mitylenæans; nor was any man better aware of the opportunity which had then been lost than Brasidas, who had been attached in the command to the incapable Alcidas upon the return of the latter from Lesbos. What had then been neglected must now be made good, and the first opportunity seized of transferring the scene of war into the colonial territories of Athens, without at the same time allowing the result of the first attempt to depend upon a naval battle: in other words, it was necessary to make an effort to approach the cities allied to Athens on the land side. But for an invasion of territories so remote, it was impossible to employ an army of Spartan citizens: other materials were therefore requisite for this purpose; and these materials Brasidas found in the Helots.

The Spartans feared the Helots within their own country more than the enemy without, particularly at the present time, in consequence of the proximity of the hostile positions at Cythera and Pylus. Only a short time previously two thousand Helots, all of them young men thoroughly capable of bearing arms, had been massacred by a shameful act of treason, after their liberty had been solemnly promised to them. Such was the mode in which

Sparta requited the faithful devotion of the Helots at Sphacteria.

The shamefulness of these proceedings was fully felt by Brasidas; but at the same time he perceived the folly committed by the state in recklessly wasting the best strength of the country. It was clear to him that this strength should be employed beyond the limits of the country itself, Spartan commanders being sent with Helots and Peloponnesians into the colonies ready to revolt against Athens, in order to support their rising, and to acquire in their territory the resources imperatively necessary for an ultimate victory over Athens. For even the most short-sighted Spartan must now clearly see that the war could not possibly be decided without a navy. Accordingly, after the most recent peace negotiations had fallen to the ground, an application had been made to the Great King: and during the last winter an envoy of the latter had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, who had found him armed with powers to proceed to Sparta, there to obtain full information as to the intentions of the Spartans. An opportunity now offered of accomplishing the same object without any loss of dignity. Brasidas was personally concerned in the matter.

Although Brasidas had as yet held no independent command, he was known far and near as the only hero and statesman whom Sparta possessed. The Corinthians, with whom he had been brought into contact (p. 135), had doubtless not omitted to point out his merits; and thus even the remote colonies were acquainted with his name and hoped to obtain assistance from him against Athens.

Such assistance was at that time pre-eminently needed by the towns on the coast of Thrace; for these still stood under arms. Olynthus (p. 16) continued to hold out against the Athenians. But the towns as yet felt unequal to a lasting resistance, and necessarily assumed that

Embassies from the Thracian cities in Sparta.

Athens would unhesitatingly take advantage of her present successes, and endeavor thoroughly to establish her dominion in Thrace. The fate which then awaited the revolted cities might be guessed from the example of Mitylene. Under these circumstances it was advisable to seek in time for help from abroad. The hopes of the cities rested entirely on Brasidas. Perdiccas of Macedonia, the first king of the North who had exercised influence upon Grecian affairs, favored their wishes, because he happened at the time to be involved in a dispute with the princely house of the Lyncestæ, and wished to put a speedy end to this quarrel with the aid of foreign troops. Accordingly he also sent envoys to Sparta, who were to urge the despatch of an expedition under Brasidas, and to promise every possible co-operation on the part of the king.

No opportunity could have offered itself to the Spartan general more entirely in accordance with his strategical plans than this. On the Thracian coast the gold mines were still unexhausted, and timber for ship-building abounded. Here was the best position on the whole coast-line of the Archipelago for commencing the construction of a fleet; here was by far the most favorable scene of war for operations against Athens; here remained the strongest feeling of independence and the largest amount of unbroken strength; no colonial territory was of superior importance to the Athenians, nor would any be harder for them to hold, than that on the coast of Thrace.

Yet, notwithstanding the favorable prospects offering themselves in connection with this scheme, it would scarcely have met with the approval of the authorities at Sparta, had it involved any sacrifices. But as the Chalcidians undertook to supply the troops with provisions, and as Brasidas merely asked for an armed force of 700 Helots, the expedition was sanctioned, however adventurous it appeared in the eyes of the majority. The risk

seemed to be small. Some were probably well content to let the restless innovator run the risk, together with his fine troops, of paying the penalty of his foolhardiness; the others hoped that at best this or that position might be gained, which would serve as an exchange against the places held by the Athenians, and help to ransom the prisoners of Sphacteria; for the prevailing wish at Sparta was to obtain peace by the shortest possible way. Under these circumstances, Brasidas succeeded in realizing the bold stroke of suddenly transferring the seat of war from blockaded Peloponnesus into a distant colonial territory of the Athenians, where he obtained not only liberty of action, but also new allies and resources of war. This was the first great and sagacious act of Sparta in the entire war, and constituted the commencement of a new method of conducting it in other regions, by other means, and in quite another spirit than hitherto.*

Brasidas in Thessaly. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424.)

At the same time, even after obtaining the consent of the authorities, Brasidas was still far from his goal, and found obstacles in his path which any other Spartan would have deemed insuperable. The first danger met him before he had left Peloponnesus; for had Megara fallen into the hands of the Athenians, he would have been forced to come to a stand-still at the Isthmus. But at the last moment he succeeded in saving this important position (p. 171), and laying open the road before him. Hereupon, while the Athenians were entirely occupied with their operations against Thebes, Brasidas, reinforced by one thousand men, whom he had procured in northern Peloponnesus by payments of Thracian money, continued his march through Bœotia to Heraclea (p. 144). Here his real difficulties commenced; for, before reaching the territory of his allies, he had to pass through the whole

* On Brasidas see Thuc. iv. 80.

of Thessaly. Such a march of troops as this, Greek international law only permitted in case the authorities of the particular country gave their consent. But the great majority of the Thessalian population was well affected towards the Athenians, and had recently been unusually excited against Sparta by the foundation of Heraclea. It was accordingly an act of no little daring to lead a small army, whose intention it was to rouse the Attic colonies to revolt, through the midst of this unknown and hostile country, abounding with warlike tribes. Brasidas, however, trusted to the confused state of public affairs in Thessaly. For, as at the time of the Persian wars, the popular party and the nobles in the several cities continued to oppose one another, neither, however, succeeding in obtaining a decided and lasting superiority; the power of the ancient families, which, on account of their anti-national policy, Leotychides had been commissioned to overthrow (vol. ii. p. 405), had up to this time maintained itself; and the treasonable proceedings forty-five years since of that Spartan king now operated in favor of the Spartans. For the party which had in the time of Leotychides favored the Persians now stood on the side of Sparta. Brasidas accordingly effected an understanding with this party, which also included the adherents of, and the friends on terms of mutual hospitality with, Perdiccas and the Chalcidians. They came out to meet the Spartan commander as far as southern Thessaly, in order to act as his guides through the country. With their assistance Brasidas carried out his intentions with so much sagacity and resolution, that the population of the country was not alarmed until he was about to cross the river Enipeus on his way to Pharsalus. The Thessalian bands resisted his passage across the river. Parleys ensued. Brasidas contrived to calm the agitation of the population, whom he persuaded he had come with no hostile intentions, as, *e. g.*, Demosthenes had when invading Ætolia; his only wish

was to be allowed a free passage through the country, and even this he would never desire to secure by force. While the Thessalians went home to enter upon further consultations, Brasidas, by the advice of his guides, hastened on at increased speed, and succeeded in crossing the passes of Olympia, before the entire community of the Thessalians had come to a determination as to whether he ought to be allowed to pass through their country.

Brasidas in Macedonia: Perdiccas.

On his arrival in Macedonia, he soon perceived that no reliance was to be placed upon Perdiccas, who wished merely to use him as a *condottiere*, by whose aid he might overcome Arrhibæus, the chieftain of the Lyncestæ, who endeavored to maintain their independence in the upper highland country. But Brasidas was unwilling to allow himself to be involved here in conflicts which were not of the slightest moment to him; nor was it in his opinion advantageous to the interests of Sparta absolutely to rid the Macedonian king of his enemy, inasmuch as the energy of the former as an ally would decrease in proportion; he accordingly preferred to mediate in the dispute between the princes by means of a treaty, although Perdiccas was dissatisfied with this course, and immediately withdrew part of the promised subsidies. Brasidas, on the other hand, obtained perfect liberty of action, which before the end of the summer enabled him to continue his march straight across the ridge of the Chalcidian peninsula to the bay of the Strymon, where lay the cities which had summoned him to their aid.

Brasidas in Thrace. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424.) Autumn.

His transactions with Acanthus.

He first marched before the gates of Acanthus, a flourishing town on the Isthmus of Mount Athos, which Xerxes had cut through. But the reception with which he here met failed to answer his expectations. He found that only a minority of the citizens was in his favor, and that by no

means all the communities were, as he had believed, rising against Athens. He therefore simply asked to be admitted alone, in order before the assembled citizens openly to declare his intentions; and he then displayed a skilfulness of speech which was not less surprising from the lips of a Spartan than the speed with which he had accomplished his march from Sparta to the Thracian Sea had been astonishing in a general of his nationality. His speech was addressed not to the Acanthians alone, but at the same time to all the neighboring cities. For the first time he now unfolded the guiding principles of his military and political efforts. It was here in Thrace, he said, that the war had first broken out. At that time Sparta had immediately promised her assistance to the cities; but hitherto the unexpected course of the war had kept her at a distance; now at last the moment had arrived when she made good her promise, and was true to her mission of liberating the oppressed colonies. To support the Spartans in this endeavor was the duty of all Hellenes; and to them, the Acanthians, the honor had been allotted of laying the foundation-stone of the great work of liberation. The example of a community so influential and so respected on account of its intelligence was of great importance. No fear ought to restrain them from obtaining honor for themselves by taking part in the work; for he would most solemnly pledge his word to them, that his intention was not to overthrow the constitution, or to deliver over the friends of the people to the aristocrats, or in short to proceed to any measure of force, but that he would on the contrary respect the absolute independence of all civic communities. The Spartan authorities had bound themselves to him by an oath to this effect. On the other hand, he could not consent to see a great national undertaking frustrated by the obstinate resistance of individual states, and would therefore in the case of a refusal find himself forced to

adopt hostile proceedings against the city, and by a devastation of its territory oblige it with all the means at his command to ally itself with Sparta. In this case, they would, after undergoing a diminution of their prosperity, be forced to consent to what they might now accept without suffering any hurt, and even with great honor and glory to themselves. Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the speaker and the imminent peril, a great difference of opinion prevailed, and the fact that in the end the popular vote after all decided in favor of Brasidas, was chiefly due to the circumstance that the vineyards surrounding the city happened to be ready for harvest, and that the citizens could not bring themselves to sacrifice the entire produce of the year. Acanthus opened her gates to the Spartans. This was the first success obtained by Sparta on the Thracian Sea, a success deriving additional brilliancy from the very fact that it cost not a drop of blood, and due to the confidence called forth by the vigor and skill of a single individual. The foundation had thus been laid for a new alliance, which, in consequence of a prudent and tender treatment of foreign rights and the recognition of existing constitutions succeeded in attracting the most important positions of the naval dominion of Athens to the side of Sparta. The example of Acanthus exercised an immediate effect upon the neighboring cities, which like her derived their origin from Andrus—in the first instance upon Stagirus and Argilus. Before the summer had come to an end Brasidas commanded the western side of the bay of the Strymon. Embassies arrived from many towns offering homage to him, and when the winter set in, about the time of the defeat of Hippocrates at Delium, Brasidas was able without encountering any resistance, to advance upon Amphipolis, the colony of Hagnon (vol. ii. p. 537), the capital of the entire district, and long

Brasidas on the Strymon. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B. C. 424.) Winter.

an object of envy to the lesser neighboring cities, particularly to Argilus; for which reason they eagerly assisted the undertaking against Amphipolis.

Athens declares war against Perdiccas.

When the news of the expedition of Brasidas reached Athens, active steps were immediately taken. War was instantly declared against King Perdiccas, and public attention directed to the protection of the allied cities, without, however, rapid and vigorous measures being adopted. The courage of the citizens was for the moment broken by the calamity in Bœotia; nor could they summon up courage to equip a fleet for Thrace at a season so near the close of the year, when the north winds prevailed. The new danger was indeed perceived, but not considered to be sufficiently close to counterbalance the prevailing aversion from a winter campaign in Thrace. Thus for a time the defence of the endangered coast-district was left to two men, who were responsible for the entire seat of war, and who yet had so small a force at their disposal that they found it impossible effectively to counteract the progress of Brasidas. One of these was Eucles, and the other Thucydides, the son of Olorus (vol. ii. p. 569), a near relative of Miltiades and scion of a Thracian royal house. Thucydides was himself proprietor of gold mines on the coast, married to a Thracian lady, and possessed of considerable influence in the cities in the vicinity. The two commanders had to divide between them the supervision of the most important points. Eucles took the command at Amphipolis; Thucydides lay with his seven ships in the bay of Thasos. The choice of this station cannot have been merely an arbitrary whim on the part of Thucydides, but must have been determined either by an agreement between the two commanders, or by instructions from Athens, and is explained by the fact that the mine

Eucles and Thucydides charged with the defence of the Thracian coast.

district opposite Thasos was considered to be in particular danger. Its population, as the ensuing events showed, was utterly untrustworthy; the ancient relations between Sparta and the Thasians were remembered, as well as the desire which the former had evinced for the possession of the gold coast (vol. ii. p. 405); and doubtless Thucydides was believed to be pre-eminently adapted for counteracting a hostile revolt on that coast by means of his personal authority.

As to Amphipolis, an increase of its means of defence seemed in the first instance unnecessary. For, after all the previous experiences of the war, no sudden danger could possibly be expected from a small Peloponnesian army by a city furnished with arms, and supplies, and fortified so strongly by river and walls as was Amphipolis. Moreover, it was commanded by an Attic general. Yet the Athenians, notwithstanding, deceived themselves, not only in reference to the sagacity and energy of Brasidas, but also with regard to the citizens of Amphipolis. For, of the latter, very few were Athenians, the great majority being composed of a mixed population which had collected in the new trading town, and neither had attained to any firm internal coherence, nor was altogether devotedly attached to the Athenians. Part of this population had been gained over by Perdiccas, while another part kept up a secret understanding with their compatriots, the revolted Chalcidians.

The fall of Amphipolis. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B. C. 424.)

After, then, Brasidas had entered into an agreement with the latter, he advanced with his troops to the Strymon, under the guidance of the Argilians, whose territory touched the river. It was a rough winter's night, during which the snow fell, and no one expected an attack. At daybreak Brasidas was unexpectedly discovered standing below the city by the bridge, the very small body of troops stationed there having been easily overcome. The city

itself was entirely unprepared, a large number of citizens immediately fell into his hands, and a rapid attack would have at once put him in possession of the city; yet he preferred a more generous method of procedure, and proposed the most favorable terms to the inhabitants. All who were in the city, Athenians as well as Amphipolites, were to be allowed to remain or depart, according to choice, and none to suffer any hurt. His generosity surprised the citizens and disarmed resistance; the party favorable to Sparta, supported by the relatives of those who had been taken prisoners outside the walls met with increasing assent; and Eucles found himself unable to hold the city. A few hours after its surrender, Thucydides, who had immediately on receiving the news of the dangerous situation of Amphipolis quitted his station, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon with his squadron, speedily fortified the lower town, Eïon, the population of which had in its turn begun to entertain thoughts of treating with Brasidas, assembled the fugitive Athenians there, and defended the place which Brasidas had intended to occupy on the following morning. For until he should make himself master of Eïon, Brasidas had only succeeded in effecting half of his plan, since as yet he had no command over the mouth of the river. The lower road by the coast was also closed up as long as Eïon remained hostile.

Thus Thucydides was the one commander who at this time achieved a genuine success, and who with small means at his command frustrated the intentions of Brasidas, when the latter already deemed himself master of the Strymon Yet the surrender of Amphipolis drew down upon Thucydides the anger of the citizens, and drove him into exile. He was at that time in the forty-ninth year of his age, and henceforth employed his enforced leisure in writing the history of the war in which he had hitherto taken part in the service of his native city.

Accusations against Thucydides. His banishment.

Probably Thucydides was indicted of high treason and found guilty, though we are left in doubt as to whether he was accused of having injured the interest of the state by mere negligence or with evil intent. This high-minded man, who probably failed to conceal his aversion to the prevailing system of the democracy, was naturally unacceptable to the persons then in power, and it must have been an easy task for his influential enemies to represent him, who was of noble birth and the relative of foreign princes, besides being a wealthy landed proprietor in Thrace, as a bad patriot, and to take advantage of the discontent of the citizens for the purpose of inflicting an injury upon him.

Thucydides himself, who is his own historian as to this epoch of his outward life, has with severe self-restraint done nothing to free himself from the suspicion of well-founded blame. He merely states that Eucles has been appointed to keep watch over Amphipolis. With these words Thucydides briefly and simply discharges himself of all responsibility as to Amphipolis: for it was not possible that in the rapid succession of events one man could simultaneously keep in view the situation of affairs on the Strymon and in the bay of Thasos. If accordingly blame attached to either of the generals, it was to Eucles, whose duty it was to inquire into the state of feeling in Amphipolis: he allowed himself to be completely taken by surprise by Brasidas, although no doubt could exist as to the designs of the latter; he most strangely neglected to entrench and cover with a sufficient body of troops the most important point, and that which at the same time admitted of the easiest defence, viz., the bridge over the Strymon. This point might certainly have been held till other troops arrived.* Nor did the revolt of the citizens

* See Note VI. Appendix.

ensue until Brasidas had entered into negotiations with them and held the hostages in his hands.

The fall of Amphipolis made the deepest impression upon friend and foe alike. A blow had been inflicted upon Athens at her most vulnerable point; her weakness had been laid bare and her dominion over the coasts shaken. Only very recently, Eupolis had, in his comedy of *The Cities*, brought before the eyes of the proud Athenians the whole series of the tributary allied towns. Now the wreath was torn asunder, and one of the most important colonies of Athens, established on a soil purchased at so vast a cost of life, had been lost only thirteen years after its foundation (vol. ii. p. 537), a city which was the pride of Athens, which produced considerable revenues, supplied the capital with timber for ship-building, and commanded the communication between Eastern and Western Thrace, between Macedonia and the Hellespont.*

Further conquests of Brasidas

Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424–3.)

Even now Brasidas had no thought of resting for the winter, but wished to take immediate advantage of the favorable conjuncture, in order to establish himself as firmly as possible in Thrace before the arrival of hostile ships. He accordingly, accompanied by his new allies, amongst whom were bold partisans well acquainted with the country (of their number Lysistratus of Olynthus deserves special mention), undertook an expedition against the towns of the "Acte." This is the name given to the tongue of rock most to the east, the apex of which is Mount Athos—a rocky district resembling the Maina of the present day in Laconia, where, notwithstanding the sea around, very primitive habits of political and social life had continued to prevail. For here the Chalcidians formed only a small minority of

* Eupolis' "Πόλεις" was acted about the time when the Spartans transferred the scene of war to Thrace. Cf. Meineke, *Fr. Com. Att.* ii. 509.

the population, the majority belonging to pre-Hellenic, Pelasgian tribes, which had partly been driven into these rocky seats from the southern shores, from the regions of Lemnos and Attica, and had partly immigrated from the north out of the districts of the Bisaltæ and Edoni. The entire peninsula, in accordance with its natural formation, contained none except small towns, which were at the same time mountain towns and seaports. Most of them opened their gates to Brasidas on his approach; Sane alone (situate in the neighborhood of Acanthus on the canal dug by Xerxes) and Dion remained true to the Athenians.

He takes Torone.

Brasidas next continued his march to the central of the three peninsulas, the Sithonian, in order to take Torone (vol. i. p. 456.) Here lay an Attic garrison, and a couple of guard-ships kept watch over the harbor. The inhabitants were occupied in repairing the fortifications; but, before they had accomplished their object, Peloponnesian partisans had called upon Brasidas to make his appearance, and seven men of his army, furnished with daggers, and sent on by him in advance, had been secretly admitted into the city. Meanwhile the general himself approached at night-time; two gates on opposite sides of the city were opened from within; and the whole surprise was so effectively managed, that the enemies unexpectedly entered the city in two directions, raising a loud war-cry, before the garrison had been apprized of the existence of any danger. The Athenians retired to the fastness of Lecythus, which lay on a peninsula jutting far out into the sea; and here, notwithstanding the ruined condition of the fortifications, rejected even the most favorable offers of the enemy. For the first time Brasidas was obliged to resort to force, and endeavored by the promise of ample rewards to incite his men to attempt an assault. This was beaten back; but the break-down of a wooden tower, erected on weak foundations, caused so much consternation among the besieged, that the majority

of them took refuge on their ships. Brasidas ordered those who had remained behind to be put to death, and the entire place to be cleared of its rubbish and walls, and to be consecrated to the goddess Athene, who from ancient times owned a sanctuary there. To her he ascribed his unexpected success, and to her temple he presented the sum which he had designated for the bravest champion. Thus he showed himself munificent and attentive to the goddess of the country, unlike the Athenians, who violently turned foreign sanctuaries into military stations. The remainder of the winter he devoted to settling the affairs of the cities gained by him, and to putting them in a state capable of defence in case of a siege; for with the arrival of the spring the full forces of Athens were to be expected in these waters. Brasidas therefore unceasingly applied at Sparta for an increase of his forces; nor could any man have urged a better-founded claim upon acknowledgment and aid on the part of his native city.

Character and value of his successes.

While the Spartans, unable to stir in their peninsula, had lost the control of their own coasts and trembled at their own slaves, their general, without sacrificing either the lives of citizens or exhausting the pecuniary resources of the state, had suddenly obtained new and unwonted honors for their city. In her name he settled the disputes between Macedonian princes, imposed the obligations of oath and duty upon one coast town after another, constituted one of the most essentially important colonies of Athens the centre of a federal empire rapidly extending its limits, and commenced, on the Strymon, the construction of a fleet, upon which, as Histiæus had attempted in former times (vol. ii. p. 189), he proposed to found a naval power in these regions. Myrcinus, the capital of the Edoni, on Mount Pangæum, the Thasian colonies on the mainland which Thucydides had held in a state of subordination, and other towns on the further side of the Stry-

mon, where the golden treasures of Thrace offered themselves, did homage to him, partly by open acts of revolt against Athens, partly by means of secret messages; one town endeavoring to anticipate the other in offering her services. In Chalcidice itself Athens was confined to the western peninsula. In Brasidas, his native city was looked up to and admired, for her capability in training such citizens as himself. It was believed that at last Sparta had risen to the occasion, in order to appear in the character in which the Hellenes, long disappointed, had expected to see her stand forth in the beginning of the war—that of an unselfish, just, and energetic state, pursuing no other object than the restoration of their independence to the Hellenic communities. Solely as the representative of Hellenic liberty, Brasidas called upon the Athenians to give up the property of the allies forcibly occupied by them, and treated even the Athenians themselves with gentleness, provided they consented to retire. From this point of view he also demanded that the partisans who opened the gates of towns to him should be regarded, not as traitors, but as voluntary instruments towards the liberation of the Greeks, and as meritorious patriots. In the pursuit of this equally sagacious and energetic policy he occasioned an entirely new phase of the war towards the close of its eighth year, and for the same reason courageously awaited the opening of the new campaign, believing himself justified in counting upon vigorous support.

But in Sparta, as well as in Athens, views prevailed wholly different from those of Brasidas. In Sparta the feelings of aversion from himself personally had been augmented, instead of being altered, by the glory of his achievements, and his success pleased only in so far as it promised well for the policy of peace. For the latter policy had continued to prevail incessantly since the battle of Pylus; since which date nothing higher was kept in view than the acquisition of advantages which might be used

for the purpose of exchange. About the same time, then, when Brasidas, as it were, re-commenced the war, and published his manifestoes announcing the liberation of the Greeks, which was now to be at last made a reality, the Spartans themselves had thoroughly sickened of the struggle, were ready to renounce all schemes of a national character, and, according to the selfish policy of a state composed of noble families, to sacrifice everything—their confederates as well as their own honor—so long as they could liberate the members of their own civic families out of the Attic prisons.

Return of Plistoanax to Sparta. Ol. lxxxviii. 2. (B.C. 426 circ.)

A peculiar personal complication helped to support the party of peace at Sparta in their endeavors. The same King Plistoanax, the son of Pausanias, whom Pericles had induced by a pecuniary bribe to take his departure from Attica (vol. ii., p. 450), had ever since lived in exile on the height of the Lycæon, the sacred mountain of the Arcadians, as a refugee under the protection of the Lycæan Zeus. He had built himself a dwelling close to the wall of the sanctuary, so as to be able at any moment to retreat before his pursuers upon consecrated ground. For nineteen years he had led this wild life amidst the storms visiting his wooded height, but had never renounced the hope of return. For this purpose he had applied to the priests at Delphi with so much effect, that for a long time the Spartans, whenever they sent envoys to the Oracle, were directed to bring back the "scion of Heracles, the son of Zeus, from exile, or they would yet have to plough with silver ploughshares;" *i. e.*, a season of dearth would come upon them, so that the barest necessaries of life would cost them great pecuniary sacrifices. These directions ultimately achieved their object, and, after a banishment of nineteen years, the king was brought back with the most solemn honors, and reinstated upon the throne of the Heraclidæ. But when, soon afterwards, the domestic troubles of Sparta

increased, and the means whereby the Oracle had been gained over became known, the deepest dissatisfaction was felt at what had been done, and all the calamities of the state were now ascribed to the illegal act into which the citizens had allowed themselves to be seduced.

Feeling in favor of peace at Sparta

Under these circumstances, the policy which naturally recommended itself to Plistoanax was that of finishing the war as soon as possible; because he thought that the only way of holding himself was to lead the state back as soon as possible into the ancient courses of a condition of peace and tranquillity, and to put an end to the captivity of the Spartans; his government was to derive glory from bringing home these long-absent citizens, and by this act to be marked out as a happy epoch in the national history. Delphi co-operated towards this end with all its strength; for although the Delphic priesthood had favored the outbreak of the war, yet they had come to realize more and more clearly how slender were the chances of a result favorable to the interests of Sparta and Delphi, and how the progress of the war tended to diminish the religious sense, the feeling of reverence towards the common sanctuaries of the nation, the frequency of the visits paid to the latter, as well as the pious foundations and acts of homage—all this to the most serious disadvantage of the priestly establishments.*

Thus it came to pass, that the victories in Thrace in point of fact exercised the contrary effect to that intended by the victor. For, instead of being inspired thereby with heightened pride and firmness, the Spartans were merely induced to seek for peace with redoubled ardor, because they placed no confidence in the permanence of these successes, and accordingly endeavored to anticipate another revulsion in the course of events. They regarded

* Plistoanax on Mt. Lycæon—ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Διὸς ὀικῶν, Thuc V. 16; cf. Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 303.

Brasidas as an adventurer favored by fortune; his popularity filled them with suspicions, because they had no means of retaining in their power those distant regions, where many a general had already entered into selfish schemes of dominion; and however easy it might be for the Spartiatæ to achieve their victories with other men's money and by the arms of Helots, yet this very circumstance itself filled them with fear and anxiety. In short, royalty and aristocracy at Sparta desired peace at any price, in order to re-settle, in accordance with their interests, the internal affairs of the state after its troubles; and they found no difficulty in opening negotiations at Athens before the current winter had come to an end.

and Athens: (Aristophanes' Acharnians and Knights.)

In Athens public feeling had naturally undergone an equally decided change during the last year of the war. The Moderate party, which had disapproved of the thoughtless refusal of the first offers of peace, had gained fresh ground, since the defeat in Bœotia had given so speedy a confirmation to their warnings as to a possible change in the fortune of war. Ever since the battle of Delium, Athens was sick of the struggle. Moreover, the war and peace parties were opposed to one another upon very different terms, ever since the Athenians had at their command the means of obtaining an honorable peace as soon as they wished. An aimless continuation of the war, now more than ever, wore the aspect of impious self-assumption, and the public voice opposed it more and more loudly, particularly on the stage. Here Aristophanes, with undaunted outspokenness, continued his struggle against Cleon, and in the month of February of the year 425 (Ol. lxxxiii. 3) produced his *Acharnians*, in which the worthy Dicæopolis makes his appearance, arriving in the city with the object of advocating peace. The honest countryman's simple good sense sees through the absurdities of the ruling policy of Athens, the deceptive delu-

sions of brilliant alliances, and all the evils of Demagogy, which keeps the citizens in a perpetual state of excitement, and condemns all men of sense to silence. Nor will he allow himself to be disturbed in his convictions by the angry peasants of Acharnæ, who wish to take vengeance upon the Spartans for the devastation of their vineyards (p. 60); he sends for various samples of peace from Sparta, is charmed by the taste of the Thirty Years' sample, and on the spot concludes a separate treaty of peace for his own house, upon which all the blessings of fortune immediately pour down, so that the mouths of all other men water to participate in these good things. With far greater earnestness and daring the poet came forward in the ensuing year under his own name. There could be no use in contending against special tendencies of the prevailing policy; the real object of importance was the overthrow of Cleon himself, for which purpose the poet formed a close alliance with the Knights, from whom the play derives its name. The *Knights* is a dramatic party-manifesto of the aristocracy, clothed in bristling steel; the state is represented as the household of an old gentleman who has given up himself and all his property to a Paphlagonian slave; the Paphlagonian is checkmated by the demagogic artifices of a rival, and as soon as the former is got rid of, the old gentleman's youth revives, and together with it a blissful condition in which he is filled with shame at his past follies. *

The *Knights* of Aristophanes subjected the poet to a further prosecution, under which he had to suffer for his outspokenness. For Cleon still continued his terrorism for a season; it was he, as we may assume, who occasioned the banishment of Thucydides; he demonstrated how the

* As to the causes of the hostility between Cleon and the Knights, cf. Theopomp. in the Schol. ad Ar. *Eq.* 226. As to Aristophanes' conflicts with Cleon, Bergk in Schmidt's *Zeitschr.* ii. 206.

negligence of the generals and the indolence of the citizens had alone enabled Brasidas to obtain his successes. At the same time, Cleon was unable to check the growth of the peace-party, and after the offers of Sparta had been thrice rejected, a year's truce was actually concluded in the beginning of the spring—a truce which both sides regarded as preliminary to the conclusion of a peace.

Ninth year of the war. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 423.)

The form of the treaty offered by Sparta to the Athenians proves that the Delphic priesthood assisted in its preparation. The first article secured a restoration of free access by land and by water to Delphi. Sparta and Athens were to unite in guaranteeing the peace of Delphi and the property of the god. The Ægean was to be opened again to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, but only for sailing, *i. e.*, merchant vessels, whose size was moreover not to exceed a certain limit (in order that reinforcements might in no wise reach Brasidas), and freedom of intercourse was also to be restored between Athens and the Peloponnesus. Up to the conclusion of the peace the *uti possidetis* was to remain unchanged, for which reason precise lines of demarcation were fixed for the Lacedæmonian garrisons as well as for the Athenians at Pylus, Cythera, Nisæa, Minoa, and Trœzene, which were not to be transgressed; moreover, no fugitives were to be admitted on either side during the continuation of the truce.

Spartan proposals of peace.

Conclusion of a truce. Ol. lxxxix. 1. B.C. 423.) March.

The whole of the treaty could not fail to meet the wishes of the great number of Hellenes, who desired the restoration of freedom of intercourse, while at the same time everything was avoided which had the appearance of endangering the *status quo* of the Athenian dominion. The acquisitions of Athens still left her in a superior

position; her absolute rule over the sea was completely acknowledged in this preliminary instrument, and at the same time the imminent revolt of her allies was prevented without the expenditure of new naval and military resources. To restore order to the relations with Delphi was an object which the conservative party had very much at heart; but even in this matter they were supported by the approval of the civic community, and the picture of a general peace, in which the great national festivals might once more be undisturbedly celebrated, appeared with all its attractive features before the eyes of the Greeks. Accordingly, Laches, who in these matters was the organ of the Moderate party, succeeded in inducing the civic assembly to accept the treaty, which in the month of Elophebolion (March) was solemnly sworn to by three Athenian generals and by the envoys of the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. It was hoped that, after the states had during a few months tasted the blessings of peace, the public mind would soon everywhere calm itself and be filled with aversion to the war; and at Athens itself the sentiments of the citizens were so favorable to this hope, that the *strategi* of the city were immediately authorized to commence negotiations with a view to settling permanent terms of peace with the Peloponnesians. As the first step, two commissioners were despatched to Thrace, in order to publish the treaty there. By way of a good omen the Lacedæmonians chose for the purpose a citizen of the name of Athenæus, and the Athenians Aristonymus.*

Athenian and Spartan commissioners in Thrace.

But these commissioners found that the state of affairs in Thrace had undergone an important change. Brasidas had, in the interval, instead of paying the slightest

Continuance of hostilities in Thrace. Ol. lxxxix. 2. (B.C. 423.)

* Truce. Thuc. iv. 117-119.

regard to the events which had happened at home, in the fulness of his warlike ardor taken advantage of the opportunity for further securing a strong position on the third of the Chalcidian peninsulas, *i. e.*, on Pallene. The town of Scione, situate on the south coast of Pallene, had gone over to the Peloponnesians, although, besides being exposed from the sea to the Attic fleet, it was also threatened in the rear by Potidæa, which cut off the transmission of all supplies by land. This revolt had occurred two days after the conclusion of the truce. Aristonymus accordingly refused to include Scione among the places of which the treaty left the Lacedæmonians in temporary possession: Brasidas, on the other hand, had no intention of giving up the place: nor was there any possibility of arriving at an agreement. When the news reached Athens, the pacific disposition of the citizens was changed into the most vehement indignation; and Cleon, who had led the opposition of the minority against the conclusion of any treaty, once more met with assent on every side, when he inveighed against the faithlessness of Sparta and the folly of those who trusted her. His motion was carried ordering fifty triremes to be immediately despatched to Thrace, and sentencing all the inhabitants of Scione to death as traitors.

When Nicias and Nicostratus arrived with a fleet at Potidæa, they found that another city of the Pallenian peninsula, viz., Mende (situate on the promontory Posidium, and directly opposite the pass of Tempe), had gone over to Brasidas and admitted a Peloponnesian garrison. Brasidas himself had meanwhile led the main body of his troops into the interior of Macedonia, in order to assist Perdiccas against the Lyncestæ (p. 178). For at however inopportune a season this campaign of the king occurred for the Spartan general, yet the latter deemed a good understanding with Perdiccas of too great importance to allow him to refuse the assistance demanded. But he

found cause for bitterly repenting this step. In the first place the faithlessness of the Macedonians, on the occasion of an unexpected attack by the Illyrians, involved him in a most dangerous conflict, from which only the greatest sagacity and valor enabled him to issue forth victorious; and moreover, in consequence of the indignation of his troops, which found vent in the devastation of the royal territory, the alliance with Perdiccas was after all broken up, and the latter induced to transfer his aid to the side of the Athenians—an irreparable loss for the Peloponnesian forces, whose means of communication with their native country were thus cut off.

During the time of this unfortunate campaign of Brasidas, Nicias had met with continuous successes; he had recaptured Mende and placed Scione in a state of blockade. Brasidas, on the other hand, was unable to attempt any advance, and a considerable reinforcement on its way to him had to turn back at the Thessalian frontier. Here was the first result of the rupture with Perdiccas. For the latter now used his Thessalian influence against the Spartans, partly in his own interest, partly in order to respond to the demands of Nicias by proving to the Athenians the change that had taken place in his foreign policy. Thus it came to pass that the troops were prevented from marching through the country, and that only their leader, Ischagoras, accompanied by a few Spartans who were to assume the command in the conquered places, reached Thrace. For it was feared that persons of an inferior rank belonging to the military staff of Brasidas might be advanced to this kind of posts The sending of these men could accordingly only contribute to give offence to the general, and to hinder him in the execution of his plans. A bold assault upon Potidæa, which he attempted in the winter, failed;* and thus the state of

* Continuation of the Thracian war: Thuc. iv. 123 f.

affairs remained unchanged up to the expiration of the truce, which had never taken effect in Thrace.

Expulsion of the Delians. Ol. lxxxix. 2. (B. C. 423).

Greece itself had meanwhile tasted the advantages of the cessation of arms and general security, although the Athenians had not allowed even this interval to pass without committing an act of violence which caused a deep sensation among the Hellenes. It was discovered that the previous purification of Delos (p. 152) had been insufficient; not the dead alone, it was now declared, polluted the sacred island, but also the inhabitants still living upon it, who were charged with this or that offence, dating from ancient times. It is impossible to ascertain whether Athens had reason to distrust the Delians, or whether her sole object was to employ the navy in a manner useful to the citizens (a purpose as to which the Athenians were never at a loss for suitable pretences.) This, however, we know: that the measure was carried out with relentless cruelty; the Delians being forced to emigrate with their wives and families to Mysia, where Pharnaces provided them with habitations in Adramytteum; and Attic citizens being settled as proprietors in the vacant lands. These proceedings were a base mockery of religious formalities, carried out by the exertions of the opponents of the pious Nicias and his friends, as it were for the purpose of deriding them. For this reason the calamities suffered soon afterwards in the war were regarded as a punishment sent by the gods, and after one year had elapsed it was, under the influence of Delphi, resolved to restore the Delians to their homes.*

Tenth year of the war. Ol. lxxxix. 2. (B. C. 422.)

The war-party now made the most vigorous efforts to take advantage of the liberty of action restored to them after the expiration of the term fixed by treaty; and this party was headed by Cleon. He was aware that his

* Boeckh, *Abh. d. Akad.* 1834, p. 6, Thuc. v. i

importance must diminish in proportion as men's minds calmed down and general Hellenic sympathies gained ground once more. He needed troubled times, if he was to maintain himself at the height of his influence. Accordingly, in proportion as the wealthier citizens manifested their weariness of the war, Cleon addressed himself to the lower classes, inveighed against the cowardice of the rich, insisted upon the perfidiousness of the enemy and the disgrace which would befall Athens should she continue to leave Amphipolis in the hands of Brasidas, and in the end managed to carry a popular decree ordering the equipment of another fleet. The peace-party had been outvoted, but still possessed sufficient power to cripple the success of this measure from the very outset. This party at bottom by no means objected to the successes obtained by Brasidas, inasmuch as they helped to increase the chances of peace. For if Sparta had nothing to give in exchange for Pylus, Cythera, &c., it was to be anticipated that Cleon would propose and carry offers of peace upon conditions which it would be impossible for Sparta to accept. Thus, then, it came to pass that, probably at the instigation of the peace-party, Cleon was named commander of the expedition, who, notwithstanding his lucky stroke at Sphacteria, was regarded as an inefficient general: furthermore, although the numbers of the troops accompanying him were considerable (they consisted of 1,200 heavy-armed foot-soldiers and 300 cavalry) and their equipments complete, and although they were taken from the flower of the civic body, yet they, from the first, lacked ardor and confidence, and included amongst them many of the most passionate adversaries of Cleon, who hoped that their own commander might suffer a reverse.

Cleon appointed to the command in Thrace.

The situation of Brasidas was a directly contrary one. He had under him few veterans, and the majority of his

troops was composed of Thracian mercenaries and the contingents of the Chalcidian towns; they formed a curiously-mixed and imperfectly-equipped force, which was, however, animated by the spirit of its general. He stood like a heroic figure in the midst of his army, admired and loved by all the neighboring cities, for whom his arrival had opened up a new era, and whose expectations now rested upon him alone, though he had been deserted by Perdiccas and cut off from his native city, and who shared his hopes and fears alike.

Cleon took care to avoid an immediate meeting with such a foe. He contrived to find out the weak points of the Thracian coast, and surprised Torone, (the fortifications of which were being enlarged at the instigation of Brasidas) by a successful assault, which delivered the city into the hands of the Athenians. Towards the end of the summer he entered the mouth of the Strymon, and from Eïon undertook a successful raid into the districts of the mines. But he hesitated to advance against Amphipolis itself; the troops of Brasidas being equal to his own in number, and possessing all the advantages of position. Brasidas had made Amphipolis itself incomparably stronger than it had been before, for he had constructed a wall with palisades, reaching from the city wall to the bridge across the Strymon, enabling him to cross the river without emerging from the fortifications: hereby the citadel height Cerdylium, on the further bank, had been brought into the circle of the city fortifications; and from this height Brasidas was enabled to overlook the entire valley as far as its inlet, so that no movement on the part of the Athenians escaped his notice. One thing alone he had to fear, viz.: the arrival of Macedonian troops, which would render feasible a simultaneous attack from both banks: he was accordingly anxious to fight as soon as possible, and hoped easily to find an opportunity. Nor

Amphipolis besieged by Cleon. Ol. lxxxix. 3. (B. C. 422). Autumn.

was he deceived; for, as he had anticipated, Cleon was without sufficient authority in his own camp to be able quietly to await the arrival of his new allies, and the murmurs of his troops rose to such a pitch that he was forced to take some active step. He accordingly marched along the left bank as far as the height which connects Amphipolis with the mountains, and whence, over the long wall (vol. ii., p. 538), all the streets and open places of the city came into view. His intention was simply to reconnoitre the ground, a knowledge of which was indispensable to him, in order to enable him to act upon a combined plan with the Macedonians whose arrival he expected; and, as for his part he at present intended no attack, he was foolish enough to believe that it rested with himself to return into his camp without having struck a blow. Brasidas, on the other hand, had immediately taken measures for an assault. As the main body of his troops were so imperfectly equipped that he feared that their aspect would only serve to encourage the enemy, he assembled 150 hoplites in his presence, in a short address pointed out to them that this day would decide whether they were to be free confederates of Sparta or slaves of Athens, and then broke forth at the pace of assault from the lower gate; *i. e.*, the gate of the wall. For, as soon as the Athenians perceived the intention of Brasidas, they hurriedly beat a retreat, so as to save themselves from being cut off from camp and fleet; preceded by the left wing, the rest of the army followed, but in no order of battle, and without cohesion or system, the right sides of the soldiers, which were undefended by their shields, being turned towards the gates of Amphipolis. On this side Brasidas, with impetuous ardor, attacked the centre of the enemy's line of march; and, as soon as he had engaged them in hand-to-hand conflict, a second gate opened in the city wall, whence Clearidas, at the head of a large body of troops, rushed forth upon the right wing of the Athenians, which still remained on the

heights, while the left wing had already severed itself from the right, and was hurrying forward in full flight towards Eïon. Cleon had lost all self-possession; his army had no longer a commander or any internal cohesion. The men of the right wing alone did their duty, and several times threw back Clearidas. But their powers of resistance were wearied out by the cavalry and archers; and Brasidas himself, after his victory over the Athenian centre, threw himself upon the right wing, so that the latter was obliged to relinquish its position, and retreat through a trackless country to Eïon, suffering great losses in the effort. When the troops re-assembled at Eïon, 600 men were found missing. Cleon himself had been killed in the flight. So complete was the victory of the Peloponnesians that they are stated to have lost not more than seven men. But during the attack upon the right wing, Brasidas himself had been severely wounded, and died at Amphipolis immediately after this most brilliant of his military achievements. The citizens manifested their sorrow for his death by honors such as had heretofore been paid to no mortal man. In the midst of the city a piece of land was consecrated around his tomb, and sepulchral rites instituted in his honor, with solemn sacrifices and games. The honors of the founder of the city were transferred to his name; and thus Amphipolis, as a daughter-city of Sparta, became more intimately connected than ever before with the native city of Brasidas.*

Death of Cleon and of Brasidas.

If the peace-party at Athens had wished, or had even labored to the effect, that the expedition against Amphipolis might end in the thorough defeat of the opposite party, their plans had met with an unexpected realization; though, at the same time, this triumph had been dearly

Consequences of the death of Cleon.

* Battle of Amphipolis: Thuc. v. 2, 3; 6–11.

bought. For now, not only had the leader of the war-party been removed, but his overthrow had been such as to humiliate all the adherents both of himself and of his policy. Though a variety of intemperate individuals continued to preach war in his sense—including military men eager for new campaigns, such as Lamachus, and demagogues, such as Cleonymus and Hyperbolus;—and though they were supported by all those who derived a profit from the war, (as, *e. g.*, the armorers,) or who pursued private schemes of ambition, yet the death of Cleon gave to Nicias freedom of action, and enabled the feelings which prevailed among all the educated classes to assert themselves more openly. Not in vain were three more plays produced by Aristophanes, after the *Knights*, all of which aimed at supporting the work of peace in Hellas.

Peace negotiations. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 422–1.) Winter.

On the other hand, the situation of affairs had certainly changed to the disadvantage of the Athenians. For in the meantime Sparta had gained an unexampled victory, her commanders having, with the contingents of allies of Athens, with Helots and barbarian mercenaries, inflicted a complete defeat upon the flower of the Athenian troops. Yet this victory was not sufficient to induce the Spartans to relinquish their policy of peace, or essentially to increase their demands. Now, as before, they put little trust in the acquisitions beyond the seas, which they could reach neither by land nor by water, and never regarded them as more than pledges for the Spartan prisoners at Athens and the places on their own coasts occupied by the enemy. Brasidas had, indeed, strongly opposed these views, and, had he survived his victory, he would scarcely have consented willingly to give up all his acquisitions, and to restore to the dominion of the Athenians the new allies to whom he had sworn to be true. His death freed the Spartans from this embarrassment; and as therefore on either side the voices had been silenced

which demanded the continuation of the war until the foe was annihilated,—as, moreover, the expiration of the treaty between Sparta and Argos was close at hand,—and as it was in the interest of the former to have no open enemy at this conjuncture with whom the Argives might conclude an alliance: for all these reasons, soon after the battle of Amphipolis, the peace negotiations commenced, under the influence principally of Plistoanax and Nicias, and were now zealously and seriously prosecuted on either side. The Spartans, indeed, once more summoned the confederates to assemble in the spring, in order to establish a military position in Attica; but, before the spring set in, the two powers had agreed that they would constitute the territorial *status quo* before the war the basis of the peace.

Peace of Nicias. Ol. lxxxix. 3. (B.C. 421.) April.

After this agreement had been arrived at, the confederates of Sparta were invited to give their assent. All accorded it with the exception of the Bœotians and the Corinthians, whose protest was followed by one on the part of Megara and Elis. The recent events of the war had aroused new hopes in the Bœotians and Corinthians; the latter had already entertained thoughts of re-establishing their power in Thrace, and could not bring themselves so soon to renounce all their plans, and to leave even Anactorium (p. 168) in the hands of Athens; while Megara was equally unwilling to relinquish her claims to Nisæa (p. 171). Thebes had, indeed, with the aid of Sparta, permanently acquired the possession of Platææ, (under the shameful pretence that this city had voluntarily gone over to Thebes!) but refused to give up Panactum, on the Attic frontier, which she had lately seized. Notwithstanding this opposition, a majority of votes gave a legal sanction to the treaty, which was sworn to in the beginning of April by the plenipotentiaries of Athens and Sparta. The exordium of the document rehearsed the

usual articles ensuring freedom of access to the national sanctuaries, and the inviolable independence of Delphi. Then followed the principal article, establishing a fifty years' peace between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies by land and by sea. Next, the particular articles providing for the restoration of Amphipolis and the Chalcidian towns; and, on the other side of Pylus, Cythera, Methone, &c. Meanwhile, the political relations of the Chalcidian towns were settled after this fashion: that they were indeed to pay tribute to Athens, but in other respects to be free and independent; nor was any citizen to be prevented from emigrating with all his property, All prisoners were to be released on either side. Finally, the instrument of the peace was to be deposited in the national sanctuaries, as well as at Athens and Sparta, and its solemn confirmation by oath to be annually repeated.

This is the treaty called since ancient times the Peace of Nicias, which put an end to the war between the two Greek confederations of states, after it had lasted for rather more than ten years, viz. from the attack of the Bœotians upon Platææ, Ol. lxxxvii. 1 (beginning of April B. C. 431) to Ol. lxxxix. 3 (towards the middle of April B. C. 421). The war was for this reason known under the name of the Ten Years' War, while the Peloponnesians called it the Attic War. Its end constituted a triumph for Athens; for all the plans of the enemies who had attacked her had come to naught; Sparta had been unable to fulfil a single one of the promises with which she had entered upon the war, and was ultimately forced to acknowledge the dominion of Athens in its whole extent,—notwithstanding all the mistakes and misgivings, notwithstanding all the calamities attributable, or not, to the Athenians themselves: the resources of offence and defence which the city owed to Pericles had therefore proved their excellence, and all the fury of her opponents

had wasted itself against her in vain. Sparta herself was satisfied with the advantages which the peace offered to her own city and citizens; but great was the discontent among her confederates, particularly among the secondary states, who had originally occasioned the war and obliged Sparta to take part in it. Even after the conclusion of the peace, it was impossible to induce Thebes and Corinth to accede to it. The result of the war to Sparta was therefore the dissolution of the confederation at whose head she had begun the war; she felt herself thereby placed in so dangerously isolated a position, that she was obliged to fall back upon Athens in self-defence against her own confederates. Accordingly, the Peace of Nicias was in the course of the same year converted into a fifty years' alliance, under the terms of which Sparta and Athens contracted the obligation of mutual assistance against any hostile attack. Sparta was to send a festive embassy to the Attic Dionysia, and Athens to the Hyacinthia at Amyclæ, in order by means of this community of celebration to strengthen the alliance in arms, by which the two great powers of Greece hoped, in defiance of the objections of the secondary states, permanently to establish the general peace.*

Defensive alliance between Sparta and Athens.

See Note VII. Appendix.

CHAPTER III.

ITALY AND SICILY.

WHILE the whole of Hellas as far as Macedonia and Epirus gradually came to take part in the struggle between the two cities, the Western colonies remained externally free from any contact with it. They had their separate history, which continued its course in a homogeneous development by the side of that of the mother-country. For it was about the same period that they attained to the height of their prosperity; they had their Tyrants and their wars of liberation against the barbarians' lust of conquest; they hereupon fell into a period of party-strife at home, which divided them, as it had the states of the mother-country, into two mutually hostile camps, so that the feuds on either side of the Ionian Sea in the end met and formed *one* war.

Sicily.

The situation and natural conditions of Sicily after a certain fashion mark out the course of its history. Lying in the midst of the Mediterranean, between the Libyan, Tyrrhenian, and Greek seas, stretching out its open coasts on three sides, at the same time attracting immigration by the richest abundance of natural blessings (uniting as it does the treasures of the soil of Greece and Italy with those of the North-African clime), Sicily ever since the first beginnings of navigation was a favorite goal of colonizing maritime nations. The history of Sicily is accordingly the history of a colonial country, and has for its scene the border of the coast,—in other words, it is the history of several distinct maritime cities. The coasts are separated from one another by a

mountainous interior which offers no favorable sites for town-settlements,—a country which is upon the whole better adapted for pasture than for agriculture, and which served as a habitation for the islanders who had been driven from the coasts, and who were thus enabled to maintain their independence in the interior. In this way no common national history could form itself, nor any federal constitution with federal laws. For this purpose the cities moreover varied too considerably with respect to race and political position. For the towns of the west coast, inhabited by a mixed population of Greeks, Libyans, and Phœnicians, stood under the supreme sovereignty of Carthage (vol. i. p. 475), so that the Greek colonies alone could attain to an independent history. But among the latter, again, very definite contrasts existed, the germs of which had been already brought over from the mother-country at the time of the foundation of these cities. For as soon as the Chalcidians had occupied the country near Mount Ætna with Ionic population, the Dorians from Corinth and Megara immediately endeavored to prevent their further spread; and before the Corinthians had dared to advance as far as the south coast, the Rhodians established themselves on the same in a series of towns.

The Hellenes in Sicily.

The opposition between the different races was indeed from the first less marked here than in the mother-country, because large numbers of Ionic population had also taken part in the colonizing expeditions of the Doric maritime towns. For this reason, the Doric character and habits of life did not assert themselves in their sterner forms in Sicily; for, although the towns retained the distinctions of the Chalcidian and the Doric dialect, and the Chalcidian and Doric ordinances of law, yet we find trade and maritime life, unrestrained habits of luxury, the worship of money, and the rule of Tyrants prevailing from an early period in the Doric no less than in the Ionic towns, and the former engaging in feuds with one another, regardless of

their community of descent. Sicily was in short the scene where a greater variety of the most different nationalities met and blended than in any other region. Dorians and Ionians were here blended into populations speaking a mixed dialect, half Doric, half Ionic (as, *e. g.*, in the case of the Himeræans, who came from Zancle and from Syracuse). A mixture of Hellenic and barbarian blood had on the west coast formed the people of the Elymi (vol. i. p. 476). Finally, the native Siculi had also, on all the coasts, united with the Hellenic population, and these manifold combinations between different peoples and tribes such as were nowhere else effected to the same extent, again gave to the inhabitants of the island the peculiar character which rendered it easy to distinguish the Siceliotes, *i. e.* the Sicilian Greeks, among all people speaking the Greek tongue. They were for the most part men of great versatility and knowledge of the world, inventive and industrious, sensual, and inclined to a life of comfort and enjoyment, but at the same time of active mind and fine powers of observation; they always had a ready answer at command, and did not even allow mishaps to discourage them sufficiently to prevent them from amusing themselves and others by witty conceits.

The periods of Sicilian history.

The further development of the political and social condition of Sicily depended upon the prosperity enjoyed by each particular town. For, although nearly all attained to a high degree of prosperity, yet the development of their respective forces and power varied very considerably. It was not, as might be expected, the towns of the Chalcidians in the neighborhood of Mount Ætna, pre-eminently favored though they were by the fertility of their territory and the comforts of their situation, which flourished in advance of the rest. Even Syracuse, although fortunate above all the other colonies in its situation on the coast, exercised no independent influence upon the history of the island: it was in the Rhodian cities that the movements originated

which gave rise to a common history of the Sicilian states. They were the first to pursue political objects of greater importance, to pass beyond the narrow limits of their respective territories, and by both negotiation and force to blend together the resources of several communities. Thus the earlier history of Sicily may be naturally divided into three periods. The first is the era of the foundation of cities, a long period of a century and a half. Upon this follows the era of the internal development of these cities, during which the Chalcidian colonies in particular introduced and developed those systems of law which were ascribed to the legislator Charondas (vol. ii. p. 106).

This period belongs principally to the sixth century; and in it each of the three sides of the island, and, again, each individual town, has its particular history. No connected accounts exist of this period. For the cities remained in obscurity until the time of the seventieth Olympiad (B. C. 500): at this date a livelier activity commences to manifest itself simultaneously at points mutually remote from one another; party-conflicts break out in the communities, the mixed character of whose population admits of no calm development. Warlike personages seize the supreme power, and their ambition leads them to undertakings of wider and wider scope. The narrow boundaries of the territories of the cities, in which the different communities had dwelt peaceably by the side of one another, are passed. A distinction comes to be made between great and small states; one city raises itself above the rest; and alliances and counter-alliances are formed, which at last lead to the intervention of foreign powers. In this period, and not before, we are justified in speaking for the first time of a history of Sicily. The starting-point of this history is Gela (vol. i. p. 474).

The history of Gela.

The Rhodian families, to whom belongs the immortal glory of having placed Hellenic civilization in possession of the south

coast of the island, had come across with a multitude of people from Crete, Rhodes, Thera, and the lesser islands of Telus, Nisyrus, &c., which lie immediately opposite the coast of Asia Minor. The great varieties of race among these colonists added to the strength of the young community, but on the other hand also, at a very early period, occasioned divisions which endangered the existence of the state. Thus in Gela also two parties had formed themselves which were directly opposed to one another, so that in the end one of them had to emigrate to Mactorium, above Gela; the state was distracted by these quarrels, and a feud had broken out similar to that between Athens and Lipsydrium (vol. i. p. 397). It was then that a citizen of Gela, named Telines (who derived his origin from the island of Telus), succeeded in averting the outbreak of a sanguinary civil war. Protected by his religious character as priest of the Infernal Deities, he went out into the hostile camp, and by the power of rational persuasion succeeded in reconciling the conflicting parties. The existence of the community was saved; and the hereditary priesthood of the deities by whose aid he had restored peace was, in accordance with his own proposal, officially conferred upon Telines as a reward (vol. ii. p. 4). But the rule of the families could not be permanently restored. Further party-feuds resulted in the Tyrannical rule of Cleander, who was succeeded in Ol. lxx. 3 (B.C. 498) by his brother Hippocrates. The latter hereupon with extreme cunning and relentless energy entered upon a policy of conquest, taking advantage of the quarrels in the neighboring towns in the interests of his own ambition, and concluding alliances which he respected precisely so long as they were of use to him. Through him the whole island was for the first time involved in disturbances and insecurity, and the age of feuds between the cities commenced, just as similar times in Peloponnesus followed

Hippocrates. Ol. lxx. 3, lxxii. 2. (B.C. 498–1.)

upon the first acts of violence on the part of the Spartans against the territories of their neighbors.

In Sicily, however, the temptation to invasion and conquest was far stronger than in the mother-country. The cities succeeded one another on the narrow border of the coast at far shorter distances; and the communities, as they rose into prosperity, necessarily felt themselves hemmed in on all sides. Moreover, in Sicily, the territories of the different cities were separated from one another by natural boundaries. As in Greece, so in Sicily, fertile plains, watered by rivers, opened towards the sea, and belted in the rear by mountains, formed natural cantons. Yet these divisions were not so marked and thorough as those formed by the mountain-ranges of Greece, and afforded neither sufficient protection nor satisfactory grounds of confidence to the weaker states. And, since it followed from the circumstances of the island that no common system of law could possibly exist to secure the uncertain frontiers, nor any religious statutes which maintained peace in the land; no barrier whatsoever was opposed against the impulse towards conquest animating the more vigorous of the civic communities.*

The feuds which hereupon ensued were not feuds between different races; for the attack which proceeded from warlike Gela was directed against Syracuse: accordingly two Dorian cities commenced the struggle against one another. One hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of their city (*i. e.* about the time of Solon), the Syracusans had planted a colony on the south coast, founding Camarina between the promontory Pachynum and Gela, the Megareans having a generation previously built Selinus on the western part of the south coast. Evidently the Peloponnesians, prompted by the successes of the Rhodians, wished to emulate them in these regions, precisely as they wished on the east coast to

* As to the cantonal formation of Sicily, see Jul. Schubring, *Umwanderung d. megar. Meerbusens*, in *Zeitschr. f. allg. Erdk.* N. F. xvii. p. 435.

rival the Chalcidians. But the Rhodians intended to be sole masters on their side of the island; and thus a conflict was unavoidable. In the frontier district between Gela and Syracuse, on the river Helorus, two Greek forces for the first time confronted one another in arms; and although Syracuse was supported by Corinth and Corcyra, yet she could only preserve her independence by ceding her share of the south coast, *i. e.* Camarina and the territory belonging to that city.

Hippocrates and Zancle. (B. c. 393 circ.)

Meanwhile, Hippocrates continued to extend the scope of his undertakings. He directed his invasion to the rear of Syracuse, which now became completely isolated, towards the territory of the Chalcidians, and established his authority at Leontini, Naxos, and Zancle. The means which he employed for carrying out his policy of conquest are most clearly displayed in the case of the last-named of these cities.

Among the Chalcidian colonies of the island Zancle possessed the greatest vitality. Her territorial possessions were, in proportion to those of the other cities, meagre and unproductive; but in consequence she devoted double attention to her excellent harbor, while her situation on the Sicilian sound forced her to provide for the security of commercial intercourse between the Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas, and to place the harbors of the north coast in Greek hands. The Zanclæans had here to perform a task even more difficult than that of the Rhodians in the south; for the northern shore is rocky, devoid of good roads, and in part extremely unhealthy: besides which, they not only had hostile neighbors in the Carthaginians, but also in the Tyrrhenians and Siculi, who had retained more power in the north than on the other side of the island. The Zanclæans, notwithstanding, succeeded in founding Mylæ on the nearest promontory of the north coast, and after this, close to the Punic frontier, the city of Himera, which grew into an independent and populous

community. Thus a more extensive city-territory formed itself, which in the period of the Ionic revolt was governed by Scythes, the ruler of Zancle, a man of great political intelligence and foresight, who was also familiar with the state of affairs in the East. It occurred to him to take advantage of the difficulties of the Asiatic Greeks, and to obtain an increase of forces for the Hellenization of the north coast. Milesians and Samians obeyed his summons: but when they arrived at Rhegium with their ships, the wily Argesilaus of Rhegium succeeded in persuading them to make an attack upon Zancle (vol. ii. p. 212). Scythes, who was engaged in a campaign against the Siculi, found himself excluded from his own city, and hereupon summoned his ally Hippocrates to his assistance. But even by the latter he was most insidiously deceived; for the Tyrant of Gela seized the person of Scythes, and made prisoners of the Zanclæans, delivering up the three hundred persons of the highest birth in the city to the Samians for execution. Though the Samians abstained from this sanguinary act, they concluded a treaty with Hippocrates, by which they divided the rich spoils with him, and doubtless also recognized the supremacy of Gela.

Gelo, Tyrant of Gela. Ol. lxxii. 2. (B. C. 492–1.)

Hippocrates enjoyed the support of two men, to whose talents as generals he principally owed his splendid successes. One of these was Gelo, the son of Dinomenes, a scion of the priestly family of Telines (p. 213); the other Ænesidemus, who belonged to a yet more illustrious family, that of the Ægidæ, the same house which had emigrated from seven-gated Thebes to Sparta, helped to establish the polity of the latter, and subsequently branched off to Thera, Cyrene, and Rhodes (vol. i. p. 200). From Rhodes, again, a branch of this vigorous and migratory house had come to Gela; viz., the family of the Emmenidæ, to which Ænesidemus belonged. He as well as Gelo were ambitious schemers, and neither

intended to remain the instrument of another man's power and glory. Gelo, the younger of the pair, outstripped his rival. After Hippocrates had fallen in a battle against the Siculi, Gelo remained at the head of the troops, and under the pretence of defending the rights of the Tyrant's sons, who were under age, vanquished in open battle the citizen-army of the Geloans, and hereupon himself seized the supreme power, in order to carry out on a grander scale his predecessor's schemes of founding a Greek empire in Sicily. He was particularly anxious to establish a naval power; and as the towns of the south coast with their open roads were ill adapted for the purpose, he cast an eye upon Syracuse, the capacities of whose large harbor seemed to him to mark her out as the capital of the island. The circumstances of the time favored his plans. For the attention of the mother-country was engrossed by the imminent Persian invasion, so that he had no intervention to fear from that quarter; and, similarly, the internal affairs of the island met the designs of Gelo half-way.*

Syracuse.

The first settlement of the Corinthian colonists had been effected on Ortygia (vol. i. p. 467), where stood the sanctuary of Artemis, near the spring of Arethusa and the temple of Athene—the two sacred localities of the island, in the vicinity of which the ancient families of the city for a long time continued to dwell. These families were descended from the original body of the Syracusan settlers, who had in Dorian fashion divided amongst themselves the conquered lands, and were, as proprietors of these lots of land, called the lords of the soil, or *Gamori*. By the side of these original citizens, in whose hands was the government of the city, an industrial population

* Cleander and Hippocrates: Herod. vii. 154; Aristot. *Polit.* p. 231, 25.—Zancle: Herod. vi. 23.—Generally, Burnet de Presle, *Recherches sur les Etablissements des Grecs en Sicil*, 1845.

arose, whose numbers rapidly increased and attained to prosperity by means of trade in corn, navigation, arts, and handicraft. These were the unenfranchised residents under the protection of the city. A third class was composed of the so-called Cillicyrii, the unfree remnant of the ancient inhabitants, who tilled the soil belonging to the Gamori as the serfs of the latter, resembling as to position the Helots and Penestæ (vol. i. p. 215). The governing families displayed as much efficiency and energy of action in Syracuse as in the mother-city, with which they always kept up intimate relations. They connected their small island off the shore by means of a large mole with the great island, upon which they thus as it were laid hands, thus taking the first step towards the establishment of an island-empire. For they not only filled the shores in their immediate vicinity with their suburban population, but also sent out colonies in every direction: *e. g.*, in the seventieth year of the existence of their city, to Acræ (Ol. xx. 1, B. C. 664); twenty years later to Casmenæ; and later still (Ol. xlv. 2, B.C. 599), to Camarina. Thus they encircled the territory of their city with a belt of fortified points, secured their command of the whole south-eastern corner of Sicily, and obtained military stations well adapted for further undertakings. They also penetrated far into the interior, in order there also to spread Greek civilization, and to possess themselves of the most fertile regions in the interior of the country. Thus they are said to have founded, in the centre of Sicily, in a lofty situation abounding in springs, the city of Enna, about contemporaneously with the foundation of Acræ; while at the same time they availed themselves of their numerous colonies to distribute the turbulent population of Syracuse itself, and thus to strengthen the existing government.*

* Acræ: Thuc. vi. 5; Schubring, *Acræ*—Palazzolo, in *Jahrb. f. Kl. Philol. Supplem.* iv. 661.—Enna: Steph. Byz. *s. v.*

Yet, in spite of all their sagacity and energy, the Syracusan families were not permitted to achieve a permanent success either in their domestic or in their foreign policy. For on the south coast, where their advance necessarily led to conflicts with Gela, their possessions were taken from them by Hippocrates, who, after the battle on the Helorus, victoriously advanced into the immediate vicinity of the city. The calamities of war shook the authority of the aristocracy, as was also the case with the Corinthian Bacchiadæ (vol. i. p. 294). The two lower classes of the population of Syracuse combined for the purpose of a common rising; the families were expelled and fled to Gela, to seek the support of the Tyrant in power there, although he had contributed more than any one else to their fall. This event occurred in the seventh year of Gelo's rule over Gela, and he contrived to take every possible advantage of the opportunity offering itself to him. He returned with the exiles to Syracuse, before a new political system had been established in the revolted city. The citizens placed their destinies in his hands, and Gelo was delighted to find himself so soon and so completely master of the main object of his rule, the city in its state of internal discord voluntarily recognising him as entitled definitely to settle her domestic affairs. He immediately entrusted his brother Hiero with the administration of Gela, and himself took up his residence at Syracuse. This event signalized the commencement of a new epoch both for the latter city and for the whole island of Sicily.

Gelo in Syracuse. Ol. lxxiv. 2. (B.C. 484-3.)

Gelo's next task was to transform Syracuse into a great capital and a splendid royal residence, so as to bury the former state of things in oblivion, and to prevent the possibility of a reaction. For this end, he transplanted all the Camarinæans, and the majority of the Geloans, to Syracuse. He also introduced the population from the east

coast into the new capital. On that coast, in the beautiful bay in the immediate vicinity of Syracuse, lay the city of Megara (vol. i. p. 468), the metropolis of Selinus: hemmed in between the Leontinians and Syracusans, the Megareans had been unable to raise their city to any steady condition of prosperity; much less therefore were they likely to be able to withstand the overpowering strength wielded by their neighbor at the present time. And yet the nobles at Megara had resolved to defend their independence, and to resist with all the means in their power the forcible incorporation of their city into the Tyrant's empire. Gelo was obliged to resort to a siege, before he could achieve his object. Syracuse was hereupon increased to twice her previous size. For, the population having long ago spread across the isthmus of Ortygia on to the mainland, the vast high plain of the latter, from the isthmus as far as the sea to the north (Achradina) was organized into a town, and surrounded with fortifications: while, further inland, the quarter of the city next to Achradina, called Tyche, at an hour and a half or two hours' distance from the island, was constructed on the same principle. For these gigantic efforts all the labor at hand was employed, and most lucratively rewarded. Public attention was diverted from all questions regarding the constitution. At the same time, so many additional elements were infused into the population, that a revival of the ancient party-divisions became impossible; the city was as it were founded anew; and Gelo hereby succeeded in making himself personally indispensable amidst the multitudes flowing in from all sides, amidst the construction of great public works and the establishment of new institutions, because in him alone the entire body found a source of security and cohesion.

Political views and measures of Gelo.

The policy pursued by Gelo was not that of an ordinary tyrant. He contrived, after a fashion peculiar to himself, to combine the

principles of aristocratic and of democratic government. Thus in Megara it had been the nobles who had taken arms against him, and who therefore trembled in apprehension of his vengeance. Instead of suffering any penalty or incurring any loss, the nobles were transplanted into the new capital; but the common people, on the other hand, amongst whom were many Siculi and men of Phœnician descent, were sold into slavery abroad. The same procedure was adopted in the case of Chalcidian places. Gelo desired a great city, but one without paupers; he wished for a population of as many educated and well-to-do citizens as possible, in which not only the particular interests of different classes and towns, but also the specialities of the Doric and the Ionic character and habits of life, should be reconciled with one another. Syracuse may, therefore, be called the first Hellenic town of first-rate importance (*Gross-stadt*), because in it natives and foreigners enjoyed the same measure of rights and honors. After the fashion of the aristocratic governments, Gelo particularly encouraged the citizens in agricultural pursuits, and kept a strict watch over the fields and lands, but at the same time allowed full play to the agencies of civil society, and opened all the sources of wealth offered by ship-building and trade; the construction of galleys was carried on upon the grandest scale; the population was exercised in the use of arms, and the entire civic community regarded as the possessor of the supreme power. Accordingly, when Gelo had reached the summit of his power, he declared his willingness to restore the government into the hands of the community; for he was well aware that the citizens would hereupon adopt no other course than that of hailing him as their preserver, their benefactor, and their king, because on him was based the prosperity and security of the new city.*

* See Note VIII. Appendix.

Gelo's relations with the mother-country.

His views extended far beyond the walls of Syracuse, and even beyond the coasts of Sicily. He was acquainted with the condition of affairs in Asiatic Greece, with its internal disruption and the power of the Great King. He thought that a favorable opportunity had arrived for obtaining for the Siceliotes a deciding influence in the mother-country, and for offering a brilliant satisfaction to the pride with which the flourishing colonies glanced across the sea upon the elder Hellas (vol. i., p. 499); for, while the states of the mother-country had only recently commenced to construct navies, and in the matter of land-troops had to depend upon the levy of their citizen militia, suffering at the same time from a great want of cavalry and light troops,—while, moreover, their pecuniary means were small, and their supplies of corn had to be obtained from distant lands; Gelo, on the other hand, possessed complete and well-practised military and naval forces. His land army, ready to take the field at any time, numbered 20,000 citizens and mercenaries; besides slingsmen, archers, and heavy and light cavalry. The number of his galleys is said to have amounted to two hundred. Furthermore, he possessed a treasury and magazines of corn filled from the superabundance of the island. His neighbors, the Carthaginians, had manifestly taught him how to create an imperial power, of which the mother-country had no conception: beyond the sea, as well as on his own island, he was confronted by the national enemy, and thus forced to hold in readiness well-organized forces, capable of action at any moment; and his design could be no other than, with the help of these forces, to unite under his sway the entire island, and to complete the work of the Greek colonization of Sicily, which still remained unfinished. For this purpose he had already entered into negotiations with the states of the mother-country, and had particularly sought to persuade Sparta to assist him in the subjec-

tion of the western part of the island. The Spartans were themselves not unfamiliar with schemes of the kind. A few years previously Dorieus, the brother of King Cleomenes (vol. ii., p. 292), had fought there against Phœnicians and Elymi, and had himself fallen in battle. Gelo accordingly called upon the Spartans to avenge, in combination with himself, the death of that Heraclide, and to make good the failure of his adventurous enterprise by a well-organized campaign. He, at the same time, pointed out the advantages which the mother-country would derive from taking all the harbors of the island, which abounded in corn, out of the clutches of the Carthaginians, and opening them to the merchant vessels of the Greeks. Thus Sicily was to be constituted the centre of Greek history, and the King of Syracuse commander-in-chief of the Greek forces. Sparta had no wish, and at that time also lacked the power, for entering into any such schemes. But we may now understand why, when a few years later the envoys came across from the Isthmus (vol. ii. p. 303) to claim federal aid against Xerxes from Gelo, he met them with haughty pride. He regarded his state as the sole great power hitherto established by Greeks; he considered the republics of the mother-country, as inferior in resources and without the strong guidance of a single hand, wholly incapable of resisting the Persians, and therefore believed that his own aid was indispensable in the approaching international conflict. The troubles of the Greeks would, he hoped, induce the states of Greece Proper to recognize his well-founded claims to supremacy. He accordingly demanded, as the condition of aid on his part, that the conduct of the war both by water and by land should be entrusted to himself. When the Spartan representative indignantly rejected the notion, that his kings, the successors of Agamemnon, should allow a foreign prince to lead the Hellenes, Gelo declared

Interview of Gelo with the Hellenic envoys asking aid against Xerxes. Ol. lxxiv. 4. (B. C. 481.)

himself ready to make one concession. He asked the envoys to choose whether they would give him the conduct of the war by land, *or* of that by sea. But, as towards the Spartans, this proposal was equivalent to a motion for a transfer of the naval command to Syracuse; and the Athenian envoy therefore now came forward in the name of his state, the rise of whose power Gelo (like all the rest) failed to appreciate. The Athenians, he was apprized, who had never changed their place of habitation, ought on no account to concede the precedence to younger states, and to Hellenes who had emigrated from their homes. It was not generals, but troops that were wanted. Thus the cities of the mother-country and the colonies answered pride by pride; no reconciliation of their respective claims was possible; and after a violent altercation, Gelo dismissed the envoys from his palace, mocking their folly after the fashion of the Sicilian Greeks: "Let them go home and tell their fellow-countrymen that their year had lost its spring;" *i. e.*, that they had deprived themselves of the best part of the national power.

Such is the account which Greek tradition gave of the embassy. The Sicilians, on the other hand, refused to allow that the negotiations had miscarried on the point of honor as to the supreme command; they affirmed that Gelo had been ready, even under the hegemony of Sparta, to offer active federal aid, and that wars at home had alone prevented him from sending it. And, in truth, as early as two years before the expedition of Xerxes, a Sicilian war of the most dangerous character was imminent; and it is therefore in the highest degree improbable, that so sagacious a prince as Gelo should have entertained serious thoughts of taking part in a war in Hellas and in the Ægean, especially with a force sufficiently large to allow him to found on it a claim for the supreme command.

He could not, however, in his own interest, refrain

from taking any part whatever in the affairs of Greece; it was necessary for him to be sufficiently well informed as to their progress, so as to be able in good time to shape his policy according to their course; for if the Greek force should rapidly succumb, as he could not but expect, it was probable that the Persians, who had already taken measures to reconnoitre the Sicilian waters beforehand (vol. ii. p. 192), would not content themselves with the Greek mother-country. No time could be more favorable for subjecting Sicily than that of the war with Carthage, which had already broken out; and therefore it behooved Gelo to use his utmost endeavors to prevent a junction between the two hereditary foes of the Greek nation. He accordingly sent one of his most trustworthy servants, Cadmus, the son of Scythes (p. 216), to Delphi, with three ships and rich presents, with orders to observe thence, as from a neutral spot, the course of events. Cadmus was directed, in case of a victory of the barbarians, to offer the homage of Gelo to the Great King, while the latter was still in Greece, thus anticipating the outbreak of actual hostilities. Cadmus was peculiarly well adapted for this mission, since he had himself been governor of Cos under the Persian supremacy, and was, like his father before him, favorably esteemed at the court of the Great King. Gelo's own attention, on the other hand, was wholly occupied by the Sicilian complications, the starting-point of which was at Acragas.*

Gelo watches the progress of the Persian invasion of Hellas.

Acragas, one of the youngest of the Greek colonies, situate between Gela and Selinus had with extraordinary rapidity passed most of the other cities of the island in the race (vol. i. p. 475). It had from the first been built in the style of a great town, at an hour's distance from the sea, on a broad

History of Acragas.

* See Note IX. Appendix.

terrace of rock, of which the precipitous walls descend towards the sea and towards either side, so as in many places to obviate the necessity of a city wall, while mountains of greater height rise in the rear. The city, built on the successive tiers of this rocky terrace, was crowned by the acropolis where, at a height of 1,200 feet, stood the temples of the gods. The management of the public works was entrusted to Phalaris, an ambitious citizen, who took advantage of the power necessarily attaching to such an office (vol. ii. p. 505) to make himself master of the city, after the latter had existed for scarcely as many as twenty years. Doubtless, the influence of his rule was beneficial, in so far as it essentially contributed in a short space of time to increase the strength, size, and importance of the young city. But in other respects his government, according to universal tradition, was arbitrary and hated; so that the memory of its fall in Ol. lvii. 4 (B.C. 559 *circ.*) survived as that of a happy epoch. However, even after his overthrow, the community failed to enter upon a course of tranquil progress in its civil life; and the great difficulties attending upon the guidance of a heterogeneous and rapidly accumulating multitude continued again and again to place the state in the power of single rulers. Among the colonists who had immigrated into Acragas were members of the family of the Emmenidæ (p. 216), one of whom was Telemachus, who had already played an important part in connection with the overthrow of Phalaris; and after two other despots—Alcamenes and Alcander—had successively held sway in Acragas, the house of the Emmenidæ once more came into the foreground. In Gela, Ænesidemus had been obliged to give way to his rival Gelo; whereupon he for a time endeavored to maintain himself in Leontini, and finally emigrated to Acragas, where his two sons, Thero and Xenocrates, succeeded in restoring the ancient

glory of their house in a new locality, and with new splendor.

Thero, Tyrant of Acragas. Ol. lxxii. 4. (B. C. 489.)

The Tyrannical rule of the Emmenidæ at Acragas closely corresponded, as to both origin and character, to the rule of Gelo. Thero was commander-in-chief of the city and contrived to establish a personal influence over the military forces; so that in Ol. lxxii. 4, (B. C. 489) he was able to make himself master of the city, over which he ruled undisturbed for a period of sixteen years. His sway was both wise and gentle, so that, although established by force of arms, it was not felt as a despotism. The best proof of this is derived from the fact, that even after his death his memory was blessed. He closely attached himself to his more powerful neighbor, to whom he married his daughter Demarete; he not only took care to adorn the city under his rule with all the arts of peace, but even, after the example of Gelo, endeavored to enlarge its territory by new acquisitions. On the further side of the hills, from which the streams flow down towards Acragas, lay Himera, the colony of the Zanclæans (p. 202), to which already Phalaris had turned his attention. Himera was ruled by Terillus, the son of Crinippus, who imposed a severe discipline upon the Ionico-Doric population. With the opponents of Terillus Thero established communications, and expelled him in a successful campaign. Thero was now, like Gelo, ruler on two coasts of the island. But Terillus was not devoid of friends; he was allied with Anaxilaus, his son-in-law, and exerted every means of resistance, placing his chief hope in Carthage.*

In Carthage the Phœnicians had created a power

* Death of Phalaris, Ol. lvii. 4. (B. C. 549).—Hieronymus, Τηλεμάχου τοῦ καταλύσαντος τὸν Φ. παῖς γίνεται Ἐμμενίδης, οὗ Θήρων καὶ Ξενοκράτης; Schol. Pind. Ol. iii. 68.—Terillus: Her. vii. 165.

The Carthaginian empire and its power.

such as they had never called into life in their mother-country — an empire extending between sea and desert in a country of inexhaustible resources, and surrounded on all sides by strong fortified posts. With Carthage for its base the Phœnician power, after being driven back at all points in the Eastern waters, endeavored to maintain itself in the Western Mediterranean. As Carthaginians, the Phœnicians avenged their former losses upon the Hellenes, and set a limit to the advance, hitherto unchecked, of the Hellenic power; in Africa they defended the frontiers of their empire against Cyrene and Barca, and in Sicily they maintained their possessions against Selinus and Acragas. The outposts of the African empire were the small islands to the south and south-west of Sicily, which were as troublesome to the Greek towns as Ægina had formerly been to Athens; particularly Gaulus (Gozzo) and Melite (Malta), whose precipitous shores and harbors, readily admitting of being closed, constituted it a fortress in the midst of the sea, and a naval station of incomparable excellence.

In proportion as wars at home claimed the attention of the Phœnician cities in the mother-country, Carthage found herself forced to occupy an independent position, and not only to assert the interests of her own trade, but also to assume a hegemony over the other staples and colonies of the Phœnicians, which were neglected by the mother-country. In the sixth century B. C. we find Carthage appearing as a warlike power. The Hellenic colonization of Sicily, in consequence, comes to a sudden standstill; the Rhodians and Cnidians are, about the year 580 B. C. (Ol. 1), driven back from Lilybæum; the Carthaginians combine more closely with the Elymi on the one hand, and with the Tyrrhenians on the other, occupy Sardinia, with the aid of the Tyrrhenians clear Cyrnus (Corsica) of the Phocæans, (who had with much audacity

intruded into the waters claimed by the Carthaginians as their own,) and, after the loss of the Liparian islands (vol. i. p. 477), with increased obstinacy retain their hold upon the western point of Sicily and the Ægates. In these regions they were masters of three strong points: Motye on the west coast, with a harbor of war well defended by rocky islands, serving as a point of communication with Africa; on the north coast, serving as a means of communication with Sardinia, Panormus, the best naval station in Sicily; and, lastly, Solois. Thus the boundary-line, separating the Hellenic dominion on land and water from the non-Hellenic, passed straight across Sicily from the north-east to the south-west.

Neither side could remain satisfied with this state of things. The Carthaginians felt themselves at all points confined, endangered, and excluded from the most important sea-routes, and more especially from the Sicilian sound. The vigorous rise of the Rhodian towns had long filled the Carthaginians with suspicion and jealousy; and when Syracuse became a great harbor of war, and when the two powerful dynasties in Syracuse and Acragas drew the bonds of their alliance closer and closer, until they formed a united naval and military power, no doubts could remain as to the objects of these armaments. To this were added the complications in the East, which brought forward in a clearer light than ever the ancient opposition between Hellenes and Phœnicians. To Tyre and Sidon had belonged the ships by which Ionia had been conquered (vol. ii. p. 204); and on the auxiliary forces of the Phœnicians the Persians had based their principal hopes of victory, when undertaking their expedition against Hellas. The kings of Tyre and Sidon were the foremost vassals of Xerxes (vol. ii. p. 318). And, since already Darius had extended his plans against Hellas as far as the western colonies of the Hellenes: how could the Persians have neglected to reckon upon the

colonies of the Phœnicians for the execution of their schemes? (As early as the time of Cambyses they had intended to make use of the resources of Carthage for the objects of their empire.) How, moreover, could the Phœnicians themselves, in the mother-country or in the colonies, have omitted to take thought of using the circumstances of the times for overthrowing the naval dominion of the Hellenes in the West as well as in the East? There is therefore no reason for questioning the fact of the embassies said to have been sent to Carthage by the Great Kings.*

Carthage had never been so powerful, and so well prepared for war, as she was at the present moment. From a colonizing, she had changed into a conquering state. The real author of this bolder line of policy, the founder of the warlike power of Carthage, was Mago, or Anno as (Herodotus calls him). He had given a systematic organization to the army, and had introduced a strict code of military regulations, such as was imperatively necessary in the case of an army made up of so many heterogeneous elements. For in the Carthaginian army, the citizens formed a small minority; the main body of the troops consisted of Numidians and Libyans, Baleares, Spaniards and Gauls, Ligurians and Italicans, and Greek mercenaries. Herein lay furthermore the reason for investing the generals with extraordinary powers; they held royal sway over the forces, and, after once proving themselves worthy of trust, were left in office for an unlimited period: their powers were even allowed to descend to their sons, who had grown up in arms under their guidance, so that a kind of dynasty of generals

* Ephorus ap. Schol. Pind. *Pith.* i. 146 (Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. p. 264); and Diodor. xi. 20. Duncker, iv. p. 864, doubts the fact of a mutual agreement. Carthage in the fifth century, Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 13 [Am. Ed.] Movement of Rhodians and Cnidians to Lipara; Diod. v. 5.

formed itself, especially as the dignity of the City-king or Supreme Judge appears to have been occasionally conferred upon the generals. Thus the house of Mago at that time stood at the head of the state, its influence being based not only upon the military talents and governing capacities, but also upon the superior degree of culture which characterized its members. Greek civilization contributed very essentially to the flourishing condition of the entire state (vol. i. p. 485); and the house of Mago was pre-eminently connected with Greek families by the bonds of mutual hospitality and relationship. Hamilcar or Amilcar, the son of Mago, was married to a Syracusan wife; and another member of the same house was Anno, or Hanno, who made the great voyage of discovery into the Atlantic along the coasts of West Africa, and composed a narrative of his voyage, of which fragments have been preserved to us in a Greek translation.*

The intervention of Carthage in the affairs of Sicily.

After Hasdrubal, the elder son of Mago, had fallen in battle in Sardinia, Hamilcar filled the office of commander-in-chief. Personal motives could not but very strongly incline him to intervene in the affairs of Sicily; and he accordingly used his best endeavors to recommend Terillus to the protection of the Carthaginians, when the former came to Africa as a fugitive from Himera—particularly as the two men were connected by rites of hospitality. Terillus at the same time procured for the Carthaginians the advantage of an alliance with Anaxilaus, (who ruled over the two cities on the Sicilian sound,) and went so far in his jealousy against the splendor of the Tyrants of Syracuse and of Acragas, as to deliver up his two sons to the Carthaginians as hostages of his fidelity. Furthermore, the Selinuntians were, from motives of hatred against Acragas, on the side of Carthage. Thus

* *Geogr. minores*, ed. C. Müller, i. p. xviii.; Bähr ad Herod. vii. 165.

the Sicilian Greeks were disunited amongst themselves; in addition to which the Siculi in the interior of the island were hostile to the coast-towns, while there was not the slightest chance of aid from the mother-country. Hence the position of affairs could not possibly have been more favorable for an attack upon the Sicilian Greeks; and the intentions of Hamilcar were doubtless directed to no less an aim, than that of making Sicily a vassal-state of Carthage, similar to what Sardinia had already become. The expedition actually undertaken was accordingly planned on the grandest scale. Two hundred galleys set sail, accompanied by an immense fleet of transports. The numbers of the land-troops are stated at 300,000; though even less confidence should be placed in the numbers given in this instance, than in that of the Persian hosts which inundated Hellas about the same period. Of the horsemen of chariots a large proportion perished, before Hamilcar reached Panormus. He next marched before Himera, and pitched a double camp, one for the land-army, the other for the ships, which he caused to be drawn on shore, the coast hereabouts being devoid of harbors. He risked everything upon the attempt to take the city from Thero, intending to constitute it a new position and a basis of military operations for the Carthaginians in Sicily.

Hamilcar besieges Himera. Ol. lxxv. 1. (B.C. 480 circ.)

The situation of Himera was extremely strong. A broad terrace of hills descends with high and steep borders towards the plain of the coast, and again into the valley of the river, protecting the city in the southeast: on its other sides the city-height communicates with the mountains and their gorges. One solitary road leads up from the shore, ascending by a narrow pass between the borders of the city and a conical elevation jutting out by itself (*cozzo della Signora*). The siege protracted itself, and the allies found time to unite their forces, before

the superior number of the enemy had been able to inflict damage upon them separately. To protect the city, Gelo built a fortified camp in the valley of the river, whence he could communicate both with the city and the country of the interior, and where he at the same time remained unobserved by the enemy; while, on the other hand, a full view could be obtained from the city of the double camp of the Carthaginians, and of all the movements in progress there. The Syracusans made most successful use of their cavalry, falling upon the enemy as soon as an open space had been reached. Soon the Himeræans felt entirely free from danger, while the besiegers themselves had to endure a dangerous siege, and anxiously looked for a reinforcement of cavalry from Selinus. By the capture of messengers sent by the enemy, Gelo learned the day of the expected arrival of this reinforcement, and succeeded on the day in question in introducing a body of his own cavalry, unrecognized by the enemy, into the entrenchments of the latter, contriving at the same time, as we may conjecture, to stop the genuine reinforcement. As soon as Gelo had from the heights above assured himself of the success of his stratagem, he at the head of all his forces set out from the valley of the river to storm the enemy's camp. When the Carthaginians rushed to meet his onset, they beheld in their rear the flames ascending from their ships, which the cavalry of the enemy, furtively introduced into their lines, had set on fire. Hamilcar himself fell, according to one account slain by the horsemen, while among his countrymen the story went that he had sought a voluntary death in the flames of the sacrifice which he was engaged in offering up. After his fall the heterogeneous mass of troops, which his personal influence alone had held together, dispersed in wild confusion. Only a small number found a refuge on the ships which had escaped the conflagration.

Victory of Gelo at Himera.

Importance and results of the victory.

This was the victory of Himera,—a victory which the Hellenes were justified in regarding as a worthy counterpart of the battles of the War of Liberation in the mother-country. And, in truth, notwithstanding several differences, the two cases have many points in common. In Sicily, no less than in Greece, the superior numbers of the barbarians succumbed to Hellenic sagacity and bravery; in either case it was the overthrow of a hostile invasion designed to restore a Greek dynasty, and in either the two great powers made a combined resistance against the national enemy, while the secondary and lesser states partly stood on his side. In the mother-country the victory was purchased by a more protracted struggle and by heavier sacrifices; in Sicily *one* day brought with it the final decision and unmeasured gain, since no opening for retreat was left to the defeated foe: the numbers of the prisoners were such that they afterwards formed an entire class of servile population; the whole of Libya, it was said, had been taken prisoner in Sicily. The circumstance that the Greeks assigned the date of the victory of Himera to the very day on which the battle either of Thermopylæ or of Salamis was fought, is due to a tradition which had no other origin than the wish to exaggerate the marvellous, and to make the providential interference of the gods in the humiliation of the barbarians assume a still more startling aspect.*

After the complete rout of her army and fleet Carthage entertained no thought of continuing the war, but con-

* Expulsion of Terillus, B. C. 482. (Boeckh), *Expl. Pind.* p. 117. The Greeks strove to give a more expressive aspect to history: this end was served by the contemporaneous dating of events, which realized the idea of a divine Nemesis. For the critical view of the traditional account, see Niebuhr's *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. ii. p. 103 (*Eng. Tr.*), where the date of the battle is placed several years earlier. The cautious phrase of Aristotle, Poet. c. 23, is κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, cf. Bergk, *Philol. Vers. Zu Halle* (Leipzig, 1868), p. 27.

tented herself with endeavoring to save what was to be saved. Gelo's readiness to grant a peace, in which the Carthaginians were allowed to retain possession even of their Sicilian dominions, was probably caused by his desire to secure freedom of action for assuming the position appearing best to him in the Persian wars, upon the results of which he maintained an expectant watch. For this purpose his attention was in the first instance directed to the increase of his pecuniary means, as well as of his military forces; and in this respect he obtained the greatest advantages by means of the rich booty and the 2,000 talents which Carthage had to pay as costs of the war, as well as by the large number of prisoners. At the same time the delicate attention with which he treated his ally Thero, and the wise clemency which he observed towards his subjects and the other Greeks, caused even the cities previously hostile to do homage to him; so that under his leadership the resources of the Sicilian Greeks were united as one imperial force.

Death of Gelo. Ol. lxxvi. 1. (B. C. 476.)

He was not, however, permitted to employ this force for new victories. Contrary to his expectations, the Persian wars were decided before he was able to throw the weight of his power into the scale; and after living to hear the news of the first deeds of the Athenians in an offensive expedition against Persia, he died (of the dropsy) in Ol. lxxvi. 1 (B.C. 476). Even in death he gave proof of his moderation, by his testamentary injunction, that he should be buried, in accordance with his own sumptuary laws, like an ordinary citizen, and far away from the city. Doubly honorable to him, therefore, was the voluntary participation of the entire population, which was not prevented by a distance of several miles from testifying its gratitude to the man who had made the little island-city great and powerful, who had founded it anew, and beneficently governed it as a just and courteous prince.

Hiero Tyrant of Syracuse. Ol. lxxvi. 1-lxxviii. 2. (B.C. 476---467.)

For the same reason the citizens were also inclined to bestow their confidence upon the members of Gelo's family. He had himself in his last will appointed his brother Hiaro, or Hiero, regent during the minority of his son; while Polyzelus, his other brother, in whom he reposed special confidence, was to marry his widow, conduct the education of his son, and fill the office of commander of the troops. But it became impossible permanently to carry out these injunctions. Hiero, who now transferred his residence from Gela to Syracuse, was a man of passionate temperament, and unwilling to rest satisfied with a title of regent while deprived of dominion and power. He accordingly endeavored to rid himself of Polyzelus, by giving orders to the latter intended to bring about his death. Hiero surrounded himself with followers absolutely devoted to his person; and the court divided itself into two parties, the followers of Hiero and the adherents of Polyzelus and Thero. In the end Polyzelus, notwithstanding his popularity among the citizens, was forced to seek a refuge with his father-in-law. The two cities, between which it had been a chief desire of Gelo to maintain a cordial understanding, armed for war against one another; on the river Gela their armies met for a decisive battle; and it was only with great difficulty that a reconciliation was effected, and a new connection between the two dynasties established, by means of a marriage between Hiero and a niece of the ruler of Acragas. This settlement corresponded to the wishes of Hiero, because he had already carried his ambitious schemes far beyond Sicily,* the demands for assistance made by the Italian Greeks

* As to the remembrance of Gelo in Sicily, Plut. *Timol.* 23; Leake, *Transactions of the Roy. Soc. of Lit.* iii. 370. Concerning the tomb of Gelo conflicting statements occur in Diod. xi. 38 and xiv. 63.

offering an opportunity for undertakings of a wider scope and of more glorious promise.

The Italian Greeks. Their struggles with the Tyrrhenians

In Italy the Greeks had greater difficulty in maintaining themselves than in most of the other countries beyond the sea colonized by them, particularly on the west coast, where they were opposed, not only by the sturdy tribes in the interior of the peninsula, but also by a people powerful at sea. The Tyrrhenians, inhabiting the coast of Southern Etruria, were the same people against whom the Phocæans (vol. ii. p. 148) had already struggled in the disastrous conflict, in consequence of which they were forced to relinquish the island of Cyrnus (Corsica) together with the town of Alalia. This people was doubly dangerous, because in this case Greek forces opposed Greeks. For, according to an ancient tradition, the Tyrrhenians were connected with the people of the same name inhabiting the valley of the Cayster above Ephesus; nor is there any reasonable ground for doubting that, in the time when the Pelasgo-Ionic population of Asia Minor spread itself by sea and, following in the courses of the Phœnicians, swarmed over the coasts of the Western sea, a settlement of this description was also effected in the coast-land of Etruria, situate along the line of the sea to the north of the mouth of the Tiber, and that this settlement laid the earliest foundations of Greek civilization in those regions (vol. i. p. 461). This civilization could not, however, attain to an undisturbed development, because it could not resist the invasion of foreign elements; for, although the communication with the mother-country never ceased, although in the middle of the seventh century B. C. a new emigration of Greek families came in from Corinth on the occasion of the overthrow of the Bacchiadæ (vol. i. p. 294), yet the national characteristics of the Greeks could not here maintain themselves free and undisturbed, and the settlements on

the coast fell into a state of dependence upon powers in the interior. One of these powers was that of the Etruscans (who in the sixth century vigorously spread as far as Campania), which included the Tyrrhenian places in its confederation of towns, and which thus availed itself of the forces of the Greek population. At the same time no complete amalgamation took place. The coast-towns of Pisæ, Alsium, Agylla, and Pyrgi never ceased to display their Greek origin. Agylla, afterwards called Cære (situate fourteen miles to the north of the mouth of the Tiber), the chief settlement of the Tyrrhenians, had a treasury of its own at Delphi; obedient to the Pythian god, it expiated the guilt of blood incurred by its treatment of the Phocæan prisoners; it retained a Hellenic sense for municipal law, and further distinguished itself from the barbarians by respecting international statutes. From Cære culture of the most manifold description spread through the surrounding countries. But these coast-towns, notwithstanding, became so estranged from the people of their mother-country, that, like the Elymi in Sicily, they opposed it as enemies—an opposition doubly dangerous, inasmuch as the Tyrrhenians, in order to keep all disturbing intrusion on the part of the Hellenes away from their sea, from an early date maintained a connection with the Carthaginians. By means of this connection they had been able to place a barrier in the way of the progress of Greek colonization in Lower Italy, and particularly in the way of the Achæan towns. Thus it had happened that Cyme, on the Gulf of Naples (vol. i. p. 464), had been left in utter isolation, at a great distance from all settlements connected with it by descent, so as to constitute a solitary outpost of Hellenic civilization, exposed to the attacks of the barbarians. For the latter endeavored to extend their dominion to the south. Fear of their ships was felt as far as the eastern sea, so that Anaxilaus estab-

and Etruscans.

Cyme.

lished a fortified position near the promontory of Scyllæum, as a station for men-of-war, and as a bar excluding the Tyrrhenian privateers from the straits of Messina. At the same time the power of the Etruscans by land continued to press upon the citizens of Cyme from the north, and the distance at which their city was threatened was constantly on the decrease. The high-minded Cymæans, indeed, displayed an admirable vigor of resistance; about Ol. lxiv. (B.C. 524) they warded off a powerful armada of the barbarians (whose numbers, as in so many undertakings of the same kind, were the very cause of their ruin); and even sent support to the citizens of Aricia against the common enemy. But new dangers followed in rapid succession, and the Cymæans were in the end, about Ol. lxxvi. 3 (B.C. 475), obliged to seek help from abroad. They applied to the most powerful Hellenic prince in their vicinity, to Hiero of Syracuse; the Sicilian fleet achieved a splendid victory; and to this day a helmet is preserved of the Tyrrhenian spoils, dedicated by Hiero to Zeus in Olympia.*

Succored by Hiero.

When the powerful arm of Hiero reached as far as the Gulf of Naples, and when the only two naval powers whose opposition remained dangerous to the Greeks had been thoroughly humiliated, the authority of the ruler of Syracuse advanced with more and more powerful strides among the Greeks themselves. Even before his Cymæan campaign he had asserted himself as peacemaker at the southern extremity of Italy. In this quarter a war had broken out between Locri and Rhegium. The restless Anaxilaus had attacked his neighbors, with the design of

Warlike achievements of Hiero.

* Agyllæans in Delphi: Herod. i. 167. Ὁ Ἀγυλλαίων καλούμενος θησαυρός, Strab. 220. Victory at Cyme; Diod. xi. 51, Str. 248. Pindar *Pyth.* 1. Helmet of Hiero: C. I. Gr. n. 16. Kirchoff, *Studien zur Gesch. d. gr. Alph.* p. 196.

extending his dominion on the peninsula, since he had no prospect of increasing it in Sicily itself. Hiero sent across his brother-in-law Chrominus, and by simply issuing his word of command prevented the ambitious Tyrant from proceeding further. Anaxilaus, without attempting resistance, gave way; and the Locrians thus owed to the ruler of Syracuse the preservation of their independence. In Sicily itself a change was produced by the death of Thero (Ol. lxxvi. 4, or lxxvii. 1; B.C. 472). His wise moderation had made Acragas great and flourishing, without endangering the continuance of peace with Syracuse, on which the welfare of the island depended. His son Thrasydæus was of a different temperament. He was unwilling to acknowledge the hegemony of Syracuse, and accordingly assembled an army of 20,000 men from the cities of the western part of the island; but the victory was gained by Hiero, although he was himself carried in a litter during the battle. Thrasydæus forfeited both dominion and life; and the supremacy of Syracuse was henceforth recognised more completely than ever in Italy and Sicily.*

His foundation of cities.

But the energies of Hiero were by no means confined to warlike undertakings. He was anxious to perpetuate his name in an equal degree by works of peace, and to avail himself of his power for calling into life new foundations of permanent importance. Thus he sent colonists to the islands which lie on the west coast of Italy opposite Cape Misenum, and caused a fortified city to be built on the principal of these islands (the modern Ischia); a proof, how completely he had put an end to the resistance of the Tyrrhenians, and how boldly he was able to push forward the outposts of the Hellenic power towards the north.

* Locri and Rhegium: Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 35.——Thrasydæus: Diod. xi. 53.

From these islands the Chalcidians had formerly crossed to the mainland in order to found Cyme (vol. i. p. 464); and Hiero equally proved his anxiety to assert the Dorian power at the points where the Ionians had exerted their energies, in Sicily, where, in the regions inhabited by a Chalcidico-Ionian population, he founded a new city with Doric ordinances. This foundation was his favorite achievement, in the execution of which he shrank from no measure of force; the communities of Naxos (vol. i. p. 467) and of Catana were removed; the Ionic population which had here for centuries led a happy and honorable life, in conformity with the laws of Charondas, was forced to herd together in Leontini, where a watchful eye might be kept upon it from Syracuse; and hereupon a new town was built in the locality of the destroyed city of Catana, at the base of Mount Ætna, from which it received its name. Here Hiero settled 10,000 citizens from Syracuse, Gela, Megara, and Peloponnesus, and established his son Dinomenes as Governor. Hiero took pride in calling himself a citizen of Ætna, and in making the name of the new city known beyond the sea, by means of brilliant victories which he and his kinsmen achieved in the horse and the mule-race.*

His victories and dedicatory offerings at Olympia.

Hiero was indeed not allowed to participate in the festive games of the Hellenes without a protest. As is related on credible authority, his right to such a participation was violently contested by Themistocles (vol. ii. p. 390). On this occasion we for the first time observe a hostile feeling between Athens and Syracuse, a feeling of mutual animosity, the reasons for which it is easy to discover. For the Sicilian rulers were vexed, that the great deeds in the Ægean should have been successfully accomplished without their help; while, on the other

* Ischia (Αἰναρία): Strab. 248.—Ætna; *ib.* 268.

hand, their well-earned glory excited the jealousy of the Athenians, who were unwilling to offer to the victories of the Sicilian Hellenes the kind of acknowledgment to which the latter laid claim. Moreover, the dynasts of Syracuse pursued a policy of avowed hostility against the Ionic race; and as the relations between Sparta and the Athenians became less amicable, the latter could not but see in the Sicilian towns, and particularly in the newly-founded Ætna, dangerous props of the Dorian power. For the same reasons, on the other hand, the Peloponnesians were well-affected towards the Sicilian rulers; they were delighted when the splendid studs of horses and mules landed on the banks of the Alpheus, and invested the Olympian festivals with an unwonted grandeur. The federal sanctuary of the Peloponnesians was thus acknowledged as the centre of the Greek world; and, like the earlier Tyrants of the mother-country, the Sicilian princes evinced a constant anxiety to offer their homage to the national sanctuaries. The Acragantines, in memory of their victory over the Phœnician city of Motye, erected upon the walls of Olympia a series of figures of boys engaged in prayer; Anaxilaus, in remembrance of his Olympic victory, caused coins to be struck bearing upon them a representation of his team of mules; and Hiero, who obtained victories on the Alpheus in the threefold character of a Geloan, a Syracusan, and an Ætnæan citizen, commissioned Calamis and Onatas (vol. ii. p. 601) to sculpture for Olympia bronze-groups representing his four-horse chariots and racers. At Olympia*, the city of Gela owned its separate treasure-house in the immediate vicinity of the *stadium*, and in it were preserved the dedicatory gifts of the Dinomenidæ. And on the occasion of the victory of Himera another separate

* Hiero in Olympia: See vol. ii. Appendix, Note xliv. Καρχηδονίων θησαυρός: Paus. vi. 19, 7; Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Kunstler*, ii. 339.

edifice was erected, the so-called treasure-house of the Carthaginians, where spoils taken from the barbarians and dedicatory gifts were deposited.

The Tyrants of Syracuse as patrons of poets.

But, besides endeavoring by means of victories and the exhibition of their royal splendor to spread their fame in Greece and to attract universal attention, the rulers of Syracuse also sought to secure the support of the leading poets of the mother-country, who were to celebrate their deeds and obtain for them recognition, as having taken equal part with the other Greeks in the great struggle between Hellenes and barbarians. This intellectual approximation was the less difficult, inasmuch as the western colonies had never become estranged from the mother-country, while their high prosperity had operated very beneficially upon the general development of intellectual life. From the very first they stood in the midst of so grand and extensive an intercourse of nations, that even in the Doric cities no unbending Dorism could assert itself. The Ionic poets were as well known in Sicily as in the mother-country; and through Cinæthus of Chios, one of the Homeric hymn-poets, Syracuse was familiar with the art of the Rhapsodes. Among the personal followers of the founder of Syracuse we already meet with a poet, the Bacchiade Eumelus (vol. i. p. 293); and the uninterrupted continuance of intellectual intercourse with Hellas Proper is evidenced in the person of Arion, the contemporary of Periander and a Lesbian poet, who in the Sicilian towns also met with an enthusiastic reception.

Intellectual life in Sicily before the age of the Tyrants.

But Sicily, besides maintaining an intellectual connection with the mother-country, also gave birth to independent tendencies and new forms of art, such as were always wont principally to develop themselves where different tribes of the Greek nationality united, and where transmigrations from one locality into the other called forth a

lively interchange of ideas and inventions. This is very clearly proved by the first and greatest of all Sicilian poets, Stesichorus, whose parents had crossed to Sicily from Mataurus. This was a colony of the Locrians; and the family of Stesichorus was thus connected with those parts of the mother-country, where the Æolic poetry of Hesiod enjoyed general popularity; while Himera, the birthplace of the poet, was a semi-Ionic, semi-Doric town. Under these circumstances, he succeeded, in an even higher degree than his contemporary Arion, in vindicating to himself a legislatorial position in the development of Greek poetry. Stesichorus addressed himself to an epical subject, not with the design of spinning it out in full and equal breadth, but he rather presented this subject to the view of his public in the shape of single compositions, and made use of it for poems adapted for public production by many voices, accompanied by the cither and dances. This transition from epic into lyric poetry, from Ionic into Doric art, was an exceedingly important step in the development of the national poetry of the Greeks; the Homeric myths were revived after a new fashion; and at the same time a strong foundation was laid for choral poetry, and in particular for the strophic structure of Greek rhythms—a basis which the Hellenes never afterwards relinquished. In everything handed down to us of Stesichorus we recognize an uncommonly vigorous and creative genius, which had at its command an abundance of learning and practical experience. He was acquainted with distant Tartessus, and equally at home in Hellas and in Ionia.

Stesichorus

Rhegium, situate in the vicinity of Himera, was, like the latter, half Doric and half Ionic. Rhegium was the birthplace of Ibycus, whose journeys as a poet led him as far as the court of Polycrates (vol. ii. p. 164). He followed closely

Ibycus.

in the footsteps of Stesichorus; but in Ibycus the severe solemnity of Doric choral poetry appears in a softened form, and his Muse devoted herself with particular success to the ardent expression of the passion of love. The most distinctive features in the life of the Western Greeks were their festive games and mimic dances, which formed part of the celebration of Dionysus and of the joyous harvest-feasts belonging to the worship of Demeter—a national worship in Sicily; both of which here, as in the mother-country, called forth a sportive kind of popular poetry in a dramatic form. The Siceliotes were particularly qualified for enlivening such festive games with delicate conceits of wit, because the co-existence on their island of so many kinds of human usages and habits offered to the inhabitants manifold opportunities of observation, and because they possessed an inexhaustible fund of wit, enabling them to discover in everything its characteristic and humorous element. In Selinus, where barbaric and Hellenic usages of life came into the closest contact, Aristoxenus first sounded the note of sportive Iambic verse, which remained the standard for the later comedy of the Siceliotes; and the spirit of this form of poetry seems to be so intimately connected with the island and its habits and customs of life, that even the poets who immigrated into Sicily from abroad were strangely seized upon by it, as in the case of Epicharmus. And if we take into consideration how philosophy also—which was at that time rising into importance—was domesticated in Western Greece by Pythagoras of Samos, and by Xenophanes of Colophon (vol. ii. p. 466); how, in particular, the critical tendency of the Eleatic school deeply pervaded these countries, and by shaking the foundations of traditional dogmas called forth a free-thinking tendency here at a far earlier date than in the mother-country; if we further

Aristoxenus.

Philosophy, political science, and plastic art.

remember how practical statesmanship and written law developed in the Chalcidian states, how the plastic arts also flourished in these regions from an early age—*e. g.*, sculpture in Rhegium, the native city of Clearchus (vol. ii. p. 82), and architecture in Acragas, Selinus, and Syracuse—we may form some conception of the splendid height of culture to which the population had advanced, when the Tyrants of Gela and Acragas urged Sicilian history into a great and brilliant course, which could not but cause intellectual life to press forward with equal vigor and ardor.*

In the Greek states a monarchical form of government always proved advantageous to the advance of art and science, as is sufficiently attested by the history of the earlier Tyrants. But in Sicily Tyrannical government was a kind entirely peculiar. Here it had at its command far more considerable resources, and popular forces at an incomparably higher stage of development. In Sicily the Tyrants were men of ancient race, born aristocrats, who ruled in Royal fashion—men of great virtues as rulers, and of mild and generous character, who stood at the head of the national movement, and whose policy it was to surround themselves with the most eminent personages of the nation. Gelo, it is true, was himself unacquainted with art; he was, like his father, a genuine cavalry general; and when, on the occasion of a festival, it was his turn to sing to the cither, he is said, in order to display the art which he professed, to have called for his horse. But he was at the same time able to appreciate talent; he attached such men as the wise Phormis (or Phormus) to his

Intellectual life in Sicily under the Tyrants.

Sicilian Comedy.

* Aristoxenus, the predecessor of Epicharmus (Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 487) was a native of Selinus, according to Eusebius, the contemporary o Archilochus.

court, and confided to him the education of his children. Phormis was a comic poet, and his presence at the court of Gelo proves the esteem in which comedy was held. Epicharmus was especially instrumental in making this branch of the drama popular at Syracuse.

Phormis.

Epicharmus, the son of Helothales, was born on the island of Cos; but he had crossed thence to Sicily at so early a period of his life, that he might be regarded as a genuine Sicilian; and although he brought over with him from the home of his race certain tastes and tendencies—above all, his interest in medical science—yet it was in Sicily that his genius was first directed into the course to which he owed his literary fame. He spent his youth and the greater part of his life at Megara, in Sicily. The citizens of this little community were, like the Megareans in Hellas, particularly distinguished by natural gifts qualifying them for the production and appreciation of humorous festive plays and mimic representations; and the aristocracy which held sway at Megara (p. 220) must have encouraged this form of popular entertainment, so that it attained to a certain degree of estimation, was furnished with a chorus, and raised in character by means of public competitive representations. Epicharmus perceived the germs of culture in these popular plays; and accordingly, after enriching his intellectual resources by means of a variety of studies—in particular deriving from Pythagoras, in Italy, an impulse towards deeper views of life and loftier aims—he returned to Megara, and hereupon attempted to transform the popular farce into a form of art to which a poetic value and a moral significance attached. In this attempt he was successful, and this at a much earlier date than that of the admission and refinement of the Megarean farce at Athens. It is probable that the comedies of Epicharmus were produced at

Epicharmus.

Megara as early as Ol. lxviii. *seq.* (B.C. 508 or later); and, when subsequently Megara ceased to exist as a city, and the inhabitants with the most valuable of their belongings were transplanted to Syracuse (p. 221), Epicharmus and his comedy emigrated with them to the new capital, which, like Athens in Hellas, gradually attracted to itself all important phenomena which had shown themselves in the surrounding countries.

Epicharmus in Syracuse. Ol. lxxiv. 2. (B.C. 484.)

Syracuse was not, however, a republic like Athens; and an Attic comedy was therefore out of the question here. But the Megarean comedy possessed this advantage, that it was at the same time popular and courtly; for with regard to its subjects it developed itself particularly in two directions, equally devoid of danger to the dynasts. On the one hand it exhibited popular life in vigorously drawn characters, so that the different classes of the population (the peasant, sailor, prophet, parasite, &c.) appeared on the stage, the ridiculous points in each being most strongly brought forward; on the other hand, even the gods of Olympus had to descend upon the boards, and the tales of the Gods and Heroes were enacted in merry burlesques. But both these forms, that of the comedy of character and that of mythological travesty, were again blended together; Zeus, according to the figure which he was here made to assume at the wedding-feast of the Olympians, was in reality nothing else but the type of the Sicilian gastronomes. But a man like Epicharmus, an inquirer and a thinker, desired something beyond offering a merry diversion for the multitude. At the root of his works lay a serious meaning; and the sterling nobility of his sayings, the teachings of a genuine philosophy of life, expressed in a brief and apt proverbial form, enables us to form a conception of the philosophic meaning, of which the silver vein pervaded the ruder mass of the comedy. His vigor of gnomic expression vividly recalls that of his

contemporary Theognis (vol. i. p. 306), the great poet of Megara in Hellas, who is himself said to have made a journey to Sicily. Both these poets are splendid instances of the genius of the Megareans, who in the mother-country and in the colony equally failed to attain to a successful political development, but at the same time reached an admirable degree of intellectual culture. Their close contact with non-Doric population very possibly contributed to call into play their intellectual powers.

Epicharmus remained at the court of Hiero, to whose famous achievements (the preservation of the Locrians in particular) the poet contrived to allude in his plays; and on the part of the Tyrants every possible measure was taken to satisfy the curiosity and love of spectacle distinguishing the public of the great city, and the fondness for dramatic entertainments innate in the Siceliotes. A handsome theatre was built at Syracuse by Democopus, probably as early as the time of the first two Tyrants; and we may assume that the entire management of the stage was here in many respects reduced to a system at an earlier date than in Athens. Phormis, Dinolochus, and others, were rivals in the same branch of art, and considering the flourishing state to which it in consequence attained, we need not wonder at its having found imitators even beyond the limits of the island. Thus in Athens especially this Sicilian invention was duly appreciated, and Crates (vol. ii. p. 591) is there said to have first set the example of making whole classes of men, instead of individual characters of public life, the subject of comic representation. By the side of the comedy of character, mythological travesty also became popular at Athens, as can be demonstrated in the case of writers as early as Cratinus and his contemporaries.*

* Phormis: Arist. *Poet.*, v. 5. Epicharmus: Suidas: cf. Lorentz, *Leben*

Sophron.

Similar to Epicharmus in the bent of his genius was his younger contemporary, the Syracusan Sophron, whose writings were neither in verse nor, as it appears, destined for the stage, but who was notwithstanding a dramatic poet of the first class; for he contrived in his *Mimes* (which, when skilfully recited, produced the same effects as dramatic scenes,) to create pictures of Sicilian society characterized by the freshness of real life, and expressed in pithy and popular language, intermixed with proverbs. At the same time he not only displayed the keenest power of observation in the delineation of male and female characters, but also the highest skill of artistic reproduction, and by the originality of genius pervading his works exercised a very important influence upon the poets and philosophers of both Greeks and Romans.

The court of Hiero and its guests.

While Epicharmus cultivated a branch of poetry which flourished in Sicily, and developed it to such a degree as to make it acceptable at Athens also, other artists brought over the arts which had matured in the mother-country: and thus an exceedingly fertile interchange arose between the two shores of the sea. The Greek artists, particularly the singers, had always been fond of traveling; and the attraction which drew such men as Pindar, Æschylus, Simonides, and Bacchylides to Sicily, lay not only in the prospect of honors and advantages of an uncommon kind awaiting them at the courts of Acragas and Syracuse, but also in the reputation of manifold intellectual culture belonging to the island, in the splendors of a dynastic career of rare success, in the charm of a deep repose after glorious deeds, such as had not blessed

u. Schriften d. Koers Epicharmus. For the date of the construction of the theatre, cf. Lorenz, *Epicharmos*, p. 91; Schubring in *Philol.* xxii. p. 620. As to the relations between Crates and Epicharmus; Lorenz, pp. 191, 208; Ar. *Poëtik* by Susemihl, p. 168.

the mother-country; and lastly in the abundance of marvels, of which all had to tell who had visited and admired the numerous cities of the island. Among these marvels none engaged the imagination of the Greeks to such a degree as Mount Ætna, which, precisely at the period of the accession of Hiero, had, after a long pause, once more begun to illuminate the Western sea of the Greeks with towering columns of flame. Both Pindar and Æschylus attest the impression which this phenomenon of nature created in the contemporary world.*

This attraction towards Sicily, felt by the Greeks of the mother-country, was eagerly taken advantage of by Hiero, who personally possessed a vivid interest in science and art, and who himself composed poetry. He had already surrounded himself with all the eminent natives in Sicily. Corax, the founder of Sicilian oratory, the first Greek who applied the principles of science to the art of speech, stood high in the consideration of Hiero; philosophy and natural science, mathematics and medicine, simultaneously flourished in the highest degree, art and science pervading one another in a remarkable manner (*e. g.*, Epicharmus wrote treatises on medical science, even in its veterinary branch);—in short, there manifestly existed in the intellectual life of the Siceliotes a universal tendency, a philosophic habit of mind, which pursued, and meditated upon, all kinds of subjects, and attempted to comprehend all things human in their mutual connection. And these native tendencies were strengthened by the influence of the presence of the great foreign artists; so that around the hospitable hearth of Hiero was assembled a body of sages and poets, a chosen circle, unequalled in any other part of Greece. Nor were these men merely instruments

* Sophron: Suidas. The eruption of Ætna took place in Ol. lxxv. (B.C. 479), according to the Parian chronicles (*vide* Boeckh in *Corp. Inscr.* ii. p. 339); according to Thuc. lxxvi. 1, in B. C. 475. Thucydides was unable to obtain any precise information as to any earlier eruption.

of the vanity of Hiero, as adorning his court of the Muses, and adding to his royal throne its brightest glory; but the influence exercised, by the foreign artists especially, was also a beneficent one: *e.g.*, in the case of Simonides, when he acted as peacemaker between Hiero and Thero (p. 236). As independent men, the artists were qualified for assuming a position of greater freedom towards their host; and, lastly, they offered the surest pledge for the fame of the Sicilian princes. For this reason Hiero soon after his accession summoned Æschylus to his court, where the poet spent many happy years, extremely productive for his Muse; he glorified Hiero's favorite work in his *Women of Ætna*, a grand festive poem in honor of the new city (Ol. lxxvi. 1; B.C. 476); he connected the history of Sicily with that of the mother-country; and what could have more gratified Hiero's love of fame, than to see the military glories of his house celebrated in company with Salamis and Platææ in a trilogy (vol. ii. p. 581), as national achievements connected with, and equal in kind and degree to, these victories? The production of the *Persæ* in the theatre at Syracuse marked a brilliant epoch in the history of that city: nor can it well be doubted that the entire work originated in impulses received in Sicily, and upon Sicilian soil. Æschylus grew so habituated to Sicilian life, that in the language of his later dramas the influence of his residence in Sicily was thought to be discernible; and his love for the fair island led the poet once more back to its shores, when he was already growing weary of his life.*

Æschylus.

* Æschylus was twice in Sicily; on the former occasion at the invitation of Hiero, about 478 to 474 B. C. The Αἰτναῖαι were acted 476; the *Prometheus* (?); then the *Persæ* for the first time. He returned before 472. The *Persæ* was acted in Athens in 472, the *Orestea* in 458. His second journey took place after the fall of the Areopagus (cf. vol. ii. pp. 426, 583). He died at Gela in 455. Cf. Kiehl in *Mnemosyne*, i. p. 364; Lorenz, p. 83.

Still more intimate is the connection between Pindar and the Sicilian dynasties. Pindar. He too loves the island, which his song declares Zeus to have bestowed upon Persephone as a gift of honor; he enthusiastically praises the cornfields, and beseeches the gods to let "the glorious land, heavy with corn, shine in radiant splendor, exulting in the crests of wealthy cities, inhabited by a nation ever mindful of the clash of arms in war, riding proudly to battle, and often crowned with the leaves of the Olympic olive-branch." For him, who loyally venerates the ordinances issuing from Delphi and honors the fame of the ancient houses, it is a genuine triumph to see the Doric system of state attaining to new splendor in the distant isle, and new branches sprouting out here into so vigorous a life from trunks of primitive and illustrious fame in the Hellenic nation. For this reason he is particularly devoted to the Emmenidæ, who, like the poet himself, belong to the house of Cadmus, and who so gloriously make good his faith in the hereditary virtues of great houses. He therefore praises with cordial warmth the virtues of Thero, his hospitality, his kindliness, and his delight in aiding others; and, when hostile feelings came to prevail between the two Tyrannical dynasties, Pindar stood on the side of the Emmenidæ, while Simonides and Bacchylides rather adhered to that of Hiero. But in Syracuse also Pindar's repute stood high; he knew how to acknowledge and celebrate the merits of Hiero, and emulated Æschylus in spreading the fame of the founder of Ætna throughout the whole Greek world; yet, though his songs of praise became solemn exhortations, he endeavors to calm the passionate temperament of the prince, and to incline him to content and peaceable serenity. He makes good his saying that "the man who speaks the truth is the best in every form of state, even at the Tyrant's court," and, with a reference to the unworthy system of spies introduced by Hiero to keep

him informed of all the movements in progress in the capital, Pindar is not afraid to inveigh, with the bitterest scorn, against the creatures of the court and the fawning sycophants who make the king untrue to his better nature.

Sicilian architecture under the Tyrants.

Thus Syracuse in the age of its Tyrants was a centre of the most varied intellectual life, a chosen abode of Hellenic power and culture. In conformity with this character the city had itself entirely changed its aspect. It had long ago passed from the island Ortygia to the mainland, extending, not (as would seem to have been the most natural course) from the isthmus in a westerly direction round the bay of the great harbor, but in a northerly direction, upon the limestone plateau of Achradina. The citizens had moved further and further away from the harbor, and preferred the less convenient site, because here alone were to be found a dry soil and wholesome air. Gelo had caused the nearest part of the table-land to be surrounded with walls; and thus were formed the city-quarters of Achradina, (by itself already between four and five times as large as the city on the island,) and, immediately to the west of it, of Tyche. This was the triple city of Gelo, with its walls and stone-quarries, which also served as fortifications; its harbors and docks; its palaces, sanctuaries, and public edifices—the grandest of all Hellenic cities. The castle of the Tyrants, together with the most ancient sanctuaries (p. 217) lay on the island. There, also, not far from the Isthmus, was the temple of Apollo, whose eastern steps bear a dedicatory inscription belonging to the same period with that upon the helmet dedicated by Hiero (p. 239). Opposite the walls of Achradina, Gelo, after the victory of Himera, erected a gorgeous temple to the Great Goddesses, who had made his house great and honored (p. 213). On the further bank of the Anapus, which flows into the innermost part of the great har-

bor, a suburb had grown up, which had for its centre the temple of the Olympian Zeus. Sacred architecture had come to Sicily from Corinth, the ancient school of temple-architecture; and in this instance again the colonies were desirous of surpassing all contemporary efforts of the mother-country in grandeur and splendor.

The victory of Himera marked an epoch in the history of Sicilian as the victories over the Persians did in Athenian architecture. Not only were the temples filled with dedicatory gifts and precious objects, (as, *e. g.*, the suburban temple of Zeus, near Syracuse, the statue of which Gelo adorned with a mantle of solid gold from the Carthaginian booty,) but the multitude of slaves obtained was also employed for building new edifices, far exceeding all their predecessors in size. Marble was scarce in the country itself; but the mountains of the island offered numerous and abundant stone-quarries; and to the limestone found in these it was contrived to give by rough-casting an effulgence similar to that of marble. In remembrance of the victory a temple was built at Himera itself, the remains of which have only recently again come to light. But the mightiest of all the creations of Sicilian architecture was the Olympieum at Acragas, situate on the road along the port. Here, as at Syracuse, the worship of Zeus, the giver of victory, was established after the model of the religious worship of Peloponnesus; but the body of the temple itself was such as to be inferior in size to none but the Artemisium at Ephesus. Its height doubled that of the Parthenon. The edifice was externally embellished most richly with works of sculpture; in the interior, above the lower row of columns, stood colossal figures of Gigantes,* whose lower arms, and heads bent

* As to the temple of Apollo and the inscription on its steps, see *Philologus*, xxiii. 361, xxvi. 567. Cavallari's discovery at Himera, *Giornale di Sicilia*, 1864, June 13. Olympieum, Sieferi, *Akragas*, p. 31.

forward, supported the tablature of the *cella*, in which was placed the image of the Olympian Zeus, the conqueror of the Gigantes.

Aqueducts.

These edifices, indeed, lacked the simplicity and genuine grandeur which distinguished sacred architecture, especially at Athens. There are undeniable traces of the influence of foreign elements and of a tendency, hurtful to art, towards external effect. On the other hand, the development of civil and domestic architecture, which the princes of Sicily had specially at heart, was thoroughly peculiar of its kind, and challenges admiration. The island is full of structures dating from this age, which bear witness to the marvellous height to which technical science had been carried. Among these must be mentioned, above all, the aqueducts of Syracuse, through which the mountain-springs flow through all parts of the rocky city and under the sea to Ortygia, where they rise to the surface again as the spring of Arethusa; while on the other side an arm of the river Anapus is conducted to the city in an artificial bed. By means of numerous well-shafts the subterraneous aqueducts were everywhere rendered accessible for use, as in the case of those in Attica (vol. i. p. 387); and in either place part of the aqueducts have continued to perform their service up to the present day. Still more famous were the aqueducts of Acragas, the conduits there called *Phœaces* (these, as well as part of the conduits at Syracuse, had been dug by Carthaginian prisoners of war); and the fish-ponds, designed to supply the luxurious demands of the banquets of the citizens, and covered with swans and water-fowl, formed a delightful ornament to the city. Finally, the architecture of private houses, particularly at Acragas, was in a style of greater splendor than in the rest of Greece; the dwellings of the rich were palaces, built and furnished in a style far surpassing the exigencies of family life. The citizens took pride in

being able to receive in their private houses as many guests as possible.*

Sicilian numismatic art.

The policy of the Tyrants made them generally desirous to see the populous cities where they resided distinguish themselves by cleanliness and good order. Accordingly they also endeavored to admit none but noble and well-to-do families into the cities (p. 221), and to prevent as much as possible an accumulation of a poor town-population. They further very effectively provided for the fame of their cities abroad, by causing particular attention to be devoted to the mintage of their coins: and in no other department has Sicilian art more brilliantly distinguished itself. For while in the mother-country coins continued to be regarded exclusively as money, the state confining its attention to a maintenance of the due standard of weight (vol. 1, p. 360), in Sicily the beauty of the coinage was first regarded as an object of public interest. The die-engravers were artists; and it was therefore principally here that the custom arose of allowing them to introduce their names upon the coins in miniature characters. And, as it happens, coins have been actually preserved of all the more important cities of the island, which by means of a skillful arrangement of the symbols, of consummate technical craft, and of intellectual expression in the heads, may lay claim to be considered as real works of art. They are not only monuments of the native forms of religious worship, but also historical monuments which perpetuate epochs of the histories of the several cities. Thus, the coins of Messene proclaim the chariot-victories of Anaxilaus; on those of Selinus the river Hypass is seen offering sacrifice at the altar of Asclepius. This sacrifice is a thank-offering for

* On aqueducts at Syracuse, see Julius Schubring in *Philologus*, xxii. pp. 577–638.

the draining of the low country (which had been effected by the advice of Empedocles). A marsh-bird taking his unwilling departure furnishes a witty and pregnant indication of the salutary change in the condition of the territory of the city. But the most beautiful of all the works of art of this species are the large silver coins (ten-drachm pieces) of Syracuse, of which the reverse represents a victorious yoke of horses, showing that these pieces probably served as a prize of victory; while the obverse bears the charming head of a goddess, surrounded by dolphins, representing the deity of the fountain of Arethusa which, abounding in fishes, sacred to the goddess, welled up in Ortygia. This species of coins also includes that which, in memory of the daughter of Thero, went by the name of *Demaretium.* Demarete united in her person the two royal houses, upon whose fraternal alliance was based the most glorious period of Sicilian history; and after the conclusion of peace she is said to have received from Carthage the gift of a golden wreath, and to have caused a quantity of coin of corresponding value to be struck for the public benefit. Her memory further connects itself with the dedicatory gift, in Delphi, the tripod of 'Demaretian gold;' and the same Simonides who consecrated the monuments of victory in the mother-country by his epigrams, also wrote the inscription for that of the Dinomenidæ, and testifies in it in their behalf that they, by conquering the Barbarians, had extended to the Hellenes the helpful hand of brethren in the establishment of freedom.*

These are the works and monuments of the years of peace which ensued upon the glorious victory, and which, in their significance for Sicily, corresponded to the period

* Pollux, ix. 85. According to Diodorus, xi. 26, it was out of the golden wreath presented to Demarete by the Carthaginians. Simonides also (n. 142 in Bergk's *Poetæ Lyr.*) speaks of Χρυσὸς Δαμαρέτιος (Λαρέτιος acc. to Meineke, *Œdip. Col.* p. 316). For this reason Boeckh (*Metrol. Unters.* 305) assumes the Demaretium to have been a gold coin = half a

of peace enjoyed by the mother-country, and by Athens in particular, after the Persian wars. Those who won and enjoyed the former victories were not, indeed, free communities; but nowhere were the fame and success of the dynasts so closely connected with civic prosperity as in Sicily; nowhere did the despots succeed so well in using their power with moderation, and in maintaining for a time simultaneously two things naturally irreconcilable: tyrannical rule and legal order.

But however highly the Sicilian Tyrants are distinguished above all their predecessors, yet their rule met with the fate of the rest: it failed to attain to permanency, and for this reason: that the royal rule which Gelo and Thero had held, degenerated into despotism and party-government, and that the younger generation which had grown up in prosperity and luxury lacked the virtues by which its predecessors had established the power of the dynasty. Thus the success of the Emmenidæ broke down already with the son of the great Thero; and Gelo's son experienced the saddest fate which can befall the heir to a throne. He was placed—probably after the death of his stepfather—in the hands of his uncle Thrasybulus, the youngest of the four sons of Dinomenes. Thrasybulus, urged on by criminal ambition, designed to plunge his nephew into a life of debauchery, which proved his physical and moral ruin. In this endeavor Thrasybulus was aided by a party which wished to see him at the helm of the state. But at the same time a republican party formed itself, which encouraged domestic discord in

Downfall of the Tyrannis at Syracuse. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. c. 466.)

gold stater. See *contra* Duc de Luynes (*Rev. Numism.* 1843). Leake (*Transact.* p. 357) and Mommsen (*G. d. R. Münzw.* p. 70), who reckon the Demaretium among the various silver decadrachms. See also Hultsch *de Demaretio*, Dresd. 1862. Boeckh repeated his previous opinion, *Verh. d. Hall. Philologenvers.* 1868, p. 36. *Contra* Hultsch, *ib.* p. 40. Coins of Selinus: *Arch. Zeitung*, 1860, p. 38.

the Tyrannical dynasty, in order thus more easily to remove the latter; and so it came to pass that, though Thrasybulus accomplished his design and became ruler after the death of Hiero, not even the application of extreme measures of force enabled him to maintain himself on the throne for the space of even a single year. A conflict openly broke out at Syracuse between citizens and mercenaries, between Tyrannis and Republic,—a struggle in which the other cities of the island, Acragas, Gela, Selinus, &c., took part; and in the end Thrasybulus might deem himself fortunate in being allowed to depart unhurt and seek a refuge at Locri in Italy.*

Political changes at Syracuse.

Such was the end of the eighteen years of the Tyrannical rule of the Dinomenidæ at Syracuse. The example of Acragas was followed by Gela and Syracuse, in both of which the republic was restored, and, in order to mark the beginning of a new and happy era, the Syracusans instituted in honor of Zeus the "Liberator" the festival of the *Eleutheria;* they engraved on their coins the laurel-crowned head of Zeus *Eleutherios,* and on the reverse an unbridled horse, in the act of taking a spring, as a symbol of their newly-won freedom.† This change was, however, accompanied by arduous conflicts and protracted sufferings. For the rule of the Tyrants had too violently affected the inner life of the cities, and strange elements had been too largely introduced into the communities, to allow public life to resume a peaceable development. It was indeed attempted at Syracuse to unite the old and new citizens into a corporation; but the latter, by their exclusion from all offices of honor, were wounded at their most sensitive point, and a division was thus created which led to a sanguinary conflict in the city.

* One year's reign of Thrasybulus: Diod. xi. 66. Close of tyrannical government: Arist. *Polit.* pp. 220, 230.

† Coins of Zeus Eleutherios; Leake, *Numism. Hell.* i. 79.

The several quarters of the city were used as fortresses from which the parties made war upon one another: 7,000 mercenaries and newly enfranchised citizens still remained over of those admitted into the city by Gelo; and these made themselves masters of the two inner districts of the city, Ortygia, and Achradina, so that the old citizens were driven into the suburbs, where they entrenched themselves on the western part of the wide city-hill, in Epipolæ, thereby cutting off all supplies by land from the city. And thus they at last succeeded in forcing their opponents to quit the ground.

Ætna.

The consequences of the overthrow of the Tyrants, however, extended far beyond Syracuse. For the Siculi, who had been hard pressed by the dominion of the Dinomenidæ, now also ventured upon rising; and, under their bold leader Ducetius, attempted to bring about a closer combination among themselves, and thus to place themselves on a footing of equality with the Hellenes. The Syracusans now even allied themselves with the Siculi, on account of their common hatred against the Tyrants and all things connected with them; and the combined forces undertook an expedition against the Tyrants' city of Ætna, which was an object of equal hatred to both. Hiero's citizens bravely resisted the attack, but were at last forced to yield; and thus, after a brief existence, the proud royal city, which Hiero had founded amidst splendid solemnities as if for eternity, came to an end. The monument erected in honor of its founder was destroyed; the original population of Catanæans returned, the Siculi received back their land, and the Ætnæans removed to Inessa at the base of Mount Ætna.*

Tyrannical government maintained itself longest in the two cities on the Sicilian sound, which Anaxilaus had united into a single principality. Its government had

* Diod. xi. 76.

Final overthrow of the Tyrannis at Rhegium and Zancle.

since Ol. lxxvi. 1 (B. C. 476) been administered by Micythus, a man originally belonging to the slave-class, whom the confidence of Anaxilaus had subsequently raised to the position of guardian of his children and regent of Rhegium and Zancle. In this capacity he governed with prudence and moderation, but at the same time with resolution and vigor. He aided the Tarentines when their city was in danger, and even sent out colonies to the west coast of Italy. Thus it came to pass that Hiero himself became jealous of Micythus, and accordingly induced the tyrant's sons to put an end to the regency. Micythus resigned the government in Ol. lxxviii. 2. (B.C. 467) after furnishing an account of his administration, in which it was impossible to discover a single blemish.* The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves in power for about six years more, and were then expelled like the rest.

General victory of Democracy.

And now, at last, an identical order of things had been brought about in the whole of Greek Sicily. The civic communities had been purified by the removal of all those who owed their enfranchisement to the times of the Tyrants; the exiles had returned; the domains of the Tyrannical families had been made public property, and the free constitutions everywhere reinstated. After the times of despotism had thus passed away, all the communities were pervaded by the same fresh and youthful vigor which animated Athens after the fall of the Pisistratidæ.

State of Syracuse.

There was, indeed, no want of ambitious party leaders who took advantage of the confusion ensuing upon the expulsion of the Tyrants, and endeavored to restore monarchical rule. This was in particular the case at Syracuse, where a certain Tyndareon distributed money among the poor, and

* Herod. vii. 170; Diod. xi. 48; Paus. v. 26.

had already surrounded himself with a band of followers, who were prepared to help him in his attempt to seize upon absolute power. But, before he was strong enough to spurn the interference of the legal tribunals, he had to submit to a judicial inquiry, which resulted in his execution. In order to prevent similar attempts an institution was established resembling the Attic ostracism, which, it will be remembered, owed its origin to similar events. In Syracuse, it was termed the judgment of leaves (*petalism*) because the name of the individual who appeared dangerous to the constitution was here scratched upon olive-leaves instead of upon potsherds. This signalized the consummation of the victory of the democratic movement which pervaded the whole island, and which, on the one hand, appears as to particular political institutions to have followed the example of Athens; while, on the other, it doubtless exercised a reaction upon Athens and upon the party struggles in progress there, where it supported the successes of the party of reform.*

Institution of petalism.

For the different cities of Sicily, and particularly for Syracuse, the complete victory of the democracy marked a literary as well as a political epoch. The multitude of private suits occasioned by the revolution in the relations of property, offered an opportunity for the exercise of forensic eloquence; and the popular assemblies, in which the decrees of state were now passed, became a school of political oratory. The Siceliotes possessed a natural gift for the artistic use of speech,—a gift the cultivation of which is attested by the comedies of Epicharmus. At this epoch Corax (p. 251) brilliantly distinguished himself as a forensic advocate; and, aided

Consequences of the overthrow of the Tyrants.

Sicilian orators.

(Corax and his school)

* As to the temporary introduction of *petalism* into Syracuse, see Diod. xi. 86, 87.

by his varied experience, composed a theoretic system of oratory, in which he gave instructions as to the treatment of different kinds of legal cases. One of his scholars was Tisias, who again was followed by Gorgias; so that a new branch of Hellenic oratory rapidly and vigorously developed itself, which was entirely peculiar to Sicily. Under circumstances similar to those prevailing at Syracuse, the art of oratory was equally cultivated at Acragas, where Empedocles the philosopher also exercised influence as a popular speaker, so that he could be regarded by Aristotle as the founder of Rhetoric, and successfully opposed party-movements which had for their ultimate object the restoration of monarchical government. Geographical and historical studies also flourished in consequence of this universal intellectual activity. Inquiring minds collected the abundant existing materials of native history: *e. g.*, in the years following upon the expulsion of the Tyrants, the Syracusan Antiochus, the son of Xenophanes, composed a comprehensive work on the cities of Italy and Sicily, the loss of which forms one of the most unfortunate gaps in the information left to us concerning Greek antiquity.*

and historians.

(Antiochus.)

With regard to the common constitution of the island, all the cities, the Doric as well as the Ionic, in the first instance acted in unison, and sent deputies to common diets, in order to combine for the purpose of a harmonious and national policy. With the Siculi, too, the Hellenic cities were upon good terms, and displayed such generosity even towards the now homeless mercenaries, as to hand over to them a spot in the territory of Zancle, where they founded a settlement of their own. This happy period of

Consequences for the island in general.

* Concerning Corax and Tisias, Aristotle ap. Cic. *Brutus*, § 46; cf. Blass, *Att. Beredtsamk.* p. 18f.—Empedocles, acc. to Aristotle, the inventor of Rhetoric. Diog. Laert. viii. 54. Antiochus περὶ Ἰταλίας and Σικελιῶτις συγγραφή. *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 181.

national progress, concord and enthusiasm, was not, however, of long duration; the evils of the degenerate Tyrannis had been successfully removed; but this involved the frustration of the great objects pursued by the Tyrants of Acragas and Syracuse: the reconciliation of differences of race, the blending of all the Sicilian Greeks into one nation, and the combination of their resources into an imperial power capable of withstanding all foreign enemies and of preventing all foreign intervention. The island again divided itself into a number of particular states, whose military strength fell away; popular government was accompanied by extreme disorder, the communities not having gradually accustomed themselves to liberty and its use; all the evils of democracy—party-spirit, want of discipline, and invidious attacks upon the rich—rapidly supervened, and consumed the strength of the communities, whose conduct was not directed to any higher aims. The jealousy between Dorians and Ionians broke out afresh; the Siculi put forward claims of increasing audacity, and, since the rule of the Tyrants had occasioned a violent interruption of the general state of law, it was now doubly difficult to attain to fixed and unchanging constitutional systems.*

The Hellenes in Italy.

In Italy, even less than in Sicily, can there be any question as to a common history of the Greek cities? For here neither the Amphictyonic sanctuaries (vol. i. p. 473), nor the predominance of the power of particular states, produced a lasting combination. In Italy, the forces of Greek nationality were upon the whole far less concentrated, and the contrast was far more marked, between the cities of Achæan, Doric and Ionic origin, which had grown up in a dense succession. During the first two centuries after

* As to the mercenaries in the territory of Zancle, see Diod. xi. 76; Siefert, *Zankle-Messana*, p. 22.

their foundation these cities flourished at the height of prosperity upon the prodigally luxuriant soil of Magna Græcia. The history of this development, composed by Antiochus (p. 264), is lost to us, so that as our chief source of information we have nothing left beyond the coins, which testify to the high prosperity of the cities, to the forms of religious worship prevalent in them, and to their mutual connection. The thinly-beat silver-pieces, bearing inscriptions of the Achæan towns, which are coined with sunken dies on the one and reliefs on the other side, in contrast to the thick metal pieces of the mother-country, prove how cleverly the Italian Greeks at an early period, *i. e.*, in the seventh century B.C., contrived to spoil the forgers' trade. The political knowledge of the Italian communities is attested by their legislations (vol ii., p. 106 f.), and their power by the colonies on the west coast: the citizens of Sybaris, Croton and Locri held sway on the coasts of either sea of the peninsula (vol. i. p. 471). But as soon as the cities issue forth out of the dark centuries of darkness in which they gradually developed their strength, we find them immediately inflamed against one another by a violent jealousy, which made Magna Græcia the scene of the most sanguinary conflicts between Hellenic neighbors. And, indeed, in no part of the Greek world do we meet with instances of so terrible a destruction, and with such sudden falls from the fulness of human prosperity into the depths of misery and utter desolation.

History of the Italian cities.

At first the Achæan cities were the most powerful—Sybaris, Croton and Metapontium. They endeavored, by their united efforts, to overpower the settlements of the other tribes; and, as a result of this combination, the old-Ionian Siris between Metapontium and Sybaris was laid level with the ground (Ol. l. *circ.;* B.C. 580). Subsequently, disputes arose among the Achæan cities; Croton and Sybaris made war upon one another, and the latter was so utterly over-

thrown, that the Crotoniates conducted the river Crathis over the site of the city, in order to destroy every vestige of it. Thus, before the period of the Persian wars, the two cities, whose representatives we met with in the royal hall of Clisthenes (vol. i., p. 285) as those of the most foremost Greek cities of Lower Italy, had vanished from the face of the earth. But the fall of Sybaris proved ruinous to the victors as well as to the vanquished. There ensued an utter overthrow of order in the Achæan cities; stormy popular risings put an end to the influence of the Pythagoreans, which had made Croton strong and great, and at the same time to the power of the aristocratic families (vol. ii. p. 108). Sedition and bloodshed prevailed for a long time. From the most various parts of Greece arrived embassies with advice and aid; and, as the Achæans were unable by their own exertions to return to a condition of order and law, they were in the end rescued from dissolution by the cities of their mother-country Achaia, whose political statutes were adopted by the colonies.*

Croton and Sybaris.

Tarentum.

For the rest, the history of Magna Græcia continued its progress apart from that of the mother-country; and although the Italian cities had learned distinctly enough that they, too, were included among the objects of the Persian king's lust of conquest, yet only one Italian ship came to the aid of the Hellenes at Salamis—that of the Crotoniate Phayllus. The strength of his native city, which had

* As to the influence of the destruction of Sybaris upon Croton, see Timæus, *Fragm.* 63, Göller. According to Justin. xx. 3, and Strabo 262, the rout of the Crotoniates on the Sagras must have followed upon the fall of Sybaris. Niebuhr, *Rom. Hist.* vol. iii. p. 514, note [E. Tr.]. It is fixed at an earlier date by Millingen, *Considerations sur la Numism. de l'anc. Italie*, p. 66, and Heyne, *Opusc.* ii. 184. Concerning the embassy to Achaia, see Th. Müller. *de Thuriorium rep.* p. 24; and concerning the extension of the territory as far as the Tyrrhenian coasts, *ib.* p. 30. Polyæn. ii. 10.

so long offered an illustrious example to all the Hellenes, of the home of Democedes (vol. ii. p 191) and of Milo, which had gained more wreaths at Olympia than any other Greek city, had been broken by civic discords and defeats. As their palæstræ became deserted, the military vigor and confidence in victory of the Crotoniates vanished. Moreover, at the very time when the Carthaginians were advancing in Sicily and the Persians in Hellas, a general movement of the Italian tribes took place towards the coasts inhabited by Greeks, particularly of the Iapygian or Messapian people (vol. i. p. 461), as well as of the Peucetians, who dwelt in a locality more remote. The Achæan cities having fallen into decay, Tarentum was now the most flourishing city, and the chief seat of the trade of Lower Italy. Her luxurious wealth was the principal attraction which tempted the barbarians; and, notwithstanding the aid furnished by the Rhegines, she had to suffer a disastrous defeat, the heaviest blow inflicted upon a Hellenic people known to Herodotus, Ol. lxxvi. 4 *circ.* (B. C. 473). Thus, about the time when Hiero overcame the Tyrrhenians, the east coast of Italy, as far as the Sicilian sound, was in the hands of the barbarians. The power of the Tarentines was not, however, broken. The ancient families of the city were indeed annihilated in the struggle; but the movements which pervaded the entire Greek world since the end of the sixth century B. C., now also found vent at Tarentum. The lower classes of the population acquired a share in the administration, and the change of the aristocratic into a democratic constitution was accompanied by a new rise of national vigor: so that the Tarentines renewed the conflict with success, and about Ol. lxxviii. and lxxx. were enabled to erect great monuments of victory at Delphi, the works of Ageladas and Onatas, which represented the brave fights on horse and foot against the barbarians.*

* Cf. page 277; Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Künstler*, i. 90.

Renewal of the conflict between Sybaris and Croton.

After the rout of the barbarians, the disputes between the Greek cities, here as in the mother-country, broke out afresh. Fifty-eight years after the destruction of their city, the Sybarites returned home from their colonies (vol. ii. p. 535); but they were driven out four years afterwards (Ol. lxxxiii. 2; B.C. 447) by the Crotoniates. The ancient struggle burst forth into fresh flames. The Sybarites applied first to Sparta, and then to Athens; and their application for aid became the occasion for expeditions from Hellas, which, for the first time, exercised a lasting influence upon the history of Magna Græcia.*

Athens and Italy.

Upon the whole, communication between the mother-country and the western peninsula had progressed slowly, even in the case of the Athenians; and, even among the latter, a voyage to the Adriatic for a long time remained a proverbial expression for a bold venture. Not until they were brought into closer contact with Ionia, did they become more familiar with Italy. From an early age this country had been most intimately connected with the maritime cities of Ionia, thus in particular Sybaris with Miletus. The attractions of Italy became better and better known; and, after the Athenians had become a naval state, their attention was in the first instance directed to the corn-fields of Siris. They believed themselves possessed of a claim upon this old-Ionic region, whose beauty had been sung by the poet Archilochus; oracles were current assigning this possession to them; and when for a time they had to be prepared to renounce their own home, like the citizens of Phocæa, they were, as Themistocles actually declared to Eurybiades, resolved to emigrate to Siris (vol. ii. p. 322). The bold mind of

* Iapygian struggles with Tarentum: Lorentz, *Tarentinorum res gestæ* (1838), p. 9.—Constitutional crisis: Aristot. *Polit.* p. 198, 7.

Themistocles was to such a degree occupied with the distant western coasts, that he named two of his daughters after them—the one Italia, and the other Sybaris. His intentions were carried into execution forty years afterwards, when, under the administration of Pericles, Athens established colonies in the territory of the Sybarites (vol. ii. p. 536).*

Foundation of Thurii.

The foundation of Thurii was not, indeed, designed as an enterprise of war, but as a work of peace, with a view to the settlement of the ancient discord prevailing among the different Greek races. For this purpose, the locality seemed particularly favorable: because here from the first a more considerable intermixture had taken place; so that even in the one Doric city, Tarentum, anything but a harsh Dorism prevailed. Thurii also adopted the political ordinances of the native cities, the laws of Charondas; while Athens, as the protecting power of the new settlement, manifestly observed great caution in her conduct, and avoided everything which might have betrayed ambitious aims. The creation of Pericles could not, however, succeed without a conflict; for the Tarentines saw in it an attempt to limit the predominant influence of their city, which was no longer opposed on equal terms by any power in Magna Græcia, and to prevent its further extension,—the more so, as the new city rapidly rose to prosperity and established communications with the cities of Achæan origin. Thus Thurii was also obliged to take the place of Sybaris as the enemy of Tarentum; and once more the border-feuds broke out concerning the fields of Siris, since the citizens of Thurii desired to carry into effect the claims of their mother-city. By a strange coincidence, their commander, in this conflict with the

* Voyage to the Adrias: Boeckh, *Seeurkunden*, p. 137.—Themist. and Sybaris: Plut. *Themist.* 32.

Doric city was a Lacedæmonian, the same Cleandridas who had been banished from Sparta for accepting a bribe from Pericles (vol ii. p. 451). In the end, a treaty of partition was concluded, in which the Tarentines were granted the right of founding a colony in their share of the Siritis, while the citizens of Thurii endeavored to restore the ancient dominion of Sybaris (vol. i. p. 470), and advanced their territory as far as the Tyrrhenian sea.

The foundation of Thurii had brought considerable life into the relations between Athens and Magna Græcia. Thurii constantly demanded an accession of population, and up to the middle of the Peloponnesian war many Athenians immigrated, partly for personal reasons, and especially well-to-do resident aliens, who at home suffered from the pernicious proceedings of the Sycophants. Among the allies also, some emigrated who felt themselves oppressed by the rule of Athens, by the increase in the rate of tributes, and by other burdens. But, besides the discontent which impelled the Hellenes to cross the sea, a universal attraction was also exercised by the Hesperian regions, which was extremely strong and widely-spread in that age: by the manifold charms attaching to the land of the west in the eyes of men desirous of travel, by the fame of the cities, in which life had attained to so high a degree of luxurious splendor, by the superior cheapness of life prevailing in the countries abounding in corn and herds, and finally also by the manifold and peculiar culture which had followed in the wake of the prosperity of the cities. Thus the festive amusements of the Tarentines (vol. i. p. 499) had developed a species of entertaining poetry, which dealt in a dramatic form with the figures of popular mythology, with gods and heroes, treating its subjects with fun and satire, and contriving at the same time to introduce diverting features taken from daily life. These were poetic

Ionian immigration into Italy.

works which owed their origin to a natural flow of wit, and accordingly always retained the fresh character of improvisations. Yet neither were they wholly devoid of a serious purpose, and serious truths were occasionally communicated to the public by laughing lips. For a philosophic tendency, as will be remembered, had taken root in Magna Græcia more deeply than elsewhere, and had here gained a significance for public life which occupied thinking minds among the Greeks. Accordingly many sought out the home of Pythagorean wisdom, and particularly admired the men able to combine music and gymnastic culture, such as the famed Iccus of Tarentum, who, in the period after the Persian wars, obtained the victor's wreath at Olympia—the foremost master of the gymnastic art among the Hellenes, and at the same time a sage of acknowledged reputation. The Greek vessels became more and more habituated to the Western seas; already Euctemon (vol. ii. p. 562), the associate of Meton, propounded correct views as to the pillars of Heracles; and trade connected the western colonies more and more closely with Athens, after the equalization of the standard of coinage, and essentially facilitated intercourse.*

Trade and coinage of the Italian cities.

In Italy, copper was universally adopted as the standard of value: the pound of copper, or *libra* (*litra*), divided into twelve ounces, was the unit of money and weight; and the system of coinage thus regulated spread to Italy. The Greek merchants and colonists found this system in a stage of complete development; they brought over with them their native species of money, which found admittance by the side of one another. But the most important impulses were received from Corinth and from Athens. Corinth had at an early period adopted the Babylonian

* As to Thurii, f. Meier, *Opusc, acad.* i. p. 213. Iccus: Plat. *Protag.*, 316. Euctemon ap. Avien. *Ora Maritima*, v. 350.

gold-weight current in Asia Minor; she had at an earlier period than Athens transferred the standard of gold to silver, and her silver stater, together with its system, adopted in Asia Minor, of a division into third-sixth-, and twelfth-parts, was introduced among the Achæans in Italy, the Crotoniates, the Sybarites, and others. But the foreign and native standards could not continue permanently to co-exist without a medium; and in the interests of trade the Corinthians gave up their ancient system of dividing the stater, which (a piece of two drachmas) they now settled at ten litres, and a tenth-part of which they coined as a silver piece (*nomos*, *nummus*), this being accordingly equivalent to a pound of copper. Thus the Corinthians, as the born mediators between the East and the West, first established a common standard among the three metals used as money in the ancient world, and blended the Italian system of litres with that of drachms; and even at home in Corinth reckoned by litres. The Athenians, as well as the Corinthians, succeeded in introducing their standard of coinage in the West, particularly in Etruria, in Tarentum, and in Sicily. They also at the very period when their communication with Lower Italy became brisk, overcame their repugnance against copper money. Demetrius, celebrated in connection with its introduction, the so-called "copper-man," was one of the conductors of the colony of Thurii.*

Athenian plans of intervention.

But while the West was in every respect brought into closer contact with the Athenians, it was natural that ulterior plans should be formed at Athens. The Athenians were no longer willing to rest satisfied with the policy of Pericles,

* As to the dislike of copper money entertained by the Athenians, see Buclé, *Monnaies d' Athènes*, p. 13. On Dionysius see Boeckh, *P. E.* vol. ii. p. 383 [E. Tr.] On the amalgamation of the litra- and drachm-systems, see Mommsen, *G. d. R. M.* pp. 81, 83; the tetradrachmon as a prop of Athenian commerce, *ib.* p. 328. The Corinthian standard was not, as

which desired to assert the authority of the city by peaceable, and by no other means in the Western sea, where Athens henceforth intended to appear not only as an influential, but also as a ruling power. Plans of this kind were fostered by alliances with particular cities. Thus an ancient alliance was in force with Rhegium; and when Corcyra was admitted into the Attic Confederation, the Athenians already included Sicily and Italy in the scope of their proceedings (p. 11). In their hatred against Corinth they found a continual motive for schemes of conquest in the territories of Corinthian colonization. In order, therefore, to carry these plans into execution, nothing was needed but a favorable opportunity, which might lead to an intervention on the part of Athens in the internal affairs of the colonies; and this opportunity was furnished by Sicily.

The Siculi.

Sicily was unable to attain to a lasting state of tranquility. Too much combustible matter existed in the island, partly in the individual states, where attempts were made to establish new Tyrannical governments; partly in the mutual relations between the cities; and partly, in fine, in those between the Greek cities and the Siculi. For the latter had, for the first time, found a leader in Ducetius (p. 260), who, not content with taking advantage, as a bold chieftain, of the impervious regions in the interior of the island, and thence executing a succession of attacks upon the different coast towns, endeavored himself to found cities after the fashion of the Hellenes. In the first instance he settled a civic community of Siculi, near Palici, a locality to the west of Leontini, distinguished by volcanic phenomena, and

Ducetius. Ol. lxxxv. 1. (B.C. 440.)

was formerly supposed (Boeckh, *Metrol. Unters.* p. 97), borrowed from Athens, but independently derived from the Babylonian gold talent; cf. J. Brandis, *d. Mass-Gewicht u. Münzw. in V. Asien*, pp. 60, 159.

held sacred by the inhabitants. He even succeeded in defeating the united troops of Acragas and Syracuse, and, after hereupon suffering a defeat at the hands of the Greeks, and being forced to quit Sicily for a time, he took advantage of an outbreak of discord between the two cities in order to found on the north side of the island a new city, called καλὴ ἀκτή, or "*Fair Coast*," as the strong and well-situated capital of an empire of the Siculi. But before he was able to secure an enduring existence to his creation, he died in his new capital, Ol. lxxxv. 1 (B.C. 440); and the Syracusans, who had meanwhile inflicted a humiliating defeat upon Acragas, were now able, without much difficulty, to suppress all efforts towards independence on the part of the Siculi, and to subject all their posts in the vicinity of their territory. Syracuse was more powerful than ever before. She now revived the plans of a dominion embracing the entire island; the cavalry and navy, which had been neglected since the age of the Tyrants, were again increased; the places of the Siculi were treated with severity, and the Chalcidian towns with overbearing insolence. The consequence was, that the ancient dislike of the races against one another re-asserted itself, which had fallen into the background for a time during their combined struggle against the Tyrants. This, moreover, happened at the period when the opposition between Dorians and Ionians was re-awakened and intensified in the whole Hellenic world by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Sparta opened communications with the Doric cities of the island (p. 33); and, although the Sicilian cities displayed far less sympathy and interest than the Spartans had expected, and than the Corinthians had delusively promised to them, yet in Sicily, too, the adherents of the Attic and those of the Peloponnesian cause began to take up a position of more and more de-

Power of Syracuse.

Increase of party feeling in Sicily.

cided partisanship, particularly after the Athenians had attained to power in the Ionian Sea and had entered into closer communications with the members of their race on its farthest shores. Thus, *e. g.*, the ancient alliance with Rhegium was renewed, Ol. lxxxvi. 4 (B.C. 433).*

When accordingly the insolent pride of Syracuse most violently menaced the Chalcidians of Sicily, an open division of feeling ensued in the island, and two war parties were formed. On the one side stood the Ionic towns, Leontini, Catana, and Naxos, which were joined by Rhegium and also by the Doric Catana. The latter city had been restored after the expulsion of the Tyrants, and now saw its independence threatened by Syracuse. On the other side were the Dorian colonies and Locri, which had already at an earlier date attached itself to Sparta. The Leontinians, menaced by Syracuse both by land and by sea, ventured upon a decisive step, by sending in the fifth summer of the war (Ol. lxxxviii. 1; B.C. 427), an embassy to Athens, soliciting her support.†

Embassy of Gorgias. Ol. lxxxviii. 1. (B.C. 427.)

The leader of this embassy was Gorgias, at that time already past his sixtieth year; but he was one of those Hellenes whose intellectual vigor and activity were supported by extraordinary vital powers (vol. ii. p. 543). He was a man of an imposing personal bearing, full of assurance and self-confidence, resembling Empedocles, of whom he was also intellectually a follower. For he was distinguished by an extremely varied culture, being equally familiar with natural philosophy and with the dialectics of the Eleatic school. This philosophical culture he chiefly employed for practical purposes, seizing upon the minds of his hearers by means of surprising combinations of ideas, of unexpected conclusions and

* *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* n. 74. Meier *Op. acad.* i. 331.

† Παλική: Diod. xi. 88, 90.—Καλὴ Ἀκτή: Diod. xii. 8, 29; cf. Ad. Holm. *Beitr.* z. *Bericht. d. Karte d. a. Sicil.* (1866) p. 26.

demonstrations, and thus directing their resolutions. He belonged entirely to the Sophistic school; but it was his wish to be, not a teacher of wisdom like Prodicus, or an encyclopædist and polyhistor like Hippias, but solely a rhetor after the fashion of Corax and Tisias, (p. 246) to exercise influence as an orator, and to form others into orators. The more he concentrated his powers upon this object, the more complete was the mastery which he acquired in its realization; and the Athenians were eminently adapted for recognizing its brilliant effect. The phenomenon was a perfectly novel one to them; for the orations of Gorgias formed a decided contrast against the chaste form and solid meaning of the eloquence of Pericles; they acted like a magic music upon the senses of the Athenians, amongst whom he spoke in private circles and in the theatre. Their influence was due to their irresistible grace, an abundance of metaphors, ingenious turns of ideas, a poetical coloring, wealth of ornament and loftiness of diction; the ideas followed one another in rhythmical succession, so that the whole created the impression of a perfect work of art.

It was accordingly of extreme importance that the Leontinians had placed so distinguished a personage at the head of their embassy. But even irrespectively of Gorgias' art of persuasion, their request was in itself undeniably important, and would not admit of being treated with indifference. If the feeble remnants of Ionic population in Sicily were overthrown, this amounted to a defeat of the Attic policy; if Syracuse realized her ambitious schemes, the Peloponnesians would acquire a powerful ally, who, even by the one fact of being able to furnish supplies of corn, might prove of the greatest assistance to the enemies of Athens.

Athenian expedition to Sicily. Ol. lxxxviii. 2. (B.C. 427.)

The Athenians took their measures with vigor, but at the same time with caution. They despatched a fleet of twenty ships, under

Laches and Charœades, into the Sicilian waters, for the protection of Leontini; but, at the same time, with orders to enter into negotiations with other states, and to reconnoitre the whole theatre of war in those countries. They constituted Rhegium their chief station; expeditions were undertaken into the interior, and attacks made upon individual maritime places, without a fixed plan being pursued, or any important end achieved. Thus the Athenians made an attempt to take possession of the Liparean islands (vol. i. p. 477). But these small islands which had gained experience when defending themselves in the conflicts with the Tyrrhenians, offered an unexpected resistance to the Athenians, and thus furnished them with a standard for judging of the energy and power existing in the Dorian colonies.

In the following spring, forty ships took their departure for Sicily, under Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was this fleet which had Demosthenes on board; and, for Sicilian affairs, the delay at Pylus, of which the commanders so loudly complained (p. 155), was doubtless extremely disadvantageous. For an entire summer was lost; Messana, which had already been taken, fell into the hands of the Syracusans, and the Athenians only with difficulty succeeded in maintaining themselves on the Italian side of the sound, at Rhegium. In the beginning of the eighth summer of the war great events seemed to be imminent in Sicily as well as in Hellas. A mighty fleet of from fifty to sixty sail lay at Rhegium; and the great successes obtained in Peloponnesus filled the troops with confidence and ardor. But, on the other hand, the same events occasioned a political revolution in Sicily, which furnished a definite goal to all undertakings on the part of the Athenians.*

* First armed interference on the part of Athens in the Sicilian troubles: Thuc. iii. 86; Diod. xii. 54. Philochorus ap. Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 240. Lipara: Thuc. iii. 88. Eurymedon and Sophocles: Thuc. iv. 2 f

Affairs of Syracuse.

From the time that Syracuse possessed a free constitution, we find much resemblance between the state of affairs in that city and in Athens: contrasts prevailed between poor and rich, between the elder and the younger generation, between the moderate party among the citizens and the champions of an absolute democracy; and at Syracuse political party feelings were in a state of flux and reflux even more lawless than at Athens. There existed a party which openly declared that it saw the ruin of the state in measureless democracy. This party was subjected to an unwearied succession of attacks from the demagogues who, like Cleon, pursued and endeavored to destroy all anti-constitutional tendencies. And yet men of aristocratic sentiments maintained their ground at Syracuse, and, although in ordinary times their voices were drowned and themselves driven into the background, on extraordinary occasions they came forward again, because their knowledge of affairs, their courage, firmness, and incorruptibility, ensured them respect and confidence. This direct opposition of constitutional parties also extended to the management of foreign affairs. For as in Athens, so in Syracuse, the democratic party pursued an utterly inconsiderate and despotic course with reference to the lesser states, and wished to secure to the Syracusan people the rule over Sicily, while their opponents thought that moderation, caution, and justice were alone able permanently to establish order in Sicilian affairs.

After the war had been in the first instance provoked in Sicily by all kinds of unjustifiable acts, the dangers were recognized which the democratic policy had brought upon the state. The Syracusans were terrified to see that Athens was now free to act as she wished, while Sparta on the other hand was unable to send aid, and the Dorian colonies by themselves could not resist the Athenians. It therefore seemed necessary to use every effort in order to

get rid of the Athenians, and for this purpose to enter upon a course of conciliatory policy, so as, if possible, to put an end to all disputes on Sicilian territory without the intervention of Athens. Under these circumstances the aristocratic party again obtained the upper hand in the state. The foremost man in this party was Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusan of noble birth, a decided opponent of Athens and of the Attic policy; at the same time a general of proved merit, a statesman of clear intelligence, an eloquent orator and a man of unblemished reputation, who was therefore well adapted for securing universal confidence in Sicily. It operated in his favor, that the adversaries of Syracuse were without cohesion, and that the approach of the Attic fleet as well as the imminent outbreak of a great island war filled all the cities with awe. He accordingly in the first place succeeded in reconciling Camarina with Syracuse, and next in assembling a general congress at Gela, where all matters in dispute were to be discussed.

Hermocrates.

When at Gela the Sicilian cities successively brought forward the matters in which each was individually interested, Hermocrates spoke, in order by convincing representations to commend to the deputies the one interest common to all, viz., the welfare of the whole island. The interference of the Athenians could not be to the advantage of any one Sicilian state; for their object in coming to Sicily was not to assist their allies, but to subject to their dominion the whole island, both friends and foes. In opposition to these designs of conquest the Sicilians ought to unite in the pursuit of a national policy, in order to preserve their native country from the lot of servitude. In the name of the first city of the island he offered the hand of reconciliation; all disputes should be settled by peaceable discussion, and Sicily be one united empire, a confederation of free allied

Diet of Gela. Ol. lxxxix. 1. (B.C. 424.)

cities, whose citizens should regard themselves, not as Dorians and Ionians, nor as Leontinians and Syracusans, but as Siceliotes. Syracuse herself by actual concessions proved her desire for peace; and thus a universal settlement of differences was achieved with perfect success. A series of articles was agreed upon and confirmed by oath; among them this proviso—that no port should be opened to any foreign power arriving with more than one ship of war. Sicily was better united against Athens than it had ever been against the barbarians. At the same time the Sicilians were wise enough not to assume the character of avowed enemies. Information was sent to the Athenian commanders of the decrees of the congress; they were asked to assent to this agreement and then return home, the object of their presence having been accomplished, although not by themselves. Nothing remained for Eurymedon but to give in his assent.

Return of Eurymedon.

To refuse would have been to remove the last remaining doubt as to the selfish plans of Athens, and merely to confirm the islanders in their aversion and fear. The commanders were, notwithstanding, on their return to Athens received with undisguised signs of vexation, and punished with banishment and pecuniary fines, as if they had voluntarily sacrificed the interests of Athens. For the people in the insolence of triumph had already imagined itself master of all Sicily and now deemed itself deceived once for all in its hopes. But the more intelligent clearly perceived that the rapid reconciliation effected on the island would not prove permanent in its results, and that, sooner than they wished, new complications must be expected.

And in point of fact fresh disturbances broke out soon after the peace-diet at Gela. The first place disturbed was Leontini. Here the democratic government had, for the purpose of

Revolution at Leontini.

increasing the strength of the city, admitted a number of new citizens, in whose favor it was desired to carry out a new distribution of lands. The rich inhabitants on the other hand entered into an alliance with Syracuse, expelled the members of the popular party, put an end to the existence of the city as such, and themselves emigrated to Syracuse, which gradually and unobservedly again entered into the courses of a domineering policy. Meanwhile, love of their native ground soon brought back a part of the ancient inhabitants to the deserted Leontini, where they maintained themselves in several fortified positions against the Syracusans; while the majority of the Leontinians remained in exile, and hereupon made eager applications for aid to the Athenians.

Athens was at the moment crippled by the defeat at Delium (p. 174) and occupied with the affairs in Thrace; so that, not wishing to remain wholly inactive, she contented herself with sending to Sicily two vessels of war, whose commander Phæax was commissioned to endeavor to counteract the proceedings of Syracuse by means of negotiation, and to encourage the opposite party to hold out. But as Phæax engaged in no serious proceedings, Syracuse succeeded in completely appropriating the territory of Leontini. Soon a new feud arose in the western part of the island, between Selinus and Egesta.*

Disputes between Selinus and Egesta.

The Selinuntians had after the battle of Himera been on friendlier terms than before with the Greek cities of the island; they had taken part in the expulsion of the Tyrants from Syracuse, and had prospered during the fifty years' peace ensuing upon that event. Their treasury was well filled. The groups belonging to their temples in the Upper and Lower city, the remains of which to this day attest a prolific progress of native art, prove as clearly as

* Union of the Siceliotes under Hermocrates: Thuc. iv. 58 ff.—Phæax, Thuc. v. 4.

the coins of Selinus the high degree of prosperity and culture to which that city attained. From an early period it was involved in constant disputes with Egesta (or Segesta), the city on the northern boundary of the Selinuntian territory, the capital of the Elymi (p. 211), to whom also belonged the lofty rock of Eryx, with the city of the same name on the north-west coast of Sicily. The Elymi were by the Dorians regarded as barbarians, and received this appellation even from the Attic historians, although in language, usages and art they had followed the course of Hellenic civilization, as their temples and coins attest. Their Dorian neighbors avoided all contact with them; accordingly frequent disputes concerning the right of intermarriage had already taken place between Egesta and Selinus. Disputes as to the boundaries supervened; and, as the Syracusans did their best to incite the Selinuntians, and even supported the latter with troops against Egesta, the latter city, deserted by all aid, was closely besieged by water and by land.* In vain Egesta sought to obtain support at Acragas and at Carthage, and finally applied to Athens, in order here to urge the aid formerly furnished to the Leontinians as a justification for their own claim upon Attic assistance under circumstances of equal hardship. Ten years after the embassy of Gorgias, in the latter part of the summer of B.C. 416 (Ol. xci. 1), the Egestæans arrived at Athens; and their arrival at last caused the actual outbreak of the Attico-Sicilian war.†

Egestæan embassy to Athens. Ol. xc. 4. (B.C. 416.)

* Selinus and Egesta. Thuc. vi. 6.

† Was there really in existence any treaty of alliance between Egesta and Athens? Grote vii. 198, and Meier, *Andoc.* 118 (*Opusc. Acad.* i. 337), erroneously found a conclusion in the affirmative upon Thuc. vi. 6, where Λεοντίνων should be construed with ξυμμαχίαν. Had an alliance with Egesta existed, it would be mentioned elsewhere, nor would the Egestæans have applied to Syracuse, Agrigentum and Carthage before Athens, as Diodorus states them to have done, xii. 82.

This result explains itself by the changes which had taken place in the states of the mother-country since the peace of Nicias.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE END OF THE SICILIAN WAR.

Limited effects of the peace of Nicias.

THE peace of Nicias succeeded in the course of a few weeks by the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance, had occasioned an entire change in public affairs in the mother-country, and had called into life a new system of states. The two great powers had again mutually recognized one another, and combined for the purpose of carrying out the peace, as well as of preserving the *status quo* of their possessions. If they remained united, there could be no fear either of any serious danger to tranquility at home, or of any attack from abroad. The documentary instruments of the new political treaty had been confirmed by oath according to law, and solemnly placed on stone tablets in the Amyclæum and in the sanctuary of the city goddess at Athens; nor was there on either side any lack of genuine friends of peace. But no real peace had, notwithstanding, been effected; those evils of war which were most heavily felt had been temporarily removed—and this was all. Under the influence of the peace-parties a bare settlement of differences had been arrived at, but not a reconciliation between the two states, nor a real union of their interests and re-organization of national affairs which might be expected to become permanent. Accordingly it appeared immediately after the conclusion of the peace, that nowhere had satisfaction been given. The universal discontent was deeper, and the mutual relation between the individual states were less easy, than before the outbreak of the war: in

the first instance between Sparta and her confederates, next between the leading states themselves, and finally within either of them individually, where new parties attained to power.

Movements among the secondary states.

The first fact which made itself manifest after the peace of Nicias was the defection among the Peloponnesian confederates, an event which had long prepared itself. The members of the confederation demanded from its head a sincere and vigorous defence of their common interests; they demanded the pursuit of a Peloponnesian policy; instead of which they had come to understand that Sparta only pursued the narrowest line of policy for the sake of her special interests, and that she claimed all the rights of the leadership without fulfilling its duties. For the sake of certain captive Spartans the peace had been sought for many years, and now at last obtained; meanwhile, the grievances and wishes of the confederates, which had been the main cause of the whole war, had been entirely neglected, and Sparta, well aware of the wrong committed by her, was accordingly obliged to conclude an armed alliance with her enemy, in order not to be left entirely isolated. Athens stood in no need of this alliance; it was Sparta who sought for protection, even against her own Helots. Hence to the feeling of indignation against Sparta's inconsiderate selfishness was added that of contempt. The Peloponnesians felt that they had been betrayed; and particularly, the last article of the treaty in which Athens and Sparta expressly reserved to themselves the right of amending its provisions according to their judgment, had provoked extreme excitement; for this article appeared in the light not only of a proof of utter disregard for the states of secondary and tertiary rank, but also of a secretly preconcerted agreement which was to lead to their subjection under the leading states.*

* See the article in Thuc. v. 23.

Corinth, who, notwithstanding her unwearying exertions, had gained none of her objects, and was now even obliged to leave her most important positions on the Ionian Sea, Sollium and Anactorium, in the hands of the enemy, put herself at the head of the movement and rested her hopes above all on Argos. The latter state had regarded the war recently closed, as it had the Persian, in an attitude of unmoved repose. Since the outbreak of hostile feelings between the two leading states, Argos had stood on the side of Athens, but had cautiously remained in the background, and in Ol. lxxxii. 3 (B.C. 450) *circ.*, concluded a thirty years' peace with Sparta. Secured by this treaty, Argos had appropriated to herself all the advantages which are wont to fall to the lot of neutral states in times of war. During an undisturbed era of peace she had recovered from her former calamities, but had never renounced the remembrance of her ancient greatness, her claims on Thyreatis and her sturdy refusal to submit to the hegemony of Sparta. Hemmed in from without, she had within, increased her strength by a concentration of her polity. Argos had developed a democratic constitution, while at the same time endeavoring to increase her defensive force after a very peculiar fashion. One thousand picked men, belonging to families of consideration, formed a select band of veterans who lived at the public expense and entirely devoted themselves to military duties; a clear proof of the serious preparations in progress against Sparta, whom it was intended to oppose with soldiers equal in birth and training to her own. Another characteristic feature in the policy of the Argives was their persistent refusal, notwithstanding their weakness,* to renounce the position of a great power, for which reason they also maintained relations on their own account with

Argos, Corinth.

* Discontent of the Peloponnesians: Thuc. v. 17, 20: Οἱ πόλλοι ὥρμηντο πρὸς Ἀργείους, *ib.* 29. Callias and the Argives: Herod. vii. 151.

the Persian king. Callias (vol. ii. p. 454) met with Argives at Susa, who were assuring themselves of the favor of Artaxerxes.

With the peace of Nicias a new era commenced for Argos, to whom the expiration of the treaty gave liberty of action. The time seemed to have arrived for her to step forward from her retirement and realize her ambitious schemes. For it was now generally said in Peloponnesus, that Sparta had forfeited the leadership by her base treachery; that her place was vacant, and that the city of Agamemnon was called to occupy her ancient post of honor. The Corinthians, who themselves could never exert their activity in any but the second place, unceasingly urged Argos forward, and, when they found willing listeners, summoned the deputies of the Peloponnesians to a meeting in their city, in order that a separate league (*Sonderbund*) might openly and publicly be founded to protect the interests of the states of the second class.* The Achæan cities were found ready to join this alliance. For a long time Elis had been estranged from the Spartans (vol. ii. p. 434), and recently open enmity had broken out between the two states on account of Lepreum. The Lepreatæ, dwelling in Southern Triphylia, on the borders of Messenia and Arcadia, had been supported by the Eleans against the Arcadians, and had in return undertaken the obligation of ceding to them half their territory, which the Eleans had returned to them on condition of the payment of an annual contribution to the temple at Olympia. This contribution they refused to continue after the commencement of the war, committing the decision of the matter to Sparta. When the Eleans, without awaiting this decision, made war upon Lepreum, the Spartans placed a garrison in the latter

Elis.

* Thuc. v. 30.

city, and even after the conclusion of the peace refused to restore the territory to the Eleans, who believed themselves to possess a just claim upon the lands of the Lepreatæ in conformity with the stipulation of the treaty, according to which the *status quo* before the outbreak of the war was to be everywhere restored.*

To these movements was added another in Arcadia, where Mantinea, supported by Argos, had risen to an importance which now for the first time enabled her to occupy an independent position among the states of the second class.† The citizens of Mantinea had brought the remains of Arcas, the royal ancestor of the whole race, from Mænalus into their city, in order by this means to invest the latter with the character of a national capital; they also endeavored to enlarge their territory by conquests in the interior of Arcadia, where the mountain tribes dwelt, united by the loose bonds of district associations. At the present crisis the Mantineans openly espoused the cause of the adversaries of Sparta, because it was in the interest of the latter to prevent all changes in the ancient political relations prevailing in the peninsula. A strong impression was created by the fact of an Arcadian city having joined the separate league of the secondary states; the whole political system of Peloponnesus was, as it were, unhinged, and all feelings of reverence towards Sparta had been converted into hatred and contempt. Sparta, indeed, by envoys sternly protested at Corinth against these revolutionary doings. She appealed to the Peloponnesian law, according to which the decrees of the majority were binding upon all the confederates.

and Mantinea.

The separate league of the Peloponnesian states. Ol. lxxxix. 4. (B. c. 420.)

* Thuc. v. 31.

† As to Mantinea's desire to become a leading city (*Grosstadt*), see Pausan. viii. 9; Curtius, *Peloponnesus*, i. 238.

Corinth in return appealed to the more sacred obligation of sworn promises, and declared that under no circumstances could she permit herself to betray the cause of the Chalcidian cities. After the Corinthians had thus justified their political conduct, the Eleans concluded an alliance first with them and then with the Argives. In Argos the alliance was hereupon further joined by the Chalcidian cities, which had been very recently greatly disturbed as to their own safety by the fall of Scione, whose garrison Athens had put to death and replaced by Platæans.

The Peloponnesian confederation was dissolved, and everything now depended upon bringing over into the Argive-Corinthian separate league the doubtful states, viz. Megara and Thebes, and those which still remained faithful to the Spartans.

The new league commenced its common action by the despatch of an embassy to Tegea. But here all attempts proved futile; and the enmity of the neighbors Tegea and Mantinea outweighed all other considerations. This time, Tegea (vol. ii. p. 433), probably actuated by an ancient jealousy against the rising ambition of her neighbor, stood firm and immovable, and Sparta regained her self-confidence as she witnessed the fidelity of the Tegeatæ.

Action of Sparta against it.

Plistoanax invaded Arcadia, the Mantineans were expelled from the territory conquered by them, while Lepreum was most strenuously protected against Elis by a garrison of Helots, whose services under Brasidas had obtained for them their liberty.* These events operated very discouragingly upon the undertakings of the counter-league; the secondary states had manifestly reckoned too prematurely upon a general defection on the part of the Peloponnesians; there was a want of confidence and cohesion; and Argos in particular, which had with such

* Plistoanax in Arcadia: Thuc. v. 33.

unexpected rapidity been called upon to play a prominent part, lacked all experience and preparation. Argos oscillated hither and thither in anxious timidity; nor could the other states conceal from themselves their own unfortunate position, as they had made enemies of both the leading states, and were obliged to recognize the difficulty of forming a third power in Greece.

Imperfect execution of the conditions of peace by Sparta and Athens.

The movement on the part of the secondary states would have remained wholly insignificant had the two leading powers entertained sentiments of real good-will towards one another. But even between them no union was effected; scarcely for half a year were they even able to continue upon tolerably friendly terms; nor was even the execution of the conditions of the peace seriously proceeded with, although it had been solemnly promised in case of necessity to carry them out by force. Sparta especially could not bring herself immediately to relinquish the advantages obtained in Thrace, and to allow the Athenians completely to restore their power in that country. Accordingly, after securing their main object, viz. the liberation of the Pylian prisoners, the Spartans were at bottom well pleased, when Clearidas (p. 203), who pursued the policy of Brasidas, refused to give up Amphipolis and the other cities in its vicinity which had revolted against Athens. The Spartans declared themselves to have proved their good faith by restoring the Attic prisoners and withdrawing their troops from the Thracian cities; to force Amphipolis they asserted was beyond their power. Similarly, the frontier-fortress Panactum remained in the hands of the Bœotians. The natural consequence was that Athens also continued to hold Pylus occupied, and only gave way in so far as to remove the garrison composed of Messenians and Helots, and to substitute Athenians in their stead. Thus the summer passed amidst

protracted negotiations, which led to no result. But both states continued to make new attempts at effecting a settlement, and the Spartans even offered to force Bœotia to deliver up the disputed frontier-fortress; for as yet both in Sparta and Athens those parties stood at the helm of state which were really anxious for peace.

Policy of the new Ephors. Ol. lxxxix. 4. (B.C. 420.)

But as early as the autumn a change ensued in this state of things. A new board of Ephors was chosen, composed of men of an entirely different tendency, unquiet and ambitious spirits, such as especially Cleobulus and Xenares. They were decidedly against the peace which had brought upon Sparta nothing but humiliation and losses; they boldly opposed the party which, led by Plistoanax, was supported by the ancient Laconian conscientiousness and timidity, as well as by the ancient dislike of undertakings of a wide scope; they exerted themselves for the purpose of putting as speedily as possible an end to the unnatural and obstructive alliance which had been concluded. But, since at present the stipulations of the treaty were binding, and prevented the conclusion of any other treaties by Sparta, the Ephors were forced to gain their end by circuitous proceedings, and in the first instance endeavored to effect a union between Thebes and Argos. These states were to form the starting-point of a new combination against Athens, which Sparta was openly to join, when the suitable period had arrived: by this means it was hoped at the same time to avoid all dangers from the separate league of the secondary states.

Conclusion of alliance between Sparta and Thebes. Ol. lxxxix. 4. (B.C. 420.)

The plan was cunningly devised, and its execution successfully commenced. For, after their ardent outset in the course of their new policy, the Argives had relapsed into timidity; they feared that they would be left in the lurch alone against their

hostile neighbor, and accordingly, renouncing their ambitious plans, hastened to make overtures to Sparta. It was a matter of far greater difficulty to deal with the obstinate Bœotians. Their federal generals, indeed, were ready to accept every proposal, but the boards of the council which constituted the supreme municipal authority refused to grant the powers desired by the generals, and this for no other reason except their fear that a junction with the Peloponnesian seceders, the members of the separate league, would offend Sparta, the natural ally of Bœotia. They failed to see through the insidious policy of the Ephors, and, as it was impossible for them to disclose their secret intentions, this misunderstanding ruined the entire transaction, which had evidently not been contrived with an excess of diplomatic skill. The Spartans were now obliged to adopt a more straightforward line of conduct. Their primary object was the recovery of Pylus, which they could only hope to obtain by the evacuation of Panactum. They accordingly sent envoys to the Bœotians, to induce them to evacuate the frontier-fortress; but this was decisively refused by the Bœotians, unless Sparta would consent to conclude an alliance with them. They urged this step upon Sparta, in order thus to occasion a violation of the treaty with Athens, which had entirely altered the foreign relations of the Bœotians, who were now desirous of taking advantage of this opportunity for obtaining a strong position in the affairs of Greece. The Spartans gave way, because they hereby hoped to realize their immediate objects, and because irrespectively of these, they would have been well content to renew their alliance with Thebes as a means of strengthening themselves against Athens. The alliance was accordingly concluded in the spring of B.C. 420 (Ol. lxxxix. 4) at Thebes; and the Spartan Envoys immediately repaired to Athens, where, after handing over the disputed frontier-fortress and all the prisoners of war still

detained in Bœotia, they hoped to recover Pylus. But they greatly deceived themselves in hoping thus easily to secure a double gain. The walls of Panactum had been in the mean time razed by the Bœotians; so that the evacuation of the place could in point of fact not be regarded by the Athenians in the light of an honest fulfillment of the conditions of the peace. Moreover, they were justified in representing the Bœotian treaty as an open violation of the peace, both Athens and Sparta having promised to conclude no separate treaties with any third state. The consequence was, that the Athenians hereupon declared themselves to be equally absolved from all obligations, and dismissed the envoys with an extremely unfriendly answer. The Thebans had thus completely accomplished their object—the odious alliance between the two great powers was virtually at an end; and the further consequence was, that another party now obtained the upper hand at Athens.*

Virtual rupture of the alliance between Athens and Sparta.

Athens was the only state which, in the midst of the confusion ensuing upon the conclusion of the peace, stood firm and remained free from all danger. The influence of Nicias was at its height. His plans were even advanced by the difficulties of Sparta, on the strength of which he was able to convince the Spartans, that they would have to attach themselves all the more intimately to Athens, as they saw the power of their individual state so rudely shaken by the movement among the Helots, by the defection of the Peloponnesians, and by the perversity of their former confederates. For this reason he had so eagerly advocated the conversion of the treaty of peace into one of an armed alliance, believing that, if Athens and Sparta

Nicias and the peace party at Athens.

* As to the non-execution of the conditions of the peace, see Thuc. v. 35; new Ephors at Sparta, *ib.* c. 36.

honestly held together in a manner corresponding to the interests of either, and if they mutually guaranteed the *status quo* of their respective possessions, the best pledge would have been obtained for a lasting peace in Greece. The policy which he hoped once more to establish was accordingly in all essentials the ancient policy of Cimon. Public opinion was in his favor. For that it was no longer particular classes and parties, but the whole population, which longed for a termination to the sufferings of war, is proved by the *Peace* of Aristophanes, acted at the great Dionysia shortly before the conclusion of the treaties.* In this festive play, which is as it were intoxicated by the mere anticipation of the coming happy era, the imprisoned goddess Peace is liberated amidst rejoicings, and brought down together with her long-missed companions "Autumn Joy" and "Festive Bliss;" the two pestles with which the god of war is said to have pounded poor Hellas, *i. e.* Cleon and Brasidas, having now been happily removed. Thus Nicias was widely esteemed and lauded as a public benefactor. At last there was again room for hope, that the gaps in the civic community might be filled up by a new growth of citizens; and there were, after a long interval moneys to deposit in the treasury.† With Delphi also, as many pious souls rejoiced to think, a good understanding had been once more established; and at the bidding of the god the exiled Delians (p. 200) were reinstated on their island.

Aristophanis Pax.

But the fatality, which had from the first attended the policy of those who advocated a union of the Greek states, once more intervened: the success of this policy always depended upon the bearing of Sparta, and was seriously damaged by every act of faithlessness on her

* Date of Ar. *Pax.* the thirteenth year of the war: *Pax.* ver. 99, cf. *Argum.* Cod. Ver.

† Boeckh, *P. E. of A.* vol. ii. p. 194 [E. Tr.].

Political short-sightedness of Nicias.

part. Nicias was short-sighted enough to believe in the tenability of a combination, to which Sparta had only agreed in a moment of temporary difficulty, and under the influence of Plistoanax and his party; and even in the carrying out of the treaty Nicias had shown want of caution. For although, as is related, he even resorted to corruption in order to induce Sparta to be the first to carry into execution the conditions of the peace, yet he assumed the order given for the evacuation of Amphipolis to be equivalent to an accomplished fact, ordered the liberation of the prisoners taken at Pylus before the Thracian cities had been given up to the Athenians, and thus threw away the most powerful lever in the hands of Athens for inducing Sparta to fulfil her obligations. The Athenians found themselves deceived; the intrigues of Sparta became clearer and clearer; and the deep irritation caused by the conduct of public affairs found a passionate expression in the speeches of Alcibiades.*

The times in which the fate of the city depended upon individual citizens seemed to have passed away in Athens. The spread of culture equalized more and more the differences between single characters and capacities Cleon and Nicias themselves had been influential, not so much as eminent personages to whose superiority the community submitted, as by constituting themselves the clearest exponents of certain sentiments and party tendencies. But now a man came forward among the people, whose rich natural gifts distinguished him before and above all the rest, and the brilliancy of whose unique personality exercised a dæmonic influence upon his fellow-citizens, so that the destinies of the state were in the main directed by him up to the end of the whole war.

* The Athenians repented of the premature extradition of the Spartan prisoners. Thuc. v. 35.

Alcibiades the son of Clinias.

For a series of years already the inhabitants of Athens had taken the most lively interest in the youthful Alcibiades, who united in himself everything capable of enchaining the attention of the public. He was the grandson of the Alcibiades who, as the friend of Clisthenes, had intimately connected himself with the reforms of the latter statesman (vol. i. p. 397), and the son of Clinias, a hero of the Wars of Liberation, who, on his own trireme, had gained the prize of valor at Artemisium, and who had subsequently strengthened the connection with the Alcmæonidæ, which he inherited from his father, by taking to wife Dinomache, the daughter of Megacles. Clinias fell in the battle of Coronea (vol. ii. p. 449), and left behind him two boys, Alcibiades and Clinias, whom by his last will he entrusted as wards to Pericles and his brother Ariphron. Alcibiades was at that time about five years of age, and hereupon grew up under the eyes of his mother, without the discipline of paternal guidance which such a nature as his could least afford to spare. For, together with the greatest multiplicity of natural gifts, which made all intellectual and physical exercises appear mere play to him, his character unfolded an indomitable arrogance which knew no bounds, a conscious pride in the wealth and splendor of his family, and a bold relief in his own powers, which was fostered by youthful vigor, perfect health, a lordly figure, and rare personal beauty. The Thracian slave, to whom his guardians had assigned the duties of pedagogue, was unable to restrain the vivacity of the boy, who thus grew up into a youth well instructed in all branches of Attic culture, but with a mind undisciplined, untamed, and fanciful, never accustomed to obedience, and thoroughly incapable of self-mastery. His entrance into public life was ill adapted for making up for the errors and deficiencies in his training. For, among a people so receptive as the Athenians for impressions produced by brilliant quali-

ties, the high-born and spirited young man became the object of universal homage; all his wild escapades were pardoned, nay, even borne with loud applause from mouth to mouth. The last doings of the son of Clinias, his fashions of dress, his ways of speaking, were immediately adopted by all Athens, and imitated as the latest fashion; the artists took him as a model for their figures of Hermes, in which they represented the beauty of the Attic *ephebus;* and the vain youth was not only environed by the flatteries of ordinary men, but even the most famous men of the age, such as Prodicus and Protagoras, felt the charm of his personality, and deemed themselves highly honored by any favor he deigned to bestow upon them. And Pericles? Was he unmindful of his youthful relative, whom the confidence of his noble father had confided to his care? Was nothing done by him to prevent the demoralization of his ward, which could only bring evil to the latter and to the city? True, he was even in ancient times accused of having neglected his duty; and it is possible that his experience as to his own sons induced him to esteem too lightly the influences of education and example in general, and, accordingly, to leave the youthful Alcibiades, more than was well, to himself and to his inefficient pedagogue. Yet a proof of his care as guardian is to be found in the circumstance that he separated the younger brother Clinias from Alcibiades, in order to guard against the former being spoilt by the latter; and however incorrigible he must often have thought Alcibiades, yet he is stated for a time to have kept him in his own house. Pericles must, after all, have put trust in the better tendencies inborn in Alcibiades. Notwithstanding all his dissatisfaction with his ward, he never broke off personal intercourse with him; and Alcibiades was among the intimate associates who remained around Pericles in his retirement, and who persuaded him once more to return to public life (p. 75). Alcibiades could not but recognize the intellectual power

and greatness of Pericles; but he had no sense of appreciation for the best features in Pericles' character, for his calm moderation and reflecting caution. It seemed to him as if Pericles had stood still half-way on his course; he ridiculed his guardian for taking pains to render an account to the civic assembly according to constitutional prescription, instead of discovering a mode of doing away with the necessity of rendering any account at all. Thus he ventured to lay his injunctions upon Pericles; and even to Pericles his haughty spirit refused to subordinate itself.*

Alcibiades and Socrates.

The endeavor in which the great Pericles had failed succeeded in the hands of a man of insignificant appearance and position, who in those days walked the streets of Athens in voluntary poverty, bare-footed, and in mean apparel—by his calling a handicraftsman, who had quitted his workshop because an inner voice impelled him to move about among the multitude, to converse with men of all classes, to allow himself to be instructed by them, or to suggest to their minds problems, which became the germ of serious self-inquiry and moral elevation. This was Socrates, the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus, who was forty years of age at the time of the death of Pericles. Among the mixed population, in which, after the terrible visitations of pestilence and war, immorality, frivolity, and conceited half-culture were making irresistible and increasing advances, he unceasingly sought for men to whom he could

* Youth of *Alc.*, Plut. *Alc.* 1—17: cf. Hertzberg, *Alk. der Staatsmann u. Feldherr*, pp. 18—72. For the relations between Pericles and Alcibiades, see Plut. *Alc.* i. 122; *Protag.* 320. "Alc. educatus in domo P." (Corn. Nepos, c. 2); "apud avunculum eruditus" (Aul. Gell. xv. 17); "τρεφόμενος παὶ αὐτῳ" (Diod. xii. 38). Alcibiades as a model for statuaries, Clemens *Coh. ad Gentes*, p. 47; as the leader of luxurious young Athens in Comedy, Ar. *Dætal.* xvi., *Acharn.* 680, 716; as the inventor of "a morning draught," Eupolis, *Fr.* 303; Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 1847, i. p. xxiv.

offer his services: and thus his eye fell among others upon the son of Clinias, who at the time numbered about nineteen years; and the idea seized hold of him, that he might be enabled to raise that gifted youth out of the intoxicating fumes of sensuality, and to save his better self. Socrates felt that he could perform no service greater than this for Athens.

When Socrates first made overtures to Alcibiades, the latter, like most of the Athenians, thought that he had before him only a sophist of a peculiar style, and he took delight in measuring himself with this sophist in skillful word-fencing and ready dialectics, in which Alcibiades believed himself the equal of any other Athenian. The strange bearing of the man attracted his curiosity; and he was struck by the unselfishness with which Socrates expended time and trouble on behalf of others. But soon an interest of a totally different kind was awakened in him. For Socrates was not one of those who vended their wisdom in ready phrases to every man desirous of listening to them, and who thereby rather sought to satisfy their vanity, than to create a deep and lasting impression in their scholars. He incidentally attached the thread of his discourses to the most insignificant objects of daily life; by a series of simple questions he endeavored to arouse an impulse towards serious and independent thought, which seized upon the whole mind, for the first time opened to his youthful companions the depths of the life of their own souls, and awakened a movement full of anticipations of truth and not devoid of pain—a movement which they were themselves unable either to comprehend or to command, and which he compared to the throes of labor preceding the unfolding of a new life; and he therefore himself desired to be nothing but the man-midwife, in order to deliver the germs of the Divine existing in the human breast from the forces obstructing them, and to bring these germs forth to light. The eyes

of Alcibiades were thus for the first time opened as to the vanity of his life and doings; a mental world lay before his eyes of which he had never dreamt before, a virtue and moral grandeur upon which he gazed in dumb amazement. Hitherto spoilt, admired and envied on all sides, surrounded by flatterers whose selfish and greedy intrusiveness could not but fill him with contempt towards mankind, he now found one who esteemed as nothing his beauty and gifts of fortune, who unsparingly revealed to him his frailties and faults, who remained inaccessible to all the seductive favors expended on him by Alcibiades, and who sought nothing from him but his immortal soul. And as Alcibiades was now obliged to confess to himself that all this search and all this labor had no other motive than the deepest and purest philanthropy, such as he had never met with elsewhere, it was impossible for him to resist the power of this love, united as it was to the lofty earnestness of wisdom. For the first time he felt confounded, humiliated, and deeply ashamed of himself. His empty conceit of his brilliant advantages, of his inborn genius as an equivalent for all learning and study, of his natural calling to a statesman's career, vanished into air. He came to see the truth: that the self-knowledge required by the Delphic god was the foundation of all virtue, and that he who wished to command others must first learn to command himself. Before his soul the image presented itself of a state, whose greatness, in conformity with the ideas of Pericles, was based upon intellectual culture, civic virtue and unity; he arrived at a perception of the fact, that nothing expedient or salutary can exist which contradicts the idea of justice, and well understood what position he must, in accordance with such a perception, himself occupy in the commonwealth. Amidst hot tears he confessed, that a life to which Socrates objected was not to be called a life at all. Nor was this a passing affection of the mind: but with a grateful

heart he attached himself to Socrates as to a paternal friend, shared his meals, visited the palæstræ in his company, was his tent-fellow in the field; and, after once at Potidæa (Ol. lxxxvii. 1; B. C. 432) owing his life to Socrates, he in return, at the risk of his own, saved the life of his friend in the unfortunate battle of Delium. The frivolous multitude jeered at this strange companionship between Alcibiades and the ugly philosopher, and suggested evil explanations of it; but Alcibiades refused to allow it to be disturbed. This relation between the pair, which continued for several years, is in truth an irresistible testimony to the genuine element of nobility in the character of Alcibiades, who was created for and called by nature to the performance of all, even of the highest, duties of society.

Political attitude of Alcibiades.

As to the receptivity of Alcibiades, therefore, Socrates had not come too late; for he still found in him a youthful soul capable of the loftiest inspirations, and possessed of sufficient vital force to raise himself out of the mire of sensuality. But to effect a permanent reaction, and a lasting and fixed change of mind lay beyond the power even of a Socrates. The virtue of the ancients stood in need of the support of early habits; and in this respect Alcibiades had met with his paternal friend too late. He was able to be an enthusiast for Socratic virtue, but to remain true to its principles, to renounce himself and everything in which he took pride and to become another man, this he could not do: he accordingly oscillated between two mutually irreconcilable ends of life, and was at last drawn away by his ambition to where splendor and power beckoned him. He was then obliged to drown again the voice of conscience awakened in him, and his conscious falling away from that which he had recognized to be the right made him more unconscientious and immoral than ever before. It had not been the design of Socrates to

take him away from public life; but the Socratic road, which led through the school of earnest self-examination and self-denial to the statesman's calling, was too inconvenient and too uncertain for the passionate impatience of Alcibiades. He wished to employ *all* the means bestowed upon him, so as to be the first man in Athens; and as soon, therefore, as a prospect of a splendid career opened before his eyes, he cast himself into the whirlpool of parties, not in order manfully to champion any particular and definite view of his own as to the true principles which ought to guide the state, but in order in any and every way to satisfy the cravings of his ambition.

The politics of his family had in the last generations been anti-Laconian; but his ambition and spirit of contradiction attracted him to the opposite side. In the period after the death of Pericles he, like the majority of the young nobles, came forward as an opponent of democratic government and of those who then advocated its cause; he even renewed the connection of his house with Spara, to which his grandfather had put an end, and was extremely attentive to the well-being of the prisoners from Pylus, in order thus to make himself a good name in their home. To these services he appealed, when the negotiations were in progress between the two great states; and, as he from the first felt a peculiar inclination and capacity for diplomatic business, he desired to play a prominent part as the confidential friend of Sparta. But Sparta refused to avail herself of his services; Nicias was preferred to him as one on whom greater reliance could be placed; and, burning with wrath at this frustration of his schemes, he now cast his lot in with the other side, and endeavored to acquire political importance as leader of the Demos, and as the enemy of Sparta.*

The situation of affairs favored his efforts. After the

* Plut. *Alc.* 14.

death of Cleon, the people was without any leader of distinguished importance, with whom it was able to meet the party of the nobles and moderates. Hyperbolus, indeed, a man of obscure origin, by his calling a potter and manufacturer of lamps, who had been serviceable to Cleon as a sycophant, for a time not unsuccessfully attempted to take his late leader's place; but his moral worthlessness and utter want of superior culture were too evident to allow of his long maintaining himself in this position.* Moreover, the whole method of political leadership, as practised by Cleon, had been brought into disrepute by his last undertakings. The people, after all, felt the need of men of superior gifts, who should be able to lead the multitude; and no man was to be found who in so high a degree shared its preferences and tendencies, and yet at the same time overtopped it by superiority of intelligence and vigor of resolution, as well as by wealth and birth, as Alcibiades. In him seemed to be united the different qualities which had made powerful party leaders of a Pericles, a Nicias, and a Cleon; and therefore the multitude, in want of a leader, readily followed him, and believed itself right in expecting from him the most vigorous espousal of its interests. His influence rose in proportion as the dissatisfaction with the political proceedings of Nicias spread more universally at Athens.

He determines to lead the people in the place of Cleon.

By the death of Cleon at Amphipolis Nicias thought himself freed from his most dangerous adversary. But now an incomparably more arduous struggle and the real troubles of his life commenced for him, who valued nothing more highly than a tranquil and undisputed position. For he now met with an opponent possessed of all the talents which he lacked himself, a man as restless and

* "Ἀπορῶν ὁ δῆμος ἐπιτρόπου καὶ γνμνὸς ὢν τοῦτον τέως τὸν ἄνδρα περιεζώσατο."—Ar. *Pax*, 687. Plut. *Alc.* 13; Cobet, Platon. *Rel.* pp. 146 sq.

unconscientious as Cleon, but at the same time full of creative intellectual power. Nicias had not proved himself efficient. He had prematurely caused the prisoners to be released before obtaining a satisfactory guarantee for the evacuation of Amphipolis. But a decisive proof of his failure occurred in the conclusion of the alliance between Sparta and Bœotia (p. 293). For this was an event which removed all doubts as to the fact that Athens had been shamefully deceived in her honestly-meant peace policy, and it was eagerly welcomed by those who wished as soon as possible to put an end to the rotten peace and to bring ruin upon traitorous Sparta. This party was led by Alcibiades, because he could in this way most fully wreak his vengeance upon the Spartans, as a new war would afford him an opportunity for the most brilliant display of his talents, and thus advance him with the greatest rapidity to fame and unlimited influence. For in this matter he had the great majority of the populace on his side, the same which had for years supported the war policy of Cleon, and in addition a large number of young men, who put trust in his good fortune and wished to share its gifts.

His plans of war operations.

As to his plans of war operations, he was in favor, not of a war of defence such as Pericles had conducted, but of an offensive war, opening up a prospect of fame and profit. As, however, the moment had not yet arrived for a resumption of active war, the plan of Alcibiades was, during the continuance of the peace to attack Sparta at her most vulnerable point, by taking advantage of the breaking-up of the Peloponnesian confederation for obtaining a vigorous ally for Athens in the Doric peninsula. Therefore he had already entered into previous communications with Argos, in order to give information to the leaders of the people there of the imminent downfall of the Laconian party at Athens, and to secure their assent to an Attic alliance.

Speed was necessary, for Argos was so terrified by the conclusion of the treaty between Bœotia and Sparta, that she was hurriedly taking steps for securing her own position by means of a settlement of differences.

Meeting of embassies at Athens.

Hereupon Alcibiades acted with fearless resolution, as if he had already been supreme at Athens. By his instigation Argive deputies appeared there, accompanied by envoys from allies of their state, the Eleans and Mantineans, the most unbending foes of Sparta.

Quadruple alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea. Ol. lxxxix. 4. (B.C. 420.)

In the spring of B.C. 420 (Ol. lxxxix. 4) they met at Athens the envoys of Sparta, who were commissioned to appease the anger of Athens caused by the Theban alliance, and at any price to restore a good understanding between the two great powers. These conciliatory overtures exercised the intended effect. The authority of Alcibiades for all future time was at stake: he was accordingly obliged to resort to the most daring and fearless measures in order to prevent the rejection of the demands of the Argives, who built upon his promises. He therefore persuaded the Spartans, who had introduced themselves with full and absolute powers to the Council of the Five Hundred, to adopt a tone in their address to the public assembly implying that they were not empowered to conclude anything definite; while he promised them in return to effect the restoration of Pylus to Sparta. The Spartans were unsuspectingly caught in the trap: whereupon Alcibiades made use of the contradictory character of their statements in order next day vehemently to inveigh against their untruthfulness before the assembled people, and hereby to inflict an unexpected blow upon the entire peace party.* Now, it was everywhere said, it had surely become evident how impossible

* Thuc. v. 44 sqq.; Plut. *Alc.* 14.

it was to carry on negotiations fairly with Sparta, whose envoys every day changed their tone; other friends must be sought, friends, the similarity of whose political constitution and the identity of whose interests with those of Athens naturally tended to make them seek her friendship. These ought to be supported and encouraged in their friendly sentiments, or they would immediately go over to the enemy. If Sparta allied herself with Thebes, why should not Athens ally herself with Argos? The envoys of Sparta found themselves obliged to depart in shame and disgrace; and, after Nicias had used every endeavor both at Athens and at Sparta to prevent such a proceeding, a treaty and alliance in arms was concluded for the term of one hundred years, by Athens on the one side, and by Argos, Mantinea, and Elis on the other.* Athens now stood at the head of the Peloponnesian separate league; and the destinies of the city lay in the hands of Alcibiades.

Hostilities in Peloponnesus. Ol. xc. 2. (B.C. 419.) Summer.

He had no intention of delaying to a subsequent occasion the harvest to be reaped from these advantages; he wished it to become clear at once, how Athens had now gained a new and promising scene for her undertakings: the treaties of peace were not indeed revoked, but practically the war recommenced with the summer of B.C. 419 (Ol. xc. 1–2). Alcibiades was general, and under his command the quadruple alliance took the field as a military power; and a Peloponnesian war, in the proper sense of the word, commenced. For the intention was to secure Arcadia, in order thus to form a junction between Argos and Elis, and to isolate Sparta in the south, as had been done once before in ancient times by the Argive Phidon (vol. i. p. 273): as in those days by the Pisatæ, so now by the Eleans, was Sparta

* Thuc. v. 46 sq.

excluded from the Olympic festivals. On the other hand, the operations of the allies were also directed against Corinth, which under existing circumstances had of course withdrawn from the separate alliance. For obtaining new bases of support for the Attic power on the Corinthian Sea no country was better adapted than Achaia. Here Alcibiades entered into negotiations with the citizens of Patræ, which were productive of most important consequences, and induced them to join the Attic alliance, and at the same time to connect their city with the sea by means of long walls, so as to be always protected against Sparta and within reach of Attic aid.* Thus a chain of Attic military stations reached across from Naupactus as far as the Ionian Islands. Finally, an attempt was made to bring about the defection of the city of Epidaurus (which lay in the straight route between Argos and Athens) from the Spartans, to whom this city adhered with special loyalty, on account of her hatred against the other two states, and on account of her own aristocratic constitution.† The execution of this scheme, however, like that of all others which were in the main in the hands of the Argives, halted to some extent; and even Alcibiades, notwithstanding the influence now wielded by him, was unable to persuade the Athenians to declare the treaties at an end. They found it more convenient to allow them to continue nominally in force; and contented themselves with adding to the document of the treaty at Olympia the statement, that Sparta had broken that treaty.‡

* *Ib.* 52; Curtius, *Peloponn.* i. 437.

† Thuc. v. 56. To the Epidaurian quarrel belongs the simple stratagem (explained by Grote, vii. 66, Am. ed.) of the Argives, who, in order not to be prevented by the occurrence of Carneus, the month of the truce, inserted after the 26th of the preceding month as many days as they required for carrying on the war.

‡ Clause added to the instrument of the peace at Olympia: "ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέμειναν οἱ Λ. τοῖς ὅρκοις."—Thuc. v. 56.

Irresolution of Athens.

For this irresolution the Athenians met with a sufficiently heavy punishment. For, while Athens contented herself with mere half-measures, Sparta roused her energies, and employed the winter in chastising Argos with all her might, in relieving Epidaurus, and in preventing the imminent annihilation of the Spartan power in Peloponnesus. An attack upon Argos now amounted to a declaration of war against Athens; and yet in the latter city the parties disputed with one another as to the expediency of sending aid: and, although the war party had gained the day, a measure was taken involving a twofold mistake. Not only was so small a number of men sent that nothing of importance could be effected with them; but they were not even placed under the command of Alcibiades, who was merely sent across in the character of envoy to use his influence with the allies. Thus measures were adopted certain to irritate Sparta in the highest degree, and in a quarter where she could not do otherwise than concentrate all the resources of her state in her defence; and yet the Athenians could not make up their minds, to intervene in Peloponnesian affairs with determined energy. Their conduct amounted to a lamentable combination of two mutually irreconcilable political tendencies; for they thought themselves able to save the comforts of peace, and at the same time to conquer Peloponnesus by the way.

Battle of Mantinea. Ol. xc. 3. (B.C. 418.)

This irresolute and short-sighted policy met with its due reward. At first, indeed, the operations of the Athenians progressed with rapidity, *i. e.*, in so far as Alcibiades exercised any influence upon them. Argos was forced immediately to revoke a truce concluded with Sparta; whereupon the troops of the allies entered Arcadia, took the lofty citadel of Orchomenus, one of the strategical bases of the Spartan power, and marched before Tegea.

But already the army was weakening itself by internal discord; for the Eleans were dissatisfied to find that the first and foremost object was not to expel the Spartans from Lepreum; and accordingly departed home with 3,000 heavy-armed troops at the very moment of the greatest dangers, when the Spartans marched out under King Agis with five-sixths of their entire army, eager to chastise Argos for her faithlessness, and to restore the Spartan authority in Arcadia. The allies retreated out of Tegeatis into the territory of Mantinea, and there occupied the heights, which were so strong as to oblige Agis to relinquish an attack already begun by him. He resorted in its stead to another stratagem, frequently employed on previous occasions by the Tegeatæ in their border-feuds; viz., he diverted the brook Ophis, which flowed from the territory of the one city into that of the other, out of its natural course, into one where it threatened the fields of the Mantineans, who occupied the lowest part of the plain common to the two cities, with a general inundation. The consequence was, that it became impossible to restrain the Mantineans from descending from the heights; all opposition on the part of the generals was futile; and to his surprise Agis next morning saw his desire fulfilled, and the enemy drawn up before him in order of battle in the plain. The departure of the Eleans had given him the superiority in numbers, and moreover the advantage of standing at the head of a body of troops united by the same military discipline and exercises. He conducted the battle with extreme bravery and with the commanding intelligence of a general; and soon the whole breadth of the line of battle was hotly engaged. Agis overthrew the enemy's centre, composed of the Argives, and then with extreme presence of mind hastened to the assistance of his left wing, which had been already beaten. The Mantineans, who had here been victorious, were now also obliged to fly the field amidst the

heaviest losses. It was a victory of the greatest importance, because it suddenly once more brought into clear relief the superiority of the Spartan arms, as well as the internal weakness of the separate league. The Argives, who were to form its main strength, had not even been able to await the advance of the enemy's lances; how hollow and vain, then, must have appeared their claim to dispute the hegemony with Sparta!

Its consequences at Argos and elsewhere.

It was in Argos itself that the effects of the battle of Mantinea first made themselves critically felt. The democratic party was utterly discouraged, while its opponents, who had always opposed the policy of Alcibiades, opened communications with Sparta, in order to raise themselves into power with her aid. The band of the One Thousand (p. 267), who alone among the Argives had done their duty in the battle, formed the main focus of these aristocratic intrigues: accordingly, when the Spartans in the winter sent envoys to offer peace and an alliance, and at the same time threatened with the approach of an army which had already advanced as far as Tegea, the partisans of Sparta succeeded, notwithstanding the presence of Alcibiades, in inducing the citizens to accept the offers of peace. An exchange of hostages and prisoners took place; the Argives ceased to commit acts of hostility against Epidaurus; all attacks upon Peloponnesus were henceforth to be resisted by combined efforts, while in other respects the states were to govern themselves according to their own choice. This was the first victory obtained by the aristocrats. Soon afterwards they further succeeded in bringing about the complete dissolution of the Attic alliance, and in concluding in its place a fifty years' peace with Sparta, on terms dealing in a very conciliatory spirit with the claims of the Argives, a position nominally equal to that of Sparta being conceded to them at the head of the Peloponnesian confederation. Simul-

taneously an attitude of hostility was without delay assumed towards Athens; combined embassies of Argives and Spartans went to the Thracian coasts, where they opened negotiations with the revolted cities, induced Perdiccas to renounce his friendship with Athens, and called upon the Athenians to evacuate Epidaurus, which still contained Attic and Peloponnesian troops, the last remains of an army of the separate league. Finally, a reaction also ensued in several Peloponnesian states, due either to the agency of force, or to circumstances special to each particular case. Mantinea again relapsed into her former insignificant position of subordination to Sparta; in Sicyon an army, furnished jointly by the members of the re-established confederation, overthrew the constitutional government (accused of a democratic tendency); and at last—and this had evidently been the ultimate object of these preparatory steps—a counter-revolution of a similar character took place in Argos itself, the sanguinary violence of which before the end of the same winter placed the entire government of the state in the hands of the oligarchic party, to which the heads of the One Thousand belonged. It had been long since the influence of Sparta had held so absolute a sway over the peninsula; with the exception of Elis, who was allowed to nurse her anger undisturbed, all the states were united by the two bonds of the confederation, and of similarity of constitutions. Even in Achaia these were now changed, in conformity with the wishes of Sparta, in order to take away from the cities the possibility of following the example of the Patræans (p. 308).*

Increase of party feeling at Athens.

These momentous results of the victory of Mantinea could not but exercise a reaction upon Athens herself. The peace party eagerly endeavored to turn to a good

* Battle of Mantinea, Thuc. v. 63—74; its consequences, *ib.* 76—79.

account for their purposes the pitiable failure of the boastful schemes of Alcibiades. Was it not now, they asked, clear to every man: that Sparta was not, as she had been thought to be, a power on the eve of her downfall? and, on the other hand, what was the real value of the new allies of whom so much had been expected? and that this kind of thoughtless policy, devoid alike of object and of measure, must inevitably bring ruin upon the state? Alcibiades was in return justified in affirming that the blame of this failure should attach, not to his counsels, but to the want of resolution displayed by the Athenians. If they, after being betrayed by Sparta, and while living in the midst of war, wished their dreamy confidence in peace to continue at the same time—if, after obtaining new allies in the heart of Peloponnesus and instigating them to make war, they failed to support these with all their strength, how could they marvel if all the advantages in their hands changed into the reverse? They must decide as to which alternative they would adopt. It might be a matter of doubt, whether Nicias or Alcibiades was in the right; but there could be no doubt whatever as to the fact, that a course of political action oscillating between the two must, under all circumstances, prove pernicious. Either a serious attempt ought to be made to effect a good understanding with Sparta, or the war ought to be resumed earnestly and energetically. In this conjuncture it was very natural that resort was had to the ancient and proved expedient of ostracism, which had formerly decided between Aristides and Themistocles, and between Pericles and Thucydides, and had thus happily rescued the State from the dangers of the keenest party feuds. It amounted to a mutual challenge between Nicias and Alcibiades, when (probably in consequence of an arrangement preconcerted between the two statesmen) it was proposed that the full assembly of the citizens should judge between them. One of the two was

to quit the city, after which the government of Athens might be once more conducted on definite principles and with ascertained ends. Besides Nicias and Alcibiades, Phæax the son of Erasistratus, who had been employed in public embassies (p. 282), and who also sought to acquire influence as a popular orator, came forward in the party struggle. He stood on the side of Nicias, and as one of the leaders of the aristocratic party was with him involved in the question of ostracism.

Ostracism of Hyperbolus. Ol. xc. 4. (B.C. 417.) February.

While the preliminary steps were being taken for arriving at this important decision, and the two leaders were busily occupied in mustering and strengthening the ranks of their adherents, Hyperbolus unexpectedly succeeded in again attracting public attention on the orators' tribune, by exciting the citizens through insolent attacks upon both Nicias and Alcibiades. And since, as it appears, neither of the two had full confidence in the issue of the vote, and since it could not answer the purpose of either to oust his rival by a small majority—and since, finally, the introduction into the question of secondary personages, such as Phæax, had made the situation of affairs difficult and unintelligible: both parties at the last hour combined to turn the popular vote (inasmuch as the preliminary measures for it had once been taken) against Hyperbolus, who was now driven into exile. Thus the day which was to decide the destinies of Athens brought with it no decision of any kind; and, most unfortunately for the city, things remained *in statu quo*. And the misfortune was doubly great, because, owing to the fact that an unworthy and insignificant personage was banished by ostracism, the latter process itself fell into disrepute for all future times, and was never again employed. But this result is again connected with the circumstance that ostracism, which formed so essential a part of the constitutional life of

Athens, and which had contributed so largely to a vigorous development of the state, presumed a healthy condition of political activity such as no longer existed. The commonwealth lacked the requisite vigor for eliminating by a legal process the elements which operated as preventive and obstructive agents; the people was devoid of inner unity, and of an earnest and clear knowledge of its own interests, and was thus unable to decide by a considerable majority in favor of any one political tendency; nor was any statesman in existence upon whom the popular confidence was in full measure bestowed. Finally under existing circumstances, the banishment of a powerful party leader might have brought new, and yet more serious, dangers upon the state. For it could not be expected of an Alcibiades that he would, in obedience to a popular vote, reside tranquilly abroad for the space of five years; and it was naturally feared that he might be immediately driven into the enemy's camp. Thus the party leaders might prove incomparably more dangerous to Athens away from the city, than within its walls. It accordingly seemed both more convenient and safer to retain both the statesmen, who were to hold the balance to one another. But the day of this decision was in truth an ill-omened day for Athens, and the decision itself a gloomy sign of the decay of public life and a precursor of evil times.*

Increase of the influence of Alcibiades.

Of the two statesmen who now again resumed their party conflict, Alcibiades was, as may be supposed, the more active and energetic. He soon contrived to convince

* In the date of the last instance of ostracism (the institution was never abolished by law) I have followed Cobet's (Plat. Com. *Rel.* p. 143) elucidation of Theopompus in the Schol. and Ar. *Vesp.* 1042, according to which Hyperbolus, who died B. C. 411, lived six years in exile.—Vischer, *Alk. u. Lysandros*, p. 67. Generally these names were placed on the list (as to Phæax, see Meier, *Opusc.* i. 145; Buttner, *Hetärien*, p. 61); the fact that action was taken against none of the three of itself amounted to a violation of traditionary usage.

the citizens that the recent successes of Sparta, which had been urged as arguments to humiliate himself, were not of a permanent character. Between Argos and Sparta a sincere relation of mutual good-will was as impossible as between Athens and Sparta. Furthermore, at Argos the opposite parties confronted one another full of savage hatred, ready at any moment for a renewal of hostilities. The word for their resumption was given by Bryas, the leader of the One Thousand, who, by an act of base violence, disturbed the celebration of a civic wedding. The bride ravished by him avenged herself by putting out his eyes while he was asleep, and then sought the protection of the people, who rose in a body against the military insolence of the oligarchs, and overthrew the system of government supported by Sparta after it had lasted no longer than eight months.

New alliance between Athens and Argos. Ol. xc. 3-4. (B. C. 417.)

The Argives now stood once more in need of aid from the Athenians, in order to be able to maintain themselves against Sparta and the expelled oligarchs; envoys were sent to Athens, and Alcibiades hereupon honestly exerted himself to knit the bonds of the alliance closer. With the help of a body of Attic artisans he personally superintended the building of the long walls, by which the Argives were for all times, as it were, to incorporate themselves with the island and coast-empire of Athens: for a city encircled together with its seaport by walls was still as impregnable as an island against any Spartan attack. The Spartans invaded the country and destroyed part of the harbor walls, but were unable to take the city itself. In order to prevent another revolt, Alcibiades hereupon caused three hundred citizens, who were known to favor the Spartans, to be carried aboard the Attic ships and placed under arrest on the islands. Thus Argos was in the summer of B.C. 417 (Ol. xc. 4)

attached more closely than ever to Athens, and the former allies of the Argives began to revive from the effects of the terror inspired by the defeat at Mantinea.*

It is easy to understand why this indirect war against Sparta assumed a far more invidious and malignant character than would have belonged to a campaign of the two adversaries carried on by open and honest war. For now, when the popular feeling against Sparta was more bitter, and the war party more active than ever before, while the latter was still unable to bring about a declaration putting an end to the treaties, opportunities were eagerly sought in every direction to damage the Spartans at as sensitive a point as possible, in spite of the treaties. Accordingly, the popular desire for war was allowed to vent itself upon states of lesser importance, which were connected with Sparta, but had actually done nothing to provoke the vengeance of Athens. The relentless harshness with which the Athenians actually carried out such undertakings is shown in the instance of the expedition against Melos in the ensuing year.

Athenian expedition against Melos. Ol. xci. 1. (B.C. 416.)

Melos is one of the volcanic islands lying to the south of the Cyclades group on the confines of the Cretan sea. Seven centuries ago Dorian settlers from Peloponnesus had occupied Melos, which regarded itself as a daughter-city of Sparta, and adhered with unalterable loyalty to the Peloponnesian confederation. It was extremely natural for the Athenians to wish to include this island in the number of their allies: for by its situation it belonged to the maritime dominion of Athens. The more remote island of Thera, which stood in the most intimate relations to Sparta, had during the Peloponnesian war submitted to Athens, as had her proud neighbor Rhodes, with her three Doric cities. Of all the larger islands Melos lay nearest

* Alliance with Argos. Thuc. v. 82. Bryas: Paus. ii. 20, 2. Double walls: Curtius, *Peloponnesus*, ii. 384.

to the Peloponnesian coast, and was moreover, as it were, marked out by nature as a station for the Athenian navy, by a harbor retreating into the island in lines of great breadth and depth. Accordingly, Nicias had already several years before made an attempt upon the island (p. 136); the failure of which attempt had increased at Athens the feeling of irritation against the Melians. Since the Athenians had commenced their Peloponnesian expedition, this island assumed a double importance in their eyes. To these motives were added the instigations of the other islanders, who were vexed to see their neighbors permitted to live free from all tributes and burdens and in conformity with the laws of their fathers. Moreover, it was the interest of the Athenians, not to allow their navy to lie idle, but from time to time to prove to the Greek world that it was in their power to fill up the gaps in the line of their dominion, and to enlarge it according to their liking; for which purpose opportunities must be sought out if these failed spontaneously to offer themselves. The prospect of being able to offer new distributions of land to the citizens was also sufficiently tempting; but the main motive was the desire of damaging the Spartans in the persons of the Doric islanders, and of avenging the defeat at Mantinea and settling older scores—in particular that of the destruction of Platææ.

For it cannot be denied that the expedition against Melos greatly resembled that of the Spartans against Platææ. In either case, a Greek state is suddenly attacked, in order to oblige it by superior force of arms to pass out of ancient and historically well-founded federal relations into new; in other words, groundlessly to bring upon itself the enmity of its ancient friends and convert them into enemies. The only difference was this: that the Athenians scorned to shelter their conduct behind such pretences as the false boast of a national policy,

which the Spartans were in the habit of putting forward, and openly avowed the principles, in accordance with which they were obliged to call upon the Melians to submit. Specious phrases were the less necessary in this case, inasmuch as the Attic generals had to deal, not with a popular community, but with a council conducting the affairs of state. They curtly refused to enter into any discussion as to the question of right; for such a one they declared to be appropriate only in cases where equal powers were opposed to one another. In the present instance, they declared the only question to be as to what was most expedient at the present moment for either state. "Our interest," said the Attic general, "is to strengthen our naval power; yours to preserve your commonwealth and your prosperity. The only mode of reconciling these interests is by your voluntarily submitting and paying tribute like the neighboring islands. The neutrality which you offer is insufficient for our object; any compact with you would only cast doubts upon our power in the eyes of the other Greeks. Your hope of aid from Sparta is futile; and your appeal to the gods, as avengers of injustice, is equally groundless. For the gods, as well as mankind, acknowledge the eternal law: that those are the masters who have the power, and that the weak must obey. You adhere to the side of the Spartans, but, as a matter of fact, the Spartans are least of all among the number of those who decide as to what is right and just according to any other standard, and if you were yourselves in possession of the necessary power, neither would you speak nor act otherwise." Thus the Athenians unblushingly asserted the right of the stronger, attempting to justify it by means of a heartless sophism.

Fall of Melos. Ol. xc. 1. (B. C. 416.)

They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this

reason they were wroth at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city. The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in breaking through part of the wall built round them by the enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived; and they had to undergo sufferings which made the "Melian famine" a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery; and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender unconditionally to Philocrates, who arrived with a fresh army. There was no question of quarter. All the islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the women and children to slavery. The Athenians had nothing less in their minds than to take vengeance for the bloody acts of Sparta, and to spread fear and terror in all the regions which could be reached by the Athenian navy. So relentless a policy of violence corresponded to the ideas of Alcibiades, and it had been he who had advocated the application of the utmost severity. *

Farther schemes of Alcibiades.

But it could not satisfy the ambition of an Alcibiades, to have asserted his influence after this fashion; he looked around for other theatres of war than Peloponnesus and the Archipelago. For as the hateful peace with Sparta seemed to survive all attempts at putting an end to it, he felt the need of enterprises which should lead the state into courses hitherto unattempted, and extend the dominion of Athens beyond the limits hitherto assigned to it. These enterprises would necessarily be of such a nature, that the command in them could be entrusted to none but the boldest spirits, and that their successful exe-

* For the last fact, see Bähr ad Plut. *Alc.* 15; Hertzberg, *Alk.* p. 117. Expedition against Melos: Thuc. v. 84—116.

cution must raise the victorious commander to a position towering far above that of an ordinary Athenian citizen. For in proportion as the foreign relations of the state were extended and the limits of its dominion enlarged, it would become less and less possible for that state to be governed by the civic assembly on the Pnyx, and the personal rule of a single individual would at last be a simple matter of necessity. While Alcibiades was full of such thoughts, the envoys of the Egestæans arrived with their prayer for aid (p. 283); and the theatre of war for which he was longing was suddenly found.

The Sicilian question in previous times.

The Sicilian question was no novel theme. Athens, ever eager for war, had long glanced across to the western shores, and already at the time when Corcyra was admitted into the Attic alliance, many regarded that island merely as the threshold of Sicily. In the time of Pericles such ideas had not been allowed to assert themselves; for his prescient sagacity recognized all the dangers which would result to Athens from a policy of conquest; he saw the distinguishing mark of a Hellenic state in its capability of moderating its course, and not, like the states of the barbarians, allowing itself to be mechanically driven forward by the momentum of its own power, till in the end it became the victim of its own ambition. Therefore he had severely and vigorously suppressed all such longings on the part of the Athenians. But after his death things changed; for the community was by itself incapable of exercising wise self-restraint. To possess an unrivalled power, without applying it to whatever extent opportunity made possible—this could not be expected of the Attic people; the less so, since the demagogues were constantly busy to raise its conscious pride to measureless height, and hold up before its eyes the temptations of new schemes and plans.

Schemes of conquest in Sicily and beyond.

These plans were the more dangerous, in proportion as their objects were uncertain. For all knew by experience the difficulties presented to the Athenians by the wars with Bœotia and Sparta. But a distant country beyond the sea, known to few, and for that very reason capable of being represented in colors of all the brighter brilliancy—an island-country, too, whither the worst enemies of the Athenians could not follow them, and where their unconquered navy was alone to decide the issue—such a country could not but present unwonted attractions to them, especially as they were equally disinclined to sit still and renew the former war in the same way. But to enjoy at home all the advantages of peace, and at the same time to receive brilliant tidings of victory from the distant west, seemed to the Athenians the most enviable of lots. And might they not, in point of fact, assure themselves of the most successful result? No navy existed in those waters which could prove a match for the Attic. The power of the Tyrrhenians had been broken (p. 239); the Carthaginians no longer ventured to advance with their fleet; their own allies could not count upon their support, and had for this very reason been forced to apply for aid to Athens. Furthermore, in the case of a war against Syracuse, the Athenians might look for support, rather than for resistance, from both Carthage and the Tyrrhenians. The Siceliotes themselves were so powerless by sea that Leaches' squadron of twenty ships had been able to command their waters (p. 277). Again, the Leontinian war had progressed successfully, and though its results had been suddenly rendered fruitless by the peace of Gela, yet it was sufficiently evident that this peace was utterly untenable; nor could it be expected that the weaker states would again and again allow themselves to be deluded by the tranquillizing assurances of the Syracusans. Syracuse was by its very nature a state which could not but con-

tinually return to its old policy of conquest. Possibly, nay probably, a third Greek great power was here arising which, in a general Hellenic war, might serve to ruin Athens. Thus a timely intervention might in this instance be regarded in the light of a wise and provident policy. After all, it was said, there existed at present no other purpose upon which to employ the navy. The power of Athens was consuming itself in idleness; to do nothing was equivalent to retrogression. The honor of Athens demanded the resumption of the policy formerly pursued in Sicily. If the city displayed a want of spirit, not only an increase of insolence on the part of the Syracusans, but a fresh interference on the part of Carthage was to be apprehended. It was the vocation of Athens to be the champion of the Ionic race in the West as well as in the East. These arguments were reinforced by the seductive idea of the chance of conquering the Doric race here, where it had attained its most brilliant development; of humiliating Corinth in the daughter-city in which she took the greatest pride; in depriving the Spartans of all hope of future assistance from that quarter; and in gradually isolating Peloponnesus. At the same time it was hoped to open up the richest sources of material wealth to Athens; the soil of Sicily, fertile in many products, might become a possession of inestimable value to the Athenians, by means of its corn, horses, &c.; and, as all the advantages of the island, as well as the facility of success, were described to the people in brilliant speeches by the envoys—as the Egestæans offered very considerable subsidies, thus making it appear possible to gain all these advantages by other men's money—it naturally followed that the credulous multitude, to whom the undertaking was represented in no other except its favorable aspects, was carried away to such a degree as to have all its thoughts full of these utopian pictures. No other subject but this was discussed in the gymnasia and cloistered halls around the market,

in all the taverns and booths; here and there might be seen a figure of the Trinacrian island drawn in the sand, and surrounded and eagerly discussed by dense groups; Dodonæan oracles were dragged to light, which were supposed to approve of the undertaking; the name *Sikelia* exercised a magic charm in the ears of the Athenians; and after once imagining Mount Ætna included in the territory of the Attic alliance, they were not content even with this. An expedition to Carthage had been urged by senseless demagogues as early as the time of Pericles: at the present moment Libya and Italy were regarded as the first and indubitable objects of conquest; nay, an Attic empire was dreamt of, extending from the Lycian waters and the shores of the Pontus as far as the pillars of Hercules.*

The opponents of these schemes.

But there were some in Athens who resisted the transport of these dreams. There was no lack of cool-headed and reflecting citizens, whom the new schemes filled with fear and anxiety. Hitherto the power of Athens had advanced step by step in the Archipelago and the neighboring waters; and even the inclusion, within the limits of her alliance, of the islands of the Ionian Sea, which had taken place in the course of the war, appeared, so to speak, to have been demanded by the circumstances of the times, as a necessary security for Athens against the maritime states of Peloponnesus. But at this point a natural limit had been reached, and it seemed to amount to an act of foolish temerity to attempt to pass this limit, and to pursue aimless schemes of conquest beyond it. The state of affairs beyond the sea was so little known in detail, that it was impossible to form strategical plans and to judge

* Boeckh, *P. E.* p. 291 (E. Tr.). As to the false interpretation put by the Athenians upon the Dodonæan oracle Σικελίαν οἰκίζειν, vid. Paus. viii. 11, 12. Cf. as to the Hill Sicelia, near Athens, the author's Essay in *Rhein, Mus. N. F.* viii. 133.

of the success likely to attend upon military and naval operations with regard to these regions. At least, however, this was known: that Sicily was not an island to be conquered at one blow, but a small continent, with many cities which would have to be besieged one after the other, which it would be difficult to reduce to submission, and yet more difficult to keep in subjection. How could Athens govern a province from which she was so far separated by a sea devoid of islands, that in the winter season three or four months might pass by before a messenger arrived thence?

Social and financial condition of Athens.

Athens had reached a critical epoch in her history. To this fact all her citizens were alive; it was a question affecting her most vital interests, and the answer to which must decide the whole future of the city. Accordingly, all the conflicting forces in the community were brought into action and raised to the highest degree of tension. On the two opposite sides were respectively ranged those who owned property and those who owned none, young Athens and the older generation, mariners and husbandmen, the friends and the foes of the democracy. The numbers of the poor had increased in the course of the war; their mouths watered at the thought of new revenues of state being distributed, of a rise in the rates of public pay, and of new allotments of land. They felt a thorough aversion from Thracian campaigns, which certainly ought to have been their first care, because in this case none but the dark sides of war were brought before their eyes. On Sicily they placed the highest hopes, while contrasting the meagre poverty of their own lives with the splendor and prosperity said to prevail in the Sicilian towns. The men of property, on the other hand, were afraid of being subjected to new and increased burdens; they had hoped to be able to restore

order to their pecuniary affairs in the time of peace; for only the very rich, whose number was extremely small, could without personal inconvenience satisfy the demands of the state; most of them suffered under these demands and longed for relief, the more so because they earned but little gratitude in return for all their sacrifices, and failed to enjoy in the state the authority which they were justified in claiming, since upon them was based the power of Athens, the strength of her navy and army, as well as the splendor of the city, which manifested itself in festivals and dramatic performances. These tax-paying citizens calculated gain and loss, and reflected upon the chances of success and failure, thus distinguishing themselves from those who had nothing to lose, and might have something to gain,—and who accordingly welcomed all new schemes of war. Finally, among the more thoughtful citizens, regard was paid to the finances of the state as the point of view from which its foreign policy ought to be regulated. The public treasury had been utterly exhausted by the ten years of war, and with it the real source of the Attic power dried up. Since the conclusion of the peace, moneys had been again brought into the citadel, to the amount of one thousand talents, or thereabouts, annually. A new treasure was accumulating, and order was beginning to return into the Attic finances. But a new war would utterly destroy these favorable prospects, before Athens had collected the pecuniary resources requisite for entering, without resorting to new loans and war taxes, upon so vast an undertaking, the costs of which were utterly incalculable.*

Thus there existed, indeed, forces counteracting in some degree the measureless movement among the people, nor

* Thuc. vi. 26: ἀνειλήφει ἡ πόλις ἑαυτὴν . . . . ἐς χρημάτων ἄθροισιν. To this I formerly referred the inscr. in Boeckh, *P. E.* p. 291, note [E. Tr.]; but see above, note to vol. ii. p. 580.

were voices wanting to exhort and to warn. But their influence was paralyzed by the fact, that the true reasons of their resistance could not be strongly urged, as they were invariably ascribed to selfish fears on the part of the rich. Herein lay the old weakness of the peace party, which still followed the leadership of Nicias. As long as public opinion was in favor of peace, and a general lassitude prevailed, that party might obtain a few successes, but it was unable to establish an influence capable of guiding the citizens in disturbed times as well. And recently the peace party had lost authority, because the peace which had been concluded by their exertions proved itself less tenable from day to day. By using their utmost endeavors, notwithstanding, for the purpose of at all events deferring as long as possible an open rupture with Sparta, they had against their will greatly helped to direct the warlike thoughts of the Athenians towards entirely new undertakings.

Position of Alcibiades at Athens.

All these circumstances were to the advantage of the man who at this critical moment stood at the head of the movement, and who used every exertion to induce Athens to unfold her whole power, unhesitatingly to take advantage of every favorable conjuncture of circumstances, and to advance with her sails full set.

Alcibiades at that time stood in the full flower of his manhood. His influence was not, like that of Nicias, based upon the circumstance that a certain part of the population had chosen him as leader; but his authority was, like that of Pericles, a personal authority, and rested upon numerous gifts by which nature had qualified him for a position of command. He stood among his fellow-citizens with no other like unto him. The admiration and affection of the Athenians attached themselves to one whose figure brilliantly reflected their own character, and from him, the Invincible, they hoped for a new era of

good fortune, for new revenues, new allotments of land, new treasures from Sicily and Libya; and now, as at no previous period, it was thought Athens ought to display her whole strength and develop all her powers. No Athenian had ever enjoyed so enthusiastic a popularity as Alcibiades.

Furthermore, Alcibiades also possessed a definite number of followers who were always at hand to help him in the execution of his designs; young men of adventurous spirit, among them doubtless a few whom a sincere recognition of extraordinary gifts attached to his person—patriotic spirits, who looked for the greatest deeds from him, and wished to aid in their execution. Such a one was, *e. g.*, Eurytolemus.* The majority of his adherents, however, consisted of men who were united to him by common banquetings and debaucheries, and who after wasting their patrimony lived on his bounty. They were accordingly his dependents, obeyed his slightest wishes, worked upon the people, kept it in a state of excitement, fostered the most extravagant hopes, and frightened the opposite party into silence. They were chiefly young men of rank, who were delighted to see a demagogue of their own class once more take the lead in affairs, instead of one of the common fellows, clamorers rather than orators, and capable only of seeking personal profit from the troubles of the times, without accomplishing any really great achievement—a man of high birth and distinguished bearing, instead of an artisan or trader. They constituted themselves the instruments of his ambition, hoping at the same time to derive a personal profit from his success.

His arrogance.

But the very circumstance that the whole authority of Alcibiades was derived from his personal qualities also constituted his weakness. For the safe guidance of others he lacked the moral dignity

* Plut. Pericl. c. 7; Alc. c. 32.

which alone is able to call forth real respect and lasting attachment. With all his brilliant advantages, Alcibiades was but a human being like the rest, and therefore incapable of steadying and concentrating these natural gifts; for he was unable to rely upon himself—a character full of inner contradictions, in which good and bad tendencies, unregulated by principle, kept up a continual conflict; and therefore, notwithstanding its acute intelligence, his mind failed to attain to clearness and distinctness of aim. Those who came to know him most intimately were least able to place confidence in him; for at bottom he only sought to gratify himself and to pursue his own advantage. He prized Athens only as the theatre of his deeds; the glory of his native city was to him only a step towards his own glory; and his associates felt that he would only keep them by his side as long as they were serviceable to the schemes of his personal ambition. Therefore he was ill adapted to be the permanent leader of a party. And even beyond the circle of his more intimate associates he gave offence and caused irritation in all quarters.

He had not learnt to master the Tyrannical nature dwelling in him, or even to conceal it. By the side of the most heroic bravery he displayed an effeminate love of luxury, such as became a Persian satrap rather than a citizen of Athens. Wherever he appeared, he wished the eyes of all to be turned exclusively on himself. He came to the market-place arrayed in long folds of purple; even in battle he endeavoured to out-shine all the rest, bearing a shield made of gold and ivory, and surmounted by a god of love hurling lightning-bolts, as a crest,—an arrogant symbol of the irresistible charms of his person.* The people, as a body, he flattered after the manner of the demagogues, but individuals he treated with overbearing scorn. All contradiction irritated him to insolence and

* Ἔρως Κεραυνοφόρος, Plut. *Alc.* c. 32.

violence, as if his fellow-citizens had been his subjects. Agatharchus, the foremost scene-painter of Athens—the same whose art had beautified the stage of Æschylus (vol. ii. p. 578)—excuses himself for being prevented by other orders from complying with the wishes of Alcibiades; whereupon the latter shuts up the painter in his house and forces him to perform the desired task on the spot. Taureas, who attempts to dispute the prize of the best chorus with Alcibiades, is driven by the latter out of the theatre with blows in the presence of the assembled people;* his wife, Hipparete, he carries forcibly back into his house upon her attempting to obtain a divorce before the archons;† and he even dares, as public treasurer, to remove the festive vessels of gold from their place on the citadel, and to employ them for his private purposes.‡ And all these insults against the public civil and sacred law he was allowed to commit with impunity, because the citizens had accustomed themselves to concede to him an exceptional and privileged position; so that they themselves bore a heavy share of the blame by encouraging in him the wild spirit of license which laughed at their laws, and allowed it to grow into an uncontrollable habit.

His display.

But the city of Athens was too narrow a sphere to suffice for Alcibiades as the theatre of his ambition. His wish was not merely to outshine all his fellow-citizens by the sums spent by him upon the urban festivals and upon the equipment of ships, but to make all Hellas the witness of his glory and splendor. With this view he revived the ancient traditions of the house to which he belonged by the mother's side. For, as its splendor had begun with the Olympic chariot-victory of Alcmæon, the contemporary of Solon; so Alcibiades, as a genuine Alcmæonide, wished to tread the

* Agatharchus and Taureas, Plut. *Alc.* c. 16.

† Plut. *Alc.* c. 8; cf. Hertzberg, *u. s.* p. 126.

‡ *Ib.* c. 13.

same path of fame. For this purpose, however, he needed resources beyond those which his wasted patrimony offered to him: and he therefore sought to connect himself with the wealthiest of all Athenian families, that of the *Daduchus* Hipponicus (p. 82). Although he had committed an act of impious insolence against this worthy man, he succeeded in obtaining the hand of his daughter, together with a dowry of ten talents (2,580*l.*)—a dowry such as had never previously fallen to the lot of any Athenian. He was at no pains to conceal the selfish motives which had actuated him in seeking this connection. For scarcely had he brought home his bride, Hipparete, with her gold (Ol. xc. 4; B. C. 416 *circ.*), when he began to occupy himself on the grandest scale with the training of race-horses. He became owner of a stud admired alike by foreigners and natives, and in order to pay its expenses managed to obtain a further sum of ten talents from his brother-in-law Callias, which Hipponicus was said to have promised to bestow upon him in the event of Hipparete giving birth to a boy. By such means as these he completely accomplished his end. For he sent to Olympia not one, but seven racing chariots, and obtained not one, but three prizes at the same festival. A special significance attached at the present moment to this splendid display at Olympia. The messengers from Elis, who announced the date of the approaching festival (vol. i. p. 250), had for the first time, after a long absence, come to Athens; and after it had been believed in Peloponnesus that war and pestilence had broken the prosperity of the city, an Attic citizen was now seen to unfold a splendor such as no prince had ever displayed. Moreover, about the same time, Sparta was excluded from the Olympic festival; and, during her quarrel with Sparta, Elis had to seek for another protector. Alcibiades being a patron of the separate league, and having been the means of bringing

Alcibiades at Olympia.

about the treaty between Argos and Athens, the authorities at Elis did everything to oblige him; while on the other hand his display served to raise in an uncommon degree his influence in Peloponnesus, among a nation so susceptible to the impressions created by wealth as the Greeks.

At the same time, no man was equally master of the art of using other men's resources for his own purposes. For, as he had obtained access to the Olympic wreaths by means of the riches of Hipponicus, so he contrived to use his influence among the allies for the same objects. Lesbos sent him wine for the celebration of his victory, to which he invited all persons present at the festival; Chios furnished the sacrificial victims and the fodder for the horses; and the Ephesians erected him a gorgeous tent. Thus the cities emulated one another in conciliating the favor of the powerful demagogue; and, since brilliant success in the breeding and training of studs and chariot-victories at Olympia were always regarded as a preliminary step towards the furtherance of Tyrannical schemes, Alcibiades at Olympia, in fact, already appeared in the light of a prince, calling in the tributes due to him, and concentrating the splendor of his native city upon his person. The other festive localities of Greece were also witnesses of his glory; and, in order to celebrate all these victories and to preserve their memory, he not only employed the art of the singers, but also availed himself of the services of all the other artists of Athens. He caused a painting to be made representing his coronation by Olympias and Pythias, and himself reposing, resplendent in luxuriant beauty, in the lap of Nemea. These creations of flattery he dedicated to the city goddess, and caused them to be placed in the Pinacothece (vol. ii. p. 637).*

* As to the portraits of A. as victor, see Benndorf, *Vasenbilder*, p. 15. —Ἱπποτροφία: Hertzberg, *u. s.* p. 123.

His policy.

Finally, the political tendency represented by Alcibiades was also of a kind which could not fail to provoke manifold opposition. His desire was, not only to put an end to the peace which it had required exertions so laborious to bring about, and to renew the war in the previous fashion, but also to kindle a war of much wider extent, and with totally different means, than the most passionate demagogues before him had had in view. As the scope of all his schemes comprehended not merely Athens, but the whole of Greece, so he intended to be the omnipotent leader, not on the Attic Pnyx alone, but in Argos, in Mantinea, and in Elis. The liberation of the civic communities from all aristocratic influences was to constitute the leading principle of a general Hellenic policy, the threads of which were to be gathered together in his hand; he intended to be the head of all the democratic parties in Greece, and to unite them in a powerful alliance, to which Sparta and all the aristocratic states would in the end be forced to succumb. Thus the foreign as well as the domestic policy of the state now became a democratic policy, before which all other points of view receded into the background. The war became purely one of political ideas, and, instead of a conflict between states, one between parties,—a war which therefore could not otherwise than increase in extent and vehemence, and lose all definite objects or chance of settlement. Alcibiades wished to bring about a new era in Greece, which should make it impossible for such a state as Sparta to exist; and of this general popular movement Athens was to be the focus. But for the same purpose it was necessary that the city should unfold all her resources, and heighten them as far as was feasible,—above all, her pecuniary resources. In this particular Alcibiades followed in the steps of the earlier demagogues, who had advocated an increase in the number of the tributary allies, and every possible mode of raising their contributions. But Alcibiades, in this matter

also, surpassed his predecessors in the inconsiderate violence of his proposals; he had taken a leading part in the proceedings against Melos; and to his exertions it is said to have been owing that the sum total of the tributes, amounting under Pericles to 600 talents, about the present time finally rose as high as 1,300 (316,875*l.*). Advantage was taken of all indications of disloyalty for inflicting pecuniary penalties; and those states on whose behalf, when they returned into the Attic alliance, Sparta had especially interested herself, were now, apparently by way of an insult to Sparta, treated with double severity. Accordingly, worse fears and more intolerable sufferings than ever prevailed on the islands and coasts; their increasing oppression is even said to have occasioned numerous instances of emigration to Italy; and the part played by Alcibiades in the affairs of the allies is evident, if from nothing else, from the fact that cities such as Ephesus, Chios and Lesbos shrank from no sacrifice in order to conciliate his goodwill, and thus to prevent the application of still stricter measures against them.*

His adversaries.

But, notwithstanding the height and extent of the personal influence of Alcibiades, he was unable to acquire a power sufficiently permanent to tranquillize the state and to bring about a union among the different parties. His influence only acted as an irri-

* As to the increase of the tributes, see Boeckh, *P. E.* p. 400 [E. Tr.], U. Köhler in *Berl. Monatsber.* 1865, p. 215, and 1869, pp. 154 sqq. As to the influence of Alcibiades in the matter, M. Meier, *Opusc.* i. 193. With regard to the emigration to Italy, *ib.* p. 225.—The date of the marriage of Alc. (p. 550) is fixed by Isocr. *de Bigis*, c. 17, according to which the son of Alc. must have been born in B. C. 416. In that case, however, Hipponicus cannot have himself given his daughter in marriage (G. Herbst and Hertzberg). The date of Alcibiades' appearance at Olympia is fixed by Grote, vii. 74 *note*, in Ol. xc. 1 (B. C. 420); I prefer Hertzberg's date, viz. Ol. xci. 1 (B. C. 416). But even in the latter case it must be assumed that his brilliant ἱπποτροφία was not owing to the treasures of Hipponicus.

tant, and provoked opposition on all sides; and, amidst the joyous applause with which the multitude surrounded its favorite, the tones of mistrust and hatred made themselves heard with increasing distinctness. The elder generation was filled with indignation against this tempter of the youth of Attica, who, in imitation of Alcibiades, neglected the palæstræ, audaciously spurned every ancient usage, and considered a wild and reckless life of debauchery fashionable and aristocratic. Those who meant honestly by the constitution could not but recognize more clearly from day to day, that the sole object of Alcibiades was an absolute and irresponsible rule, to which he believed himself to have already established so safe an expectancy, that he even now fearlessly and shamelessly violated all the principles of civic equality; and, though the unthinking crowd admired the reckless audacity with which he pursued his ends, yet there were not wanting men who applied the standard of morality to his acts. On the stage, in particular, voices of disapproval made themselves heard. On the tragic stage, indeed, Euripides testified to his manifest admiration of the hero of the day, whom he celebrated as the successful creator of the Argive alliance, and whose anti-Spartan policy he fully echoed; but at the same time he raised a voice of blame and serious warning. Far less sparing, however, were the attacks of the comic poets, above all, of Eupolis, who, in the spring of B. C. 415 (Ol. xci. 1), produced his *Baptæ*, in which he with wrathful indignation brought on the stage the licentious festivals, celebrated at night-time by Alcibiades and his associates in honor of a strange goddess, Cotytto; so that Alcibiades is said to have conceived a deadly hatred against the poet. The public insult thus offered to religion by his mockeries naturally made the priests in particular, and all connected with them, his enemies, as they saw their influence menaced and their revenues diminished by his proceedings. To these adversaries were added the popular speakers, Andro-

cles, Cleonymus, and others, who could not forgive Alcibiades for having destroyed their influence; and, again, his numerous personal enemies, who lay in wait for an opportunity to take vengeance upon Alcibiades for injuries suffered at his hands, and among whom were many who had formerly been among his associates. But his bitterest opponents were the ancient enemies of the democracy, the avowed or hidden adherents of the party of the nobles, who hated Alcibiades with a double hatred, because they regarded him as a renegade, and were obliged to rid themselves of him, in case they wished to carry through their own plans. The adherents of this line of policy had for a time followed the lead of Nicias, who had formed a centre for the more worthy remnants of the ancient aristocracy of Athens; but the attitude assumed by him appeared too feeble to the younger and more vehement members of the party, and the character of his policy too honest and too confiding. An open and avowed opposition must, in their opinion, fail to have any effect; accordingly, measures to oppose the democracy must be taken in secret. Thus the warfare of parties at Athens assumed a totally different character.*

The political clubs.

Secret combinations of the kind were indeed no novelty at Athens. They made their appearance in the midst of the Persian wars; in the camp before Platææ (vol. ii. p. 366), as well as in the battle of Tanagra (vol. ii. p. 439), they led to treasonable attempts: nor were these party tendencies wholly extinguished even in the times of Pericles. But they attained to fresh significance after the death of Pericles, because the degenerate phase into which the demo-

* For the relations between Euripides and Alcibiades, see Herbst, *Ruckkehr d. Alc.* p. 26; Hertzberg, p. 130; Eupolis Βαπταί; Meineke, *Quæst. sc.* i. 42.—The secret clubs were called ἑταιρεῖαι (ἑταιρίαι) or ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. Krüger, *Dionys. Historiogr.* p. 363; Vischer, *d Olig. Partei*, p. 16.

cracy had fallen caused a reaction; and thus, particularly in the period during which Cleon's influence was paramount in the state, and by means of a democratic terrorism persecuted every independent manifestation of opposite opinions, secret associations (ἑταιρίαι) existed, whose professed object was merely joyous social intercourse, but which assumed in secret a more and more decidedly political character. It did not follow, that all who entertained the same political opinions were united in the same association, but there existed a number of separate circles of the same or similar tendency, membership of which exercised so strong a claim upon the individual, that in comparison his natural obligations to his family and native city fell into the background. For the members not only agreed upon certain principles, but also undertook the performance of certain services, and bound themselves, by a solemn oath, mutually to support one another at the risk of their property and life in lawsuits, as well as in the candidature for public offices, after having arrived at a common agreement on the subject.

These clubs accordingly differed in all respects from the political associations of earlier times (vol. ii. p. 240). Originally, they constituted a mode of defence in seasons of danger against the Sycophants (p. 120); but gradually the designs and plans of these associations proceeded further and further. They were for the most part composed of members of ancient families with innate oligarchical tendencies,—passionate and excited young men of loose habits of life, who found no sphere for their ambition in the Athens of the day, who had received a sophistic education, and were full of unintelligible political theories, which obscured in them the plain perception of law and sense of duty; who were accordingly vain and devoid of conscientiousness, contemners of law and usage, and scorners of the multitude and its rule. In proportion as the foreign policy of the state became democratic, the

aristocratic clubs grew into associations of anti-patriotic conspirators, who felt more sympathy for Sparta than for their own native city; and the more recklessly Alcibiades advanced in his proceedings, the less they troubled their minds as to the justifiability of any particular ways and means by which the dominion of the multitude and its favorites might be overthrown; nor did they hesitate occasionally to assume the mask of zealous friends of the constitution, and to effect temporary combinations with the ultra-democrats, in order under this disguise to be able to act with greater effect. Thus was formed a party numerically weak, but strong by its resolution, talent, and excellent organization, which was in constant readiness, and which firmly believed that its opportunity could not fail to come in time.

Antiphon;

Among these adversaries of the democracy only one openly opposed Alcibiades. This was Antiphon, the son of the sophist Sophilus, and himself a master of political oratory (vol. ii. p. 569); for it cannot assuredly be doubted that his speeches on the subject of the tribute paid by the allies were directed against the policy of Alcibiades. All the other Athenians, who at an earlier or later date appear as enemies of the democracy, we find engaged in secret operations more or less evidently connected with the aristocratic clubs. One of these men was

Pisander;

Pisander of Acharnæ, who stood in evil repute at Athens as an effeminate debauchee, and who was at the same time a born intriguer and an adept in dissimulation; further, Charicles, the son

Charicles;

of Apollodorus, who contrived equally well to conceal his party views, and was at the time a popular personage at Athens, filling public offices with high consideration. One of the best-known personages,

Andocides.

lastly, was Andocides, the son of Leogoras. He was descended from one of the most ancient and

wealthy Eupatrid families, a house whose history was most honorably interwoven with that of Athens (vol. i. p. 397); he was at the same time personally a talented and eloquent man, whose oligarchical sentiments, however, exposed him to manifold attacks on the part of the popular orators. He too, beyond a doubt, belonged to a close association.*

Influence of the Hetæries.

It lies in the nature of the case, that such secret societies are never perceptible, until they succeed in exercising a decisive influence upon the course of the state. And even then it remains impossible to follow their effects, as well as their changing attitude, significance, and composition, with any certainty. Only so much is clear: that this kind of party warfare more and more decomposed and poisoned society. Hitherto a certain openness and simplicity had prevailed in public life; the citizens had bestowed their confidence upon the most efficient individuals, and had relied upon their necessarily and naturally keeping in view nothing beyond the interests of the commonwealth in the administration of public offices: now, for the first time, the party-color of each man was made the test of his eligibility. By the side of political, religious fanaticism asserted itself. And—which was the greatest evil of all—the men of different views no longer as hitherto confronted one another before the people openly, honestly, and with a good conscience, as standing upon the common ground of patriotism, but a selfish system of coteries drove into the background all higher interests; the interests common to all were no longer regarded, and the predominant object of each man and party was simply to attain to power and influence by overthrowing their adversaries. For this purpose, combinations were formed between oligarchs and

* Antiphon: Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, i. 79. Pisander: Meineke, *Fr. Com.* i. 176. Charicles: Thuc. vii. 20; cf. Wattenbach *de Quadring.* p. 11. Andocides: Blass, p. 268.

demagogues, between religious fanatics and free-thinkers. And in these contrasts there was a general absence of the moral force of conviction Alcibiades was the champion of the democracy, not from any feeling of loyalty towards the constitution, but merely because the democracy promised to satisfy his ambition; and similarly the adversaries of the democracy were solely intent upon their own advantage, and prepared to sacrifice everything, even the honor and independence of their native city.

Amidst the prevalence of the influences of such party attempts as these, the community could not but degenerate with fearful rapidity. In proportion as the natural bonds of house and family were loosened, these arbitrary connections flourished, which even furnished a certain justification for, and imposed a certain obligation of, breaking up the bonds of nature. The real vigor and strength of the commonwealth were undermined; the very ground on which the state stood resembled a volcano; and the dangers at home were more threatening than those outside the walls. Abroad, the power of Athens was great and feared; for her revenues were vaster, her naval dominion more absolute, and her enemies weaker than at any previous period: but the inner force of the republic, which was based upon the virtue and patriotism of her citizens, was in a state of thorough decomposition.

Such was the condition of affairs at Athens when the envoys from Egesta arrived there (p. 283).

Reception of the embassy from Egesta.

They addressed the citizens in skillful speeches, pointing out the danger which would accrue, were Syracuse allowed gradually to subject to herself all the independent states of the island; and they promised to defray the expenses of the war from their own resources. Their application was discussed amidst much excitement in meetings of the citizens. The opponents of the Sicilian schemes wished

that the project should be rejected at once, because they foresaw that it would be afterwards impossible to know at what point to stop; and they particularly warned the citizens against allowing themselves to be deceived by the delusive pretences of the islanders. This was the language of those who considered an adherence to the policy of Pericles in foreign affairs the primary condition of the public welfare, nor was any one more eager in the advocacy of this view than Nicias, who entertained no doubt as to the fact that the Sicilian expedition would inevitably entail a renewed outbreak of a general Hellenic war. The party of Alcibiades, on the other hand, vehemently supported the Egestæans; and at last the majority of the citizens agreed upon in the first instance despatching envoys, to convince themselves with their own eyes as to the resources of Egesta—a measure which doubtless was demanded by the Egestæans themselves.

Athenian Commissioners sent to Egesta. Ol. xc. 1. (B. C. 416–15.)

This decree, in fact, already amounted to a victory of the war party. For it was not difficult to delude the Athenians even more completely at Egesta than had been possible in the popular assembly at Athens. They were shown the monuments of the city as proofs of the public prosperity; they were led up to the sanctuary of Aphrodite on Mount Eryx, where the entire mass of silver cups, cans, censers, and other vessels were displayed before their eyes; in the city they were entertained at luxurious banquets, at which identical sets of plate were successively shown to them in different houses—plate partly borrowed from neighboring Greek and Phœnician cities. Thus the envoys, surrounded by boastful and cunning Sicilians, were wholly unable to attain to a real view of the financial situation of the city, or to a knowledge of its public moneys.* Dazzled by the semblance of universal wealth,

* Thuc. vi. 46.

they returned in the spring to Athens; and when sixty talents of coined money were landed in the Piræeus, which the Egestæans had sent with the envoys to serve as pay for sixty vessels of war for the first month, this money, which was joyously hailed as a first instalment of Sicilian tributes, as well as the account given by the envoys themselves, created so overpowering an impression, that, as Alcibiades had foreseen, the war party had won the game.

Decree of war and nomination of Generals. Ol. xc. 1. (B.C. 415) March.

The campaign was resolved upon, the commanders were named and invested with unlimited powers, being commissioned in the first instance to protect the Egestæans and to re-establish the Leontinians in their native city, and furthermore, with reference to the general affairs of Sicily, to act as might be most expedient for the interests of Athens. This extension of their powers was in perfect accordance with the intentions of Alcibiades; but he had been unable to carry his own nomination as sole commander of the fleet. To obtain this, he was after all not sufficiently possessed of the general confidence of the citizens, the majority of whom could only be brought to consent to the undertaking by the nomination of Nicias as his colleague, with Lamachus for a third, who as a bold and experienced soldier was designed to take part rather in the executive measures of the campaign than in its guidance. The citizens accordingly adhered to the view which had decided the vote on the day of the last ostracism, viz., that the safest plan was to unite the two most thoroughly dissimilar among all the Athenians for the purpose of common action. It was hoped that the thoughtful caution of the one and the daring genius of the other would act as salutary complements to one another, though in point of fact that on which everything depended, *i. e.*, an energetic conduct of the war, was by this means paralyzed at the very outset.

Nicias.

No man more deeply regretted this result than Nicias. He had never known any other principle than that of the most anxious caution, and now he was, in conjunction with a man who never cared to play for any but the highest stakes, and who was his bitterest adversary, to lead an expedition which he regarded as the most absurd and ruinous upon which the citizens had ever resolved. He was full of indignation at the thoughtlessness with which such an expedition as this had been resolved upon, before its difficulties had been considered or the means of carrying it out discussed; and determined to try every mode of bringing about the revocation of the decree of war. He accordingly in the next assembly, which had been fixed on the sixth day following for settling the details of the equipment of the expedition, without hesitation, although the proceeding was illegal, insisted upon the entire question as to embarking in the war at all being once more debated. He fully realized the importance of the decision of this day for himself and for all Athens. He therefore refused to give way before the angry impatience of the multitude, before the wrath of the war party or the counter-manœuvres of Alcibiades, who had distributed his followers throughout all parts of the assembly, in order to overawe and confuse his opponents. Nicias spoke more courageously and impressively than on any previous occasion, and actually obtained one more hearing for the voice of reason and caution, before the fatal resolution was actually carried out.

His speech in the assembly.

In the first place he rebutted the insinuation of personal timidity. He then described the situation of the state. The peace which had been obtained amounted to nothing but a brief pause of uncertain duration; the ancient enemies of Athens were either lying in wait to put an end to this peace at the first opportunity, or had even not yet laid aside their arms.

The Chalcidian towns were still in a state of revolt. "And we," he continued, "without being safe for a single moment in our own house, or having recovered our dominion in our own territory, hurry into a new war, of which no man knows the end, and which far exceeds all previous limits—into a war devoid of any rational object. For even supposing that we meet with the greatest success, yet it is impossible to hold such a country as Sicily; while, on the other hand, the least mishap must plunge us into the very worst of dangers, and double the number of our enemies, for whom we are scarcely a match, even as it is. And for what reason do we undertake this war, in which we risk everything belonging to us? Is it from fear of Syracuse? The danger which might arise to us from that quarter is a vain and imaginary fancy. Or from any obligation towards Egesta? The Egestæans are utter strangers to us, and have no claim upon our risking people and country on account of their border feuds. Or are we, perchance, to undertake this war merely for the purpose of gratifying the ambition of a few young men, who, without maturity or experience, long for the offices and the fame of generals, and hope incidentally to be able to restore order to their ruined finances? There exists only one rational principle with regard to the admittance of new allies offering themselves from a distance, and that principle is this: only to entertain the offers of those who are able to furnish the same amount of help as that to which they lay claim. We have every reason for caution at home, as against that state which possesses allies in the oligarchs in our own ranks. Therefore I have this confidence in the elder and more experienced among my fellow-citizens—that they will allow no false notion of honor and no attempts at overawing them to prevent them from following the counsels of caution; and from the presiding Prytanis I expect that he will not be afraid, at a moment when the welfare

of the state is at stake, to disregard considerations of form, and to put the whole question as to the despatch of a fleet to Sicily once more to the vote on this day."*

The discussion was opened. A few spoke for Nicias, but the majority against him; and the debate was closed by Alcibiades. Reply of Alcibiades.

He first answered the personal attacks in which Nicias had against his wont on this occasion indulged with extreme acrimony. If, said Alcibiades, he spent much money and was addicted to pomp, both these things redounded to the honor and advantage of the city; but as to his inexperience in affairs of state, he had proved in Peloponnesus how it was possible without spending any public money, or exposing the state to any danger, to humiliate and weaken such an enemy as Sparta. Events were his witnesses; for Athens had not only gained sure adherents in the Doric peninsula, but already at the present moment Peloponnesian contingents responded to the levy of the Athenians, and this on his, Alcibiades', account. The difficulties of the new war were exaggerated by Nicias in accordance with his interests. The Sicilian cities were inhabited by a mixed population, and accordingly always ready for innovations and willing to receive those arriving from abroad. The Siceliotes were without a country in the sense in which such a one was owned by the Hellenes on the hither side of the sea. Moreover, they were neither united among themselves, nor sufficiently prepared for war. On the other hand, it was unworthy of Athens never to afford protection to other states except after an anxious calculation, and to take thought of nothing but her own safety; in the days of her brightest glory she had at the same time taken the field against the Persians and been opposed by the enmity of the Peloponnesians. A navy such as the Attic sufficed both to pro-

* Thuc. vi. 9—14.

tect the home country and to achieve new victories. In the present case this consideration should exercise additional weight: that the Athenians were bound by their promise to uphold the resolution which they had once taken. He accordingly addressed himself, not to the elder members of the Assembly, as Nicias had done, but to both young and old, and confidently hoped that, according to the custom of their fathers, the active energy of the young would unite with the wise counsel of the old to advance the glory of the city.*

War decreed. Ol. xc. 1. (B. C. 415.) March.

The speech of Alcibiades was admirably calculated and brilliantly expressed, and acted with irresistible force upon his hearers. The consequence was, that the citizens were now in a state of mind even more warlike and resolute than in the previous assembly; and when the Leontinians and Egestæans had also spoken, renewing their urgent appeal for help, all chance of success was at an end for the peace party. But Nicias still refused to renounce all hope. He now tried to create an impression in the minds of the citizens by endeavoring to give them an idea of the enormous costs of the war, which would fall upon them alone; for the promises of the allies beyond the sea he declared to be untrustworthy or purely delusive. The sixty talents would be spent in the course of a few weeks; and who would guarantee that the Egestæans would offer up all their treasures and sacred vessels for the maintenance of foreign troops? Upon the men of property these representations might exercise a strong effect; but the multitudes, which had nothing to lose, turned a deaf ear to them. After the speech of Alcibiades, all further hesitation seemed to detract from the honor of Athens; and the grander the scale on which the expedition was equipped, the grander were the success and profit expected from it.

* Thuc. vi. 16–18.

Therefore the popular orator Demostratus called upon Nicias to state, without any further attempts at evasion, the scale of armament demanded by the war; and when he asked for a hundred triremes, a corresponding number of transports, 5,000 heavy-armed, and a considerable body of light-armed, troops, as well as other comprehensive preparations, all this failed to exercise any deterrent effect; and the citizens in feverish excitement unhesitatingly granted everything asked, and accorded absolute powers for the purpose to the general. Such was the result of the two assemblies of the people, held upon the 19th and 24th of March, at Athens. The sole effect of Nicias' attempt at opposition was accordingly this: that the armament was equipped on an incomparably more costly scale, and that all the resources of the state were in a disproportionate degree called into play for the purposes of the war. This only helped to raise the expectations of the Athenians to a still higher pitch of unmeasured arrogance, while on the other hand an equivalent access of security by no means accrued to the undertaking itself. For the size of the fleet and army necessarily determined the degree of difficulty as to its maintenance in a foreign country, while these vast armaments furnished additional justification to the suspicions of the neutral states, who could not but regard them as evidence of the fact that a great territorial conquest was intended. Meanwhile the Athenians took no heed of these considerations. All resistance was at an end, and the enterprise itself was entered upon with all energy. City and ports assumed the aspect of a military camp; the people hastened to enroll themselves in the lists of soldiers; and the orders to the allies were drawn up.

State of public feeling after the decree.

But, although the Athenians courageously and vigorously set to work at this great undertaking, yet it was not as in old times, when the city was arming for an honest war. There was an absence of the joyous spirit which accompanies

well-considered action, and of a calm certainty and unity of aims and wishes, among the citizens. All objections had been drowned in the clamor of excited popular assemblies; in quieter moments and in smaller circles they came to light again and again; and thus there spread among the community an uneasy and anxious feeling as of coming evil, a feeling which no man was able to suppress in himself, and possessed by which he timidly glanced round and listened for any possible omen of the future. Thus the laments were remembered, which had resounded from the roofs of the houses during the recent debates, when the Athenian women were celebrating the festival of Adonis. Solemn warnings arrived from Delphi. The divine voice which manifested itself in Socrates informed him that no good result was to be expected from the expedition, and Meton (vol. ii. p. 561) is said to have set fire to his house, in order to escape the duty of military service on the plea of insanity, or to be allowed, on account of the conflagration, to retain his son at home.*

This anxious and susceptible state of feeling at Athens became an instrument in the hands of the parties who carried on their intrigues in secret, because open resistance was impossible. The enemies of Alcibiades, in particular, were busily at work. He had now reached the climax of his influence; and although his wish for the sole command had been successfully frustrated, yet he was regarded as the soul of the whole undertaking; from his versatile genius alone was success expected, and it was to be presumed that, supported by an ardent soldiery, he would at so great a distance from home paralyze the influence of his

* As to the chronological order of the assemblies, see Droysen, *Rhein. Mus.* 1835, p. 163. With reference to the coincidences with the Adonia, Plut. *Alc.* 18 is not definite; but there is a thoroughly definite passage on the point in Ar. *Lysistr.* 389. As the Adonia were a summer-festival (Plat. *Phædr.* 276 B.), we probably ought to assume different acts or stages in the Adonia, one in the spring, the other at midsummer.

colleagues, especially as Lamachus was a fiery spirit, who preferred the boldest mode of making war, and moreover, on account of his personal poverty, naturally stood in the position of an inferior towards Alcibiades. But that the latter should thus actually realize his arrogant schemes, and succeed in adding to his other gifts of fortune the splendor of military fame as a successful general, was an idea intolerable to his enemies; so that they were determined to use every means for overthrowing him before he could return home as an omnipotent victor. For this purpose men of the most opposite parties combined, and wove a network of intrigues, of which it is difficult to distinguish the finely-spun threads.*

Mutilation of the Hermæ. Ol. xc. 1. (B.C. 415.) May 10, 11.

Six weeks, or thereabouts, had passed since the last assembly of the people, and the armaments, carried on with unwearying diligence, were approaching their completion, when an event of an unprecedented character suddenly overwhelmed the city with terror. In a single night the numerous marble Hermæ, which bordered part of the market-place and were erected in front of the citizens' houses and sanctuaries, were almost without exception beaten to pieces; so that next morning men beheld the four-cornered pillars standing with the heads broken off or mutilated, and the streets covered with fragments. Mischievous acts at night-time by drunken routs were not of uncommon occurrence at Athens; but a criminal act of this extent was unprecedented. A great number of inhabitants must necessarily have combined for its perpetration, and these men must be actuated by motives, and must pursue designs, of which the public had no conception. The very mystery which involved the whole transaction plunged the entire community into the deepest excitement and anxiety. A general indignation prevailed

* As to the intrigues against Alcibiades, see Hertzberg, *u. s.* p. 167.

at the sacrilege committed against the city; for however thoughtlessly men might generally pass by the Hermæ, yet they were not only a popular and peculiar ornament of this city, but also a symbol of public order: they were witnesses to the religious sense which from ancient times constituted the glory of Athens; and, by their antique form alone, formed venerable monuments of the cult which had undergone no change during the long succession of generations, and symbols of the divine protection. Nor was this all. Far more disquieting was the idea that in the midst of the city there existed parties who combined for such an act of impiety; against men of this kind no institution of the state, no object sanctified by law or usage could be safe. Hence it was in vain that the more thoughtful among the citizens advised the others not to attach too much weight to the occurrence, which was nothing but a new attempt to prevent the departure of the fleet by means of bad omens; possibly, even the Corinthians might have had something to do with it, in order thus to ward off the war which threatened their daughter-city in Sicily. The council deemed it to be their duty to take the matter into their own hands; and as, unfortunately for Athens, their position was not sufficiently independent to allow them to deal with any matter of importance independently of the people, the entire community was immediately made to assist at this police inquiry; so that the party leaders found ample room for the exercise of their influence, while a feverish excitement pervaded all classes of the population.

The commission of inquiry.

The first personage who now steps forward, and is manifestly pursuing definite political objects, is Pisander. He endeavors to represent the discovery of the crime in the interest of the public welfare as a subject before which all others should fall into the background; and brings about a popular decree announcing a reward of 10,000 drachms

(376*l. circ.*) for the first information as to its perpetrators. At the same time, extraordinary powers are conferred upon the council, and a permanent commission of inquiry is nominated. But no discovery ensued; the commissioners and members of the council held their sittings without accomplishing anything. This increased the fears of the public; the atmosphere became more and more stormy, and the state of the public mind more uneasy and anxious, in exact accordance with the wishes of those who were anxious to make capital, for their party purposes, out of the excited passions of the people. These were chiefly men of anti-constitutional sentiments; among them Pisander and Charicles—who, however, at the present moment assumed the pretence of the most vigilant friendship towards popular government, and were the most zealous members of the commission of inquiry. It was partisans of this tendency who took advantage of the mutilation of the Hermæ; and it is therefore extremely probable, that the act itself was directly or indirectly attributable to themselves. They were accordingly best able to prevent any information on the subject reaching the ears of the people, and any discovery being made by the commission. Finally, by means of an understanding with the demagogues, such as Cleonymus and Androcles, who were ready to enter into any combination for bringing about the overthrow of Alcibiades, and with religious fanatics of the stamp of Diopithes (p. 48), who now came forward again, they contrived to advance the whole matter to a new stage.

"The Sacrilegious mutilation of the Hermæ," they said, "is no isolated fact; a vast connection manifests itself between different pernicious tendencies; the city is full of men to whom nothing is sacred: these are radical evils which ought not to be overlooked. Accordingly, the present special inquiry must be extended to the whole field of public religious worship; and a public reward must be announced for all information referring to it."

By the adoption of this motion, the police inquiry into a single criminal excess became a comprehensive judicial inquiry dictated by special views; and to this it was impossible to assign limits in a city where free-thinking was in fashion. The doors were thrown open to informers of all kinds; and the net was cast in which all were to be caught upon whose reputation a blemish rested.

Further denunciations. (Beg. of June, B. C. 415.)

Again weeks passed, before any event of importance occurred. It almost appeared as if the great question of the campaign would throw all others into the shade: the fleet lay in the harbor ready for sailing, and the vessel of Lamachus, who was impatient to start, was already out in the roads. The authority of Alcibiades was still unimpaired, although the ground beneath his feet had been undermined by the club-men and the demagogues. He might hope to step upon the deck of his admiral's vessel without let or hindrance; for already a day had been fixed for the popular assembly, in which the generals were to make their reports as to the completion of the armament, and to receive the final commands of the people. But it was this very day which his adversaries had selected for unfolding their designs; and the military questions, for the discussion of which the meeting had been summoned, were unexpectedly interrupted by the interference of a certain Pythonicus. He mounted the tribune, and loudly and solemnly warned his fellow-citizens to take heed, lest they brought heavy misfortune upon their own heads. Their general, Alcibiades, he declared to be a criminal. He had parodied the Eleusinian mysteries in the house of his dissolute boon-companion Pulytion, and had thus, in the company of other young men, blasphemously desecrated the most sacred thing belonging to the state! A slave was brought forward, who had witnessed the performance, and who mentioned the perpetrators, among them Alcibiades, by name. Most of the accused

took flight before the commencement of the trial, and thus confirmed the truth of the statement. Hereupon, all other matters were suddenly again forgotten, and the passionately-excited people became wholly and entirely occupied with this capital inquiry. Informations flowed in from various sources, from resident aliens, slaves, and women, chiefly in reference to the mysteries. Confiscations of property and executions became events of daily occurrence. Leogoras, the father of Andocides, with difficulty escaped condemnation; for even members of the oligarchic circles of society occasionally fell as victims, and the movement had passed beyond the control of its real authors; the passions of the people had been unchained, and the intrigues of the most opposite parties crossed one another. But the heaviest blow of all fell upon that circle of which Alcibiades was the centre, and he was himself more and more clearly marked out as the focus of all impiety and of all insults to religion in the state. His closest adherents were overawed, and every kind of suspicion was cast upon himself personally. His office as general still protected him from an ordinary prosecution: and thus he continued to resist the tide, though in the face of the greatest difficulties; for he was surrounded by insidious enemies, and yet without any avowed opponent whom he could endeavor to strike down: and was thus caught in a net which he was unable to penetrate. At last he was openly attacked by Androcles, who brought forward a charge in an exceptional form, applicable as against state criminals. Alcibiades was charged with being guilty of the desecration of the mysteries, and with standing at the head of a secret association, whose object it was to overthrow the constitution. The council summoned an assembly of the citizens, in order to commit to the latter the decision of the question, whether the charge against their general was to be entertained or not.

Charge brought forward by Androcles.

The critical moment had arrived, and Alcibiades gathered together all his strength in order to issue forth victoriously from the ordeal. Instead of moving the rejection of the charge, he demanded the most searching inquiry, declaring himself ready in the case of his conviction to suffer the full penalty of the crime; while, in the opposite event, he asked to be left in undisturbed possession of his office and dignity.

Adjournment of the inquiry.

The resolute bearing of Alcibiades brought the matter into a phase unexpected by Androcles and his associates. For they had intended that the citizens should immediately deprive the general of his office; in which case the fleet would have taken its departure, and Alcibiades, deprived of the support of the warlike younger generation, would unquestionably have succumbed to the assaults of his enemies. But now the whole situation of affairs had assumed another aspect. The crews waited for their general, under whom alone they hoped to achieve victory and obtain its spoils; the auxiliaries from Peloponnesus declined to join the expedition, if it were not commanded by him; and he stood himself unbroken and unbent, and ready to defend his cause; and, in case an inquiry actually took place, might reckon upon the support of a strong party. Nothing remained but to attempt a new trick. Accordingly, certain popular speakers were made to propose, seemingly in the interest of Alcibiades himself, that the matter should be left in its present state, lest the general should at the critical moment be involved in interminable inquiries, and that he should not be called to account until after his return. In vain Alcibiades, who saw through the malignant cunning of his adversaries, entreated his fellow-citizens not to listen to this proposal, declaring it to be an unheard-of proceeding to place a general at the head of so important an armament, whilst lying under the cloud of such a charge. If he was to

confront the foe with a whole heart, he must be free from all fear of calumnies behind his back, and possess the full confidence of his fellow-citizens. The multitude entirely failed to comprehend the real point at issue. Alcibiades saw himself outvoted by both friends and foes; and a large majority decreed the adjournment of legal proceedings against him.*

Hereupon the people, easily moved in any direction, once more devoted its undivided attention to the fleet.

The armada sails. Ol. xc. 1. (B.C. 415. Beg. of July.)

The time was the middle of the summer (the beginning of July), and the hundred Attic triremes, viz., sixty fast rowers and forty transports, lay in port ready to sail; if anything was to be done before the present year was at an end, no further time was to be lost. Thus the day of departure was fixed, and at early morning the troops marched out to Dipylum in order to embark. It was an army of chosen troops, composed of 1,500 citizens, clad in heavy armor furnished by themselves, besides 700 equipped at the public cost, a squadron of cavalry, and 750 Peloponnesian soldiers. All Athens accompanied them down to the port; the citizens in order to enjoy a last view of their kinsmen, the resident aliens and strangers as curious lookers-on at so extraordinary a spectacle. Six years and four months had passed since the conclusion of the peace, during which the hostilities which had taken place had been of no importance, and for the most part of brief duration. This circumstance greatly heightened the excitement caused by the commencement of this vast enterprise; and, although already on former occasions considerable fleets had been seen assembled in the Piræeus, yet none had at all equalled the present in splendor: it was an armada such as no single Greek state had ever

* Ἡ τῶν Ἑρμῶν περικοπή: Thuc. vi. 27 sq., 60; Andoc. *de myst.* and *de reditu;* Droysen, in Welcker's *Rhein. Mus.* iii. and iv.

before called into life. For both the state and the citizens individually had risen to extraordinary exertions. The armada was intended to engage not only in naval battles and landings, but also in land-marches, sieges, and conquests; a long absence had to be reckoned upon, and the supplies were provided on a corresponding scale. The equipment of the expedition resembled the preparations for the settlement of a colony in a hostile country. The wealthy citizens who accompanied the armada as trierarchs (vol. ii. p. 525) were animated by the most zealous spirit of emulation. Each desired his rowers to be the best practised, his suits of armor and the equipment of his vessel to be the most complete. The state gave to each seaman a full drachm (9*d.*) as daily wages, amounting to one-third more than the ordinary pay; the trierarchs at their own cost added a further sum for the *Thranitæ* (*i.e.*, the rowers of the topmost bench, whose service was the most arduous), as well as for the steersman. The ships were newly painted, and adorned with heraldic symbols of favorable augury. Everywhere was apparent the influence of Alcibiades, who attached much weight to Athens appearing before the eyes of all the Greeks, not only as a strong power, but also in all possible splendor and pomp, as if what awaited her were not the manifold changes of an arduous war, but an easy and certain victory.

When all the troops were on board, the signal sounded; and the clamor which had filled the port was followed by an interval of solemn silence. The herald raised his voice and recited the customary prayer. On all the ships the words were repeated as with one voice; the people thronging the shore joined in; the smoke ascended from the altars, the goblets were passed round, the libations poured forth, the pæan was raised, and as soon as the sacrifices were completed, the oars struck into the water. In a long procession the ships passed out of the harbor-gate; arrived

outside, they formed in line, and opened the campaign by a joyous race to Ægina. The people looked down upon the departing ships from the Munychian heights, thrilled with the deepest emotions; for in this the hour of farewell the decree of war, to which they had so lightly assented amidst the excitement of the assembly, fell with a dull weight upon their hearts. Not until the present moment had they realized the long parting from their friends and brethren, the uncertainty of ever seeing them again, and the doubtfulness of success. Dark and anxious thoughts changed their proud exultation into melancholy. The seas and coasts to which their fellow-citizens were sailing were unknown to them, and if they remembered what resources the state and citizens had expended upon this fleet while war threatened on all sides at home, they could not but return to their daily avocations with heavy hearts.

Meanwhile the fleet steered from Ægina round the peninsula to Corcyra. Here it was awaited by the vessels of the allies, thirty-four triremes and two Rhodian fifty-oared ships—which were of special importance, considering the relations existing between Rhodes and Sicily—besides thirty transports laden with corn, and at the same time with bakers, carpenters, and handicraftsmen of all kinds on board; and by 100 smaller vessels belonging to private owners and temporarily appropriated by the state, and a number of other craft equipped by traders, who voluntarily joined the armada. The number of heavy-armed troops now amounted to 5,100. Inclusive of the Cretan archers, the Rhodian slingers, and other light-armed troops, among whom were fugitives from Megara, the whole numerical total of the soldiers rose to about 6,500 men. The 134 triremes required 25,460 men for their service. Besides these and the private servants of the soldiers, without taking into account the crews of the commissariat vessels—as to whose numbers it is impossible to form an estimate—and the workmen, the sum total of

the men whom Athens assembled on her vessels against Sicily may be reckoned at 36,000.*

The different plans of the three commanders.

Three vessels preceded the rest of the fleet for the purpose of reconnoitering Sicily; the fleet followed in three divisions, which the generals had distributed amongst themselves by lot. Thus the voyage was accomplished as far as Italy, and then continued in a southward direction along the coast. Here the first experiences made by the fleet were the reverse of agreeable. For of course the natives refused to believe the commanders of such an armada as this, when they declared that nothing was intended beyond the settlement of Sicilian disputes as to boundaries. The cities, with the exception of Thurii, maintained a reserved and suspicious attitude, and refused hospitable admission to the fleet. Tarentum and Locri would not even permit the sailors to fetch supplies of water, and the Athenians met with a reception resembling that of an invaded country, without being able to use force; and here it for the first time showed itself how the numbers of the fleet diminished instead of increasing the chances of success.

Near the city of Rhegium the army sat down in a general encampment, where it intended to rest for a short space of time before commencing active military operations. It was here, too, that for the first time definite plans of war were adopted and discussed.

Nicias once more endeavored to restrict the whole undertaking to the narrowest limits. The promises of the Egestæans, he showed to have proved entirely false, according to his prediction, as soon as they had to make

* Date of the departure of the armada, *θέρους μεσοῦντος ἤδη* (Thuc. vi. 30), but still *Ἀριμνήστου ἄρχοντος*: Isæus vi. 14, p. 77, ed. Schœmann; *Rhein. Mus.* p. 170. As to the size of the armament, see Boeckh, *P. E.* p. 266 [E. Tr.]; cf. Wölfflin, in *N. Schweizer Museum*, 1866, p. 251.

good their words, and this, he declared, amounted to an additional reason, why the expedition should confine itself to the most necessary proceedings. It would be sufficient to force the Selinuntians to conclude peace, to endeavor to accomplish something in favor of the Leontinians, and then return home. His proposals, as he could not but have expected, met with the strongest resistance on the part of both his colleagues. But they too differed from one another in their views. Lamachus advocated a rapid attack upon Syracuse, where everything was still in a state of the greatest confusion, inasmuch as up to the last moment the fact of the actual approach of an Attic fleet had been refused credit. To delay the attack would merely endanger its success, by enabling the city to increase its armaments, and the whole island to unite more closely. Alcibiades can scarcely have failed to perceive that this plan was the best. But a rapid success was by no means his main object. He wished to take up a settled position on the island; he desired the war to take a course in which he should play the leading part; above all, he wished in the first instance to assert his personal influence in Sicily, in order here, as he had done elsewhere, to surround himself with a body of adherents. He therefore took advantage of the timidity of Nicias, in order to carry the less bold plan of operations. The cities of the island were to be gained over to the side of Athens by means of well-conducted negotiations—their ample resources were thus to be made use of; the discontented party men, deserters, and slaves were to be attracted; and thus the Athenians were, in a certain sense as a Sicilian power, to oppose Syracuse, and, after cutting the city off from all her allies, to bring about her fall.*

The plan of Alcibiades is adopted.

Alcibiades was now in his element. He conducted

* Thuc. vi. 47.

Alcibiades summoned to Athens by the Salaminia.

a division of the fleet to the east coast of the island; made himself, without any difficulty, master of Naxos; frightened the Syracusans in their own harbor by means of daring cruises; occupied Catana; and thus secured for the Athenians a well-situated station and harbor in the island itself, whence they might disturb the safety of the Syracusans, and bring the rest of the territory of the island into their possession. Thus, after the favorable opportunity of unexpectedly striking one decisive blow had passed by, a plan of operations was agreed upon, the success of which depended solely upon Alcibiades personally; nor could there be any doubt, but that the unstable Siceliotes, as well as the native Siculi, would allow themselves to be gained over by skilful negotiations. But scarcely had this plan been determined upon when the Salaminia, the Athenian vessel of state, arrived off Catana, with orders that Alcibiades was to return home immediately, in order to justify himself before the people in the matter of the mysteries, and on account of the mutilation of the Hermæ.*

Disturbances at Athens.

Fresh disturbances had broken out at Athens after the departure of the armada. The party leaders, whose attempts had still fallen short of their object, took advantage of the points in the situation more favorable for their purpose, of the feelings of a void in the action of the state and of intolerable suspense, which now prevailed. A walk along the streets of the city was sufficient to recall the yet unsolved enigma; and to the itch of curiosity was added the craving after some fresh excitement, to which the people had now become habituated. A large number of citizens in the prime of life were absent. The party leaders had remained behind; the commission of inquiry

* Thuc. vi. 61; Plut. *Alc.* c. 22.

was still sitting, and fostered the flame of the public anger; the ancient bugbear of the Tyrannis was once more brought forward, and the remembrance of the deeds of Hippias recalled, in order to prevent the public mind from recovering its calm. The first result obtained was a change of opinion in reference to Alcibiades. His enemies fell upon him in his absence with complete success, as all his adherents were away on the fleet. Those of his friends and relatives who had remained at home were pursued, arrested, and condemned. Soon matters had fallen into a worse state than ever before. The worthiest citizens succumbed to the charges of the vilest fellows. No man was sure of his personal safety; not even the consciousness of innocence afforded a pledge of security. For a state of feeling prevailed in which every charge was believed, and the most absurd charge met with the readiest credit. Friends of Alcibiades were said to have entered into a conspiracy at Argos against the democracy: this was declared a prelude of what Athens had to expect. Lacedæmonian troops appeared at the Isthmus; this venture must have been undertaken in consequence of an understanding with the conspirators: and the people was fully convinced that Alcibiades was working in Sicily with the view of overthrowing popular government at Athens. The feeling of annoyance at the abject worship formerly paid to him helped to deprive the present wrath of the people against him of all reason and measure.

Dioclides.

Next, a mass of accusations were brought by divers informers, which for the moment diverted public attention from Alcibiades personally. First (towards the end of July) Dioclides informed against forty-two Athenians, whom he professed to have recognized by the light of the full moon as the mutilators of the Hermæ on the fatal night in May. His whole statement was unsupported by the faintest proof; and yet Pisander, as if the existence of the state were at stake,

dared to propose the most extraordinary measures. The rights of citizens were suspended, and the application of torture sanctioned, even in the case of free Athenians; the whole community stood under arms for the period of a night and a day, and trembled at enemies within and without the walls, although no actual danger could be demonstrated. Meanwhile guilty and innocent persons had been equally placed under arrest:—loyal adherents of the constitution, such as Eucrates the brother of Nicias; followers of Alcibiades, such as Critias the son of Callæschus; and partisans of oligarchical tendencies, such as Leogoras and Andocides. There was no attempt at any regular procedure; blind passion had the upper hand. Justice was administered after the fashion of despotic states, where every event out of the common order is regarded as a mark of treasonable designs. In the present case, the people was the suspicious despot, and everywhere scented conspiracy and high treason, obeying in its folly the lead of men whose sole fundamental object was the overthrow of the constitution.

Andocides.

The most melancholy end now awaiting one and all of the arrested persons, Andocides resolved to make a fresh statement. Impunity was all the more readily promised him, because from him, sooner than from any one else, might be expected a full confession of the truth; for he had from the first been considered to be one of the guilty; and the strange circumstance, that the Hermes before his house, which was distinguished for its beauty, had remained uninjured, had increased the suspicion against him. Andocides hereupon declared that the offence had been committed at the instigation of a certain Euphiletus, and by the members of an association to which he, Andocides, himself belonged. His statement directly contradicted that of Dioclides. The two statements were compared, and it was now for

the first time remembered that the act had been perpetrated, not at the season of the full moon, but at that of the new. In short, Dioclides was declared a shameless and corrupt liar, and, after having been very recently lauded as a preserver and benefactor of the state, was executed as a criminal.

Condemnation of Alcibiades.

At last a period of calm seemed to have been reached; the danger was over, it was now possible to breathe more freely; and it was universally believed that the real authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ had been discovered and punished. But the information obtained was not considered sufficient; the people refused to believe that no serious danger had really existed, that no overthrow of the constitution had been intended, and that all these troubles had been caused by the mad freak of a drinking-party. The public excitement, which required some particular object upon which to vent itself, was now again directed against Alcibiades, although Andocides had not informed against him. Once more his enemies combined; oligarchs and demagogues united with those who were above all zealous for the state religion, for the purpose of striking the decisive blow. The affair of the mysteries was reopened. On this head Alcibiades had unquestionably offended; and this fact the people now considered as equivalent to evidence of Tyrannical designs. The occurrences at Argos, the march of the Spartans, the movements of the Bœotians on the frontier of Attica,—all these events were absurdly connected with one another, and regarded as a scheme of Alcibiades for placing his native city in the hands of her foes. Thessalus, the son of Cimon, who belonged to the oligarchical party, brought forward the charge before the people, accusing Alcibiades of having, with his companions, by parodying the mysteries, sinned against the Eleusinian goddesses. He described the occurrence so minutely as to leave no room for a doubt

as to its truth, while as to the rest he prudently confined himself to facts, and left it to the people to draw the ultimate conclusions. Thus he achieved a complete success. Alcibiades was recalled in the midst of the undertaking which, in the way in which it had been actually set about, could be carried out by no man except himself. He was not powerful enough to refuse obedience to the commands of the citizens; but he was determined not to appear before his judges. When the Salaminia returned to Athens without the accused, he was condemned to death in his absence, his property confiscated, and the curse of the priests pronounced upon him as a traitor against the state.

Results of the party intrigues.

This was the first victory achieved by party intrigues at Athens over the state and its interests; the end of a struggle which had for months agitated the community, and brought into play all the decomposing elements existing in it: hatred and passion, impudent audacity and hypocrisy, superstitious terror and frivolous insolence. It was a victory of the revolution over law and usage; and therefore society had not only most heavily suffered under it externally in the shape of banishments, confiscations, and capital sentences, but had also been affected in its innermost life by the consequences resulting from this victory; the sense of right and wrong was blunted, and the voice of morality drowned. Day after day the citizens had seen the most sacred ties disregarded, accused persons sacrificing those who had become their bail, and witnesses unblushingly uttering false testimony. Things had come to such a pass, that a Dioclides was crowned with the wealth bestowed upon public benefactors, and conducted in the chariot of honor to banquet in the Prytaneum; although, even before he was unmasked, he had shown himself to be a man who let it depend entirely on the question of pecuniary profit, whether he should speak or remain silent. The

sur-excited minds of the populace were no longer to be satisfied with ordinary trials; in feverish excitement they followed the windings of a criminal justice working in the dark, in favor of which they became accustomed to sacrifice the enjoyment of the most important of civic rights. Accusation and condemnation seemed to be identical Accordingly, by far the greater number of trials dealt with absent persons. The patrimony of ancient families was sold into strange hands; while the large number of fugitives could not but serve to disclose, to the enemies lying in wait outside, the actual condition of Attic society. Subsequently, indeed, most of the exiles were reinstated in their property, but the ancient evils continued to exercise their effects; a general feeling of mistrust and insecurity remained; and public confidence was permanently weakened by the fact, that, notwithstanding all the inquiries instituted, the mutilation of the Hermæ remained for all time an unsolved enigma to the Athenians.*

The law of Syracosius.

Resort was had to extraordinary measures, in order at last to divert the attention of the citizens from these matters, and in particular to force the comic poets to renounce their constant practice, and abstain from introducing upon the stage the events of the summer. Accordingly, about the season when the new comedies were prepared for the winter and spring festivals of Dionysus, a law was passed prohibiting the poets from making personal allusions to the events of the day. The mover of this law was a popular orator, Syracosius by name. Many might be

* The trustworthiness of the information given by Andocides is doubted by Thuc. vi. 60. It seems probable that the mutilation of the Hermæ was due to the Hetæries of Andocides and Euphiletus. The *loc. class.* as to the use made of the occurrence against Alcibiades is in Isocr. xvi. 347: ἅπαντες ἴσασιν ὅτι διὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἡ δημοκρατία κατελύθη κἀκεῖνος (Alc). ἐκ τῆς πολεως ἐξέπεσεν. As to the admission of Dioclides to the Prytaneum, see Andoc. *de myst.* § 45.

anxious to prevent the same mire from being ever and ever again stirred up; most of all, those whose evil conscience made them afraid of the ridicule and wrath of the poets. Thus the law of Syracosius also may with much probability be assumed to have mainly had for its authors those whose insidious intrigues had overthrown Alcibiades, and who, after accomplishing their end, were pre-eminently anxious to leave well alone what was past and gone.

Aristophanis Aves. Ol. xci. 2. (B.C. 414.) March.

It was therefore perceptible in all the three comedies acted upon the great Dionysia (March, B.C. 414, Ol. xci. 2), that a restraint had been put upon the liberty of the stage; and yet it was this season of suppression which produced the boldest and most joyous of all the flights of the Aristophanic muse, as if she had at this very time been desirous of showing that true art is able to triumph over all restrictions, and bears its liberty in itself as an inalienable right. For the two other plays competing with his, the *Night-Revellers* (*Comastæ*), produced under the name of Amipsias, and the *Hermit* of Phrynichus, betrayed the wrath of the poets, who against their will renounced their accustomed license. Phrynichus openly curses Syracosius for having deprived him of his best subject-matter, and the hero of his piece is a man of the stamp of Timon, at that time a well-known personage at Athens, a hater of human kind, full of a deep loathing of all civil society. The poetic spirit of Aristophanes on the other hand soared in serene fancy above the troubles of the present, and in his *Birds* the Athenians beheld a city building itself up between heaven and earth, a blissful New Athens, inaccessible to the foe, innocent and secure, ruling the world and the gods at the same time; for even the latter were obliged to acknowledge the new settlement, or have the heavily-laden smoke of sacrifice cut off from them. At the same time the cloud-city in the air is by no means wholly un-

connected with the Athens of the day. For the two Athenians who emigrate in order to make their fortune amongst the Birds are unable to support any longer the state of things at home, in the so-called city of liberty, where no honest citizen is any longer safe against inquiries imperilling life and property, where in the streets and on the market he has to fear the runners of justice, and abroad on every coast the Salaminia. And in the establishment of the Birds' town good care is taken to exclude objectionable folk. For those who wish to force an entrance, and who belong to the class which at that time raised the loudest clamor at Athens—manufacturers of laws, oracle-mongers, prophets, informers, commissaries of police, sophistic wind-bags, and the rest—are pitilessly refused admission, lest they should disturb the peace of the new city. Thus Aristophanes conjured up before the eyes of his fellow-citizens a fantastic world glittering in a hundred colors, a world full of poetical beauty, which on the one hand had power once again to elevate and refresh the soul, but which on the other reflects in a faithful mirror the frivolous character of the Athenians, and chastises, by exposing its errors and defects, their social system.*

The war in Sicily.

The recall of Alcibiades exercised a most baneful influence upon the progress of the war, for he found an opportunity of taking vengeance upon the Athenians at an extremely sensitive point. His penetrating glance had recognized the im-

* As to the law of Syracosius, cf. Schol. Ar. *Av.* 1297; Aristid. iii. p. 444, Dd. The last Schol. is too confused to admit of any conclusion being drawn from it with regard to Alcibiades. For the different views of modern writers, see Hertzberg, p. 210. I incline to think the view of Droysen (*Rh. Mus.* iv. p. 59) correct; the chief anxiety of the oligarchs was, *ut ne sua flagitia palam castigarentur* (Cobet, Plat. *Rel.* 41).—The reproving tendency of the *Aves* has been very well brought out by Kochly, *U. d. V. d. A.* 1857.—As to the allusion to Nicias in the *Amphiaraus*, acted at the Lenæa of the same year, see Cobet, p. 41.

portance which could not fail to attach to the city of Messana (Zancle), on account of its situation and excellent harbor, in any Sicilian war carried on upon a grand scale. The sound of Messana offered the most convenient station for the fleet, which from this quarter could reach all the important coast-places of Sicily, control the importation of supplies, and observe the movements in progress in the neighboring cities of Italy. In short, Messana was the central position alone corresponding to the schemes of Alcibiades. The population was originally Ionic (p. 215); and even among the Dorian families of Messenian origin, settled here by Anaxilaus, a perceptible good-will existed towards the cause of the Athenians, particularly as Messana had herself had sufficient experience of the rule of Syracuse. A considerable party had already been gained over to the side of the Athenians, and every preliminary measure had been taken by the latter, in order, with the help of this party, to obtain possession of the city and its harbor, by which means the subsequent operations of the Athenians would have been furthered in an incalculable measure. Now, however, the very first proceeding of Alcibiades was to send information of the pro-Athenian intrigues to the Syracusan party at Messana, who on receiving these advices put to death the friends of Athens in the city, and took the most vigorous measures for warding off attacks of the fleet.

Furthermore, the removal of Alcibiades provoked much discontent in the army, and gave a shock to the confidence of the troops of the Peloponnesians in particular, whose eyes had already during the delay at Athens been opened to a position of affairs in the state such as could not serve to encourage them. The councils of the army grew feeble and lax; there was absent the personal animation proceeding from the one man, who contrived to communicate to those around him the feelings of self-consciousness and assurance of victory pervading himself. The supreme

command of the whole expedition was now in the hands of a general as to whom it was known, and daily became more evident, that he mistrusted the success of the undertaking. The plan of operations, commenced upon a grand scale and to a certain degree successfully, had to be relinquished; and thus the precious time of three summer months was simply lost. For Nicias in the main resumed his original plan, proceeding with all possible caution, timidly keeping in view the original cause of the war (which cause had now in reality become a matter of utter indifference), and in accordance with his love of economy providing for the acquisition of pecuniary resources. He proceeded along the north coast to Egesta. On the way an attempt was made to take possession of Himera, a place likely to be gained, on account of its mixed population; but the Athenians were refused admittance, and were only able to take the small town of Hyccara, which was at enmity with Egesta, and to sell its inhabitants into slavery. In Egesta itself Nicias managed to collect not more than thirty talents; and thus the summer came to an end. What had been done amounted to nothing. The small successes actually obtained had been accompanied by deeds of cruelty, whose only effect could be to exasperate the Siceliotes; all attempts of greater importance —in the last instance an attack upon Hybla, on the southern base of Mount Ætna—had resulted in failure.

Nicias besieges Syracuse. Ol. xci. 2. (B.C. 415.) November.

The consequence was a change of public feeling in the Sicilian cities, and particularly at Syracuse, which very speedily made itself perceptible. The first stupefying fear of the approach of the hostile armada had been overcome; and the mobility of mind peculiar to the Siceliotes now caused terror to change into contempt, and fear into audacity and insolence. Syracusan horsemen rode up to the gates of the camp of the Athenians, inquiring how they were satisfied with the island, where, as it appeared,

it was their intention to settle as colonists. The position of Nicias was an exceedingly painful and difficult one. He saw that it was incumbent on him to strike a blow, in order to vindicate the honor of the Athenian arms and prevent an outbreak of discontent in the army; he recognized the necessity of making an attack upon Syracuse, but he was at the same time fearful of approaching it, because the enemy's cavalry rendered every attempt at landing hazardous. He accordingly resorted to stratagems and deceptions, less in conformity with his own method of making war than with the character of Alcibiades. A secret partisan of the Athenians contrived to delude the Syracusans into the belief, that by an attack of the whole body of their cavalry they might make themselves masters of the ill-guarded camp of the Athenians. The Syracusans marched out, while Nicias simultaneously, at night-time, sailed into the harbor of Syracuse. Next morning his army, to the surprise of the Syracusans, stood in the district of the Olympieum (p. 255), where an entrenched camp was pitched on the bank of the Anapus, before the cavalry had returned to the city.* But although the stratagem had been completely successful, and although the first battle between the Syracusans and Athenians ended in favor of the latter, whose military superiority was thus placed beyond doubt; yet the result of the whole enterprise amounted to nothing. Nicias designedly neglected the opportunity of taking possession of the treasures of the Olympieum, because he feared the wrath of the gods above all other things; nor was he, when the winter approached, sufficiently daring to maintain his position, but only once more convinced himself, that a siege of Syracuse was impossible without cavalry and an ampler supply of money. An attempt to obtain possession of Messana before the commencement of

* Thuc. vi. 65.

winter was equally unsuccessful, although in that city, even after the execution of the Attic party leaders, a part of the population rushed to arms in favor of the Athenians. For thirteen days the latter lay with their fleet before Messana, which was distracted by domestic broils, and were then forced by storm and want of provisions to quit the fair harbor without having achieved their object, and to establish their winter-quarters as best they could, half-way between Catana and Messana, near the city of Naxos (vol. i. p. 467).

Change of popular feeling in Syracuse.

The failure of the attack upon Messana was equivalent to a victory for Syracuse. But even the battle fought by the Syracusans in the immediate vicinity of their own city, though a defeat, was upon the whole advantageous to them in its results. For the stratagem employed by Nicias amounted to a confession of his own weakness. Moreover, the Syracusans had now had an opportunity of acquainting themselves with their own weak points, and, after having once seen the foe before their gates, had become more vigilant, united, active, and, above all, more open to the advice of those whose wisdom and experience enabled them to lead the community in seasons of danger. Thus Hermocrates' opportunity had once more arrived. Already, about the middle of summer, he had predicted all the events to be anticipated, and had urged the Syracusans to arm both by land and by sea, to seek for allies abroad, applying even to Carthage, and to re-unite the states of Sicily for the purpose of carrying on the war in common. He had even recommended, as the best plan, that of sending the entire fleet to meet the Athenians as far as the Iapygian promontory, there to prevent them from entering into the Sicilian waters, and thus if possible to ward off the whole war and all its troubles. Against this proposal Athenagoras, the leader of the popular party, had exerted his influence. For at Syracuse the

opposition between the parties was such, that every proposal emanating from the one side was, as a matter of course, resisted by the other. Hermocrates had made no motion touching upon points of political differences, and yet he was attacked with savage vehemence by his opponents. They declared this to be nothing but one of the ordinary intrigues of the nobles and rich, who, by means of false or exaggerated announcements, excited the people, in order thus to obtain an opportunity for satisfying their impatient ambition by high offices and extraordinary powers.

Hermocrates in power. *Ol.* xci. 2. (B. C. 415-14.)

When the course of events with equally incontestable force confuted and humiliated the democratic party leaders and confirmed the predictions of Hermocrates, when the direct attack carried out by Nicias removed all doubts as to the necessity of placing the government of the state in strong and firm hands, the Syracusans recognized the value of their great fellow-citizen, whom in ordinary times the noisy demagogues outclamored and calumniated, but whom it was ever found necessary to call to the helm when a tempest lowered. He alone in the populous city was a man, he was a statesman intimately acquainted with the strong and with the weak points of the Athenians; a brave and sagacious general, and a leader in whom the other cities confided. Without Hermocrates, Sicily would have exactly corresponded to the picture which Alcibiades had sketched before the Attic assembly of the cities of Sicily, as unstable in themselves and discordant among one another. Hermocrates was the most dangerous enemy of the Athenians in the island. Already on a previous occasion, as peacemaker at Gela, he had inflicted a defeat upon their policy; he was their equal in word and deed, and their superior inasmuch as he was the champion of a good cause, and acted with the courage arising from a pure conscience.

To him were in the first place due most important

reforms in the army system. The democratic tendency had, from fear of the abuse of the power in a general's hand, given rise to the institution of a board of fifteen military commanders. Hermocrates, on the contrary, insisted on their number being limited to three, upon whom a larger amount of official authority was conferred. Their duty was to consist, during the winter months, in converting the citizens into a soldiery fit for active service, so as to be a match for the Athenians in equipment, discipline, and drill; while the citizens, for their part, bound themselves by an oath not to hinder the generals in taking their measures according to the best of their judgment, so that their orders, when necessary, might be executed with rapidity and secrecy. Thus at Syracuse, as at Athens (vol. ii. p. 503), the increase of the authority of the generals operated as an antidote against the evils of the democratic constitution, and Hermocrates (who was elected to the generalship, together with Heraclides and Sicanus,) now assumed a position in the state comparable to that of Pericles at the commencement of the campaigns of Archidamus.

Armaments of the Syracusans. *Ol.* xci. 2. (B.C. 415–14.)

Under the guidance of Hermocrates measures were, above all, taken to enlarge and complete the fortifications of the city. Syracuse was at that time composed of three towns—the island, Achradina, and Tyche (p. 207); to the south of Tyche lay the open suburb of Temenites, with the temple of Apollo in its centre. This suburb was now enclosed in the lines of the city fortifications, the south side being fortified along the border of the table-land, and the west side made secure by adding to the length of the walls of Tyche. Thus the entire inhabited table-land was now shut off against attacks from without, by means of a single line of walls; it being thus rendered a far more difficult task for the enemy to approach the inner quarters of the city. To protect the sea-shore, two forts were

built as outworks: one on the outer sea near Megara, the other near the Olympieum, on the border of the great harbor, a fortified station for the cavalry, who were from this point to command the low country on the banks of the Anapus. All points in the vicinity of the city, at which a landing could take place, were rendered inaccessible by the ramming-in of palisades. Hereupon envoys were sent to Peloponnesus to establish an alliance with the cities there, several attempts previously made for the purpose having remained ineffectual. It was hoped, that Sparta might be induced to make an attack such as would prevent the Athenians from sending further support to their army in Sicily. Finally, it was endeavored to counteract the spread of the influence of Athens in Sicily, and Hermocrates himself undertook the most difficult task of this kind, proceeding as envoy to the neighbor of Syracuse, Camarina: which city the Athenians, appealing to a previous alliance in the time of Laches (p. 259), were attempting to gain over to their side. Hermocrates endeavored to convince the Camarinæans of the secret lust of conquest animating the Athenians; he declared Syracuse to be the one bulwark of the liberty of the Siceliotes; and was at all events so far successful, that the city, which above all others had good reason for distrusting Syracuse (p. 220), refused to join the Athenians.* Gela and Acragas also remained neutral.

Such was the use made of the winter months. Syracuse now for the first time became a city capable of offering resistance to a siege, while the Athenians sat inactive in their camp, without advancing their interests, except by increasing the number of their adherents in the interior of the island through negotiations and violence, and by giving early orders among their original allies for all the materials requisite for conducting a great siege. But they

* Thuc. vi. 75.

took other measures of a wider scope. They went so far as to send envoys even to Carthage and to the Tyrrhenians, with applications for their assistance as allies; and thus the spring of Ol. xci. 2 (B. C. 414) opened the new year of the war, amidst stronger and more general agitations of hope and fear than had accompanied the commencement of any previous year. From all the coasts of the Mediterranean the Greek states, as well as the neighboring barbarians, regarded with a steady gaze of attention the theatre of war on the east coast of Sicily. All were more or less nearly concerned in the result of the mighty struggle now imminent.

Meanwhile in the Athenian camp the impatience of the army had risen to a climax. It was well known how the Syracusans from day to day increased their capability of resistance; and yet the Athenian soldiers, while waiting for the arrival of the promised reinforcements, were obliged to content themselves with forays into the fields near Syracuse, and with conquering small pieces of land round the base of Mount Ætna, in order to supplement and secure the small territory previously obtained there; and even in these attempts their success was very incomplete, for among the mountain castles, which lay threatening above their heads, they were, even after a succession of several attacks, unable to take Hybla and Inessa, Centoripæ alone falling into their hands.*

The Athenians reinforced. Ol. xci. 2. (B. C. 414.) Spring.

At last there arrived from Athens the 250 horsemen, who were mounted in Sicily, a squadron of bowmen on horseback, and 300 talents of silver for the military chest. As it was possible, with the aid of the allies, to increase the numbers of the cavalry to 650 horse, the army hereupon (towards the commencement of the summer)

* As to the forts at the base of Ætna, see J. Schubring in *Zeitschr. f allg. Erdk.* xvii. g. 451.

started in full force on its march against Syracuse. Fortunately, there now at all events no longer existed any doubt as to the object in view; there could no more be any question as to different plans of operations. The object of the Athenian army was to employ its whole strength for the purpose of utterly overwhelming Syracuse; and thus it was well, that by the side of Nicias stood so brave and daring a soldier as Lamachus.

The generals were kept fully informed by their friends at Syracuse of everything which had been done there, as well as of everything which had been omitted; they were acquainted with the weak points in the situation of the city, which, notwithstanding all its advantages, labored under the one great defect of being extremely decentralized and difficult to command at a glance. The increase in the numbers of the population had led to a gradual accumulation of inhabitants on the terraced height, no other extension of the city being possible. The terrace in question stretches as one monotonous plateau to so great a distance to the west, that there was in this instance no question of natural boundaries to the city, such as the Greeks everywhere else endeavored to establish. The entire division of the table-land outside the limits of the city bore the name of Epipolæ; this was the western portion of the triangular terrace, which converges to a point, and extends into the country in a cuneiform shape from the direction of Achradina; while Euryalus formed the apex of this vast triangle, which ought properly to have constituted the end point of the circumvallation of the city. The Syracusans were alive to the danger which would inevitably threaten them, if these localities, together with their eminences towering above the city, and with the conduits supplying it with water, fell into the enemy's hands. They remembered how already, on a former occasion, the inner city had been reduced by a force occupying the same position

(p. 261). But, since it was impossible to extend the fortifications as far as Euryalus, the Syracusans contented themselves with closing, as far as possible, all means of access; and moreover held in readiness against any attack upon Epipolæ light-armed troops for the defence of the threatened points. It is, however, incomprehensible how the Syracusans should have apprehended danger only from the side of the harbor, notwithstanding that the heights of Epipolæ on the other side lay in still closer proximity to the sea, which moreover in this quarter forms a crescent-shaped bay, open to the east, but protected on the north side by a rocky peninsula named Thapsus.

Capture of Epipolæ. Ol. xci. 2. (B.C. 414.) June.

It was, therefore, a happy thought on the part of the Attic generals, to constitute this bay the basis of their operations. They unexpectedly land at this point, and disembark troops in the middle of the bay near Leon. These troops at a rapid pace climb the summits of Epipolæ, distant from them only 2,000 feet if measured by a straight line, and take possession of these heights, while the Syracusan troops charged with their defence, and commanded by Diomilus, an Andrian refugee, are under arms on the bank of the Anapus. As soon as the troops of Diomilus learn what has occurred, they immediately hurry to the spot; but, having to run up-hill for more than half an hour's distance, arrive at the summit breathless and in disorder, and are in consequence beaten back with great loss. The Athenians remain masters of the height: they fortify Labdalum, a place on the north rim of Epipolæ above Leon, whence a view was to be obtained over the bays of Thapsus and Megara; they establish their headquarters in Labdalum; and at the same time build a fortified station for their fleet on the peninsula of Thapsus, whose narrow isthmus they close up towards the land, at the same time levelling the road which connects in the shortest line the shore and the height.

Construction of Fort Syce and the bifurcate walls.

After they had secured to themselves an impregnable position above, and had made themselves masters of the wide locality of Epipolæ, from the prominent points of which they could command a view of the entire triangle of the terrace, including both city and suburb, towards the sea on either side, they without further delay proceeded to establish the blockade itself. For this purpose they built, to the south of Labdalum, in the middle of the terrace (*i. e.*, at an equal distance from its north and south rim, from the great harbor and the bay of Thapsus), on a spot deriving from its fig-trees the name of Syce, a circular fort, with out-works of considerable strength. They thus obtained a strong position in closer proximity to the city, which was at the same time to constitute the centre of the line of blockade. The Athenians now had an opportunity of giving splendid proof of their efficiency and skill. The fortress rose suddenly from the ground, so as to fill the Syracusans with astonishment and terror; all their attacks were beaten back, and before they were prepared, the first line of bifurcate walls was in progress, running out from the round fort in a north-easterly direction, straight across the ridge of Epipolæ, being designed thus to extend as far as the outer sea. The erection of this line of wall was simultaneously carried on at either end; at the one by the garrison of Epipolæ, at the other by the ships' crews.

Dangerous situation of the Syracusans.

Hereupon the Syracusans changed their plan of operations. They relinquished their attempts to resist in the open field an enemy, who had on his side preponderating advantages of position and experience, and determined to erect counter-walls, to run across the Athenian lines of circumvallation, and thus prevent the completion of the blockade. They accordingly cut down the olive-trees in the suburb of Temenites, and, endeavoring to emulate the skill of the Athenians, inserted a passage in the gaps of

the enemy's works. The Athenians allowed them to proceed undisturbed, and then evinced the superiority of their own skill by destroying all the counter-works so laboriously erected. Having thus at this point overcome all difficulties, and removed all fear of danger, they considered it advisable, before completing the one line of the bifurcate walls, to commence building the second, which it was necessary to conduct towards the south from the central fort, so as to connect it with the shore in the harbor. This task was, however, by far more difficult of execution, because the Athenians were here more exposed to the attacks of the Syracusans, and had to build first on a rocky declivity, and then through a deep morass. Before the Athenians had carried their works across, the Syracusans had already crossed the line of blockade with a cross wall. Hereupon the Athenians sent their fleet from the outer sea round Achradina and Ortygia into the harbor, in order to have their ships at hand, and then, effecting a passage across the morass by means of broad planks of wood and wings of doors, made an attack upon the enemy's counterwork. This they destroyed, and again, notwithstanding the desperate bravery displayed by the Syracusans, remained the victors in every contest. Although Lamachus fell in these conflicts, and Nicias himself was forced by sickness to remain behind in the round fort, yet the success of the Athenians was complete; so that there seemed no doubt of their being able to establish an unbroken blockade, and thus bring about the fall of Syracuse; since even aid from abroad, if it should arrive so late, would then be of no avail.

The report of this condition of affairs spread through Sicily and Italy. Supplies of provisions and auxiliaries arrived in increased numbers in the Athenian camp; even the Tyrrhenians, who wished to share in the overthrow of their ancient foe, sent three fifty-oared vessels to join the Attic fleet. In Syracuse, on the other hand, discourage-

ment prevailed; all further attempts at preventing the completion of the blockade were relinquished, and a scarcity of the necessaries of life made itself perceptible. The aqueducts were for the most part in the hands of the Athenians, who used them for their own purposes, and diverted the drinking-water from its course towards the city. The population of Syracuse was ill-adapted for submitting to deprivations; capitulation began to be openly talked of, and negotiations were opened with Nicias.

The democrats took advantage of this state of affairs to overthrow Hermocrates; three new generals were nominated, Heraclides alone among the former generals remaining in office. Thus the Syracusans in their hour of danger deprived themselves of the only support which remained to them. Exasperation, distrust, and despair increased in the city; and her ruin seemed inevitable.*

In the last hour, after Hermocrates had already retired, and after all resources in the city itself had come to an end, aid unexpectedly offered itself from without. A change occurred in the position of the combatants—a change occasioned by Alcibiades.

Escape of Alcibiades.

The crew of the Salaminia (p. 360), which had been commissioned with his recall, had orders to treat him with every possible consideration, in order not to exasperate the troops. Lest he should appear to be held as a prisoner, he was to follow on his own vessel. It thus very naturally suggested itself to him not to follow at all. And such

* Capture of Epipolæ: Thuc. vi. 97. As to Labdalum and Syce, v. Schubring, *d. Beiträge. v. Syracus* (*Philol.* xxii. p. 629); as to Leon, *ib.* p. 630; as to the use made by the Athenians of the aqueducts, *ib.* p. 629. With regard to the fact of the latter having been filled up with earth or diverted into another course, see Thuc. vi. 100: διέφθειραν τοὺς ὀχετούς. For this reason the aqueducts were subsequently entirely included in the city walls. Schubring, *a. a.* p. 630.

was very possibly the object of his enemies themselves. In their vehemence they had undermined the very foundations of the state, reckless as to any misery which might thence accrue to guilty or to innocent, so long as they brought about the removal of the hated demagogue. They would most fully compass their end if he did not return at all; for his presence might exercise an effect on which it was impossible to calculate. Thus are to be explained the instructions given to the Salaminia, doubtless drawn up by the commission of inquiry under the influence of Pisander. Alcibiades, for his part, was not inclined to risk his life at Athens. His conscience was not clear, and he was deprived of the support of his adherents. Accordingly, he speedily determined upon his course of action. He resolved to take vengeance for the insidious malignity of his enemies, who far surpassed him in all evil devices, to chastise the contemptible fickleness of the multitude, and at the same time to give a new proof of his own superiority, and to show how victory passed to whatever side he joined. Moreover, this appeared to be the only method by which he might at last in his native city itself compass his ultimate objects. Athens was to experience the fearful significance of the enmity of Alcibiades, in order that afterwards, amidst the bitter sufferings she had brought upon herself, she might more completely than ever throw herself into his arms. Thus he commenced his awful work, keeping in view no other but his personal interests, and careless whether his conduct might ruin his native city, and whether the wounds dealt her by him were capable, or incapable, of being healed. He deemed himself powerful enough to make the fate of the Greek states depend upon himself alone.*

* Grote (vii. 288) also considers that the flight of Alcibiades was in accordance with the wishes of his enemies.

Alcibiades in Sparta. Ol. xci. 2. (B.C. 414.) April.

From Thurii, whither he had withdrawn himself from the eyes of the crew of the Salaminia, Alcibiades passed to the Peloponnesus, and paid a visit to Elis and Argos. In the latter place the news reached him of his condemnation to death at Athens. A homeless outlaw, despoiled of all his possessions, and, like Themistocles of old, pursued by Attic emissaries who demanded his surrender, he resolved to pass over to the enemies of his native city, amongst whom he might soonest hope to find personal security and opportunity for revenge. Accordingly, after, by virtue of his ancient relations of mutual hospitality (p. 303), securing a safe conduct to Sparta, he reached the latter city during the winter, about the same time that the maritime expedition of the Athenians had called forth the greatest excitement among the Peloponnesian states, when the envoys of the Syracusans arrived from Corinth, and, eagerly supported by the Corinthians, demanded active aid. Thus Sparta stood, as she had eighteen years before, at the threshold of a war, now, as then, urged on by her allies: herself now, as then, hesitating and doubtful. The authorities of the state were crippled by their ancient aversion from entering upon undertakings of a wide scope; and wished to content themselves with empty embassies.

Alcibiades was the very man to rouse the Spartans from their remissness by the fire of his eloquence, to inflame their passions and unchain their powers of action. The admirable elasticity of his mind soon enabled him to overcome all the obstacles in the way of his acquiring influence at Sparta. He flattered the people, as well as the individual personages of note; he declared his allegiance to the principles of Sparta, and adapted himself to the usages of life prevailing there. Like Themistocles among the Persians, so Alcibiades among the Lacedæmonians appealed to the good offices which he had performed for

them in Athens, especially with regard to the prisoners from Pylus. He declared that he had left no means untried towards reviving the ancient relations of mutual hospitality between his house and Sparta, while the latter had deeply wounded his feelings by preferring Nicias to him, and had thus forced him to become her enemy. As to his democratic opinions, he had merely adopted the principles which happened to be constitutional at Athens; it was unnecessary for him to state his actual low opinion of their value; and, indeed, he had always to the best of his power opposed the evils of mob-rule. Thus he contrived to justify his political principles no less than his previous conduct before the Spartans: they were astonished at his wondrous gifts, believed a reconciliation between him and his native city to be an impossibility, and evinced so strong a confidence in him, that in the popular assembly, which was to decide upon the answer to be given to the Syracuso-Corinthian embassy, he was allowed to make his appearance as a public speaker and counsellor of the state.

Hereupon he revealed all the schemes of the war party, the same which he had himself advocated in every way at Athens. Not Syracuse, he declared, was the real object of the present campaign, but Sparta. Therefore the imminent fall of Syracuse, notwithstanding the remoteness of the scene of war, amounted to a direct danger for Sparta herself. Accordingly, no delay should be allowed to intervene, before, on the one hand, troops were despatched to Sicily, and above all, an experienced commander capable of organizing the resistance of the besieged; and before, on the other hand, a direct attack was made upon Athens itself, in order to shake the power of the enemy in his own land: and for this purpose he declared he could give them no better advice than this—to establish a fortified military position in Attica. Finally, he offered personally to undertake any service, however

dangerous, upon which the Lacedæmonians would employ him. There could surely be no doubt that no man was better capable than himself of inflicting damage upon the Athenians; and the Spartans might be equally certain of his sincere wish to inflict such damage. "As long," he frankly avowed, "as I could live and act without personal danger as a citizen in my native city, I loved her; but the malignity of my enemies there has sundered all bonds of affection; and the only means left to me at the present moment of evincing my love towards my native soil is by attempting, in any way open to me, to recover my lost home." The only interpretation which the Spartans could put upon this avowal was, that the sole object of Alcibiades was, in conjunction with them, to make himself master of Athens.

Gylippus sent to Syracuse. Ol. xc. 2. (B.C. 415.) May.

The first result of this speech was the selection of the most efficient general whom Sparta possessed since the death of Brasidas, for the purpose of bringing aid to the besieged Syracusans. This was Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas; nor could a happier choice have been made. Gylippus was one of the Spartans of the ancient stamp, who fully believed that one man such as they was worth more than a whole army, and was born for command and assured of victory. He had at the same time advanced with his times, being active, enterprising, and versatile; and was, furthermore, well acquainted with the state of affairs beyond the sea, his father having lived as an exile at Thurii. Gylippus gave orders to the Corinthian triremes, which were ready for sailing, to proceed to Asine (vol. i., p. 231). In the end of May he set sail with four ships; in June he was off Leucas, where the Corinthian fleet was to join him. His prospect of success was poor. For, the nearer he approached to the scene of war, the more decided news he received of the hopeless situation of the Syracusans. Already it seemed as if

Sicily must be given up altogether, and as if an attempt ought merely to be made to save Italy; for which purpose Gylippus resolved to advance before the rest of the fleet with his four ships.

He landed at Tarentum, and next sought to make use of his connections at Thurii, so as to induce this city to quit the Attic alliance, and to establish a combination against the Athenians in Italy. But the Thuriatæ remained true to the Athenians, to whom they even speedily communicated the news of the arrival of the Peloponnesian squadron. Gylippus himself was forced by a violent storm to put back to Tarentum, where he had to wait weeks for the repair of his ships.

Such was the impotent commencement of the whole enterprise. But soon a thorough change occurred. The Athenians, deeming themselves absolute masters of the sea, had done nothing to guard the entrances to the Sicilian waters. They now reaped the consequences of having omitted to take possession of Messana, the key of the Sicilian sound, to which Alcibiades had from the first directed his attention (p. 371). Nicias, indeed, immediately on receiving this communication of the Thuriatæ, despatched four triremes to Rhegium; but they came too late. For, at Locri, Gylippus had received his first more definite information as to the actual state of affairs at Syracuse; and as soon as he had assured himself that the blockade of the city was not as yet thoroughly complete, he altered his plans, and finding the sound of Messana still open, sailed along the north coast and landed unhindered at Himera. As soon as he placed his foot on Sicilian soil, the course of the entire war changed.*

Gylippus was accompanied by not more than 700

* Alcibiades in Sparta: Hertzberg, pp. 220–251. Despatch of Gylippus: Thuc. vi. 93.

Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse. Ol. xci. 3. (B. C. 314.) June.

soldiers. But this small force, which it would have been easy to annihilate on the Italian coast, now rapidly increased; more than 2,000 heavy and light-armed troops being collected from Gela, Selinus, and the interior of the island, and cavalry obtained. Thus, Gylippus unexpectedly made his appearance in the rear of the besieged city, which had been already informed through the Corinthian Gongylus of the approach of aid, and derived fresh encouragement from the news, had broken off all negotiations of the enemy. While the Athenians were completing the erection of the south line of circumvallation at the harbor, Gylippus, unmolested by them, crossed the heights of Epipolæ, and through the gap in the north wall effected his entrance into Syracuse, whose inhabitants readily entrusted him with the command of all their forces and materials of war.

The Athenians still continued to depend upon their lines of circumvallation, now all but complete, and perhaps even hoped that the large number of troops now in Syracuse would only serve to increase the sufferings of the besieged. But soon, to their terror, they became aware of the spirit now prevailing among the citizens. Suddenly an army in complete battle-array once more advanced against their lines; and, instead of the envoys who had a few weeks ago arrived in the camp to negotiate a surrender, a herald now made his appearance with the offer of a truce, if the Athenians would, within the space of five days, take their departure from Sicily with their army and fleet. Thus Gylippus endeavored to convert the fears of the citizens into ardent assurance of victory. The combatants changed characters; the Athenians were driven back upon the defensive, while the Syracusans, by a constant repetition of attacks, determined the subsequent course of the contest.

Surprise of Labdalum.

The very first enterprise of Gylippus entailed momentous consequences. He marched out from Tyche, and passed under the north rim of the mountain-terrace as far as the base of the Labdalum, which, as we have seen, lay on its very border. He thus succeeded in approaching, unobserved by the Athenians. He then suddenly charged the height and mounted the walls of the entrenchment; the garrison was cut down; the position, by the fortification of which the Athenians had so successfully opened the entire siege, was now in the hands of the Syracusans, who were thus firmly established by the side of the Athenians on Epipolæ.

The surprise of Labdalum greatly facilitated the execution of the next measure necessary. A wall was built across the ridge of Epipolæ, in the direction of Euryalus, to cut across the line of circumvallation, and thus prevent the completion of the wall which the Athenians had left unfinished, intending in the first place to complete the south line (p. 379). The materials with which they were about to resume the building lay ready for use. At this point the conflict now concentrated itself; for it was necessary for the Syracusans to conquer by force of arms the position along which they intended to erect their cross wall. In the first hand-to-hand conflict Gylippus is driven back. In order to prevent the discouragement of the troops, he declares his failure to be the result of his faulty directions, the cavalry and bowmen having been unable to act in the confined space between the fortifications. He orders another attack in a more open country; the Athenians are defeated and quit the field; and in the same night the wall of the besieged is constructed, so as to reach beyond the lines of the Athenians. Hereby the blockade of the city, which had been all but complete, was henceforth rendered impossible. The Athenians were now restricted to the round fort and to the double lines of wall extending thence to the harbor. Already they were the

besieged rather than the besiegers; they had lost their confidence in fighting on land; and Nicias now determined upon new measures, which already pointed to a wish, rather of saving his army than of obtaining the victory. He directed his principal attention to the fleet.

The Athenians move their head-quarters to Plemmyrium.

Hitherto, the Attic ships had lain in the innermost part of the great harbor, where the double line of walls touched the shore. The disadvantage of this position was, that the ships could not be quickly enough at hand if there was anything to be done outside the harbor. But this was now of increased importance, since, in spite of the guard-ships sent out by the Athenians, twelve Corinthian triremes had succeeded in effecting an entrance. Their crews had already aided most effectively in the construction of the wall on Epipolæ, which Gylippus had sagaciously directed in such a manner as by a long line of fortifications entirely to cut off the Athenians from the northern part of the plateau. It was to be foreseen, that after the completion of these works, and the establishment of a perfect line of defence on the land side, the harbor itself must become the scene of all further conflicts. Accordingly, Nicias was, above, all anxious to hold possession of the entrance; and therefore resolved to fortify the rocky promontory of Plemmyrium, which lay directly opposite to Ortygia, and commanded the entrance from the south. To this point he removed his principal magazines and the greater part of his fleet; and from this position he was able to blockade the landing-places of Syracuse, while he retained a secure communication with the open sea. But even these new head-quarters of the Attic forces were not without important drawbacks, particularly that of want of water, which forced the crews to travel long distances for obtaining the necessary supply, exposing them at the same time to the attacks of the enemy's cavalry. This circumstance was

Difficulties of Nicias. Ol. xci. 3. (B.C. 414). Autumn.

also taken advantage of by some to desert to the enemy; for there were among the crews many who had been pressed into the service, and who gladly availed themselves of the opportunity to escape from their forced duties. Many, again, had only joined the expedition as adventurers, in order to make their fortunes in a foreign land; and, when matters took a serious turn, were little inclined to submit to hardships and dangers. Least trustworthy of all were the troops levied in Sicily. Thus it came to pass, that the numbers of the Athenians underwent a dangerous diminution; while their enemies, on the other hand, were reinforced on all sides. For, as soon as he could be spared from Syracuse, Gylippus had made a tour in person through the cities of the island, and, with the exception of those members of the confederation who were too weak to venture upon resistance, had united all Sicily in a combined armament against Athens. Measures were also taken to form a Sicilian navy, for which the Peloponnesian squadron formed a nucleus; these were triremes newly equipped, and manned by crews eager for war: while the Attic vessels, it being impossible to draw them up on land, began to rot and leak; there was an absence of the requisite arrangements for effecting the necessary repairs, and discipline had become relaxed, because the ships had for the most part lain inactive in the harbor. Moreover, under present circumstances, it was impossible for the Athenians to undertake anything calculated to alter their position, and to revive confidence in their ranks. So large a number of soldiers was needed for occupying the discursive line of fortifications, part of which had now become utterly useless, that there were no troops at hand for striking a blow against the Syracusans and their works. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, hovering round the Attic camps, rendered all freedom of movement impossible, and incessantly disturbed the Athenians, who—and this was the most dangerous sign of all—saw from Plemmyrium

how the vessels of Ortygia were unceasingly engaged in exercising and preparing themselves for war. The situation of the Athenians accordingly became more perilous from day to day, and it was on Nicias that the whole of the responsibility rested—on Nicias, who was worse adapted than any other man for reviving the courage of his troops, since he personally took the gloomiest view possible of everything; being by nature incapable of pitting himself against a bold and insolent adversary, who had all the advantages belonging to the offensive; and moreover disquieted by the consciousness that he had himself contributed to bring the army into its present difficulties, and finally, in addition, tormented by a painful complaint in the kidneys, which from time to time entirely prevented him from performing the duties of commander-in-chief. Under these circumstances, he would, doubtless, have personally preferred to raise the siege as soon as possible, and the sooner the better; but he dared not take upon himself the responsibility of such a step: he lacked the necessary resolution and power of self-denial for acting up to the demands of the situation, according to the best of his judgment, and without reference to his own person. There accordingly remained for him nothing but to send a perfectly plain and unvarnished report of the situation to Athens, and to leave it to the citizens, either to recall the fleet or to furnish forth another armament, equal in size and equipment to the first, in order, as it were, to begin the war over again. But, in any case, he asked to be relieved of his office of general, which, he declared, ought to be filled by one in the full vigor of health and strength. These views he explained in an autograph letter of considerable length, lest perchance the special messengers despatched by him should, from fear of bearing so unwelcome a message, soften down the worst, or pass it over in silence.

Nicias' letter to the Athenian people.

Its reception.

The letter arrived in Athens about the middle of the winter; but it produced a totally different effect from that intended by Nicias. For though the citizens were deeply affected by the gloomy news contained in the letter, yet they were unanimously agreed not to throw up the war. And, as far as is known, no manifestation of anger took place against the general, although the blame attaching to his conduct cannot have escaped recognition. The trust reposed in his personal character remained unshaken; and his wishes were only in so far acceded to, that two other generals, Menander and Euthydemus, were joined in the command with him. The citizens displayed a spirit worthy of Athens' most glorious age, a resolute determination of making any sacrifice in order to preserve the name of Athens from disgrace, and to prevent her insidious enemies from rejoicing at her humiliation.*

New armaments at Athens.

Momentous events filled the winter preceding the ninth year of the war. All the forces still existing in the Greek states were set in motion on either side. The war in Sicily was carried on with growing ardor; and the war at home once more burst out into flames. The time had arrived for both fires to unite into one conflagration, which simultaneously took hold of all the lands of Greece, both in the mother-country and the colonies, both in the east and the west; so that all previous struggles seemed to have merely been a prelude to this war. For the more that all resources were now unfolded by both land and sea, the more clearly was it felt, that the end of this war could not be another rotten peace, but that it must decide the struggle once for all. Levies were held in the whole of Peloponn-

* Gylippus in Sicily: Thuc. vii. 4. Fall of Labdalum, *ib.* 3. Nicias in Plemmyrium: *ib.* 1—6; Plut. *Nic.* 19; Letter of Nicias; Thuc. vii. 8, 10-15.

nesus, in order to attack Athens both at home and in Sicily; and a new fleet was equipped at Corinth. From Athens the vessels of war, with money and troops under Eurymedon, immediately sailed to Syracuse, in order to encourage the army there; while Demosthenes was commissioned to prepare the most comprehensive armaments for the spring. Nor were these to be employed against Syracuse alone: for a separate fleet of twenty ships was destined for Naupactus, to waylay the Corinthians on their passage to Sicily; while yet another fleet of thirty ships was to re-open the war on the Peloponnesian coasts.

In the same winter months, however, Gylippus too had been busily at work. As soon as he perceived that the Athenians were resolved to continue the struggle, he had tried all possible means for annihilating Nicias before the arrival of the new army; and in truth Demosthenes had very nearly arrived too late.

Gylippus persuades the Syracusans to fight the Athenians by sea.

As the Sicilian war in so many points presents a recurrence of previous situations of the war in the mother-country, so this was now again the case with reference to the mutual attitude of the two armies. The Syracusans were the victorious land-force, the Athenians the naval power which controlled the harbor and the open sea. Hence nothing decisive could take place, unless the Syracusans summoned up courage to meet their foes by water. In encouraging the citizens to make this attempt, Hermocrates took the lead, who by the side of Gylippus had recovered his pristine authority. He demonstrated to his fellow-citizens, how the Athenians themselves had by the dangers of their country been converted from a people of landsmen into one of mariners; and thus the Syracusans also, even at the risk of first meeting with reverses, must pit themselves against the Athenians in naval warfare, and re-conquer their waters out of the enemy's hands. The Corinthian mariners acted as in-

structors, and the Syracusans had themselves retained, from the times of the Tyrants, nautical skill, as well as various material structures, of which they now took advantage. For it is probable, that already Gelo had, besides the great harbor, also made use of the small bay situate on the outer side of the isthmus of Ortygia, and had here, as well as there, constructed an arsenal and docks.

The small bay in question is naturally ill-adapted for use, being shallow and open to the east; but a double harbor with separate entrances in any case presented an uncommon advantage for a maritime city; and at the present time the small harbor offered special advantages, lying as it did in a situation well protected by the city, and further removed from the ken of the Athenians. Building and drilling, however, went on at the same time in the great harbor; and thus the Syracusans were able, even before the arrival of Demosthenes, to commence open warfare by sea against the Athenians. One morning five-and-thirty ships broke forth from the great, and five-and-forty from the small, harbor, in order to make a combined attack upon Plemmyrium. The Athenians were delighted at last to have an opportunity of open battle, and defeated the enemy's vessels, which in number surpassed their own, in the channel, inflicting great loss upon them. But Gylippus had by no means allowed the success of his plans to depend upon this naval battle, which merely formed one part of his system of attack. In the previous night he had himself, accompanied by a band of followers, secretly skirted the camp of the Athenians on the Anapus, and from the direction of the Olympieum approached the naval station of the Athenians. In the same hours of morning in which the unexpected sea-fight, as he might presume, was engaging the attention of the garrison of Plemmyrium, he mounted the walls from the land side;

First naval battle.

Defeat of the Syracusans.

Capture of the naval station of the Athenians by Gylippus.

and the naval station, together with considerable supplies of money and materials of war, fell into the hands of the Syracusans.*

This event produced an immediate change in the course of the war. The naval victory of the Athenians had been converted into a defeat. The Attic fleet was forced to return again to its old station in the innermost part of the great harbor; and, as the entrance to the latter was in the hands of the enemy, Athenian ships were now reduced to the alternative of passing out secretly and, in order to reach the open sea, unobserved, or of fighting their way out. The Syracusans, on the other hand, now felt themselves masters of their own harbor; their confidence increased, now that they had once, although unsuccessfully, measured themselves with the enemy's ships. They cruised boldly in various directions in the sea without, captured Attic transports, destroyed Attic materials and supplies of war on the Italian coasts, until the Athenians were no longer masters even of the waters outside the harbor.

Second naval battle. Ol. xci. 3. (B.C. 413.) July.

Gylippus would never allow the Syracusans to rest satisfied with the successes obtained by them. Each piece of experience gained was used as a suggestion for more effective methods of attack; every victory was speedily proclaimed in the surrounding country, in order to incite the cities which yet held aloof, to take part in the spoils of victory awaiting them. Auxiliaries arrived from Acragas, from Gela, and even from Camarina. Some of these were indeed destroyed by means of a successful surprise, conducted by the auxiliaries of the Athenians in Sicily; and thus the death-blow preparing against the forces of Nicias was momentarily delayed and crippled.

Invention of Ariston, and defeat of the Athenians.

Yet before the new fleet arrived, a naval battle was fought, for which the Syracusans had prepared by altering the construction

* Thuc. vii. 21-25.

of their vessels. Ariston, a Corinthian steersman, had introduced an innovation, which his fellow-citizens had employed in their most recent armaments, and which was particularly appropriate in the present locality for giving force and impetus of attack to the Corintho-Sicilian ships in the confined waters of the harbor, where the Athenians had no opportunity of displaying their skill in advancing, and retreating, and making rapid turns during the battle. Ariston shortened the prows of the ships, making them stronger and heavier, and adding, on both the right and the left side, protruding beam-ends of great thickness, which had a powerful support in the hull of the vessel. By this means the Saracusans were enabled to advance upon the enemy's ships, and to smash the feebler sides of the latter by the mere force of the impulse. Nicias had good reason for resisting the proposal of giving battle; but his new colleagues (p. 391) displayed a very unreasonable ambition: they were eager to accomplish some glorious achievement before the arrival of Demosthenes; and thus it came to pass, that the Athenians advanced under the most unfavorable circumstances from their station, and, immediately in front of it, suffered a complete defeat. Hereupon the confidence of the one side, and the hopelessness of the other, knew no bounds; and nothing but a second attack was now needed in order to annihilate the remnant of the Attic forces.*

Arrival of Demosthenes.

But at this crisis a large fleet appeared off the mouth of the harbor. It was Demosthenes with seventy-three new triremes, five thousand heavy-armed warriors, and a large body of light-armed troops of every kind; for he had largely reinforced his armament on the Ionian islands and on the coast of Italy. In gorgeous array, and to the cheerful music of flutes, the ships sailed into the harbor without meeting with any resistance. The effect was

* Thuc. vii. 4—6; Plut. *Nic.* 19.

indescribable. The Syracusans were aghast with terror; they quailed before the power of a city which, though attacked on her own soil, could yet continue to send out new fleets and again and again recommence the war with fresh vigor. The Athenians once more outnumbered their enemies by both land and sea; an enterprising commander stood at their head; and they were filled with a new assurance of victory.*

Demosthenes rapidly acquainted himself with the whole situation of affairs He was far from over estimating the advantageous points in it; he found the army sick, and the low-lying locality of the head-quarters unhealthy; moreover, the wet autumn season was at hand. He therefore demanded that no time should be lost. He wished the Athenians without loss of time to assume the offensive, and to become the besiegers instead of the besieged, or, in case they failed in this attempt, to quit the fatal harbor. Nicias opposed these views. His pusillanimity had grown into perversity, and his fear of attempting anything dangerous outweighed every reasonable consideration. He appealed to his communications with Attic partisans in Syracuse, declaring the city to have exhausted her pecuniary resources, and Gylippus to be generally hated; if, therefore, the Athenians would only bide their time, the enemy would be the first to begin negotiations. Possibly the representations which nourished such expectations in his mind were merely deceptive delusions.

Attempt of Demosthenes upon Epipolæ. Ol. xci. 4. (B. c. 413.) August.

The plan of Demosthenes was carried in the council of generals. He was himself pre-eminently adapted by his courage and presence of mind for striking the blow, which was to restore to the Athenians the possession of the heights of Epipolæ, whence a year and

*Thuc. vii. 42.

a half ago they had commenced the operations of the siege. At eventide he led his troops from the Anapus up the trackless declivities, unexpectedly fell upon the uppermost of the Syracusan forts, put the garrison to the sword, and was already beginning to break up the counter-wall, constructed across the heights by Gylippus. The Athenians were once more in possession of the summit in the rear of the town, and deemed their success complete. They hurried forward, in order to take the amplest advantage of their success; when they were met by the troops from the city fortifications, to whom the alarm had been given. A sanguinary nocturnal battle ensued on the desolate ridge of Epipolæ, which, after a time, took a turn unfavorable to the Athenians, owing to the vigorous onset of the serried ranks of the Syracusan auxiliaries; while the Athenians were exhausted and unacquainted with the locality. Confusion seized upon their ranks; a confusion increased by the Doric songs of victory raised by their own allies, the Corcyræans and the Argives. The Athenians believed themselves attacked in the rear, until at last, from the chaos of a sanguinary hand-to-hand struggle, the troops of Demosthenes rushed forth, hurrying in wild flight down the steep declivities which they had climbed not long before. After suffering heavy losses, being for the most part without arms and in a pitiable plight, they reached the camp, where Nicias awaited the result of the attempt.*

Nocturnal battle on Epipolæ and repulse of the Athenians.

Demosthenes had used his best endeavors to place the Athenian expedition once more in a favorable position. His attack upon Epipolæ was suitably designed, and skilfully and bravely executed; but it had, after a momentary success, without his fault, resulted in utter failure. To re-

Demosthenes advocates raising the siege.

* Thuc. vii. 43, ff.

peat the same attempt with a more favorable result was impossible; and no man could devise any other means of once more placing Syracuse in a state of siege. Hence Demosthenes, who from the first had displayed perfect clearness and coolness of judgment, was not for a moment doubtful as to the present duty of the generals who had here, in a foreign country, according to their best judgment, to watch over the interests of their native city and of their army. It was their duty to lead the latter away, as long as freedom of movement, and a balance of forces equal to those of the enemy, remained to them. As yet, retreat involved neither danger nor even shame. For, instead of appearing in the light of flight, their retreat would merely seem a rational alteration of the plan of operations, enjoined by the circumstances of the case. Nor would the Sicilian expedition on this account come to an end; for better opportunities might be found of inflicting damage upon the Syracusans from Catana, than from their own harbor. In Catana, or near Thapsus, the generals would then be at perfect liberty to determine upon further proceedings, and to send for orders from the civic assembly at home. Only let the fleet and army find its way out of the harbor—the sooner the better.

Opposition of Nicias.

It is scarcely conceivable how any rational argument could have been opposed to this view. Eurymedon, who had arrived with Demosthenes, assented to it; but Nicias opposed it. Nicias was a man who always acted on principle, and who, being utterly devoid of self-confidence, and incapable of rising to an unfettered resolution, desired, at all events, to act in as correct a manner as possible. In insisting upon the army's remaining, he was accordingly by no means actuated by superior courage, but rather by timidity and fear—fear of the people. Even in the shallow corner of the harbor, in the neighborhood of the fever-morass and the threatening enemy, he felt more at

his case, than when he in imagination beheld himself confronting the turbulent assembly of the people, and attempting to justify himself for having raised the seige without orders. In Syracuse, he felt he stood at his post: *here* he could simply do his duty, however arduous its performance might be; while at Athens he had to expect charges of treason and corruption, as well as the most unfair judgment of the entire campaign: *there* he saw the whole wrath of the people, provoked by the failure of the expedition, bursting over the heads of its commanders; and he was well aware with whom lay the largest share of the responsibility. He urged that the enemy had exhausted their materials of war, and that want of pay would soon cause the auxiliary troops to disperse; and he continued to take refuge in the existence of a secret understanding with a party in Syracuse, wherein he deceived himself, or allowed himself to be deceived. The two generals who had already been his colleagues in the command before the arrival of the second fleet, voted on his side; and, in consequence, the army remained. Demosthenes and Eurymedon wrathfully submitted. Whole weeks of precious and irrecoverable time passed by; Nicias received and despatched secret messages, but nothing else was done. The courage of the army sank to a lower pitch than ever, and a dispiriting gloom settled more and more deeply upon soldiers and commanders, while the morass-fevers extended their ravages. And now the spies brought news of the arrival of fresh troops in the city. At Selinus, Gylippus had met the Peloponnesians, who in spring had sailed from Cape Tænarum to Libya, and who arrived in Sicily in vessels belonging to the Cyrenæans; and he led his ancient brothers-in-arms into Syracuse, in order, with their help, to compass the final victory. It was the end of August. Even Nicias was obliged to give way; for the last hour had arrived.

The necessary measures were taken with haste and secrecy; word was sent to Catana to expect the arrival of the fleet, and to stop all further transmission of supplies to the army. The start was to be effected on the night of the 27th, being the night of a full-moon. On all the ships the last hand was being put to the arrangements for departure, and all minds were in a painful state of tension; when, after nine o'clock, the heavens became obscured, and an eclipse of the moon took place. A precipitate terror seized upon the whole fleet. That such a phenomenon of nature should occur at this moment seemed a sign sent by the gods, to disregard which would be an act of criminal impiety. No man arose, like Pericles on similar occasions (vol. ii. p. 438), to calm and to encourage the superstitious crowd by his own imperturbable equanimity. Nor did any one of the generals display sufficient presence of mind and sagacity to demonstrate to the people from astrology itself, that, for undertakings like this, which were to be accomplished in secrecy, the obscuration of the heavenly bodies was a favorable and propitious sign. The entire matter, which was to decide the life of many thousands and the future of Athens, fell into the hands of miserable soothsayers, who made a trade of their profession. For, unfortunately, Stilbides had died a short time previously,—the best of the craft, who had not unfrequently made use of his influence upon Nicias to disabuse him of vulgar superstition. The surviving professors of the art declared that a full circuit of the moon must intervene, before the departure could be ordered with a clear conscience. A delay of thrice nine days, when every hour threatened ruin! Nicias was the most timid of all. More than ever, he believed himself to be under the influence of dæmonic powers, and occupied his whole time with sacrifices and expiatory

The Athenians resolve upon retreat.

Eclipse of the moon, August 29-30.

rites, until necessity scared him out of his gloomy dreamings.*

Attacks of the Syracusans, August 30.

The Syracusans had received news of all these events, and their thoughts were now entirely directed towards preventing the escape of the Athenians. Gylippus gave orders for an attack by land and sea. The Athenians had the larger number of vessels; but they were notwithstanding defeated. The remnant of their fleet was driven further and further back into the innermost corner of the harbor; and it was owing only to the want of caution displayed by the Syracusans in the land attack, and to the bravery of the Tyrrhenian auxiliaries, that the fleet was preserved from total annihilation. When the Athenians were once more attempting to recover themselves after this defeat, they were terrified anew by observing that the Sicilians were engaged in closing the entrance of the harbor, by placing vessels of both larger and smaller size, connected by chains, at anchor in the middle of the channel.† It was now beyond all doubt too late to wait for particular phases of the moon. A life-and-death struggle must be commenced without any further delay, if a single man among the Athenian thousands was to hope to see his home again. All the crews were removed from the works, and all the vessels, bad as well as good—about 110 in all—were manned. They were secured as well as possible against the impulse of the beams attached to the enemy's vessels, and were supplied with iron grapnels, to render them more effective for purposes of assault. An entrenchment capable of serving the need of the moment was thrown up on the shore, as a temporary protection for the sick and the baggage; and then Demosthenes advanced towards the mouth of the harbor,

* As to the eclipse, see Thuc. vii. 50; Diod. xiii. 12; Plut. *Nic.* 23.
† Thuc. vii. 56.

The last battle in the harbor, Sept. 1.

in order to effect a passage by force. Once more the Attic pæan resounded; and the crews advanced, animated by the courage of despair. They actually succeeded in gaining the central outlet, and in bearing down the hostile vessels nearest to them. But soon the enemy's fleets bore down from either side towards the mouth. The ships were driven against one another in inextricable confusion; nearly two hundred vessels were engaged in a close conflict, while the shores around were lined with Syracusan troops, and destruction threatened the Athenians on every side. The chaos was so terrific, that none of the captains of the ships could keep to any fixed course; all freedom of movement, any clear view or systematic guidance of the particular vessels, had become impossible; and, without being well aware how it came about, the Attic fleet at last moved back into the harbor, and took refuge at the fortification on the shore. But the Syracusans on their side had also met with terrible losses. Nothing therefore remained to be done, but to push forward again on the following day, and to attempt a passage on the only road by which safety was attainable. The Athenians might presume that the throng of ships would be less dense, and that their own vessels would have greater freedom of movement, especially as they still outnumbered those of the Syracusans. The generals were for renewing the attempt. But the crews refused. The last drop was now added to the cup of misery—that of mutinous insubordination. The spirit of the Athenians had sunk so low, that they were prevented by an uncontrollable terror from entering their ships and seeking the only means of preservation remaining to them. They demanded that an attempt should be made to retreat by land—an attempt promising absolutely no chance of success. And even this hopeless resolution, which was to be executed in the ensuing night, was delayed. Deluded by

deceptive representations, they allowed another entire day to pass by; until the Syracusans, who had not allowed any consideration to disturb the insolence of their triumph, had slept off the effects of their festive carouse, and had despatched troops to occupy the surrounding country.*

Retreat of the Athenians by land, Sept. 3.

Hereupon the Athenians commenced their march: a march of 40,000 men, who, like to the emigrant population of a city, wandered laden with their baggage, away from the coast into a country hostile to them, without any definite goal for their journey, without sufficient supplies of food, without confidence in their ultimate preservation, tortured by fear, lost in speechless and stolid despair, or raging in savage fury against men and gods. For every sorrow, every trouble capable of oppressing human hearts, weighed down the souls of the Athenians, as their army quitted the fatal spot. Their ships they had seen one after the other become a prey to the flames, or fall into the hands of the enemy. To their dead, whose corpses lay on the ground around, they had to bid farewell, without being able to pay them the last honors; but most terrible of all was it to have to leave behind on the desolate shore the many wounded and sick, who raised their voices in loud lamentations as their relatives and tent-fellows departed, or clung to the skirts of their garments, and let themselves be dragged along for a brief distance, till they sank prostrate to the ground.

The generals did their duty, and succeeded as far as lay in their power. They arranged the army in two divisions, the van being led by Nicias, and the rear by Demosthenes, while the baggage and implements of war moved in the midst, the soldiers marching in two oblong bodies. The more heavily that the clouds of calamity gathered round the army, the more loftily Nicias rose to a truly heroic

* As to the last battle in the harbor, see Thuc. vii. 61—71.

grandeur; nor did this example fail of its effect. Before the army started on the march, he made a solemn address to the assembled troops, in order to inspire them with courage. He represented to them the possibility of gaining a strong position, whence they might advantageously defend themselves; he held out to them the hope of support from friendly tribes of the island; he reminded them of the justice of the gods: for although the splendor and power of the Athenian host might have at one time aroused their displeasure, in its present state it might well count upon their compassion, in whose power it was to raise again those whom they had bowed to the ground. Nicias assured the troops, that, notwithstanding all the bodily infirmities under which he suffered, he was consoled by a clear conscience, and looked forward with confidence into the darkness of the future. At the same time he reminded them, that any possibility of success depended upon their endurance and bravery.

The fights at the hill of Acræ. Sept. 6–8.

The army marched up the left bank of the Anapus; which river forms a deep water course in the reedy morass of the soil. Already in this valley the battle commenced. For the Syracusans were anxious to detain the army in the vicinity of the city, in order if possible to destroy the Athenians under its very eyes. But the Athenians forced a passage by the ford leading into the interior; whereupon their enemies, instead of any longer attacking them in regular line, followed the army, and, by constant attacks of skirmishers in its rear and flanks, endeavored gradually to consume its strength. Thus the Athenians on this day advanced the distance of a mile, and for the first time rested for the night by the side of a hill. On the second day they entered a plain, where after a short march they halted, in order to procure supplies of food and water from the dwellings in the neighborhood; which they accomplished without any interference on the

part of the enemy. For, meanwhile, the latter had clearly recognized the intention of the Athenians, of marching through the high country in the direction of Catana, and had hastened on, in order to occupy and wall-in the height of Acræ (at the gorge of Floridia), which lay across the line of this route. On the third day the Athenians advanced, and, after a sharp fight, were forced to return to their previous position. But even here they found themselves unable to remain, all supplies being cut off from them by the cavalry. They were accordingly obliged to run the last risk for forcing the pass on the following day. At an early hour of the morning they made the attempt; but, although they charged with heroic bravery, all their exertions were in vain. From the cross walls closing up either branch of the bifurcate valley, and from the height between, they were exposed to a dense shower of arrows and other missiles, without being able to approach their adversaries. A tempest and torrents of rain came to the enemy's aid, and, notwithstanding that their occurrence was not by any means a rarity at this season of the year, helped to spread new terror. Everything in the eyes of the Athenians seemed to unite for their destruction. One day more of hopeless fighting ensued, and brought with it nothing but new losses and wounds. Accordingly, when night came on, a new plan was determined upon; and, while the enemy was being deceived by means of camp-fires, the army started on its march towards the south,—towards the coast, where the valleys promised better positions of defence, and more convenient inlets into the interior. Nicias succeeded in maintaining discipline. At early morning he reached the neighborhood of the sea and the road to Helorus, leading from Syracuse in the direction of the southern promontory of Sicily. He hurried on without resting, and without waiting for Demosthenes. To have for the moment escaped their pursuers seemed, in the eyes of the Athenians, in itself to amount to a piece of the

highest good fortune. Demosthenes, on the other hand, failed to advance with equal rapidity. Towards noon he was overtaken by the enemy, and involved in more fighting. His isolated body of troops had to move on whither the enemy drove it forward, was then surrounded, and finally shut up in some large farm-buildings called the Polyzeleum; where, without being able to defend themselves, the soldiers rapidly, and in large numbers, fell before the enemy's missiles. And now no choice was left. Six thousand in number, they surrendered to Gylippus, and Demosthenes himself, who was forcibly prevented from ending his life by his own sword, fell alive into the victor's hands.

Surrender of the army of Demosthenes, Sept. 8.

While these events were taking place, Nicias had taken up a strong position on the stream of Erineus, near the coast. Here the news reached him, accompanied by a summons to surrender. He promised payment of the expenses of the war, if his troops were allowed to depart unhurt. These conditions were rejected, and the terrible pursuit recommenced on the eighth day. Nicias exerted himself to the utmost in order to reach the nearest of the parallel valleys by the coast, that of the Asinarus; in feverish haste the army hurried on, and no sooner had the water come in view, than all the soldiers, without taking heed of the enemy, who had already occupied the opposite bank, wildly and eagerly rushed down the precipitous heights, wounding and trampling upon and hurling down one another in their desire to reach the water and to quench their burning thirst. Some were, in the very act of drinking, swept away by the river; others fell wounded into its waters: for from the bank the Sicilian troops discharged their arrows and javelins among the dense multitude crowding into the bed of the river; the fugitives were caught by the cavalry, and, sword in hand, the Peloponnesians pene-

Battle of the Asinarus, Sept. 10.

trated into the gorge to seize upon their victims, till the muddy water was red with blood, and could only with difficulty force its course through heaps of dead bodies.

Surrender of Nicias.

With this massacre, and the dissolution of all order and discipline, before his eyes, Nicias was forced to relinquish the hope of saving any part of the army. He surrendered to Gylippus, on condition of the massacre being stopped by the latter, and the lives of the remainder spared. As to himself, Nicias left it to the Spartan to deal with him as he listed. No formal treaty was concluded. Many were pitilessly cut to pieces, even after the surrender had taken place; others were captured singly, and then put aside as domestic slaves. Finally, in the midst of the general confusion, a not inconsiderable number succeeded in effecting their escape immediately, or on a subsequent occasion, to Catana. Thus, the total number of those who were led in triumph into Syracuse, when Gylippus returned from his cruel chase, amounted to not more than 7,000 or thereabouts.

Treatment of the prisoners.

The great mass of the prisoners were placed in the stone-quarries; where, in close confinement between high vertical rocks, they were exposed without protection to the glowing heat of the sun, as well as to the frost of the autumn nights. In order that the promise given to Nicias might not be directly broken, they were supplied with provisions for eight months—viz., with barley and water—but only to the amount of half the most meagre allowance of a slave, and at the same time they were in their utter misery exhibited as a spectacle to the people, who in curious groups looked down from above upon the wretched abode, where the living dragged on their existence in the midst of the dying and the dead. At last the Syracusans were unable to tolerate the existence among them of so much misery. After a term of seventy days, the horrible dungeon was opened, and a large proportion of the prisoners were sold as slaves;

only those who were Athenians by birth, and the Sicilian Greeks, being still kept back. We may willingly believe the consoling statement: that, in particular instances, the Athenians, of whom many lived in servitude outside as well as in Syracuse, found their attainments stand them in good stead, and that they contrived in particular to make themselves agreeable to their masters, and to assuage the hardship of their own condition, by reciting favorite passages from Euripides.

Death of Nicias and Demosthenes.

Immediately after the final battle a public judgment was held over Nicias and Demosthenes. Gylippus wished their lives to be spared, so that he might take them to Sparta. He was aware that he could procure no satisfaction for his fellow-citizens greater than that of placing in their hands the victor of Pylus. But his influence over the Syracusans was not sufficient to induce them to restrain their savage cravings for vengeance. The demagogues even vituperated the man to whom the city owed everything, and would not allow moderate politicians like Hermocrates to address the people. The most vehement outcry against sparing the generals was raised by those citizens who had secretly intrigued with Nicias, and who were afraid of the statements which he might make. The Corinthians who were in Syracuse encouraged this feeling of passionate revenge, in order to prevent the possibility of any future danger arising to themselves from the Attic generals; and thus a decree was passed for their execution. It was Hermocrates who did them the last act of kindness, by sending them information of the decree before the assembly had separated, and by thus affording them an opportunity of putting an end to their lives with their own hands. Their corpses were exposed at the city-gate; and this long series of fearful acts of vengeance was crowned by the institution of an annual popular festival in Syracuse, called

the *Asinaria*, in remembrance of the massacre in the gorge of the Asinarus.*

Review of the Sicilian expedition, and its results.

Thus the Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events, which to this day it is impossible to recall without a feeling of horror. Their nature is such as to make us forget everything which preceded them: whether we consider their critical importance, or the tremendous revolutions of fortune, or even merely the number of the states involved in them. The boundary feuds between Egesta and Selinus had led to a general war in which, besides the two great confederacies, all the Sicilian cities and the Italian peoples, the Messapians, the Iapygians, and Tyrrhenians, had taken part; the ancient feuds between Athens and Sparta had become a Mediterranean war, and had at the same time raised the passions of the different parties to a combative fury, which no longer confined its hopes to obtaining one or more victories and advantages, but extended them to the annihilation of the foe.

As to the result of the Sicilian war, Greece had never experienced anything similar in the history of her internal feuds. For since the Persian wars it had never come to

* Concerning the retreat of the Athenians, see Leake, *Trans. of R. S. of Lit.*, 2d Series, iii. pp. 320 ff. But the topography of the march still remains obscure: a careful survey of the district of Acræum Lepas is required, before we can understand what obliged the Athenians to take this route, and what occurred there. The eight days reckoned in Plut. *Nic.* are correct, notwithstanding Grote, iv. 268, note. It is evident from Thuc. vii. 86, that there were really persons at Syracuse who kept up an understanding with Nicias; but this does not prove that their intentions towards him were honest, which I have questioned in the text. The *Asinaria* are said to have been kept up as a festival to the present day (Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Geogr.*, i. 140). As to the death of Nicias and Demosthenes, Timæus contradicts Thuc. vii. 8, and Philistus (*ap.* Plut. *Nic.* 18). It might be conjectured, that Timæus has used his utmost endeavours to place the Syracusans, and Hermocrates in particular, in the most favorable light possible.

pass, that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on the other all was won. The long list of errors and mishaps which brought so utter a ruin upon the Athenians, notwithstanding their inflexible endurance and marvellous bravery, opens with the beginning of the whole undertaking. They equip a military and naval armada such as Greece had never before seen; but while intending to conquer the far West, they are in their own home ruled by a traitorous party, which is guiltily hazarding for its own purposes the welfare of the state; they venture upon an enterprise demanding a leader of fearless resolution and versatile skill, and convert the only man possessing the required qualifications into an enemy of the state, and into an adversary of his own work; they confide the conduct of the war to a sick and timid commander, who personally objects to it; and they meet with an enemy more dangerous than all against whom they have before contended—an enemy who fully shares the hatred of the Dorians against Athens, and who at the same time possesses an abundance of resources, and a mental mobility unknown to other Dorian states. Among all hostile cities, Syracuse was the one whose citizens most resembled the Athenians; hence nothing but the most brilliant display of Attic energy could be expected to overcome them. But, in fact, all the gifts by means of which the generals of Athens were wont to conquer, were in this war on the side of her enemies; and the Athenians, whose whole strength consisted in bold offensive war, were driven to carry on a relaxing, and a more and more hopeless series of defensive operations, in which they gradually wasted away everything on which success depended—health, numbers, materials, discipline, and military ardor. On the other hand, when once all hopes of victory had been frustrated, and when the whole attention of the leaders should have been concentrated upon the preservation of the army, it was again Nicias whose obstinacy defeated the only rational plans, viz., those of

Demosthenes. It was now the timorous general who refused to quit his position; and thus he, who labored under a morbid fear of offending men and gods, was made to draw down upon his fated head the heaviest load of blame.

Yet the result of the war was not merely dependent on individual personages and individual calamities; the whole of the Athenian commonwealth paid the penalty for its unreflecting rashness and perversity. Athens suffered for the unsound policy which she had pursued since the last ostracism, for her habit of half-measures and half-resolves; inasmuch as she allowed herself to be deceived by the tempting delusions of the boldest policy of conquest, without bringing herself to take the steps which alone were able to secure its success. The Athenians followed Alcibiades, and yet refused to confide in him; they pursued a policy directly the reverse of that of former days, and yet refused to dismiss the men who represented the very political principles which the people had relinquished. The Athenians attempted to reconcile what was irreconcilable, and endeavored according to their despotic whim to force their generals, willingly or unwillingly, to execute their commands.

The primary cause of this long chain of calamities accordingly consisted in the fact, that the Athenian people deserted the principles of Pericles. He had secured to Athens an impregnable power, and had guaranteed her its endurance; but solely on condition of confining herself to the preservation of her empire, and not risking the welfare of the state by any unnecessary venture, or attempt at pursuing a hazardous, offensive policy. And now this very condition was directly violated. An undertaking was commenced which, in any event, could not fail to involve the state in ruin. For if the undertaking succeeded, the gain must fall to those who had fostered the vague cravings of the Athenians for a vast empire, in order by this means

to raise themselves personally above law and constitution. As the conqueror of Syracuse and the master of Sicily and its treasures, at the head of an army which he might, by the distribution of the rich spoils, attach to his person, Alcibiades would have overthrown the democracy, and deprived the civic community, which was incapable of governing a Mediterranean empire, of both power and rights. On the other hand, if the result should prove unfavorable, it would not amount merely to the failure of a single undertaking, but the entire foundations of the Attic commonwealth would be shaken. For, a loss which other states might bear, it was out of the power of Athens to recover, inasmuch as the mere maintenance of her power demanded an intense exertion of all her forces, and the preservation of her resources in their integrity. And although it may frequently be the case with other states, that their misfortunes only contribute to procure them sympathy and new allies, who grudge the victorious party the full enjoyment of their victory, this rule failed to apply to Athens. For the only consequence of her calamities was, that all her enemies gathered together, both old and new, both open foes and those whose hostility she had hitherto suppressed; and against this terrible combination she stood alone, broken in strength, and isolated in position.

The Sicilian expedition is accordingly something more than an episode in the great war—it is the crisis of that war: the judgment held over the city of Pericles,—a retaliatory judgment, from which she was never again able to raise herself to her former greatness. But, on the other hand, neither did the Sicilian cities reap blessings from the result of the expedition. The ancient discord among them manifested itself anew. After the destruction of the Athenian armament, the Egestæans were defenceless victims in the hands of their insolent enemies; they therefore summoned the Carthaginians into the country. In Ol. xcii. 3 (B.C. 409) Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar,

landed on the Sicilian coast to avenge the day of Himera, and soon a number of the most splendid of the Greek cities, Selinus, Himera, and Acragas, lay in ruins.*

* Punic campaigns in Sicily: Diodor. xiii. 54.

CHAPTER V.

THE DECELEAN WAR.

Reception at Athens of the Sicilian news.

When the news of the final ruin of the expedition reached Athens, the first impression was such, that a calamity so vast, and so far beyond conception, was held impossible; and even the most trustworthy witnesses obtained no credence. Then, when it was no longer possible to avoid believing the tremendous fact, endless lamentations filled the city. There was no house in it which had not to mourn the loss of relatives and friends, the uncertainty as to whose fate added a sharper pang to the general grief; and the thought of the survivors was yet more painful, than the sorrow on behalf of those who were known to have fallen; although even in their case their shameful end, and the neglect of all religious observances towards them, yet further embittered the feelings of natural regret. When the Athenians recovered from the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had arrived.

Desperate situation of Athens. Ol. xci. 4. (B. C. 411.) Winter.

And in truth it seemed out of the question that she would be able to recover from this blow. For the reverses previously experienced by the city in Egypt, in Thrace, and in Bœotia, would not admit of even a distant comparison with the present calamity. In the present case, Athens had risked all her military and naval resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than two hundred ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, may be calculated at about sixty thousand men. A squadron still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted. For, as the Egestæans' promises of contributions had proved delusive, the annual pay of the troops alone amounted to double the annual revenue. The sums of money laid by at the beginning of the war had accordingly been speedily used up; and it had already become necessary, on account of the want of money, to dismiss to their homes the Thracian mercenaries, who were to have been despatched to join the army at Syracuse. At the same time the money capital of the people itself had suffered severely by the sacrifices of the trierarchs, who had supplied both the equipment of the vessels and voluntary pecuniary contributions; and a large amount of coin had been found on the persons of the prisoners by the enemy, and had been secured by him.

But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships, and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens, and which was more dangerous in her

case than in that of any other state, because her whole power was based on the fear inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica,—in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious dominion of Athens; and the Athenians, who, even when at the height of their power, had with difficulty succeeded in mastering certain of the revolted cities, now that their resources were utterly exhausted, had to apprehend a universal revolt. Lastly, they had lost confidence in their own constitution; for, as will be remembered, even before the departure of the Sicilian expedition a thoroughly revolutionary state of affairs had obtained; and it was now clear that the existing constitution was unequal to the protecting of the state from internal dissolution, and still less capable of offering a pledge for the continuance of its power.*

Position of Sparta.

Sparta, on the other hand, had in the course of a few months, without sending out an army or incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of the most important and momentous transaction of the entire war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the exception of Argos and Elis, all her

* As to the condition of Athens at this time, see Thuc. viii. 1.

allies were on amicable terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. And their numbers included not only the states actually attacked by Athens, —states whose desire for vengeance continued even now unappeased,—but even in Thurii the Peloponnesian party now prevailed, and induced the Thuriatæ to renounce their friendly relations with the Athenians, of which they had only recently given so signal a proof (p. 385). Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities. Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of Archidamus, who had already at Mantinea (p. 310) restored the honor of the Spartan arms, and who was eagerly engaged in redeeming all the mistakes which he had formerly committed in the course of the feuds with Argos, and in restoring to its pristine height the royal authority, which, since Ol. xc. 3 (B. C. 418), had been further weakened by the institution of a corporation of ten members, bound to accompany the king in the field as a council of war.

Thus Sparta stood at the head of her confederates, animated by a new spirit of self-confidence, and warranted in expecting the utter dissolution of the hostile confederation. Athens' supremacy by sea seemed irretrievably lost to her; and already Sparta held in readiness her military governors, to be despatched into the cities which had revolted against the Athenians, and to make her mistress of their re-

Her want of a navy and of money.

sources. It seemed as if victory were, like a ripe fruit, to drop into the lap of the Spartans. But for a full and complete victory she needed a naval force of her own. The isolated island and coast towns were incapable of forming a united force in war; nor would it be expedient for Sparta to depend upon the accident of their individual views, if she was to assume the vacant inheritance of the naval supremacy; while the young navy of the Siceliotes, though offering a welcome accession of strength, was equally unable to supply the void of a navy belonging to Sparta herself. A strong central force was needed, around which the auxiliaries gathering on all sides might form; a Spartan fleet was required to form a point of union for the several at present detached squadrons. But for this purpose none of the requisite preliminary measures had been taken. For although in the course of the war the conviction as to the existence of this necessity had become more and more universal (p. 177), yet the obstacles in its way had by no means been surmounted. The ancient dislike still continued to prevail against an energetic naval armament; nor had Sparta's incapacity for becoming a naval power undergone any change. The Spartan soldiery spurned the idea of serving on shipboard: all the successes which might chance to be obtained by sea were owing to the subordinate classes of the population, and accordingly constituted a menace against the power of the Dorian hoplites, on which the state was based. Again, in financial matters, Sparta still viewed everything from an antiquated point of view. She was without a confederate treasury, without regular revenues from her confederates, and her citizens were without private fortunes, which might have enabled them to support the state, and have allowed the latter to venture upon extraordinary exertions. The truth now became palpable of what Archidamus had predicted already at the outset of the war: that the ultimate victory would be less dependent upon arms than

upon money. It might be possible to overcome the prevailing dislike against a naval armament, considering that the latter was so absolutely demanded by present circumstances, and at the same time by them so essentially facilitated. Hence nothing was now required, except pecuniary means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in the Persian empire.

Relations between Sparta and Persia.

The relations between the Greek states and Persia had never been entirely broken off. The Spartans had entered into repeated negotiations with the Great King (p. 75 f.); but these negotiations had remained ineffectual, since even in these diplomatic transactions the Spartans had never been able to attain to the pursuit of a clear and decided policy. Moreover, great difficulties in reality attached to these negotiations. For the Persians consistently adhered to their principles, claiming all the territories on the coast of Asia Minor as their own; and refused to allow any other basis for arriving at an understanding. Accordingly, there could be no question of an agreement, unless the Spartans would consent to sacrifice these coast towns and to support and guarantee their reunion with the Persian empire. On this sole condition might the Persians be found ready to support Sparta with pecuniary contributions against Athens. Now although the Spartans were utterly indifferent as to the liberty of the Hellenes beyond the sea, yet reasons easily conceivable prevented them from entering into an agreement of this nature by means of a treaty, and from thus openly contravening their policy towards Hellas, such as they had at the outset of the war announced it to be. Nor were they now any more than before inclined to engage in a naval war in Asia Minor, which the treaties would have entailed upon them, if the same were to be of any value to the Persians. These con-

siderations explain the fact of so many futile negotiations. At Susa, discontent was felt at the circumstance, that of the many envoys who arrived from Sparta each contradicted his predecessors; while at the same time it was not thought well wholly to break off these negotiations. Accordingly, in the seventh year of the war, Artaphernes was sent to Sparta, for the purpose of at last obtaining a clear and decisive answer. But he, together with his despatches, fell into the hands of the Athenians, who contrived to gain him over to their interests; so that he returned to the Great King accompanied by Athenian envoys. The negotiations, which were hereupon to be carried on in favor of Athens, were, however, frustrated by the death of Artaxerxes (Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B. C. 425).

Artaphernes in Sparta.

Death of Artaxerxes. Ol. lxxxviii. 4. (B.C. 425).

The change of rulers was accompanied by momentous revolutions. For the legitimate successor and last Achæmenide of the true blood-royal, Xerxes II., was assassinated by his half-brother Sogdianus; who, in his turn, was in the same year overthrown by Ochus (another bastard of Artaxerxes), who hereupon ascended the throne as Darius II.* His rule failed to restore tranquility. Everywhere sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs (p. 117), rose in revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son, Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria.† After the fall of Pissuthnes,

Darius II.

Tissaphernes.

* The accession of Darius Nothus falls Dec. 424, according to Diod. xii. 71: Thuc. viii. 58 and the Canon.

† Revolt of Amorges: Thuc. viii. 5.

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King. Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime provinces.* He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King (possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied. Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia; and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced to pursue a war policy. As the Persian empire had sunk to so miserable a condition, that no attempt could be made to advance unassisted, even against the broken power of the Athenians, everything now depended for the satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all the more important cities of which a Persian party existed (p. 117). All these cities felt oppressed by the weight of the Attic supremacy, while the trading population found the uninterrupted continuance of a state of war highly irksome, as disturbing their communications with the interior. The most important and only independent power in Ionia was Chios.

His negotiations with Chios and Erythræ.

Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity contrived to retain the government. Already in the seventh year of the war, they had been suspected of an intention of revolting against Athens; but they had afterwards induced the Athenians to confirm their constitution anew, since which time they had faithfully fulfilled their federal obligations. After the great losses which they too had suffered in Sicily, they were still

* Tissaphernes στρατηγὸς τῶν κάτω, Thuc. viii. 5; cf. Nikolai, *Politik d. Tissaphernes.*

able to boast a force of sixty ships. It was their government which now became the focus of the conspiracy against Athens, in the first instance establishing a connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian forces.

Pharnabazus.

The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern province, the centre of which was Dascyleum on the Propontis, while it comprehended the regions of the Hellespont, Phrygia, Bithynia, and Cappadocia. He ruled over the Trojan country with the forests of Mount Ida, so extremely important for the requirements of ship-building, and had in his hands the points most formidable in case of a naval war against Athens. Pharnabazus sent to Sparta, with sums of money, two Greek partizans who had been expelled from their native states, Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras, who was a leader of the party friendly to the Persians at Cyzicus. They were commissioned to induce the Peloponnesians to direct their attention towards the Hellespont. Thus Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their alliance.*

Thebes.

Lastly, neither was the nearest, and the most insidious, of all the enemies of Athens inactive. Thebes had obstinately refused to accede to the peace of Nicias, had taken Panactum, and had then destroyed the fortress before it was restored to Athens (p.

* Pharnabazus and Calligitus: Thuc. viii. 6.

291); and had recently been sorely irritated by a spiteful surprise executed upon the city of Mycalessus by the Thracians dismissed from Athens (p. 415) under the leadership of Diitrephes.* Thebes had also sent auxiliary troops to Sicily, and had taken an important part in the overthrow of the Athenians there; and she was now arming for a new war, again, as before, effecting an understanding with Lesbos (p. 105 f.).

Outbreak of the war in Greece. Pythodorus ravages the Laconian coast. Ol. xci. 3. (B.C. 414). Summer.

While thus the most dangerous combinations were on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to commence direct hostilities. An Attic squadron, under the command of Pythodorus, had in the beginning of Ol. xci. 3 (B.C. 414), *i. e.*, in the course of the eighth summer after the conclusion of the treaties, disembarked troops on Laconian territory near Prasiæ and Epidaurus, who devastated the fields in revenge for the Lacedæmonian irruptions into Argos. This in itself trifling occurrence was at the same time of no mean significance. For, during the whole course of the first ten years' war, the Spartans had labored under the consciousness that the war had been unjustly commenced by themselves, because the Thebans had fallen upon Platææ in the midst of peace; and the older citizens, who represented the principle of legality in the civic assembly, had refused to be convinced, that this was not the original cause of the calamities which had overtaken the Spartans at Pylus and elsewhere. But in the present instance it was Athens who had broken the peace,—an event for which Sparta had long waited; and since on the part of Athens every appeal to a decision by law was declined, a totally new ardor for war prevailed among the Old Spartan party, who thought that they might now carry on

* Thuc. vii. 29.

the war with a good conscience, and expect better success in it.

Agis invades Attica. Ol. xci. 3. (B.C. 413). Spring.

Of this state of feeling Alcibiades availed himself with the greatest eagerness. It was owing to him, that after the Peloponnesians had in the course of the winter decreed war and given orders for the necessary armaments, a Peloponnesian army under Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B.C. 413 (Ol. xci. 3); at which date it was already to be anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of former wars had been effaced. The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved, instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a fortified position on Attic soil; for which purpose they, in obedience to the advice of Alcibiades, selected the best locality to be found in Attica.

Glancing from Athens to the north, the eye meets the lofty wall of Parnes, falling off towards the right in the direction of Brilessus. But, before the branches of Mount Parnes end in the hilly country of the Diacria, a deep indentation is perceptible in the ridge of the mountain, the crescent-formed curve of which forms a very peculiar line on the northern horizon. On the rocky summit above this indentation lay Decelea, one of the ancient cities of the ancient Attic Dodecapolis, fourteen miles distant from Athens, and as many from the Bœotian frontier. At this point the highroads passed across the hilly district of the Diacria towards Eubœa; the one leading immediately under Decelea, the other, only slightly further to the east, by way of Aphidna. Thus both these roads were commanded by the position

Occupation of Decelea.

chosen by the Spartans. They fortified a steep peak above Decelea, and the Athenians ventured upon no attempt at dislodging them. This success was of such importance, that even in ancient times it gave the name of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the connecting link between the Sicilian War and the Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. This measure was in the first instance designed as an intervention in favor of the Syracusans; while, with reference to the treaties, which had continued in force for a term of eight years, it constituted the commencement of the second war between Athens and Sparta. Its immediate object, however, it failed to effect; inasmuch as the Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea.

The city was cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. The sea-passage was still open to the Athenians, but this involved far greater difficulties and loss of time; while at the same time their tenure of the island—a tenure which they could not afford to spare—was itself in danger. But even of their own country a considerable part was under the enemy's control, together with a large number of villages and farms, of woods and of pasture-land. One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping watch; in short, all the difficulties and all the troubles of the first year of the war had returned on a larger scale. No time was now allowed for recruiting the exhausted strength of

the commonwealth. A far heavier visitation had befallen the country, out of whose resources a hostile army was uninterruptedly supporting itself; and, in particular, the slaves who desired to escape from their masters were henceforth supplied with a permanent place of refuge during the entire course of the year. They escaped by thousands to Decelea, where it was in their power to perform the most important services for the enemy. In this predicament an increase of severity availed nothing; so that the citizens, on the contrary, found themselves obliged to introduce a more considerate mode of treating their domestic slaves, in order in this way to stay the spread of the evil.*

Financial pressure at Athens.

Under these circumstances, heavy losses in property and revenues were suffered, not only by single individuals, but also by the state as a whole. The judicial dues and fines, in particular, which constituted a large proportion of the public revenues of Athens, could for the most part be no longer levied: because no parties came to Athens to sue for law, and because in the city itself the citizens had no leisure for sitting in the law-courts. Moreover, there was a cessation of many other sources of revenue, in the matter of rents, market-dues, &c.; so that there now ensued, in consequence both of the enormous expenditure for the Sicilian war and of the present losses, a period of financial pressure, such as Athens had never known before. She could no longer dare to levy forced illegal contributions upon the allies; since she was now not even

*For a more accurate picture of Decelea and its vicinity, see the author's *Sieben Karten zur Topogr. von Athen* (*Seven Maps in aid of the Topography of Athens*), table vii. The total number of slaves (chiefly handicraftsmen) who deserted, exceeded 20,000 (Thuc. vii. 27). Boeckh, *Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurion*, p. 471 [Engl. Tr.]. As to the adoption of a more considerate mode in the treatment of slaves, see Ar. *Nub* 5. A supposed act on the subject conjectured from *Anon. Probl. Rhet.* 50 (Walz, *Rhet.* p. 4). Meier, *de bonis damn.* p. 50.

certain of their legal payment, and had no means at her command for the application of force. A totally new mode of proceeding was accordingly adopted under the prevailing pressure, for obtaining larger and more certain revenues, without pressing upon the allies. Direct taxation was abolished, and in its place a duty of five per cent. introduced, to be levied upon imports and exports in all the harbors of the allied cities. These duties were farmed out, and a new species of Attic publicans, the εἰκοστολόγοι, *i. e.*, collectors of twentieths, overspread the Attic dominions. This plan, however, appears not to have met with the desired success; the customs-officers made Athens and themselves odious to all the allies, and the whole innovation merely contributed to increase the confusion existing in the public finances.*

New financial measures.

The single piece of good fortune which befell the Athenians in the midst of their troubles at home and abroad, was the circumstance, that Sparta and her confederates were not at hand with sufficient speed to take advantage of the first moment of terror, so as to strike a decisive blow against the city. The Athenians were allowed time to recover themselves, and to summon up courage for a new struggle. The citizens were united in their determination to risk everything, in order to maintain the state at its previous height of power; they were well aware that nothing would be gained by negotiation or concession, and they were resolved to enter upon the struggle, confiding in the protection of the gods.

Constitutional changes.

But not merely had the external foundations of the

* The εἰκοστὴ τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν (Thuc. vii. 28), with which a new principle was, by way of trial, applied to the treatment of the allies, was introduced Ol. xci. 4 (B.C. 413), according to Boeckh, *P. E.* p. 401 [Engl. Tr.] An imprecation is uttered against an εἰκοστολόγος at so late a date as that of the *Ran.* (v. 363).

Attic power been shaken by the recent calamity; it was not only money, men, vessels, and trustworthy allies that were wanting, but self-confidence too was absent, and a belief in the virtues of the constitution of the state. The Athenians felt too clearly, that the public calamity was not one as to which they were free from guilt; that they had committed great faults, which again were so closely connected with the nature of the democracy, that their commission could not fail to cast discredit upon the democracy itself. Accordingly, the people would have nothing to say to the former leaders of the assembly; the voices of the passionate demagogues were heard no longer; the *bema* stood deserted. There was a total absence of eminent men enjoying an authority universally acknowledged; and all eyes anxiously looked around for those who in these times of difficulty might be capable of guiding the state. Thus the party to which Nicias belonged—the party of the Moderates—now took the helm; and with them combined those whose sentiments were hostile to the constitution, and who eagerly availed themselves of the present state of public opinion, in order to make inroads upon the constitution as by law established, and thus to prepare for the success of their revolutionary schemes.

Institution of the Probuli. Ol. xci. 4. (B. C. 413.)

The great mass of the citizens were tame and docile. They calmly listened to proposals, which only a few months ago would have been regarded as high treason, and hunted down with passionate fury; without a murmur they accorded their consent to changes of the utmost importance in the constitution of the state, and to the most essential limitations of their own power. For the men who now undertook the conduct of public affairs demanded that attention should be directed, not only to what might at the present moment preserve the state and remedy its difficulties, but also to what might in future prevent the recurrence of similar calamities. The origi-

nal cause of the whole evil they declared to be no other than the frivolous haste with which decrees of the most momentous character were passed in the assemblies of the citizens. They maintained that the Council of the Five Hundred, as it had been constituted, failed to offer the slightest guarantee for a rational method of conducting public affairs; another public body was therefore needed —a board composed of men of mature age, who should examine all proposals and motions, after which only such among the latter as this board had sanctioned and approved should come before the citizens. This new board was, at the same time, in urgent cases itself to propose the necessary measures, thus making possible a vigorous and reticent administration of affairs, and especially providing for the strictest possible retrenchment in the expenditure, so that the remaining resources of the state might be husbanded for its main objects. Thus the civic community of Attica, which since the fall of the Areopagus had been free from all control (vol. ii. p. 427), was again placed under supervision; and the significance of this change was heightened by the circumstance, that the sphere of action belonging to this new council was indefinitely large, but the number of its members extremely restricted, so that it was all the easier to use them as the instrument of a party. The board consisted of ten men, who bore the name of *Probuli* (provisional councillors), and who were doubtless appointed by election from the ten tribes. The only member known to us with any certainty is Hagnon (p. 49), the founder of Amphipolis, one of the persons of the highest rank and consideration among the citizens, and formerly an opponent of Pericles; who accordingly in his political sentiments was probably connected with the party formerly led by Thucydides, the son of Melesias.*

* Besides Hagnon we hear of a *Probulus* of the name of Sophocles (Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 18), in whom most authorities recognize the poet; to

Their first measures.

The first care of the new board was the regulation of the system of public income and expenditure. The scale of outgoings in the matter of festivals, sacrifices, and games was reduced; and relief was afforded to the citizens by a new arrangement, permitting two persons to unite for the equipment of a festive chorus; a similar division of expense being allowed in the trierarchy. Perhaps the change of the tributes into port-dues mentioned above (p. 421) was included among the financial reforms of the Probuli. Hereupon, the utmost exertions were made in the matter of fresh armaments. Timber was brought from Thrace and Macedonia, and a new fleet constructed with the utmost zeal; Sunium was fortified, lest the enemy should there establish a naval station of his own capable of stopping the only passage by sea still remaining open to the Athenians, viz., that to Eubœa. At the same time the fortress served the purpose of supervision over the multitudes of slaves in the mines. The troops were massed together by calling in the garrisons stationed abroad, though some were still left at the posts previously occupied by them—particularly at Pylus. Lastly, every possible precaution was taken to watch the allies, to restore the authority of the city, and to revive confidence among the citizens. And it is also probable that it was at this period that, in order to make good the losses suffered, an amnesty was proclaimed, recalling the exiles, and restoring their civic rights to those who had been condemned in the trials on account of the mutilation of the Hermæ, *i.e.*, to as many of them as had not gone over to the enemy.*

The autumn and winter months, which were employed

which I am unable to agree. Wattenbach, *de Quadring. Ath. fact.* p. 22, suggests the son of Sostratides (Thuc. iii. 115). The *Probuli* seem to have remained in office beyond the term of a year.

* Marcellinus, *Life of Thuc.* 6; cf. Kirchhoff as to the document concerning the πωληταί of Ol. xci. 3, in N. *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1860, p. 247.

as stated by the Athenians, were a period of the most anxious expectancy in every quarter. It was believed that a power which had held half Greece in subjection had been broken, and rendered incapable of sustaining its dominion. Accordingly, its fall was confidently expected to bring about a new order of things throughout the Mediterranean, and all the states from Susa to the Italian colonies were interested in this expected revolution. All the enemies of Athens armed, either openly or in secret; none wishing to lose the advantages of the anticipated victory. So much seemed certain: that in the coming summer a judgment would be held over Athens; and the oppressed allies, who had been obliged to sacrifice both property and lives on behalf of the ambitious city, looked forward, with a savage craving for vengeance, to the day on which they would call the Athenians to account for all the acts of violence perpetrated by them in Mitylene, Ægina, Scione, Melos, &c. The Lacedæmonian confederates were persuaded that they only needed to exert themselves for a brief term, after which they would have for ever done with all the troubles of war: a conviction which increased their readiness for service both by land and by sea.

The Peloponnesian system of operations centred in two points: Decelea and Sparta. King Agis had been invested with extraordinary powers for the northern scene of the war, so that he might immediately take advantage of every opportunity for damaging the Athenians. Hence, before the winter was at an end, he undertook extensive campaigns in the north, endeavored to revive the prosperity of Heraclea (p. 135), used measures of force to obtain hostages and pecuniary contributions for the Peloponnesian fleet among the tribes of Mount Œta, among the Phthiotians and Thessalians, and accepted the overtures of the deputies who arrived from the islands to secure the

Winter campaigns of Agis.

assistance of Sparta for the purpose of revolting against Athens. These transactions it was necessary to keep very secret, because the oligarchs, who now defiantly put themselves forward in all quarters, had to fear the hostility, not only of Athens, but also of the popular parties, whose leaders adhered to that state. Thus, fortunately for the Athenians, it was impossible for a general revolt to take place; because the Spartans were without the means of simultaneously supporting their adherents in different places. They had to decide to whom they should give the preference; and, while attempting to arrive at this decision, displayed a want of certainty and resolution which helped in no small degree to cripple the success of the Peloponnesians. Thus Agis in the first instance sent three public officers, accompanied by troops, to Eubœa, which he rightly perceived to be the most vulnerable point of the Attic power, while at the same time it was most easy to excite a revolt in this island in conjunction with the Decelean war. But, soon afterwards, he again gave way to the urgent representations of the Bœotians, who wished aid to be, above all, sent to the Lesbians; and he equipped ships and troops for this purpose. Hereby he scattered his forces in two directions, and from his post at Decelea implicated himself in the Asiatic war, the course of which was to be directed from Sparta.

Sparta hesitates between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

There, in the capital, a similar want of decision prevailed: not that an objection was felt even at the last hour against entering into an alliance with the Persians, but that a difficulty was created by the two-fold character of the proposals made. For one party wished that above all Tissaphernes should be supported, and the other, that the wish of Pharnabazus should be granted, and the naval war opened on the Hellespont; while Agis, conforming to the desires of the Bœotians, exerted his whole influence to induce the Spartans in the first instance to aid the Les-

bians, who, he averred, had a claim for the speediest aid possible, on account of the disregard shown towards their interests on a previous occasion (p. 108). Under these circumstances a decisive influence was exercised by Alcibiades, who contrived to secure the voice of his adherents, the most powerful of whom was the ephor Endius, an opponent of Agis, in favor of the proposals of Tissaphernes.

Sparta determines in the first instance to carry the war into Ionia. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 412).

Ionia certainly gave the best promise of success; and this was the quarter where Athens most keenly felt every loss suffered by her. The Persian satraps had already on several occasions made successful advances upon the Ionian coast: all the cities contained partizans of Persia, Ephesus in particular, which among all the maritime places had the most important trade with the interior, and was most accessible to the influences of the East. It is even probable that Ephesus had, already previously to the Sicilian calamity, become estranged from Athens, and fallen under the control of Tissaphernes. Chios was also ready to revolt—the most important of all the allied states, whose example could not fail to decide the conduct of all Ionia. All the cities were unfortified, and bare of garrisons and guard-ships. Hence the satrapy of Tissaphernes, in every point of view, appeared the most favorable scene of warfare. Moreover, his resources were far more considerable than those of Pharnabazus; although he failed to support them, like the latter, by the offer of ready money. Lastly, Alcibiades possessed numerous adherents in the Ionian cities (p. 331), and could in the latter anticipate the earliest opportunity of brilliantly asserting the power of his influence. Thus, after manifold disputes, the plan of operations was determined upon in accordance with his advice: Eubœa and Lesbos were for the present left to themselves, while on the other hand Chios and Erythræa were before the end of the winter (after an envoy had brought a satisfactory report

as to the resources of the Chians) admitted into the Peloponnesian confederation, and promised the first support. It was proposed hereafter to extend the war in the direction of the north, as it was not wished to decline the favors of Pharnabazus, and as the importance of the Hellespont for Athens was well understood. Such was the plan of operations for the coming summer, which was accepted by the confederates, and to which even Agis consented, since it was agreed that, immediately after Chios, Lesbos was to be the goal of the fleet, and that this expedition was to be conducted by Alcamenes, as Agis had provided.*

The Peloponnesian fleet.

The fleet itself was in course of construction. Its total strength was fixed at 100 ships of war; 25 having been undertaken by Sparta, and the same number by Thebes; 15 were furnished by the Corinthians, 15 by the Phocians and Locrians; the remaining 20 were distributed partly among the Arcadians, Pellenæans, and Sicyonians, partly among the Megareans and the cities of the coast. A considerable auxiliary force was in addition expected from Sicily; and 60 ships were in readiness at Chios. No time was to be lost; for the movement in Ionia began to make itself perceptible, and the Chians incessantly urged all possible despatch.

Change in the Peloponnesian plans.

And yet the whole business was conducted in a lame and clumsy fashion. It was at first intended, that ten ships should start direct from Laconia under Melancridas; but, when everything was in readiness, an earthquake took place, and terrified the Spartans to such a degree, that they relinquished the whole expedition, substituting Chalcideus as admiral for Melancridas, and determining to make the Corinthian

* As to the Spartan plans for the conduct of the war, see Thuc. viii. 8 f. According to Herbst, *Ruckkehr d. Alkib.* p. 51, the hundred best triremes (cf. Thuc. ii. 24) were still in existence. But why does Thucydides speak of money only? As to the payment ἐκ τῶν (? χιλίων ταλάντων τῶν) εἰς τὰς τριηρεις, ch. Boeckh, *P. E. of Ath.* vol. ii. p. 194. [Engl. Tr.].

shore, and not Gytheum, the starting-point of the naval war: a resolution which superinduced further delays and mishaps.* For, although the Corinthians hastened to transport twenty-one vessels across the Isthmus to Cenchreæ, and to take all necessary measures for setting sail, they were unwilling to disturb the celebration of the Isthmian games, from which, together with the fair held at the same time, they derived so considerable a profit; and they were equally disinclined to accede to the proposal of Agis, who declared himself ready to command the fleet in his own name. The consequence was, that the Athenians in the interval sent a message to Chios, demanding seven ships from the Chians, which were immediately furnished by the latter, since the Spartan party was still without the means of actually accomplishing the revolt.† And at the Isthmian games, which fell in April or May, deputies from Athens were, at the invitation of Corinth, present among the rest, and here the plans of the Peloponnesians became palpably manifest. The Athenians hereupon resorted to the most vigorous measures for preventing the intended expedition. For, besides the delay, the confederates committed another important blunder in making the Saronic Gulf the scene of their armaments,—as if Athens had ceased to exist and there was no hostile power to oppose them. As soon, therefore, as the Corinthian fleet set sail with the ships of Agis, they were attacked by an Attic squadron of equal numbers. The Peloponnesians avoided a collision, and held back. But, when they set sail once more, they beheld a still larger number of hostile ships coming to meet them, which drove them back upon the Peloponnesian coast, blockading them in a bay of the harbor called Piræeus, and there inflicted heavy damage upon them. Alcamenes himself was slain. This was the first success obtained by the Athenians, after their

Blockade of the Peloponnesians in Piræeus. Ol. xc., 4. (B. C. 412.) Spring.

* Thuc. viii. 6. † Thuc. viii. 9.

recent losses, and it inspired them with new courage; while on the other hand its effects so deeply depressed the Peloponnesians, that it was resolved at Sparta to relinquish the whole Ionian war, against which a strong dislike, after all, still continued to exist among the citizens.

Alcibiades in Chios.

And this resolution would have doubtless been acted upon, but for the presence of Alcibiades. He contrived to make use of the blockading of the Corinthian fleet, so as to derive great advantages for his own views from the circumstance; for he was, above all, interested in being able to show, that it was in his power, even without a fleet, to bring about the revolt of Ionia, and a combination between Sparta and Persia. He managed to gain over the ephors to his views; he availed himself of their jealousy against Agis (who was his personal enemy, on account of a criminal intrigue between Alcibiades and the wife of the king); and to Endius in particular he represented the great advantage gained by the frustration of the king's ambitious hopes of triumphs in Ionia. With an audacity astonishing all his hearers, and securing the adhesion of even those who at first hesitated, he declared that there was absolutely no need of the ships. It was only necessary for the Spartans to be at Chios before the news of the mishap in the Corinthian Gulf reached that island; for everything further he promised to provide himself. Accordingly, the former resolution was revoked, and the five vessels (for this was the largest number which Sparta had been able to equip) set sail under Chalcideus and Alcibiades. After a rapid voyage they reached their goal, and as soon as the small squadron had anchored at Chios, the aristocratic party no longer hesitated plainly to declare its intentions. The terrified multitude did not venture upon resistance. Alcibiades, who represented the ships actually at Chios as merely the forerunners of a large fleet of war, contrived by means of his influence to remove all diffi-

culties. Erythræ immediately followed the example of Chios. Finally, Clazomenæ was also induced openly to give in its adhesion, although not more than three ships were detached thither. The new confederates were asked to carry on their armaments and fortification-works with all possible zeal. The flame of war burst forth, as if lit by a sudden flash of lightning; the revolt of Ionia had commenced, and Sparta issued her commands in the heart of the enemy's dominions. Never were great results achieved by more insignificant means.*

Hitherto no enemy had openly met the Spartans; for Strombichides, who had set sail from the Corinthian coast in order to intercept the squadron of Chalcideus, had missed it. But now Athens resolved upon exerting herself to the utmost, in order to maintain her supremacy in Ionia. The open revolt of Chios created a tremendous impression. This island had always been treated with peculiar consideration; Chios was esteemed as the pearl among the allied cities; her name was mentioned in the prayers offered up at the public sacrifices for the welfare of the state; and only recently Eupolis, in the comedy in which the allied cities formed the chorus (p. 188), had celebrated Chios, "the fair city which sends vessels of war and men, whensoever the need arises, and is ever docile, like a steed which requires no whip." The defection of Chios was regarded as the signal for a general revolt on the part of the allies. The Athenians determined to make use of all their resources, and even to apply the reserve fund of 1,000 talents in the citadel, which, according to a law of Pericles, was to be saved for an extreme crisis, *i. e.*, for a direct attack upon the city and port. For the Ionian revolt was looked upon as an attack upon the very

Significance attached to the revolt of Chios.

The reserved fund applied for its suppression.

* Thuc. viii. 14.

existence of the state: so that the occasion was held to justify an interpretation in this sense of the law in question. Thus money was procured for manning ships. All the triremes in reserve were drawn forth from the naval arsenals, and ships and crews marked off according to the nature of the service required from them. The blockading squadron, which formed the most efficient part of the fleet, was immediately sent to Ionia, its place being supplied by other vessels. The free Chians on the seven triremes were placed in chains, while the slaves on the same vessels were liberated; and the most comprehensive measures were taken for preventing the further spread of the revolt.*

Progress of the Ionian war. Ol. xci. 4. (B. C. 412.) Spring.

And yet it was impossible to stay the progress of such an adversary as Alcibiades. Strombichides endeavored to hold Teos with nine vessels, where the Athenians had built a fort to protect the neighboring country; but his attempts were fruitless.† Alcibiades had already collected an Ionian fleet of twenty-three ships, and commanded the sea. He left the Peloponnesian sailors behind at Chios as land troops, to guard the government there against revolts and attacks; and in their place manned his vessels with Chian sailors. He then hastened on to Miletus, in order, with the help of the power created by himself, to secure the adhesion of the ancient capital of Ionia. For, instead of waiting for reinforcements, he was solely and constantly actuated by a fear, that they might arrive sooner than was agreeable to his ambition. The Athenians could do nothing but assume an attitude of observation off the island of Lade (vol. ii., p. 210),

* Chios and Athens: Schol. *Av.* Av. 880; Eupolis in *Fragm. Com.* ii. 509; καλὴ πόλις—πέμπει γὰρ ἡμῖν ναῦς μακρὰς ἄνδρας θ' ὅταν δεήσῃ, καὶ τἄλλα πειθαρχεῖ καλῶς, ἄπληκτος ὥσπερ ὕππος.

† Thuc. viii. 16.

while the Milesians, gained over by Alcibiades, revolted from Athens.*

First twenty of the subsidies between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. Ol. xci. 4. (B. C. 412.)

And now Sparta was at last able to attain to that for which she had so long felt an anxious craving, viz., the enjoyment of Persian subsidies. For the extraordinary successes which had accompanied the commencement of the Ionian war induced Tissaphernes to quit his attitude of expectation, and to declare himself ready actually to conclude a treaty, like a master who takes a servant into his pay, after that servant has given a proof of his efficiency. In Miletus, Tissaphernes had an interview with Chalcideus, and in the name of the Great King and the Spartan state they signed a document, the introductory article of which secured to the king all the countries and cities which he at the present moment possessed, or which his ancestors had possessed at any previous date. The king and the Lacedæmonians unite to prevent any kind of tribute or duties being paid from these countries to the Athenians. Neither party to the treaty is to make peace with Athens independently of the other. Every rebel against the king is to be regarded by Lacedæmonians as their own enemy; and similarly, all those who may revolt against Sparta and her confederation are to be regarded as his enemies by the king.†

No proviso had been included in the treaty imposing upon the Persians the payment of a fixed sum on acconnt of the troops, although this advantage was the only one for the sake of which the Lacedæmonians had brought themselves to consent to such a treaty. In other respects, it brought them nothing but disgrace and loss; for they who had entered the war as the liberators of the oppressed Hellenes, now voluntarily gave into the hands of the bar-

* Alcibiades at Miletus: Thuc. viii. 17; Plut. *Alc.* 24.

† First subsidy-treaty: Thuc. viii. 18: cf Nikolai, *Politik d. Tissaphernes.*

barians the entire series of the cities of Asia Minor,—nay, if the provisions of the document were considered in all their bearings, they sacrificed even European Greece, as far as the Corinthian Gulf. The Spartans even undertook the obligation of subjecting to the barbarians the land which their ancestors had liberated; they gave the lie to the great days of Platææ and Mycale, and destroyed the results of those victories; they committed the decision of the Greek quarrel to the hands of the Great King, and allowed the hereditary foe of the nation to guarantee the existence of their confederacy. On the other hand, the policy of Persia, at a time when the empire had fallen into extremities of decay, and when the royal authority had sunk so low as to be forced to seek a support in the mutual hostilities of the satraps, celebrated a triumph as complete as it was unhoped for, and, moreover, one which cost the empire absolutely nothing. The Persians saw their ancient claims to supremacy, to which they had obstinately adhered, recognized, to their full extent, by the very enemies before whom they had everywhere succumbed. And Tissaphernes personally had without trouble secured the most important results in furtherance of his own interests. Amorges had been removed; Miletus, together with the other cities on the coast, were in Tissaphernes' hands; he wielded a dominion over his satrapy, such as none of his predecessors had possessed since the battle of Mycale; and, although he had for the present consented to act in union with Chios and Erythræ as with equal powers (p. 422), yet he had good grounds for presuming, that he would soon succeed in putting an end to the independence of these states, which he had temporarily acknowledged.

A treaty so humiliating and disadvantageous to the Greeks could not exercise any but pernicious effects: inasmuch as it blunted the sense of honor of the Spartan soldiers, roused the indignation of those animated by worthier sentiments, and brought contempt upon the state. Alci-

biades, for his part, endeavored to explain away all difficulties; he represented to the Spartans that money was the indispensable condition for effecting the humiliation of Athens, and hinted that to the other points in the treaty no very serious attention need be paid. He was the only man among the Greeks to whom this treaty was really advantageous. By bringing it about, he had conferred an obligation upon Tissaphernes, and had forged a weapon for himself, which might be used in the first instance against Athens, and afterwards, if he so wished, against Sparta herself.

Further progress of the war in Ionia. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 412). Summer.

The course of the war was not sensibly affected by the conclusion of the treaty. In the latter half of the summer new forces arrived from either side, without any decisive event ensuing. The Peloponnesian ships at last succeeded in breaking their blockade; and four of them, under Astyochus (the successor of Alcamenes), upon whom the supreme command was now conferred as Lacedæmonian admiral, sailed to Ionia. The Chians were unwearied in cruising about, and induced several other coast-towns to revolt, among them even the two most important cities on Lesbos, Mitylene and Methymna (hitherto so faithful an ally of Athens). These attempts were successful, even after the Athenians had reinforced their Ionian fleet by twenty-six ships. In Samos the aristocratic party also stirred in favor of Sparta; but in this case the movement took a different course. The people, aided by a few Attic ships, rose against the aristocrats, of whom 200 were cut to pieces and 400 expelled, their property being confiscated. A severe judgment was held over the whole nobility of the island, who were henceforth entirely excluded from the national community, all the citizens binding themselves by an oath not to marry any daughter of their own to a noble, or themselves take to wife a noble's daughter.* This party

Revolution at Samos.

* Thuc. viii. 21.

victory shows the amount of bitter mutual hatred which had accumulated here; while, at the same time, it gave a blow to the Spartano-Persian party compensating for many previous losses. For the newly-organized state now attached itself most closely to the Athenians, who felt so sure of the fidelity of the Samians, that they were able to grant them perfect independence, and an unfettered relation towards Athens as her allies. The Athenians now enjoyed the advantage of being again able to appear as the champions of the national cause in Ionia as against the Spartans; they possessed a strong and happily situated point of support for their undertakings, and could thus hope vigorously to counteract further attempts at revolt. Mitylene and Clazomenæ were retaken; Chalcideus was defeated and slain in the territory of Miletus; Chios was attacked, and this flourishing island, which had remained unhurt since the Persian wars, suffered so greatly from three successive invasions, that its inhabitants began to be extremely discontented with the policy of their government. Towards the end of the summer an Attic fleet at last arrived, numbering forty-eight ships, and carrying 3,500 heavy-armed troops, under Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides, Onomacles, and Scironides. Their intention was to take Miletus, and thus to put an end to the whole Ionian revolt. A battle was fought with the Milesians, Peloponnesians, and Persians, in which great losses were inflicted by the Ionians upon the Doric allies of Athens, the Argives, in consequence of their disorderly method of attack; while, on the other hand, the Athenians gained such advantages over the Peloponnesians, that they took measures for laying immediate siege to Miletus itself. Miletus was lost, and the enemy's control over Ionia at an end, unless relief arrived. But, before the blockade of the city was complete, a new fleet made its approach.

Naval battle of Miletus. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 412). Autumn.

It was the most dangerous of all their enemies,

Arrival of Hermocrates in the Iasian Gulf.

Hermocrates, who again prevented the Athenians from achieving the victory which they already deemed certain. He had caused himself to be sent, with twenty vessels from Syracuse and two from Selinus, to continue the war of vengeance in the Ægean, and to inflict upon Athens her death-blow. To the democrats in Syracuse his absence was not unwelcome; they had, accordingly, instead of opposing his plans, contented themselves with restricting his forces within limits so narrow as to leave him incapable of undertaking anything without assistance. He had immediately started for Peloponnesus, and had there urged haste, and united his ships to those lying ready to sail at Gytheum. The total force now amounted to fifty-five ships, which were despatched under the Lacedæmonian Theramenes, to reinforce Astyochus. Immediately after the battle fought at Miletus, they arrived in the Iasian Gulf. Alcibiades, who had himself been present at the battle, hurried on horseback to Iasus, in order to bring these unexpected auxiliaries to the spot without any further delay. The Athenians lacked neither the spirit, nor the inclination, for giving battle to the united fleets in the Milesian Gulf; but the opinion of the cautious Phrynichus was allowed to prevail. He declared, that it would be running an inexcusable risk to venture the fleet equipped from the last resources of the city upon the chances of a single battle. The Athenians retreated to Samos, and the victory of Miletus remained without results. The enemies, meanwhile, conferred an obligation upon Tissaphernes by proceeding to Iasus, taking it for him, and, as officious servants of his will, delivering up to him their prisoner Amorges (p. 420.)*

The following winter was equally undistinguished by

* Phrynichus: Thuc. viii. 25. Hermocrates: *ibid.* 26. Amorges: *ibid.* 28.

Tissaphernes lowers the rate of pay. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 412.) Winter.

any event of importance on the theatre of the war; yet, upon the whole, matters assumed an aspect more favorable to Athens, inasmuch as the situation of Chios grew worse from day to day, while very serious disputes broke out within the hostile confederation: in the first instance between the Chians and Astyochus, whose inactivity roused the ire of the former; and then between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesian fleet. The satrap disbursed the first installment of pay at Miletus, each man on board receiving a drachm per day, in accordance with the promise made by Tissaphernes at Sparta. But he at the same time declared, that he could in future only pay half that sum, until he should have received authority from the Great King to pay a full drachm to each man. The Sicilian expedition had raised the rate of pay for naval service; but after its termination the Athenians had, doubtless, themselves returned to a lower rate; and thus with them half a drachm remained the ordinary amount. No treaty-obligation of paying a higher rate could be proved against Tissaphernes; but his conduct gave rise to feelings of extreme bitterness, not only on account of selfish considerations, but also because the higher rate of the Persian pay constituted the most effectual means of weakening the naval force of the Athenians, whose men were by it induced to desert their service. Accordingly, Hermocrates in particular, to whom the entire method of conducting the war and the state of dependence upon the Persians were an abomination, vehemently opposed the satrap; and it was only with considerable difficulty that an agreement was brought about, in which Tissaphernes declared his readiness to pay three talents monthly for every five ships: *i. e.*, 36 minæ instead of 30 per ship, and to each man 3½ obols instead of three. This increase Tissaphernes believed himself able to grant, even without having first obtained the

king's assent. This unworthy bargaining for an increase in the pay created a very bad impression; and the general discontent would have been even stronger, had not the crews consoled themselves with the ample spoils obtained at the capture of Iasus. The Peloponnesians were therefore even now unwilling to take part in any decisive undertaking against the Athenians, who had increased their fleet to 104 ships, or in general to conduct the war in Ionia according to a regular plan; and they preferred isolated flying expeditions from Miletus, as *e. g.*, one to Cnidus, which had revolted against Tissaphernes. Meanwhile, the discontent which had manifested itself against the first treaty with the Persians, occasioned the conclusion of a second. It was pointed out to them, that the Peloponnesians were at the present time surely entitled to advance higher claims, than when they had commenced the Ionian campaign with one or two ships under Chalcideus. And, in fact, a few points were softened down in favor of the Greek national honor, and a more definite agreement was arrived at with regard to the money-payments; but in the main points no alteration took place.*

Second treaty of subsidies between Sparta and Persia.

But the most important event of the winter was the change which occurred in the position of Alcibiades. He had performed the most valuable service for the Spartans, all of whose successes were his work. The prominent position assumed by this stranger in itself wounded the Spartans' notions of honor in a most sensitive point; and to this jealousy was added the deadly hatred of his enemies, who pursued him with a constantly increasing vehemence, while his adherents were either, like Chalcideus, dead, or had, like

Alcibiades passes from the Peloponnesian camp to Tissaphernes. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 412.) Close of Autumn.

* As to the rates of pay, Boeckh, *P. E.* vol. i. pp. 367-9 [Engl. Tr.]. Herbst, *u. s.* p. 8.

Endius, in the meantime lost their official position. The bitterest of these enemies was Agis, who found himself thoroughly thrown into the shade by Alcibiades. The seduction of his queen Timæa (p. 428) was a public scandal of the most intolerable character; jokes were pointed at it on the Attic stage, and Alcibiades is himself said to have boasted with audacious insolence, that his descendants would at some future time occupy the throne of the Heraclidæ.* Since the services of Alcibiades had come to be regarded as superfluous, he was also no longer safe of his life in the Lacedæmonian camp; for if he was to be got rid of, nothing short of his death could ward off the consequences of his hostility. And it was his death for which the eager vengeance of his opponents called; until they procured an order from the authorities at Sparta, commissioning Astyochus to make away with him. But Alcibiades was warned—as the story goes—by Timæa. He had been long prepared for a case like the present. He had accordingly, from the first, taken advantage of his negotiations with Tissaphernes, to secure the good-will of the latter. Alcibiades had already secured every advantage which he had wished to obtain in taking the Spartan side. Half Attica was in the enemy's hands; in the harbor of Miletus a fleet was anchored, paid with Persian money; his fellow-citizens had by this time come to understand the significance of the enmity of an Alcibiades. He now intended a new revolution in affairs to take place, which again was to depend solely upon his own personal influence. He accordingly secretly quitted the Peloponnesian camp, and repaired to the head-quarters of the satrap; who, in conformity with ancient Persian policy, gladly welcomed this powerful partisan to his court." †

* Alcibiades and Timæa on the comic stage; Athen. 547 D: Bähr ad Plut. *Alc.* p. 200.

† Thuc. viii. 45; Hertzberg, *Alk.* p. 249 f.; C. F. Ranke ad Meineke's *Aristoph.* p. xliv.; cf. *Lysistr.* vii. 490, 523.

All these events had taken place immediately after the battle of Miletus; and the Lacedæmonians very soon discovered that the man who had concluded the treaty with Persia had it equally in his power to break that treaty up again. For already the sudden decrease in the rate of pay mentioned above was due to the influence of Alcibiades, who had scarcely escaped the daggers of the Spartans, before he also held in his hands the means of taking his revenge upon them.

Alcibiades at Tissaphernes.

As at Sparta he had been a Spartan, so now at the satrap's court he became a Persian grandee. He easily accommodated himself to every new mode of life, as if he had been to its manner born, and, according to circumstances, altered with his dress his language and outward habits. Soon the fugitive adventurer had become the confidential adviser and minister of Tissaphernes; and he directed the foreign policy of the state here, as he had at Sparta. It should be remembered, that the Persians had only very recently recommenced interfering in the affairs of the Greek sea, herein simply following certain rude traditions of the policy of the Achæmenidæ. The only qualifications with which the present Persians entered upon this endeavor, were the ancient Persian pride, and the ancient feeling of contempt towards the Greek nation: but they utterly lacked any more accurate knowledge as to the mutual relations and comparative strength of the different states. Alcibiades therefore arrived at the right moment for pointing out to Tissaphernes the proper mode of proceeding. Persia, he told him, ought not to become the ally of any one of the Greek states: for it was her interest to keep both the leading Greek powers weak. Not Athens alone was dangerous, but Sparta also; the more so, because, if the latter once gained power in Ionia, she might easily think of extending that power into the interior—a course which would never be entered upon by a naval

state. It would therefore be much easier to arrive at an agreement as to a partition of power with Athens, than with Sparta. The latter should therefore not be allowed to become arrogant. She ought to be baited with money, but not satisfied. It was a far wiser course to gain over the individual naval commanders by presents of money, which might be given according to the satrap's own choice, in order to secure the dependence of the men of influence.

Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes in this sense, and acted in his name. The Chians' applications for money were contemptuously rejected. They were reminded that they were the wealthiest capitalists in Greece, and yet were unwilling to attain to their ends, except at other men's cost. The Phœnician fleet was held at a distance, and everything was avoided likely to bring the war to a decisive stage. The belligerent states were mutually to weaken and destroy one another, in order that in the end the supreme power might of itself fall into the hands of the Great King.

Tissaphernes was delighted with these counsels, which were equally agreeable to his avarice and to his hatred of the Greeks. He left full freedom of action to Alcibiades, who, as he believed, had freed him from all his difficulties; he honored him at his court in every possible way, and even named the new pleasure-grounds at Sardes after his benefactor. But, in point of fact, Alcibiades only worked for his own ends; for as when in the service of Sparta he had gained for himself the favor of Tissaphernes, so at the latter's court he was really laboring to earn the gratitude of the Athenians.*

Ulterior schemes of Alcibiades.

Since he had quitted the Peloponnesian fleet, he had narrowed the gulf separating him from his fellow-citizens. They were now aware, that it was not his intention to

* Thuc. viii. 45; Plut. *Alc.* 24.

triumph with Sparta over Athens. He had virtually become their ally from the moment of his rupture with Sparta. To him it was to be ascribed, that the Phœnician fleet, which, if united with the Peloponnesian, was capable of annihilating Athens, was kept back far away in the Syrian sea; it was he who stopped the Persian payments, who created discord in the head-quarters of the enemy, who made Chios suffer for her revolt, and who caused a delay giving the Athenians time to collect their forces. It seemed inconceivable, that it could be his intention permanently to remain in the Persian camp. Moreover, he already began to occupy himself with affairs at Athens, and to form connections there. For he wished to return; and this intention he could not realize otherwise than by means of new party struggles. Civic disturbances were to pave the way for his return home.

During the last few years Athens had been more tranquil than for a long period previously. All the citizens were exerting their utmost strength, in order to make possible the preservation of the state; and all eyes were directed towards the events taking place abroad. In the field, as well as at home, the citizens were engaged in arduous military service. Their attention was restricted to what was imperatively necessary; and the wise moderation which had characterized the conduct of public affairs since the failure of the Sicilian expedition, continued to prevail. The first terrors had now passed away, and the possibility of still making a resistance had been proved: but how could permanent results and an ultimately successful issue be anticipated, in view of the exhaustion of the public resources, and of the combination recently effected between Persia and Sparta? The war was being protracted into the second winter, and a general feeling of weariness supervened: no genuine ardor prevailed in any quarter for continuing the struggle.

Oligarchic schemes at Athens for changing the constitution

Under these circumstances the idea was bruited—in the first instance among the wealthy citizens, who had most to suffer from the burdens of the war, particularly among the ship-captains at the Samian station—of making possible a termination of the war by means of a radical alteration of the constitution, since they perceived, that, so long as the multitude held sway at Athens, there could be no question of an agreement with Sparta. The leaders of this movement were the heads of the oligarchical associations, which had first proved their strength during the prosecutions of the mutilators of the Hermæ; and the prevailing state of public feeling made it easy for them to gain the assent of many an honest patriot to their plans.

supported by Alcibiades.

A determining impulse was given to this movement by Alcibiades. He established communications with the more influential oligarchs of the Samian camp, holding out to them the prospect of pecuniary aid from Tissaphernes, and of the friendship of the Great King, and promising them all the support it was in his own power to give, if they succeeded in bringing about the overthrow of the constitution. Assuredly, he said, no man could expect him once more to confide his destinies to the baneful democracy which had driven him into exile; and it was equally out of the question that the Great King and his lieutenants should ever trust a state in which the multitude was supreme.

Phrynichus.

Phrynichus was the most intelligent among the Attic commanders. He was a man of low birth (he is said to have in his boyhood tended cattle), who had worked his way up by intrigues, obtaining money and influence as a sycophant, and had then proved his great natural gifts as a popular orator and general. Phrynichus saw through the untrustworthy character of Alcibiades' proposals. He represented to his colleagues, how

inconceivable it was that Alcibiades, who well knew the real authors of his fall, could ever be a sincere friend of the oligarchs. He declared it to be equally impossible, that the Persians would ever ally themselves with Athens as long as the Peloponnesians remained in power in Ionia; the latter were manifestly the allies most welcome and most convenient to Tissaphernes, who could not take any step more irrational than that of suddenly deserting them, and converting them into his enemies; while a permanent understanding could never be arrived at between Persia and Athens. Finally, it was very erroneous to repose any confidence in the oligarchical parties in the confederate states. A change in the political system at Athens would neither bring back those who had revolted against her, nor confirm the loyalty of those who had remained true. They were interested, not in the constitution at Athens, but in the achievement of their own independence.

These representations met with no acceptance. The oligarchs were blinded by passion and ambition; they fancied, that they had at last found an incomparable opportunity of recommending the overthrow of the constitution, upon grounds which would be acceptable even to the multitude; and they were resolved not to allow this opportunity to pass by unused.' Accordingly, the secret intrigues with Alcibiades were energetically continued. A compact central body of conspirators collected, and occasionally men even ventured to make open mention of certain necessary reforms; and, although the army displayed an unmistakable aversion from such ideas, yet the prospect of Persian pay was sufficiently tempting to prevent any decided opposition. The next step was therefore confidently taken; and Pisander (p. 351), who now came out in his true party-colors, was, together with a few companions, sent from the camp to Athens, in order there to accomplish the work begun at Samos.

Pisander arrives at Athens from the camp. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. c. 411.) Winter.

At Athens, extreme excitement was the first consequence of the plans of the conspirators becoming known. Some declaimed against the violation of the constitution, others against the return of Alcibiades; and on this head the popular orators agreed with the members of the priestly families, of whose hatred the violator of the Mysteries was the most prominent object. But opinions were divided, since three different proposals and prospects were in question, which had been cleverly mixed up with one another. After all, the first ebullition of wrath against Alcibiades had long ago cooled down, and the indignation against that traitor had been softened by the consciousness, that blame attached to his fellow-citizens as well as to himself; the brilliant achievements which accompanied his course, whithersoever he directed it, heightened the public admiration of this extraordinary man, and even flattered Attic vanity. In the multitude, the ancient fondness towards their favorite awoke once more, and simultaneously, a longing for his presence; and men even ventured to express their opinion, that Alcibiades was alone capable of bringing victory back to Athens, and that this end would well repay a few sacrifices. The adherents of the oligarchical party befriended themselves with the idea of seeing Alcibiades return, provided that an end was put to the democracy. But the most universal popularity attached to the prospect of new pecuniary resources, especially as it brought with it a hope —however distant—of the ultimate conclusion of peace.

Shortly before the arrival of Pisander the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes had be enacted at the Lenæa. Of this play, also, the theme is the universally desired peace (p. 194); and, as the men are apparently after all unable to bring it about, the women resolve to take the management of public affairs into their hands, in order to put an end to

Aristophanis Lysistrata. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. c. 411.) January.

the present state of things, which makes it impossible for any one to enjoy the blessings of life, which forces wives to live the life of widows and girls to pine away in perpetual maidenhood. The Athenian ladies are, in their own opinion at least, as well able to manage the state as their husbands. In this age of conspiracies they have gained experience as well as the men. All the women of Hellas unite in a general association, occupy the citadel, defy the *Probuli*, who are responsible for the welfare of the city, and contrive to devise the most effectual means for obliging the men to give in to them. Thus the farcical extravagance of the poet enables his fellow-citizens to forget the troubles of the present; but, at the same time, the whole piece betrays the troubled state of public feeling, the want of confidence, the insecurity of public affairs—which permit no outspoken satire. Invectives are indeed not spared against such men as Pisander, who for their private advantage create disturbances; and against the uncalled-for quackery exercised upon the sick state by political *dilettanti;* but the poet himself is incapable of giving counsel or encouragement to his fellow-citizens. Accordingly, the *Lysistrata* lacks the Parabasis (vol. ii. p. 538), in which on other occasions the poet is in the habit of vigorously expressing the remedies which he deems salutary. In the streets and in the market-place, he says, the universal complaint is heard, that in all Attica there exists not one man—not one who is able to save the commonwealth.*

Efforts of Pisander.

Pisander was therefore not discouraged by the first opposition provoked by his schemes. He held separate conferences with the leading citizens in larger or smaller groups, and endeavored to gain them over to his plans. He explained how in the first instance nothing was desired beyond a measure de-

* As to the date of the *Lysistrata*, see Jaep, *Quo anno, &c. Lys. atque Thesm. dont. sint.* (Eutin, 1859.)

manded by the existing state of things, beyond a temporary limitation of popular rights, such as had indeed been already introduced; it was not intended permanently to contravene the previous course of the history of Athens, or to abolish her constitution. By these representations, the apprehensions of those who loyally adhered to the constitution were calmed. The members of the clubs were gained over, by being assured, that it would of course be possible to get rid of the hated presence of Alcibiades for a second time, as soon as he had performed the service expected from him. But the main strength of Pisander lay in his being able to propose to all his hearers this question: "Are you aware of any other means of helping Athens out of her troubles? How are we, without extraordinary means, to prosecute to an end this war against Sparta, who is well supplied with money and ships, and has established her head-quarters simultaneously in Ionia and in our own country? The present question is not one of principles, as to which it is impossible to arrive at a general agreement; but it concerns the preservation of the city."

Thus by degrees an increased number of citizens consented to admit the necessity of a change in the constitution: some honestly believing that no other means could be devised, the rest because a prospect was opened to them of themselves participating in the advantages of the innovation. The political associations were once more in full activity, and worked on a common plan; while the rest of the multitude were awed into silence, and lacked an organization enabling them to offer resistance. Lastly the plot was most materially advanced by the *Probuli*, whose office had by this time already existed for more than a year, and had more and more reduced to impotence the constitutional organs of the state. They would have been able to nip all the schemes of the conspirators in the bud, had not the opinions of the latter been shared by the ma-

jority among these officials themselves. Under the authority of the *Probuli* the decree was passed, empowering Pisander and his companions to open the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, from which an immediate favorable change in the situation of the city was expected. It was at the same time ordered that Phrynichus, and with him Scironides, were to resign their office as generals: a measure which seemed to be imperatively demanded by the events which had meanwhile occurred in the fleet.

Phrynichus and Astyochus.

Phrynichus had been filled with the deepest anxiety by the successful progress of the oligarchical intrigues, which he had opposed to the best of his power—an anxiety not so much on behalf of his native city as of his own person. In all his proceedings he had been actuated by hatred of Alcibiades; he was aware that the latter knew him to be his enemy; and he was tortured by the idea of having to succumb to him. Phrynichus accordingly anxiously sought for an opportunity of damaging Alcibiades; he looked round for enemies of the latter, whom he might secure as trustworthy allies; and since the deepest anger against Alcibiades might be presumed to exist at present in the Spartan camp, the Attic general unhesitatingly entered into a secret understanding with the admiral of the hostile fleets. But on this head Phrynichus, who was generally so capable of forming a clear judgment as to men and affairs, deceived himself. The admiral of Sparta was in the pay of Tissaphernes. Accordingly, no sooner had Phrynichus communicated to Astyochus all the negotiations which had been carried on between Alcibiades and the Athenians, than this information immediately found its way to the Persian head-quarters, and to the ears of Alcibiades himself. The latter took advantage of this opportunity to display himself in his character of the friend of the Athenians, by warning them against their traitorous general, and demanding his execution. Instead of revenging him-

self upon his enemy, Phrynichus had placed the strongest weapon against himself in that enemy's hands. And yet he would not allow himself to be induced to relinquish the road upon which he had once entered: he thought Astyochus merely incautious, and communicated that opinion to him in a second letter, in which he offered to deliver the whole army at Samos into the hands of the enemy, if the latter would execute a surprise proposed by him. Not until Phrynichus had despatched this letter, were his eyes opened: and he now endeavored to save himself by taking the most careful measures against the surprise, which he had himself recommended Astyochus to attempt. When, accordingly this new act of treason was, by the same channel as the former, made known to the Athenians, they refused to credit it, and regarded Alcibiades as a calumniator, whose sole purpose it was to ruin Phrynichus; so that the latter, beyond a doubt the ablest of the commanders on Samos, now enjoyed greater authority in the camp than at any previous period. But at the present moment, when success entirely depended upon the good-will of Alcibiades, it was no longer allowable to leave Phrynichus in office. His dismissal was the first actual manifestation of the power which Alcibiades had recovered at Athens.*

Phrynichus dismisses the command.

When hereupon the negotiations were opened at the court of Tissaphernes at Magnesia, changes of considerable importance had occurred in the situation of affairs in Asia Minor. In Sparta, extreme discontent had been provoked at the course of the war; men were ashamed of the treaties, and angry with Astyochus as well as with the untrustworthy satrap; and it was resolved, notwithstanding the unfavorable season of the year, immediately to despatch twenty-seven ships under Antisthenes, who was to be accompanied by eleven com-

Lichas and Tissaphernes at Cnidus. Ol. xcii. (B.C. 411.) January.

* Thuc. viii. 54.

missioners charged with an inquiry into the state of affairs of Asia Minor, and with the choice of measures necessary for the honor of the city. The fleet and commissioners were despatched towards the end of December. The leading member of the commission was Lichas (the son of Arcesilaus), a wealthy and proud Spartiate, who had, notwithstanding the exclusion of Sparta from the Olympic festival, ventured to make his appearance there with a victorious chariot (Ol. xc. B.C. 420). He had been in consequence punished by the authorities at Elis with blows from a whip, probably at the instigation of Alcibiades, of whom he was a bitter adversary.* In the beginning of the year B.C. 411, Astyochus had joined the fleet of Antisthenes off Cnidus; where Tissaphernes also appeared, in order to settle matters with the Spartans. He soon discovered, that a totally different spirit prevailed in their camp. For, instead of their allowing themselves once more to be deluded by his promises, Lichas roundly declared to him, that Sparta had no intention of allowing herself to be befooled by him. Lichas further demanded a revision of the treaties, stating that Sparta was not making war in order to place the Hellenes once more under the dominion of the Persians. If the satrap would not consent to new conditions, the Spartans must endeavor to manage matters without him. Tissaphernes broke off the conferences, and returned to Magnesia.

Thus the situation of affairs appeared to be highly in favor of the Athenians. Their envoys immediately made their appearance at Magnesia, and opened their commission by stating that they, for their part, had already fulfilled the preliminary condition of an understanding with Persia, inasmuch as by their exertions popular government had been as good as abolished at Athens, and that

* Thuc. viii. 39, 52.

they now expected to be paid the price held out to them as a return for their labors. The crafty Persian, however, by no means intended at once to enter into an alliance with the Athenians. The defiant courage of Lichas, and the powerful fleet that accompanied him, had not failed of their effect. After Astyochus had, on the passage to Cnidus, defeated the Attic commander Charminus, and after the treason of the oligarchs in Rhodes had placed that island in the hands of the Spartans, the latter had unquestionably become the superior force on the Asiatic coast; they had constituted Rhodes their headquarters instead of Miletus, in order to be further removed from, and less dependent upon, the satrap. They were too strong, for him to be able to rid himself of them as he liked; and he foresaw, that the refusal of money payments would in the first instance produce only this result, that the troops would compensate themselves by plundering his coasts. But he was still more deeply annoyed by the fear, that the Spartans might hereupon attach themselves to Pharnabazus, who was longing to receive them. Although, then, he was glad enough to terrify the Spartans, and to render them more pliable by his negotiations with Athens, yet it was distinctly against his interests to convert them into enemies by any premature resolution, and to conclude a treaty with Athens promising subsidies to her. On this head he remained inflexible against the representations of Alcibiades, and acted precisely as Phrynichus had rightly foreseen he would act. Alcibiades pretended to an influence which in reality he by no means exercised; the satrap looked upon him as the most agreeable of sociable companions, and as in all Greek affairs a most welcome adviser, agent, and negotiator—in short, as a man such as Tissaphernes had always desiderated in the political position which belonged to him. But he was far from unconditionally following the directions of this counsellor, whom he only

allowed to direct him to this extent, that he took care not to give too vigorous and sincere a support to the Peloponnesians; but the correct instinct of the satrap prevented him from actually changing his political course.

Under these circumstances, Alcibiades would accordingly have found himself in a most perplexing situation, had the party whose representatives conducted the negotiations been his own party, and had he rested his hopes of return upon them. But to allow a Pisander and his associates to enjoy the triumph of a successful negotiation, had assuredly from the first been far from Alcibiades' intention. He accordingly accommodated his game to the circumstances of the case, above all providing for his own personal security. For his principal object was, to allow no doubts to arise in any quarter as to his influence in the Persian camp; his reputaion must not be allowed to suffer; and if, therefore the negotiations came to an end, all the blame ought to fall upon those who had conducted them. He accordingly caused himself to be commissioned by Tissaphernes to carry on the business of the negotiations in the presence of the satrap; by which means he, in the first place, procured himself the satisfaction of seeing the hated oligarchs forced to humble themselves before him and to pay their court to him. The conferences were opened, and Pisander, who was prepared to make large concessions, immediately in the name of Athens renounced all claims to any part of Ionia, for the sake of which the state had exerted its last forces. Hereupon, Alcibiades made a further demand for the Persians of the islands fronting the coast, *i.e*, Lesbos, Samos, and Chios; and this demand also was acceded to. And now the third demand was made. The Great King was to be granted the right of free navigation for his ships of war in every part of the Ægean, and along all its coasts. This demand affected the honor of Athens in its most sensitive

The conferences at Magnesia. Ol. xc i. 1. (B. C. 411.) February. Attitude of Alcibiades.

point: for, in acceding to it, she would have renounced, not only her transmarine possessions, but also the secure dominion over her own sea. Had they agreed to such concessions, which would with one stroke put an end to the entire previous history of Athens, the envoys could not have confronted their fellow-citizens, to whom they had promised to open up a new era of good fortune. They perceived, how true an opinion Phrynichus had formed of the double-tongued Alcibiades, and, enraged at the way in which they had been befooled, returned to Samos.*

Pisander sent to Athens by the oligarchs at Samos.

Their situation was a most painful one; they were unable to bring home any of the results, for the sake of which they had claimed so heavy sacrifices from the people and pledged their own honor. But it was no longer possible to recede from the position once assumed. The oligarchical party-intrigues had already proceeded too far in the army, and the Samian oligarchs, who had been admitted to the confidence of the conspirators, demanded that the latter should adhere to their original intentions. It was accordingly determined, in the camp, to give up all further thoughts of Alcibiades, for whom it would after all be impossible to find a suitable place in the state, as reconstituted, according to present intentions. The cause which had formerly been merely a means to an end, was now made the sole end itself, and was urged on with the utmost zeal. The members of the party paid voluntary contributions; they despatched Pisander to Athens, where he was to mature the outbreak of the conspiracy; and they simultaneously sent other envoys to the allied cities, —*e.g.*, Diitrephes to the Thracian coast,—with the view of everywhere overthrowing democratic government. The power which acted thus was essentially a revolutionary power, which ruthlessly intended entirely to reconstitute

* Thuc. viii. 56.

Athens and all parts of the Attic dominion. The blind mode in which they set to work, is shown in the case of Thasos. For, when Diitrephes arrived there, in order to overthrow the constitution, the aristocrats in the state gratefully accepted his services; but as soon as he had taken his departure, they hastened to build walls, and, with the aid of Sparta, to destroy all connection between Thasos and Athens.

Their proceedings in the capital were of a more successful nature. Here, much had been done, since the departure of Pisander, for furthering the plans of the oligarchs. All the different clubs of this party had united and formed one association, a mighty combination, acting according to a common agreement. The soul of these efforts was Antiphon, the son of Sophilus (vol. ii. p. 569), at that time already an advanced sexagenarian, but full of unwearying activity, political experience, and knowledge of human nature; inexhaustible in clever devices, trustworthy and reticent; in intellectual power and influence as a speaker superior to all his fellow-citizens, and at the same time perfect master of himself, and, although not entirely unselfish and especially not free from love of money, yet devoid of the ambitious desire of pushing himself forward into the first places in the state. A second leader was Theramenes (the son of Hagnon the *Probulus*): a man of brilliant abilities, eloquent, intelligent, and versatile, endowed with noble natural gifts, but lacking inner fixity of purpose, a genuine pupil of the sophists, one of the best scholars of Gorgias and Prodicus, and, by his talents as well as by his influential connections, one of the most important supports of the oligarchical party. Furthermore, Phrynichus had by this time been entirely gained over to the side of that party, since it had been determined to break off all communications with Alcibiades. For, although the whole undertaking could not but appear dangerous to so saga-

Antiphon.

Theramenes.

cious a man, yet no choice was now left him; and it behooved him, with all the resources of his daring and crafty intellect, to support the party which worked against his enemy. A friend of Antiphon and Theramenes was Archeptolemus (the son of Hippodamus), who had many years ago opposed Cleon, when the question of war or peace was discussed after the events at Pylus, and who was now a party leader round whom gathered the enemies of the demagogues and the democracy. Among those who joined the party in conformity with earlier family traditions was Melesias, the son of Thucydides (vol. ii. p. 457).

Archeptolemus.

Melesias.

By far the larger number of the members of the party belonged to the sophistically-trained younger generation, who despised the laws of the state and the common people; who on all kinds of personal grounds desired innovations, and who greedily imbibed the political teaching communicated to them at the meetings of the party by Antiphon, the Nestor of his party, as it was the fashion to call him. The prevailing state of public feeling and the experiences of the last years helped to gain over many of the well-to-do citizens, who had previously abstained from taking any decided line in party politics. Many points of view of indubitable correctness were urged, and the deeply-felt defects of the present state of things were made full use of, for concealing the selfish motives of party. It was now regarded as an indisputable fact, that democracy was the most iniquitous and worst form of constitutional government. The people itself, it was said, evidently recognized its incapacity for government, since it had never demanded the introduction of election by lot in the case of the most important public offices; accordingly, it would also be better for the people, if the entire government fell into the hands of those upon whom it had hitherto been the custom to throw nothing but the burdens of the commonwealth,—if the different

Theories of the oligarchs.

classes were again separated, and their due rights restored to the upper classes, who had been degraded into servants of the multitude. The oligarchs made the most of the ambiguity of the Greek language, which, in accordance with an ancient tradition, still designated the men of birth, education and refinement, as "the good and true." They were now able to appeal to the fact, that a beginning had already been made for returning to a rational order of affairs from the nonsense of mob-rule; and that this beginning had proved of use. Only let it not be held to suffice. The democracy was far too costly a thing, to admit of being carried on after the revolt of the allies; in the present period of financial dearth it was simply impossible to collect the pay for the Council, the courts of justice, and the public assemblies. It was therefore intended to make the public offices what they had been in the good old times, viz., honorary; the Council must be selected from among men of property and education, and be invested with greater powers, in order to be able to guide the state according to fixed principles, and towards definite objects. Only thus could a termination of the war be brought about, while in any other case that war would infallibly end in the ruin of Athens. But it did not follow, that on this account popular rights should be abolished; a civic body was to continue to exist, but not after the same fashion as hitherto—when the poorest and least educated classes were wont, for the sake of a daily wages of three obols, to throng the assembly and to disgust all decent persons against attending it; but in this case also a selection must be made; a body of Five Thousand or thereabouts, who needed to claim no compensation for occupying themselves with public business, must represent the sovereign rights of the Athenian people. Thus, better times might be confidently expected to arrive for the commonwealth.*

* The *programme* of action of the oligarchs is to be learnt from the

These were the theories which were now zealously spread, and which, owing to the talents and sophistic artifices of their advocates, met with undeniable success. The conspirators advanced in their proceedings step by step, in order secretly to prepare the decisive *coup d'état;* they passed from permitted means to unpermitted, from persuasion to force; for it was one of their sophistic principles that it was unnecessary to be over-conscientious in the pursuit of a good end. They had a common fund for their purposes, and held venal men in readiness to act as their instruments, as well as armed followers, hired abroad and fully prepared for any kind of service. These hirelings they employed for the purpose of depriving the democratic party of its leaders. Thus Androcles (p. 354) was got rid of by assassination; and after him other victims fell. No inquiry was ventured as to the authors of these crimes. Those who were not members of the secret clubs, were awed into silence; and the power of these clubs seemed doubly great, because it worked in the dark: liberty of speech was suppressed, and the action of the legitimate organs of the state were crippled; the *Probuli* were either in the plot, or were aged and infirm persons; the Council was accustomed to be the mere shadow of an authority; and the civic body lacked both leaders and union. Externally, the forms of the constitution still continued in existence; but the actual government was in the hands of the conspirators, who declared their intentions with increasing openness; till at last the Athenians, full of fear and utterly dispirited, consented to regard the alteration of the constitution as inevitable. The state of mind pre-

Preparations for the coup d'état.

Pseudo-Xenophontic work on the Athenian state, ascribed by Boeckh to Critias. As to Antiphon's love of money, see the passage of Plato's *Pisand.* (Cobet, p. 128). It is a matter of dispute, whether Archeptolemus was the son of the architect Hippodamus (vol. ii. p. 472), as is assumed by the Schol. ad. *Ar. Eq.* 327; cf. C. Fr. Hermann, *de Hipp. Mil.* p. 6.

vailing among the citizens may be measured by the comedy of the *Thesmophoriazusæ* (produced by Aristophanes three months after the *Lysistrata*), a play in which the poet avoids all political questions of the day, having selected a safe subject, viz., ridicule of Euripides and the Attic women; only here and there we perceive a sly allusion to the enemies of the ancestral statutes of the Athenians, to the cowardice of the Council, and to the imminent advent of Tyrannical government.

Aristophanis Thesmophoriazusæ. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 411.) March.

Pisander found the ground thus prepared at Athens. He had no intention of rendering a veracious account of the unsuccessful issue of his embassy; but rather assumed the pretence of having arranged everything satisfactorily with the Great King, so that now everything depended upon rapidly taking the necessary steps at Athens. He accordingly at once brought before the citizens a motion proposing the appointment of a Commission, which was with all possible speed to lay before the people a draft of a reformed constitution. This Commission was composed, in addition to the *Probuli*, of twenty assessors elected by the citizens under the influence of the conspirators, and invested with absolute powers. Such powers were needed, in order to remove the main obstacle in the way of all constitutional changes, the palladium of civil liberty—viz., the public indictment for illegal motions. Accordingly, the use of that indictment was prohibited by virtue of a decree of the Constitution Commission; it was made permissible for any citizen, without exposing himself to danger, to propose what he held to be advantageous for the common weal; and, the way thus having been opened for Pisander and his associates, the proceedings of the Commission in all essentials terminated. The decisive step was not taken on the Pnyx (for a feeling of awe prevented the

The coup d'état. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 411). March.

perpetration of the act by which the constitution was violated upon an anciently consecrated spot), but outside the city, a mile from the Dipylum, on the hill of Colonus, where the citizens were assembled near the Sanctuary of Posidon Ἵππιος. Here, on account of the proximity of the enemy's army, an enclosed space was necessary; and this enclosure, again, could be used for the purpose of preventing too large an accumulation of numbers, and the occurrence of disturbances. In this assembly, then, the motions of Pisander were brought forward, according as they had been agreed upon in the meetings of the party. These resolutions were expressed in a short and terse form, their sole object being to transfer the power into the hands of the conspirators. The main points were the following: every species of official salary or daily pay, with the exception of a compensation for service in the field, was to be forever abolished; and a new council of Four Hundred members to be instituted, which was to govern the state according to the best of its judgment, and, as often as it deemed right, convoke a civic assembly of Five Thousand.

The Council of the Four Hundred.

At the same time the mode of election for the members of the Council was fixed: a body of five was to be appointed, who were conjointly to elect one hundred councillors. Each of these hundred was hereupon to elect three others as his colleagues. The people assented to every proposition, and, without making any sign of disturbance, returned home from Colonus, after burying there their rights and liberties.* The assembly had probably been extremely small; for, besides all those serving on the fleet, the armed citizens who acted as a city guard were absent. Nothing now remained to be done, but to dissolve the old Council. After, therefore, the election of the Four Hundred had been completed, they repaired to the Council-house, armed

* Thuc. viii. 67.

with daggers and surrounded by their body-guard (the mercenaries mentioned above). But no application of force was necessary; the members of the old Council unresistingly received their pay and took their departure. The new Council took possession of their seats, chose its chairman, performed its inauguratory sacrifices: and thus the *coup d'état* had been perfectly successful, without any outward violence having been done to the laws.*

The Four Hundred, without delay, hastened vigorously to pursue their ends in both foreign and domestic affairs. All who were suspected of not favoring the new order of things, were removed from the public offices; the popular courts of justice were abolished; individual citizens who appeared dangerous were executed; others were imprisoned or banished. A recall of the exiles was proposed, but not carried into effect, because it was not ventured either to include Alcibiades in the amnesty or to exclude him from it by name; for no open declaration had been made with reference either to him, or to the Persian subsidies. On the other hand, envoys were sent to Decelea, to inform King Agis of the changes which had taken place at Athens, and to express the hope: that the Lacedæmonians would place more confidence in Athens under her present constitution, and be more ready to enter into negotiations with her. But the ambitious king endeavored to turn to a different account the events which had happened at Athens. He believed that the city was in a state of utter confusion, and therefore, after collecting as many troops as possible, attempted an assault upon the gates. After, however, this attempt had failed, he gave a friendly reception to a second embassy from Athens, and encouraged the

* See the allusions in Ar. *Thesm.* 361, 808, 1143. Thirty was the number of συγγραφεῖς, according to Philochorus ap. Harpocr. συγγρ. and Thuc. viii. 67, according to C. Fr. Hermann's emendation (Λ for Δ). As to the entire revolution, Wattenbach, *de Quadring. Athen. fact.*

Athenians immediately to despatch deputies to Sparta, to conclude peace in the name of the Four Hundred.*

But the most anxious care of the new Council was directed towards the fleet; for upon the latter was assembled that part of the civic body, amongst whom the greatest amount of attachment to the constitution must be presumed to have prevailed. Therefore, immediately after the establishment of the new Council, ten trustworthy persons had been sent to tranquillize the army, and to remove all opposition on its part by means of calming representations. The entire reform, they averred, had for its sole object to release the state from its present difficulties: that this reform was not conceived in an anti-popular spirit, was proved by the mere fact of the number of the Five Thousand citizens, who by the side of the Council formed the civic assembly, and were the real representatives of the sovereignty of the state. Even in former times the assemblies had rarely exceeded that number of citizens. But before the ten deputies could fulfil their commission, the *Paralus* (the official vessel) entered the harbor, bringing news from Samos which far outstripped even the worst apprehensions of the Four Hundred.

Counter-movement in Samos. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 411.) April.

They were indeed prepared to hear of agitations and various difficulties being about to oppose themselves to them in the army; but instead of this, they heard that their plans had suffered utter shipwreck at Samos. They had deceived themselves most grievously of all in Leon and Diomedon, whom, by investing them with the office of generals, they had hoped to attach to their interests. For these men, although entertaining aristocratic views, were yet loyal adherents of the constitution, and patriotic Athenians. They had accordingly combined with the trierarch Thrasybulus, with Thrasylus, an Athenian of

* Thuc. viii. 70 f.

rank who was then serving as a private soldier, and with other lovers of liberty, to frustrate the conspiracy which Pisander had plotted at Samos before his second departure; they had furnished the most vigorous assistance to the Samians, whom, it had been designed, with the aid of the Attic generals, to be brought under an aristocratic government, against the oligarchs of the island; the conspirators had been overthrown, and the *Paralus* was now to bring the news of this victory to Athens, in order to confirm the citizens there in their sentiments of loyalty towards the constitution.

The Four Hundred were terrified to find from the report of the crew of the *Paralus* (who had themselves taken a prominent part in the suppression of the conspiracy), what kind of spirit animated the army. Scenes of violence ensued: some of the crew were thrown into prison, the rest were removed from the vessel, and, before they had entered the city, transferred to another ship, under orders for Eubœa. In the meantime there was nothing further to be done, but to keep the news of the events at Samos concealed as long as possible, and, similarly, to withhold from the army all information as to what was taking place at Athens.

The army refuses to submit to the new government,

But even in this attempt the new despotic government failed. For the commander of the *Paralus*, Chæreas, contrived to elude them. He made his way to Samos; and, although he had himself had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the state of affairs at Athens and with the designs of the oligarchs, yet he gave an elaborate and partially exaggerated description of the reign of terror at Athens. No man's life, he stated, was any longer safe there, and no woman's honor. Those in power shrank from no deed of violence, and, he added, intended to bring into their power the families of the men serving on the fleet, in order, by detaining the former as hostages, to

reduce the latter to submission.* The army was so enraged at this news, that they would have immediately torn to pieces those who were suspected of oligarchical sentiments, had not Thrasybulus and Thrasylus interfered, demonstrating the necessity of maintaining peace and concord, as against the enemy who was so near at hand. In consequence, the whole army bound itself by a solemn oath to hold fast to the constitution, courageously to carry on the war against Sparta, and to regard the Four Hundred as enemies of the state. The Samians acceded to this solemn union, so that there now existed a double Athens. The army had good reason for considering itself to be the true Athens; the heart of the people lay in its warriors; and they declared that it was not they who had fallen away from Athens, but Athens which had fallen away from them; inasmuch as it was not walls and houses which constituted the city, but those of her citizens who thought and acted as Athenians †

and organizes itself as an independent state.

The army accordingly organized itself as an independent state. It held meetings as a legislative assembly; it claimed for itself the revenues from the allies; it proceeded to fresh elections, in order to remove all suspicious persons from the posts of general, and to transfer the command to proved men of its own choice. Thus Thrasybulus and Thrasylus were elected generals; and, in the face of the double enemy now opposed to the army, there prevailed in the latter a fuller concord and a more ardent spirit than ever. Even without the help of the faithless city, her soldiers felt strong and sufficient in themselves; and if they should not be able to return, they at all events had in their possession ships and arms, by which they might obtain for themselves a new city and country.‡

* Thuc. viii. 74. † Ibid. viii. 86.

‡ Thuc. viii. 72—77.

Thrasybulus and Alcibiades.

It was, however, the duty of the generals to take more provident views, and to discover the means for achieving actual results. Thrasybulus was the first man in the camp. He, more than any one else, had organized the constitutional party as a coherent body, full of vigor and moral self-command. To him the highest glories seemed reserved: that of delivering his native city out of the bonds of a criminal party rule, and of restoring Athens to herself. But the obstacles in his way were of an extraordinary nature, and could not be overcome by the mere joyous ardor of the army. The Ionian sea must not be given up for the purpose of commencing a civil war at Athens; while on the other hand it was impossible to measure the consequences of allowing the Four Hundred to retain power for any length of time. The army was surrounded by enemies, without being able boldly to attack any one of them; the fleet was city and country to the soldiers, but that fleet was no longer the mistress of the sea, being equalled in numbers by the Peloponnesians together with their new allies from Italy and Sicily, while at any moment the Phœnician fleet might come forth out of its ambush; and if it were to unite with the Peloponnesians, the two armaments together would be absolutely supreme on the sea. The spirit which animated the Attic sailors in the days of Cimon, when the only question asked was the whereabouts of the enemy, before he was, in joyous confidence of victory, sought out in any harbor—this spirit had passed away; nor was Thrasybulus a hero full of such confidence of victory and able to implant it in others. But he was possessed by a noble and pure patriotism, which it is doubly cheering to observe in this age of treacherous intrigues. Because he perceived that the present situation demanded extraordinary means and powers, he manifested so much self-denial, as to seek for another to occupy his position; and this other he found in Alcibiades. Doubtless he was well ac-

quainted with all the weak points in the character of the latter, which could not but be especially repugnant to so lofty a spirit as that of Thrasybulus. But he was also able to appreciate Alcibiades' extraordinary natural gifts, and was aware that nothing would more terrify the Four Hundred than the return of Alcibiades to the army. There was no question of any combination between Alcibiades and the Four Hundred. If the former were to constitute it his sole ambition to revenge the wrongs of his native city upon her foes at home and abroad, who were his private foes as well, a radical change might ensue in the state of affairs, such as could not be brought about by any other means. And furthermore, the political conjuncture after all made Tissaphernes, though personally powerless and unwarlike, master of the situation; whoever therefore directed his action (and with such an influence Alcibiades was, although not with perfect justice, credited), whoever could persuade him to send out or keep back the fleet, and to make or refuse money-payments, was the most powerful man in Greece. The feeling of the army was indeed very strongly opposed to Alcibiades. They would have nothing to do with the man who had intrigued with the oligarchs, and from whom had come the original impulse to the conspiracies against the commonwealth: but Thrasybulus continually recurred to his proposals, until at last he was commissioned by the assembled army to recall the exile in the name of the people.

Alcibiades recalled by the army.

This was the moment for which Alcibiades had waited. By playing a skillful game, he had gathered in his hands the threads of Attic politics. He had entered into communications with the oligarchs in order to delude them; he had indirectly caused the breaking-up of the constitution, in order that the city, torn by her dissensions, might stand in need of himself, that he might return as the representative of a good and glorious cause, that he,

upon whom the suspicion of Tyrannical designs had been so frequently cast, might make his appearance as the saviour of civil liberty, and destroy a Tyrannical party-government, the certainty of whose fall he clearly perceived. He unhesitatingly obeyed the summons of Thrasybulus, who now himself retired into a secondary position, in order to entrust the welfare of Athens to the hands of Alcibiades.

His arrival at Samos. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 411.) April.

Thus, after an absence of four years, Alcibiades stood once more among his fellow-citizens; nor could he have returned under any circumstances more favorable to himself. For here, at Samos, home reminiscences were not so strong as at home itself; his worst enemies, the oligarchs and the priests, were absent; the assembled community was unanimous, full of a lofty courage, and docile; the minds of all were occupied with the present and its necessities; and it was all the easier for those to arrive at a good understanding with Alcibiades, among whom he returned as an exile, when they were themselves deprived of their native city. Of these circumstances he took advantage with extreme skill. He gained the hearts of the soldiers by bewailing his hard fate, which had kept him so long far from his native land; he raised their courage by explaining to them what expectations, founded upon his experiences at Sparta and in Persia, he thought himself justified in forming as to the future of Athens. But, above all, he greatly exaggerated his influence with Tissaphernes, whom, as he declared, he had entirely gained over to the side of Athens: so that the satrap was prepared, if the necessity arose, to convert even his domestic furniture and tapestry into money, in order to procure the means of payment for the Athenians, besides which he was holding the fleet in readiness to come to their aid, as soon as he should have obtained a guarantee justifying him in trusting them.

Alcibiades the preserver of Athens.

The Athenians accepted all the proposals or hints of Alcibiades. They chose him as first general, with absolute powers; with him they thought they would be able to accomplish all their desires; and the first proof was to be given by the immediate overthrow of the Four Hundred. If Alcibiades had obeyed their passionate wish, he would indeed have had the best opportunity for taking vengeance upon his enemies. But it would have been extremely dangerous to relinquish the station at Samos, as since the beginning of April the Spartans again lay off Miletus. Moreover, he desired no return accompanied, as this must have been, by the most calamitous events. The return which he had in view, was of a different kind; and for this it was necessary to take preliminary measures. He accordingly, in the first place, proved the superior force of his influence, by preventing the army from attempting an attack upon Piræeus. This was his first act as general, by which he expiated many previous deeds,—an act, on account of which even the severest judges have called him the preserver of Athens. He, who had never been taught to moderate the selfish impulses of his ambition, now conquered himself, and in these times, when party-spirit overcame all other considerations, for the first time re-asserted the supreme claims of the public interest. In this sense he also treated the envoys of the Four Hundred (p. 468), who, after a considerable delay at Delos, had at last ventured to enter the camp. He protected them against the fury of the soldiers; he allowed them to put forth, without let or hindrance, all the arguments which they had been ordered to use in palliation of the *coup d'état*, and dismissed them with the answer: that, under existing circumstances, his opinion was entirely in favor of the intended retrenchment in the expenditure of the state; that neither had he any objections to make against the reform of the civic body entitled to vote, connected with the above; but

that the new council must resign immediately in favor of the constitutional Five Hundred. All this was calculated with extreme sagacity. Alcibiades appeared in the character of an arbiter standing above the conflicting parties, as the man who alone was able to effect a general reconciliation. But at the same time he, by means of these proposals, caused a split in the party in power in Athens, thereby undermining this power itself.

His relations with Tissaphernes.

As to the affairs of Asia Minor, he here occupied a position completely corresponding to his wishes and character; for nothing flattered his love of self more strongly than the chance of displaying his capacity of uniting opposite extremes in his own person, and being at the same time a liberating hero, a friend of the Persians, and the first personage both at the court of Tissaphernes and in the Attic camp. Towards his fellow-countrymen he boasted of the confidence reposed in him by the satrap; towards the latter again he could now assume a far different position as the commanding general of Athens, being now a man who could, according as he chose, serve or damage Tissaphernes. The relations between Persia and Sparta, again, had been very decisively affected by the mere fact of Alcibiades' arrival at Samos. For the Spartans had completely lost faith in Tissaphernes, since they beheld his confidential adviser at the head of the Attic fleet, and found the same relations still continuing between the pair. The indignation of all men in the Peloponnesian camp who yet retained any feeling of honor, was raised against Tissaphernes, and against Astyochus, who was now openly accused of treason. King Agis had at all events made an attempt towards taking advantage of the dissensions at Athens in favor of Sparta; but Astyochus had remained absolutely inactive with his fleet, now increased to 112 triremes, on the pretence of waiting for the Phœnicians; or the trifling efforts actually

attempted by him had resulted in utter failure. All discipline was at an end; the admiral was publicly vituperated; and loudest of all was the wrath of the new confederates, particularly of the Syracusans under Hermocrates, who was filled with deep anger by the unworthy conduct of the Greeks. In the end, all consideration for Tissaphernes was entirely laid aside by the Peloponnesians; so that they remained quiet spectators while the Milesians stormed the citadel constructed in their city by Tissaphernes. The latter, indeed, subsequently repaired in person to the south coast, in order to summon the fleet of 147 sail anchoring off the coast of Pamphylia; but he had no more intention of allowing it to effect a junction with the Peloponnesians, than his sub-governor had of supplying the Greeks with the provisions due to them by treaty. Under these circumstances, therefore, the Athenians were completely out of danger; they began once more to look upon themselves as rulers of the sea, and Alcibiades contrived to have all the advantages which had been gained ascribed to his personal influence.

Athens in Samos. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 411.) April. May.

Meanwhile the Samian Athens was more and more generally recognized, even abroad, as the real Athens. Envoys arrived from Argos and made voluntary offers of her assistance. Together with them came the crew of the *Paralus*, which the new Council had ordered to carry three of its members as ambassadors of peace to Sparta—an order of which the object manifestly was, to insult the democratic sentiments of the men of the *Paralus*. But this petty party intrigue ended very unfortunately for its authors. For on the voyage the crew seized upon the ambassadors, placed them in the custody of the Argives, and hereupon put back to Samos, where, after all their adventurous experiences, they were joyously hailed by their brethren-in-arms. All these matters contributed to raise the confidence of the troops, even before any actual

achievement had taken place; and the glory of this reaction towards success was entirely given to Alcibiades, whose statue the Samians erected before their temple of Here, in order to preserve a lasting remembrance of the well-omened day of his return.

Division of opinion among the Four Hundred.

In Athens, events had in the meantime taken a totally different course from that expected by the oligarchs after their first successes. For scarcely had the Four Hundred occupied the seats in the Council-house, when it became evident how ill the men suited one another who were to govern the state in a situation of such extreme difficulty, and who were now to establish a proof of the assertion, that an orderly and beneficent government was only possible where their principles were adopted. The oligarchs had hurried the proceedings, in order to leave no place in the Council unfilled; the election had been intentionally not limited to members of the conspiracy, but partially extended to others, in order to avoid the appearance of a party government: Phrynichus in particular had been unwearied in including, by all kinds of intrigue, even honest patriots, whom he thus, as it were, made against their will share in the guilt of the *coup d'état*. How erroneously it was impossible to calculate in these manœuvres, is evident, *e. g.*, from the mistake committed in the choice of Leon and Diomedon.

It was not until after the commencement of the government, that many of the members of the new Council arrived at a clear understanding of the principles and intentions actuating the authors of the innovation, and perceived the impossibility of acting in conjunction with them. But a decisive influence was exercised by the return of the envoys from Samos. For, since the army had so unanimously identified itself with the cause of the constitution, the government in the city was stamped with a revolutionary character; Alcibiades, whose return had

with many formed the motive for consenting to a change of the constitution, and was to compensate them for the heaviest of sacrifices which they had imposed upon themselves and their fellow-citizens,—Alcibiades stood at the head of the army, and the insidious deception practiced by Pisander was now manifest. The great moderation displayed by the armed citizens, who had in their hands the fate of the city, their calm and loyal adherence to their post at Samos, the sensible answer made by Alcibiades,—all these contributed to complete the unwillingness of the doubtful partisans to adhere to the party in power; for they became aware that all the benefits which they had anticipated from change in the constitution might have been obtained by a far juster and safer mode of proceeding; they saw themselves used as the instruments of a traitorous faction; and as, furthermore, it was unsatisfactory to their ambition to play such a part, the difference of opinion which had prevailed from the first now grew into open discord in the very midst of the Council. Some wished to make concessions; others again desired, in proportion to the increase of the danger, to introduce greater severity and more thorough measures; some wished to lay open a path for extricating themselves from their difficulties, while the rest intended at any cost to maintain themselves in power. Pre-eminent among the particular measures which became contested points, was the question of summoning the Five Thousand. The Moderates demanded that this body should be duly convoked; declaring, that at the present Athens was under a purely despotic government; the others wished indefinitely to postpone this dangerous step, in order to keep the governing power as undivided as possible, and to prevent any outbreak of agitation. They considered it necessary, that a state of siege should be for the present maintained in the city: using for this purpose the foreign bowmen in their hire, who more than anything else gave to their government the

character of a Tyrannis. These men were barbarians of savage aspect, chiefly Iberians, who are mentioned in the comedies of the day. They had been distributed in the commanding points of the upper and lower city, and exercised a system of judicature and police, corresponding to the prevailing state of things. The right of public meetings, liberty of speech, and of teaching had been abolished; and the party of the fanatics (p. 351), which had its representatives in the Council, took advantage of this favorable opportunity for resuming their religious persecutions. It was perhaps about this time that a suit was instituted against the aged Protagoras, the friend of Pericles, on account of his book "On Things Divine;" he was forced to seek safety in flight, and the copies of his work were publicly burnt in the market-place.*

Construction of a fort in the Piræus. Ol. xcii. (B.C. 411.) May.

But the principal cause of the open division which broke out between the parties in the Council, was the construction, on the motion of the oligarchic leaders, of fortifications in the Piræus. Here the rocky peninsula of Eëtionea stretches from the north side towards the mouth of the great harbor; so that from this peninsula it was possible for a small garrison completely to control all vessels passing in or out. This peninsula was walled off in this wise: that the great corn hall and corn-market (vol. ii. p. 612) were included in the lines of wall.† The cause assigned for this fortification was the necessity of guarding the harbor against a sudden attack on the part of the troops at Samos; but from the first the rumor was bruited

* As to the division of the four Hundred into a moderate and an Extreme party, see Thuc. viii. 89. Pythodorus, the accuser of Protagoras, is mentioned as εἷς τῶν τετρακοσίων by Diog. L. ix. 55. Brandis, *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. 525; Meier. The condemnation of Protag. is placed by Meier, *Opusc.* i. 222, in the time of the Hermæ trials. The same is the view of Sauppe ad Pl. *Prot.* p. VI. As to the Iberian bowmen, see Steph. Byz. v. Ἰβηρίαι. Bergk, *Comment. de Rel. Com. Att.* p. 343 sq.

† Thuc. viii. 90.

about, that this fastness was built for the sole purpose of receiving Peloponnesian troops. On this question, then, the Moderates most decisively opposed themselves to the leaders of the conspiracy. The former acknowledged as their heads Theramenes and Aristocrates; the latter Phrynichus, Pisander, Antiphon, Aristarchus and Callæschrus.

Each party henceforth acted in opposition to the other; and the consequence of this contention could only be, that the real oligarchs, whose dangers from the army, citizens and from their own colleagues increased day by day, proceeded successively to measures of increasing desperateness. Nothing remained for them, but to call in Sparta; and, although they would have gladly maintained Athens as an independent state, together with her maritime dominion, yet they were resolved, if no other way should be left open to them, to rule their native city even under the protection of Peloponnesian troops; for in their eyes the supremacy of their party passed all other considerations. Antiphon, Phrynichus, and Archeptolemus accordingly proceeded to Sparta, in order to enter into fresh negotiations. Of the result no tidings reached the people; but this fact only tended to aggravate the suspicions aroused by these secret proceedings; while the prevailing fears were increased by the circumstance, that a Peloponnesian fleet lay ready for sailing in the ports of Lacedæmon.

Oligarchic deputation to Sparta.

And now the opposite party restrained itself no longer; for they perceived their own ruin to be involved in the completion of the fastness in the Piræeus, and in the success of these treasonable designs. The Moderates were their only chance of safety in joining the popular party. Thus, then, a counter-revolution was plotting among the Four Hundred themselves; and in secret conferences the victims were marked out, who were to be sacrificed to the hatred of the citizens, and sacrificed with all possible publicity, in order

Assassination of Phrynichus.

to test the power of the despots in authority. The first object of vengeance was Phrynichus. Scarcely had he returned from the odious embassy to Sparta, when he was assassinated one evening, not far from the Council-house, in the densely crowded market-place. The assassin effected his escape; but Apollodorus, a participator in his crime, was seized. Both belonged to the mercenaries hired by the Four Hundred; thus even these troops proved untrustworthy, and even of them, part were in the hands of the adverse faction. Though, even when submitted to torture, Apollodorus could not be brought to confess the names of those who had given him the order, yet he avowed that the conspirators were many in number, and that they held their meetings in the house of the commander of the police-soldiers, and in the dwellings of the citizens. These confessions terrified the majority, who ventured upon no decisive measures. Some secretly quitted the city; the rest knew not what step to take next: an increase in the severity of suppressive regulations being impossible. The Moderates accordingly advanced all the more resolutely; no secret plots were any longer necessary; and they established an understanding with the general body of the citizens, in order to prepare an open revolt.*

The citizens rise against the government.

The first signal for this revolt was given in the Piræeus; the civic troops, charged with the construction of the fortifications in Eëtionea, rose against the government, and made a prisoner of their commander, Aristocles; Hermon, the commander of the garrison of Munychia, joined the

* Assassination of Phrynichus: Thuc. viii. 92. As the use of both preposition and article proves no date to be derivable from the expression ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ in Thuc. viii. 92, I can discover no contradiction between his statement and that of Lycurg. *in Leocr.* § 112 (νύκτωρ), such as has been found by Bergk, Kirchhoff, Rauchenstein, and others. After the pause at noon, the city market used to fill again, and in the summer remained crowded up to night-time. Cf. the author's *Att. Studien*, ii. 44.

movement; and the whole port-town stood under arms against the Four Hundred. In the Council a party still existed which desired to resort to force; but the majority perceived the necessity of attempting conciliatory measures and was induced by Theramenes to send him down as commissioner of the government. He received the complaints of the troops, found them just, and combined with the party in revolt to pull down the half-finished fort. In the theatre at Munychia a civic assembly was held; from this point the citizens marched in an orderly procession to Athens, where they took up their position under arms in the Anaceum, the sacred enclosure of the Dioscuri, at the base of the temple of the city goddess—on the same place where every citizen had sworn, as a youth on the threshold of manhood, to defend his native city, and to maintain her dominions unimpaired by water and by land, and to pledge his life in defence of the laws of the city against any attack whatsoever.

Theramenes.

But while mindful of this oath, they were at the same time animated by an unwonted feeling of self-restraint. The fate of the city lay in their hands; the Council was utterly powerless, and might fall as a victim to their anger; and yet they gave audience to the deputies, who came over to them from the Council-house, and who individually besought them to maintain public tranquillity and order; they even entertained the proposal that the Council should continue to administrate the government, but should at the same time convoke the Five Thousand, and supplement its own numbers from the latter body. For the purpose of settling these measures, a day was fixed, on which concord was to be restored in a public assembly of the community. And already the multitude was assembling at the appointed hour in the theatre, in order to accomplish the work of union, and to re-establish the free Attic commonwealth: when suddenly the news spread, that a fleet of forty-two sail was approaching from the direction of

Megara and rounding Salamis. Hereupon it was naturally, and not without grounds, asserted, that this was the fleet concerning which Theramenes had informed them, that its proceedings were regulated by an understanding with the Four Hundred. Immediately all capable of bearing arms rushed to the Piræeus, in order to defend the harbor against the foes, both foreign and domestic. The ships lying in the harbor were manned, and others rapidly lowered into the water; the walls were provided with guards, and the entrances to the harbor closed. The Spartan admiral, Agesandridas, led the fleet past the harbor, and the immediate danger was past.

Defeat of the Athenians at Oropus. Ol. xcii. 1. (B.C. 411.) June.

But soon new dangers were perceived to be at hand. The fleet rounded Sunium, and made for Oropus. The safety of Eubœa was now at stake. Once more the Athenians hurried to the ships; with the utmost haste a squadron was made ready, the command of which was given to a citizen of the name of Thymochares, who was rapidly to effect a junction with the other ships in the Eubœan waters. Six-and-thirty ships met at Eubœa, the enemy lying opposite at Oropus. As yet nothing seemed lost; and the Athenians were full of ardor for battle. But in this instance again their evil fortune raised against them enemies, both before them and in their rear. The Eretrieans meditated treason. When the Athenians wished to buy their provisions, they found the market in the vicinity of the sea deserted; and were forced to rush as far as the most distant streets, in order to procure the most necessary supplies. When, therefore, the signal for the start was given, the crews were not complete; and the fleet was forced to set sail, in a state of great disorder, against the enemy, who had received from Eretria his signal for advancing. The Athenians, notwithstanding, held their own in the first part of the battle, but they were

Loss of Eubœa.

soon overpowered and driven back upon the shore; those who fled to Eretria were there cut down by the citizens; twenty-two ships fell into the hands of the enemy, and in the course of a few days the whole island was lost to Athens, with the exception of Oreus, the ancient Histiæa (vol. ii. p. 451), which was in the hands of Attic citizens.*

When the news of the battle in the Eubœan sound, and of its consequences, reached Athens, even the best lost heart; for this calamity far surpassed even the Sicilian. Eubœa, it must be remembered, could be worse spared by the Athenians than even their own country; moreover, they were now without either ships, or money, or men; the army had been torn away from the civic body, the community at home was divided in itself, the Council in secret communication with the enemy, and Agis with a menacing army before the walls. What else, then, could be anticipated, but that Agesandridas would immediately make his appearance off the Piræeus? If a simultaneous attack were made from Decelea, a successful resistance was inconceivable; it seemed as if the treasonable plans of the oligarchs were to be crowned with victory even in the last hour. For, even if the army at Samos were to hasten to the rescue of the city, it was to be presumed that it would arrive too late; and if Samos were given up, Ionia and the Hellespont would be at the same time sacrificed, and all the glory of Athens, both empire and city, destroyed at once. In short, the Athenians were prepared for the annihilation of their state.

But the enemy remained motionless. Taken by surprise by his own successes, he was unable to make use of them. Agis and Agesandridas never thought of making a combined attack upon the city, and allowed the Athenians full leisure to recover from their first terror. They

* Thuc. viii. 91—95.

accordingly manned twenty more ships, in order to defend their harbors, and then applied themselves seriously to bringing order into their domestic affairs; for they felt that they could not work their way out of the troubles of the present, unless they had first obtained a firm footing at home, and established a legal constitution.

The Four Hundred deposed. Ol. xcii. 1. (B. C. 411.) June.

Shortly after the defeat in the Eubœan sound, about the middle of June, we find the citizens again assembled in their ancient place on the Pnyx, whence they had been banished by the rule of the despotic government. The proceedings were carried on with perfect calm, but with determination and vigor. The Council was deposed, and the supreme sovereignty of the state restored to the people—not, however, to the entire multitude; for the principle was retained of reserving full civic rights to a committee of men of a certain amount of property; and, as the lists of the Five Thousand had never been drawn up, it was decreed, in order that the desired end might be speedily reached, to follow the precedent of similar institutions in other states, and to constitute all Athenians, able to furnish themselves with a complete military equipment from their own resources, full citizens, with the rights of voting and participating in the government. Thus the name of the Five Thousand had now become a very inaccurate designation; but it was retained, because men had in the last few months become habituated to it. At the same time, the abolition of pay for civic offices and functions was decreed, not merely as a temporary measure, but as a fundamental principle of the new commonwealth, which the citizens were bound by a solemn oath to maintain. This reform was, upon the whole, a wise combination of aristocracy and democracy; and, according to the opinion of Thucydides, the best constitution which the Athenians had hitherto possessed. On the motion of Critias, the recall of Alcibiades

The new constitution.

was decreed about the same time; and a deputation was despatched to Samos, to accomplish the union between army and city. The work thus begun was continued in repeated assemblies of the citizens; and a legislative committee was appointed to revise the constitution after the recent disturbance of the public laws, and to make everything harmonize with the principles now sanctioned. This committee was to complete its labors within a term of four months.*

Admirable moderation displayed by the citizens. Theramenes.

The most influential personage in this period was Theramenes. As no less severe a judge than Aristotle reckons him among the best citizens whom Athens ever possessed, we may be sure that his merits consisted not merely in his having, more than any one else, contributed to frustrate the treasonable efforts of the party which was prepared to proceed to extremities, but principally in his having, after the overthrow of that party, succeeded in preventing the outbreaks of passion which would have ruined the state, in effecting a reconciliation among the different members of the community, and in thus achieving a result which is among the rarest of all in political life. We see the failure of a *coup d'état*, which had laid impious hands upon all the most sacred possessions of a civic community—upon its equality before the law, and liberty of conscience and speech, as well as its independence; and yet there ensues no violent revulsion in the opposite direction, no sanguinary and revengeful reaction; but the cruelly deluded and deeply insulted community, after recovering the whole of the supreme power, is so well

* As to the counter-revolution, see Thuc. viii. 96. The Athenians οὐχ ἥκιστα, τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γ' ἐμοῦ φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες. Recall of Alc., under the co-operation of Theramenes, on the motion of Critias: Plut. *Alc.* 33 (γνώμη ἥ σε κατήγαγ', ἐγὼ ταύτην ἐν ἅπασιν εἶπιν). Cf. Corn. Nepos, *Alcib.* 7; Diod. xiii. 38. As to the *Nomothetæ*, see Schümann, *Opusc. Ac.* i. 250; Bergk ad Schiller. *Andoc.* p. 145.

able to put restraint upon itself, that it readily acknowledges the rational and opportune ideas lying at the foundation of the oligarchical plans of reform, and adopts them as a standard in settling the new order of things. If it is remembered how in other states, *e. g.*, in Corcyra (p. 136), similar events were wont to be accompanied by the most tremendous eruptions of party fury: it must be acknowledged that the Athenian people on no occasion acted with greater wisdom and moderation, than on this. The conduct of the city population, as well as of the army at Samos, offers a splendid testimony to the moral excellence still existing in the heart of the civic body; the ill fortunes of the state had contributed again to arouse and strengthen civic virtues; and inasmuch as this high-minded conduct also immediately inspired the entire state with new courage and new force, and enabled it once more to overcome the terrible blows of fate, we are probably justified in numbering those who in these civic critical times were the speakers and advisers of the body, among the greatest benefactors of Athens.*

In the midst of this gradual transition from one constitution to the other—some of the most important institutions of the former being actually included in the latter—it was of course, impossible to regard previous participation in the government of the Four Hundred as in itself punishable. Had not members of that government become the preservers of the state? On the other hand, upon other members of the Council the suspicion of the greatest crime against the state had fallen so heavily, that their case could not be allowed to pass without notice. Accordingly, public prosecutors were named, and a judicial commission of inquiry was appointed, in order to call to account all the members of the Council. Many of them were acquitted of all guilt. Those who evaded their re-

* For Aristotle's opinion of Theramenes, see Plut. *Nicias*, 2.

sponsibility and passed over into the camp of the enemy, *e. g.*, Pisander, were condemned. Aristarchus had not only escaped, but had even taken with him a body of the Iberian bowmen to Œnoe (p. 59), which was at that time undergoing a siege by Corinthians and Bœotians. He had deluded the garrison, which regarded him as a member of the government, into the belief that the fortress had been ceded in a recently concluded treaty; and had thus brought one of the most important ports on the frontier into the enemy's hands. The punishment of treason subsequently befell him. Personally, only two of the most influential authors of the *coup d'état*, Archeptolemus and Antiphon, were arraigned before the judges.

Death of Antiphon.

The aged Antiphon had refused to seek safety in flight; and, although without any hopes of success, for the last time exerted all the powers of his mind manfully to defend the principles upon which he had acted. The charge against him rested particularly upon the last embassy to Sparta, the construction of the fort in the Piræeus, and the connection between these measures and the naval expedition of Agesandridas. The whole of Antiphon's speech "on the changes in the constitution" was a masterpiece of eloquence, which called forth exceeding admiration, but it was unable to save his life. He failed to remove the suspicion resting upon the embassy to Sparta, and in vain endeavored to show that the Four Hundred had acted as one equally responsible body, and that, therefore, either all ought to be punished or all acquitted.*

Thus ended, in the summer of B.C. 411, immediately

* According to Thuc. viii. 68, Antiphon's speech περὶ μεταστάσεως constituted the best defence of the *coup d'état*. In the fragmentary remains of that speech (Harpocr. Στασιώτης, Ἐμποδών) reference seems to be made to an unjustifiable separation of the parties involved; this is indicated by the distinction drawn between the τύραννοι and the δορυφόροι.—Onomocles, the third person subjected to trial, had previously taken his departure (*Vit. x. orat.* 833).

after the commencement of Ol. xcii. 2, one hundred years after the fall of the Pisistratidæ, the four months' Tyrannis of the oligarchs. It had only been made possible by the unconstitutional power of the political clubs, who had in the Hermæ prosecutions tried their strength for bolder undertakings; it had been accomplished by means of the unusual talents of its supporters, aided by the favorable sentiments of the wealthier classes; but it could not last, because the main body of the people held fast to the constitution—because what was left of the naval dominion of Athens, was only preserved by the democratic party, and because at Athens itself it was impossible to reconcile the honor and independence of the state with an oligarchical form of government. Even those who meant honestly by their native city, were forced to seek a reserve in Sparta, and thus to prepare the ruin of the Attic commonwealth. But the majority of the party were, as their last steps proved, mere selfish traitors, who were ready, for the sake of gratifying their ambition, to sacrifice their native city. And yet, notwithstanding its brief endurance, and the utter impossibility of its enduring, the reign of this party did not pass without leaving its vestiges behind. The power of the state had received wounds which could never be healed; its weakness had become more manifest than ever to the foe; and Sparta had tested the strength of her following in Athens. The blood of Athenian citizens had again flowed in the city; ancient houses had been pulled down, and pillars of shame erected as remembrances of the reign of terror; and a series of prosecutions for high treason and confiscations of property had sown a seed of enmity, which shot up with great rapidity. For an era of agitation had begun, in which it was thought to make up for the neglect of the days of generous moderation. Even the dead was now brought up to judgment; the murder, with which the rising had first commenced, was to be made to appear in the light of a

thoroughly justifiable act; and therefore all the hatred provoked in the minds of the citizens against the despotic rule of the oligarchy was accumulated upon the head of Phrynichus, who had originally been a decided opponent of the enemies of the constitution, and had only been involved in their intrigues by external circumstances. A defence of the murdered man was only permitted with this reservation: that, in case of a verdict of condemnation, the defender was to be accounted guilty of the same crime as Phrynichus. After the latter had in his grave been convicted of high treason, and his bones cast out beyond the frontiers of Attica, his assassins were now able to reap the full glory of tyrant-slayers and liberating heroes; they were admitted to the citizenship, presented with part of the confiscated property, and honored with mention upon public monuments; the whole proceeding being, as it were, a centenary celebration of the first liberation of Athens, by Harmodius and Aristogiton. But these transactions occupied a long time in their accomplishment; for a variety of very doubtful characters now gave in their names, declaring themselves to have taken part in the nocturnal scene of murder, and claiming their share of honors and rewards. Even the honors belonging to the two chief perpetrators of the deed, Thrasybulus and Apollodorus, gave occasion to various objections, which were discussed by extraordinary committees; so that the whole business was not finally settled until nineteen months after the death of Phrynichus, in March, B.C. 410 (Ol. xcii. 3).*

The trials concerning Phrynichus.

Thus, political passions had been allowed to break out afresh; and several persons, who in the course of the first inquiry appeared to have escaped without much hurt,

Effects of the Tyrannical rule of the Four Hundred.

* The popular decree in honor of the murderers, belonging to the year of Glaucippus (Ol. xcii. 3), is preserved in a fragment discovered by

were called to a supplementary account: particularly those who could be proved to have adhered to the Council even after the destruction of the fort at Piræeus. Search after the traces of Tyrannical intrigues was carried on as actively as before; and no man could even now feel secure in his own house. On the motion of Demophantus, it was decreed that the penalty of high treason should in future be also extended to those who accepted any office from an unconstitutional government. Thus it was endeavored to anticipate the dangers of new *coups d'état;* and, in truth, the oligarchical party had, notwithstanding its defeat, been far from rooted out; the speech bequeathed as a kind of legacy by Antiphon to his political friends exercised an enduring effect upon them, and they only waited for a more favorable opportuuity for bringing about the realization of their plans.

Meanwhile events abroad had passed into a totally new phase, occasioned partly by the change in the supreme command of the Spartan fleet, partly by the new proceedings on the part of Alcibiades.

Active influence of Alcibiades.

Alcibiades had already exercised an important influence upon the destinies of his native city. He had created a firm and courageous spirit in the Attic army; he had renewed the ancient alliance with Argos; he had prevented the expedition of vengeance against Athens, which would have formed the commencement of the most disastrous civil war; he had rendered the foreign foe harmless, by most skillfully contriving to foster the mutual suspicions between Persia and Sparta; and, similarly, he had helped to overcome the enemy at home, the oligarchy; for it was his message which had produced the first division in the Council of the Four Hundred, and which had thus led to its overthrow. Lastly, he had, by means of a

Bergk (*Zeitcher. f. A. W.* 1847, p. 1099) and restored by Kirchhoff (*Phil.* xiii. p. 16, and *Monatsber. d. Berlin. Akad.* 1861, p. 603).

declaration in favor of a limited popular government, essentially aided in the establishment of the new constitution. In all these efforts he had succeeded, without resorting to force of arms, by his personal influence, and by a sagacious use of the circumstances of the times. He was now to show as a general that he was still the man who held in his hand the fortunes of war, and who was able to heal the wounds inflicted by himself upon his native city. It was now time, once more to conduct the Attic triremes to an offensive war, which was alone capable of restoring to the Athenians their ancient confidence in their ships: it behooved Alcibiades to show them, how pecuniary means were to be procured, even without the regular influx of the tributes, and how even under the present circumstances the Attic arms might recover their ancient fame.

His cruises. Ol. xcii. 2. (B.C. 411.) Summer.

He accordingly, during the months succeeding upon the restoration of the constitution, cruised with a squadron of twenty-two ships off the coasts of Caria, levied forced contributions upon the wealthy cities of Halicarnassus and Cnidus, fortified the island of Cos, accustomed his ships by practice to rapid expeditions, and established a personal influence over the crews by procuring them rich booty. In spite of the Rhodians (who even at that date were already aiming at the establishment of a naval supremacy of their own), and notwithstanding the proximity of the Persian fleet, the Carian waters were again entirely in the power of Athens, and more money was drawn from the revolted cities, than had ever been paid by them as tribute. He then, in the beginning of autumn, turned northwards, in order to unite with the rest of the fleet for the purpose of a decisive struggle; for the main theatre of war had in the meantime been removed from Miletus to the Hellespont.

Mindarus.

For it had been resolved at Sparta to change the course of operations. Accord-

ingly, in the spring, the indolent and untrustworthy Astyochus had been superseded in the command of the fleet by a brave Spartiate of the name of Mindarus, a man who, after the fashion of Lichas (p. 457), assumed a very resolute bearing towards the satrap. Once more a demand was made for the junction of the Peloponnesian and Phœnician fleets, by which the whole war might be brought to a speedy termination. Tissaphernes was even now desirous of avoiding an open rupture, and in order to display the semblance of zeal, personally travelled to the south coast for the purpose of summoning the royal fleet. But the latter remained now, as before, at anchor behind the Lycian promontories near Aspendus; seemingly held by a magical charm to the boundary which the victories of Cimon had assigned to the naval dominion of Persia (vol. ii. p. 456). But the real reason lay in the obstinate consistency with which Tissaphernes carried out his policy. For, had the 147 Phœnician ships joined the Lacedæmonians, he would have given to the latter an undeniable superiority of strength in the Ionian Sea; and this he wished at any cost to avoid. Pecuniary interests may also have contributed to determine his conduct, the Phœnicians evincing their gratitude towards the satrap for allowing them to remain in their safe hiding-place. In short, Tissaphernes, under empty pretences, once more excused the non-appearance of the fleet, and at the same time caused the subsidies to be paid more negligently than ever. The measure of the Spartans' patience was now full. They perceived the folly of remaining any longer in Ionia on account of the Phœnician fleet. Mindarus accordingly determined completely to break off his connection with Tissaphernes—a connection which had brought upon Sparta nothing but shame; and, instead, he gave ear to the proposals of Pharnabazus, in order, in conjunction with him,

Mindarus removes the war from Ionia to the Hellespont.

to despoil the Athenians of the cities on the Hellespont. Thus, after an irrecoverable loss of time, the entire Ionian war was abandoned.*

The new plan of operations had already been for some time in preparation. For, as early as the beginning of the summer, Dercyllidas had, with a small body of troops, entered the satrapy of Pharnabazus from Miletus, and had caused the defection of two of the most important places, Abydus and Lampsacus, from the Athenians. Furthermore, a squadron of forty ships, under Clearchus, had also already advanced in the same direction; and, although only the fourth part of it, under a Megarean sea-captain, had succeeded in reaching the goal, yet he had induced the important city of Byzantium to revolt. After, then, such important results had been obtained by means so small, it was resolved immediately to transfer the whole war into that quarter; for the importation of supplies from the Hellespont was known to be more indispensable than ever to the Athenians since the loss of Eubœa. The two sounds of the northern seas constituted the last prop of the naval dominion of Athens; and these were already half in the hands of the Peloponnesians. Mindarus, accordingly, set sail in July with seventy-three ships from Miletus, and at the same time ordered all the scattered squadrons of the Peloponnesians to move to the Hellespont: where all the forces engaged in the war now assembled for decisive battles. For the Athenians, for their part, who had hitherto been only able to oppose small divisions of their fleet to the proceedings in the Hellespont, now immediately set out from Samos with their entire naval force under Thrasybulus and Thrasylus, in order to follow closely upon Mindarus; and as early as the end of July, a great naval battle was fought near Abydus, in which the intelligence and bravery of the

Two battles at Abydus. Ol. xcii. 2. (B.C. 411.) July.

* Thuc. viii. 99, *f.*

Attic commanders successfully coped with the united fleets of the Peloponnesians and Syracusans. For, although the proximity of the shores made it impossible effectively to pursue the enemy, yet the victory was of extreme importance: the timidity which had possessed the Athenian sailors, ever since the Sicilian calamity, had been successfully overcome; and in Athens itself the unexpected news of victory called forth new life and new hopes; the sultry atmosphere of gloomy forebodings cleared up; and once more a belief revived in the possibility of a new era of greatness being yet in store for the Athenians.

Meanwhile, both fleets awaited the arrival of fresh reinforcements for continuing the war with greater vigor. Agesandridas approached with fifty ships from Eubœa, but, in rounding Athos, he was befallen by the winter-storms, which destroyed his whole fleet on the same rocks on which the armada of Mardonius had been shipwrecked of old. Another squadron of fourteen vessels under Dorieus was attacked by the Athenians before it could effect its junction with the main body. But the circumspect Mindarus succeeded in putting out with his fleet from Abydus at the right time, and rescuing the auxiliary squadron. His force now numbering ninety sail, he offered battle to the Athenians, October. having in his favor both superiority of numbers and the advantage of the shore being covered by the troops of Pharnabazus. The battle continued all day long in the sound of the sea, without arriving at a decisive result; and already victory was inclining to the side of the Peloponnesians, when a new squadron came in sight. It was Alcibiades, with eighteen ships. As soon as the Athenians saw the purple standard run up the mast of his flag-ship, they were filled with new courage; Alcibiades rapidly hurried into the hottest part of the battle, the result of which he decided at once. The

Peloponnesians were driven on land; the naval battle became a fight along the shore: and every single ship would have been taken, had not Pharnabazus offered resistance to the Athenians with all his forces and at the risk of his own life. They were accordingly forced to content themselves with returning to Sestus with thirty of the enemy's ships, and with those of their own which they had recaptured. Thus the first arrival of Alcibiades among the fleet was immediately accompanied by a brilliant victory; and, although to his brave colleagues in the generalship belonged the real merit of having been the first once more to turn the course of the war in the direction of success, yet his glory outshone that of the rest, and the belief acquired strength: that fortune and he were inseparable.*

But, even now, the Hellespont was not yet cleared of the foe. Mindarus remained fixed in his position at Abydus, as did the Athenians at Sestus: and thus the fleets again confronted, and lay in wait for, one another, as formerly at Miletus and Samos. But notwithstanding their defeat, the Peloponnesians had incomparably the more favorable position; they were covered in the rear by land-forces, and well supplied with money; while the Athenians on the other hand suffered such want, that they were never able to leave more than a central reserve of ships assembled together, while the rest went out in single squadrons to bring in booty. These expeditions lowered the discipline and moral tone of the sailors, and made the name of the Athenians more and more hated; while it was impossible to make a rapid use of favorable moments, or to carry on the war upon a combined plan, since the forces were constantly divided, and the generals dispersed hither and thither about the Ægean. Alcibiades himself, at this

* These two battles are called the battle of Cynossema, after the Chersonesian promontory near Madytus (Thuc. viii. 104). The second took place ἀρχομένου χειμῶνος, Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 4–7.

period also, met with the most extraordinary adventures. He crossed over in all the pomp of his present official dignity to visit Tissaphernes, who had made his appearance on the Hellespont about the time of the battle of Abydus; for he was extremely annoyed to find that so effective a union had been brought about between Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians; and he wished to gain an opportunity of once more placing himself on friendly terms with Sparta. And he thought, that no act would be more likely to serve him as a recommendation to Sparta and to the Great King, than the seizure of the most dangerous of the Athenians. Alcibiades was actually arrested by his ancient friend and host, and transported as a prisoner to Sardes. But he succeeded, thirty days afterwards, in regaining his freedom; and escaped to Clazomenæ, where he rapidly caused six ships to be equipped, with which he sailed to Lesbos. No time was to be lost: for Mindarus, when he saw only the minority of the Athenian fleet remaining at anchor opposite, was already preparing to resume the offensive. The Athenians were obliged to relinquish Sestus, and, secretly taking their departure from the Hellespont, anchored, in order to seek protection, on the west side of the Thracian peninsula off Cardia. All the fruits of the last victory were lost, unless a new victory were to destroy the enemy's power; and therefore the scattered squadrons were with all possible haste summoned to the spot.

Seizure and escape of Alcibiades. Ol. xcii. 2. (B.C. 411.) End of year.

Alcibiades was speedily at hand, and immediately determined to follow Mindarus. The latter, as soon as the Hellespont was open, had proceeded to the Propontis, in order in conjunction with Pharnabazus to take Cyzicus (vol. i. p. 444), and to strengthen the dominion of the allies in the waters of the Pontus. Thrasybulus and Theramenes, who had brought reinforcements from Athens,

Battle of Cyzicus. Ol. xcii. 2. (B.C. 410.) February.

arrived in time from their predatory excursions. Armed for battle, they rapidly in several divisions sailed up the Hellespont, and at night-time anchored, sixty-eight sail strong, at the marble-island Proconnesus, opposite Cyzicus. Here they rested for one day, allowing no vessel to pass, which might have carried the news of their approach across to the mainland. Next morning, in the midst of a dense winter rain (it was in the month of February), Alcibiades advances with forty ships upon the harbor of Cyzicus. As the clouds disperse, they see the Peloponnesians in front of the harbor, with all their ships out, and engaged in naval exercises. The Athenians, pretending to be scared by the superior numbers of the enemy, make a feigned retreat, and draw the enemy, who believes the force opposed to him to be merely the fleet of Sestus, further and further away from the harbor; until the rear-guard of Thrasybulus and Theramenes approaches, in the rear of the Peloponnesians. Mindarus finds himself cut off from the harbor, and hastily retreats to the coast, where he may expect the protection of the Persian troops. Alcibiades starts in pursuit. A hot land-battle ensues, which, by the vigorous co-operation of the Attic generals, ends in a complete victory. Mindarus himself falls in the conflict. All the ships are deserted, those of the Syracusans being burnt by their own hands; the remainder of the troops take refuge in the camp of Pharnabazus, while the Athenians return to the camp of Proconnesus with a large number of prisoners and thirty-eight captured ships, and on the next day occupy defenceless Cyzicus, where they levy considerable contributions of war.*

Consequences of the victory.

Such a victory had not occurred since the days of Cimon; it was unquestionably the most brilliant feat of arms in the whole

* Battle of Cyzicus λήγοντος τοῦ χειμῶνος, Diod. xiii. 49; Xen. *Hellen.* i. 1, 11, ff.

Peloponnesian war; nor was the success one, like that obtained at Pylus, owing to accident or to the clumsiness of the enemy, but rather one which had been wrested from the most efficient adversary, under the eyes of his powerful allies, by rival efforts of valor on the part of both commanders and troops by land and by sea. It is, therefore, not wonderful, that, on receiving the news of this battle, the Spartans lost all heart for prosecuting the war, while the Athenians were filled with boundless hopes.*

The victory of Cyzicus seems also to have exercised a well-definable influence upon the internal affairs of Athens, and to have occasioned a complete return to the ancient constitution. The limitation of the universal right of suffrage had, after all, only been carried into effect as a financial measure, in connection with the abolition of public salaries; it was a step believed to be required by the prevailing want, and due to a depressed state of public feeling, in which men were ready to renounce all ideas of recovering the ancient naval dominion of Athens. But, at the present moment, both money and confidence in future victories were at hand; the Athens of old had, as it were, risen again, and, therefore, demanded the restoration of her old constitution. The exclusion of the poorer classes from full civic rights appeared as a crying injustice, when only the other day the sailors had fought with greater valor than ever on behalf of their native city. Thus the battle of Cyzicus exercised a similar effect to that of the battle of Platææ; the lowest property-class was, for the second time, reinstated in all civic rights, and, notwithstanding the imprecations by which it had been attempted to prevent any changes in the limited constitution (p. 485), the different public salaries were suddenly or gradually reintroduced. The income derived from the pay for attendance on the public assemblies and juries was doubly

* Plut. *Alc.* 28.

welcome to the common people, inasmuch as the proceeds of agriculture were continually at a stand-still, in consequence of which many husbandmen and foreign settlers were wandering about the city in want of bread. There was no possibility of moderating the prevailing movement in accordance with the dictates of reason. Even the festival payments were once more made, without the necessity of a war-treasure being considered in the midst of the most dangerous war. With these reforms was also connected the law proposed by Demophantus (p. 491), which was a testimony to the newly-awakened zeal for the statutes of the democracy. This was the period of agitation, to which belong the transactions as to the tyrannicides; and simultaneously the demagogues reappear, whose voices had become mute since the death of Androcles. Among them, Cleophon came most prominently forward. He was the son of a Thracian mother, and was, therefore, accused of having surreptitiously obtained the civic franchise; but he contrived to maintain his position, and for several years to exercise the greatest influence in the civic assembly by means of his vehement eloquence—an eloquence unexampled since the time of Cleon. After the fashion of Cleon, he zealously declaimed on the tribune in behalf of the rights and liberties of the people, and contrived to make great capital out of the events of recent years, so as furiously to inveigh against the intrigues of the upper classes, against the calmer counsels of the Moderate party, above all against any settlement with Sparta.*

Cleophon.

Such was the condition in which Endius found the city, when he was sent from Sparta to make proposals of peace to the Athenians. In vain had a personage peculiarly adapted for the occasion been carefully selected, one

Endius brings proposals of peace from Sparta to Athens.

* W. Vischer, *Untersuch. üb. Verfassung v. Athen. in d. l. J. d. pel. Kr.*

who was united by ties of mutual hospitality to Alcibiades; in vain did Endius endeavor to demonstrate to the Athenians, that the peace was even more in their interest than in that of the Spartans, who had found a treasurer in the satrap, and who might, though their fleet had perished, calmly look forward to the subsequent course of events. He was unable to produce any effect. The shrill voice of Cleophon menaced any man with death and ruin, who should pronounce the word "Peace;" and the citizens allowed themselves to be entirely swayed by him. Nor could the Athenians in fact accept the *uti possidetis*, which Sparta desired to make the basis of a settlement. The departure of Agis could not compensate them for the loss of Eubœa. They felt themselves to be standing at the beginning of a new era, and regarded the leadership of Alcibiades as a pledge of victory; even the urban garrison had fought bravely against Agis before the walls of the city,—and were they now to renounce a brilliant future in the moment when they had re-entered upon their naval dominion? After the oligarchs had sued for peace under the most humiliating conditions at Decelea and Sparta, it amounted to a triumph for the democracy, to be able in proud self-consciousness to reject the proffered peace. Even Persia and her treasures, for which the oligarchs had begged, were not needed; and the people once more felt that its own civic forces sufficed for its purposes.*

Their rejection.

The sphere of the war remained principally restricted to the northern regions. It was a war on behalf of the two routes of trade in the Black Sea, a war for money and supplies, which was now carried on between a land and a sea power. For Pharnabazus lay encamped with his troops at the Bosporus, and guarded the two

Alcibiades levies sound-dues at Chrysopolis. Ol. xcii. 2. (B. C. 410-9). Spring.

* As to the embassy of peace and Cleophon, see Philochorus, 118; *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, i. p. 403; Diod. xiii. 52.

fortresses of the sound, Byzantium and Chalcedon, which lay to the right and left of its entrance. Alcibiades, notwithstanding, immediately employed his naval superiority after an extremely inventive fashion by establishing a fortified position to the north of Chalcedon, in the territory of that city, at Chrysopolis. It was admirably situated; because here commences the narrower part of the sound, and because, furthermore, vessels were, on account of the current, unable to cross from Chalcedon to Byzantium, without touching at Chrysopolis. Here he built a tower as a custom-house, and placed at this point a squadron of thirty triremes, which levied on all in and out-going vessels a tithe of the value of their lading. This, like the introduction of the twentieth-rate (p. 427), was an attempt to cover by indirect taxation the loss caused by the cessation of tributes. Of course, the necessary consequence was that the price of corn rose at Athens; but the present measure affected the other seaports as well, which imported slaves, corn, fish, skins, &c., from the Pontus; and at all events brought in a considerable revenue of ready money.*

Defeat of Thrasylus. Ol. xciii 3. (B. C. 410). Summer.

At the same time the Athenians were courageous enough to commence warlike operations in another quarter. Already, at the beginning of the winter, Thrasylus had been sent to Athens to announce the victory of Abydus, and to induce the citizens to despatch fresh troops (p. 495). He found the citizens favorably disposed, and increased their readiness, when, in the winter months, he succeeded in repulsing an attack on the post of King Agis, and hereby materially diminished the fear caused by the land-army of the enemy. Accordingly, in order to be able to oppose the foreign foe by land as well as by sea, a levy was made of 1,000 heavy-armed troops, and 100 cavalry, and 50 tri-

* As to the δεκατευτήριον at Chrysopolis, see Xen. *Hell.* i. 1, 22; Diod. xiii. 64; Boeckh, *P. E. of A.* vol. ii. p. 39. [Engl. Tr.]

remes were equipped, and entrusted in the spring to Thrasylus. It appears that the latter, encouraged by his recent success, and by the confidence displayed towards him by his fellow-citizens, would not content himself with conducting reinforcements to Alcibiades, but designed to do something on his own account. After, therefore, he had with his fleet proceeded to Samos, where at that time a considerable part of the Attic war-fund was kept, he seized the opportunity of making an attack upon Ionia,* where Tissaphernes had been requited for his double-tongued prevaricating policy by the defection of his former allies. Fortune seemed to favor Thrasylus. Colophon and Notium (p. 110) were rapidly taken; and he thought that he could accomplish no more brilliant feat of arms than that of recovering Ephesus, which had become a main point of the Persian power, to the Athenian dominion. But this attempt failed. Tissaphernes, by his cavalry, summoned the peasantry to arms, and worked upon their fanaticism, calling upon them to defend the Great Goddess of Ephesus: Sicilian soldiers, who had been recently brought from their home by a small squadron, supported the efforts of the satrap; and in the middle of the summer the Athenians suffered so decisive a defeat, that Thrasylus was obliged to renounce his ambitious plans.† The entire campaign had ended in discomfiture, and the sole advantage obtained was this: that Thrasylus succeeded in surprising the Syracusans, who were destined for Abydus, on the voyage thither, and in driving them back with great loss. The prisoners were sent to Athens, and, in requital for the treatment of the Athenians at Syracuse, were pent up in the stone-quarries near the Piræeus.

The mishap of Thrasylus only served to exalt the

* As to the war fund at Samos, cf. the year's account of the treasurers of Ol. xcii. 1; see Boeckh, *P. E. of A.* vol. ii. p. 197.

† Xen. *Hell.* i. 2.

Alcibiades on the Hellespont.

fame of Alcibiades, who even now, when no opportunity existed for further naval victories, contrived to conduct the war on the Hellespont so as to obtain glory and spoils. His object was gradually to reduce Pharnabazus, who continued his mode of conducting the war with incredible obstinacy, and who continued to advance bodies of infantry and cavalry, in order to command the shore from the side of the land. For this purpose, Alcibiades undertook the most audacious incursions into the territory of the satrap, and plundered towns and villages, dragging away troops of prisoners, and exacting ample ransoms. Under his command, the Athenians were filled with such confidence and pride, that, when they were joined by the troops of Thrasylus, they, on account of the rebuff at Ephesus, refused to hold any communication with them. For a long time the two divisions fought apart, and did not unite, until the newly-arrived troops, burning with the desire of proving themselves worthy of Alcibiades, had before his eyes performed splendid feats of valor at Abydus.

Thus the Athenians, by means of these lesser undertakings, prepared themselves for others of greater importance; for it seemed necessary for their purposes to take the two cities of the Bosporus, although they had not yet made themselves masters of Abydus. They now possessed sufficient money and courage for commencing undertakings of this nature; and delay only brought danger with it: for—at the instigation of King Agis at Decelea, who was in the highest degree vexed at seeing the results of his campaigns entirely frustrated by the ample imports from Pontus—a small squadron had been equipped with the help of Megara, the mother-city of Byzantium and Chalcedon, and on this squadron Clearchus (p. 494) had contrived to pass through the Hellespont to Byzantium, where it was intended that, after the example of Brasidas

in Thrace, and of Gylippus in Syracuse, he should vigorously conduct the resistance against Athens.

The struggle for Chalcedon. Ol. xcii. 3 (B.C. 409.)

Chalcedon was the first object of the Athenian attack; in it lay Spartan troops under Hippocrates, who had been the second in command to Mindarus. The city was on excellent terms with the neighboring Thracians, and had a powerful reserve in Pharnabazus. Alcibiades commenced proceedings, by contriving to infuse such terror in the Thracian tribes—to whom the Chalcedonians had given up their treasures in expectation of a siege—and so to work upon them by means of skillful negotiations, that they consented to break their trust; and the siege of the city was therefore now carried on with its own money. The peninsula on which it lay was shut off towards the land side by a palisade reaching from sea to sea; the point where the little river Chalcedon flowed through was most carefully fortified; a simultaneous attack, made upon the Attic lines from without and within, was victoriously beaten back, Thrasylus opposing his front to the besieged, and Alcibiades his to the forces of Pharnabazus. Hippocrates himself fell in the battle, and hereby the fate of the city was decided.

Pharnabazus offers a truce.

The most important result of this brilliant feat of arms was that change in the sentiments of Pharnabazus, which Alcibiades had so long labored to bring about. The satrap had lost confidence in the policy hitherto pursued by him; he accordingly offered a truce, which was, under his personal co-operation, to be employed for the conclusion of a treaty between Athens and Persia. He was himself ready to pay twenty talents, as an indemnification for the costs of the war, on behalf of the Chalcedonians. The city was to be tributary as before, and even to pay all tributes retrospectively due from it; but meanwhile it was to remain in the hands of the Peloponnesians. From all

this it is evident, that he attached particular importance to this city, and would not on any account permit it to fall into the absolute power of the Athenians.

The negotiations had commenced at a time when Alcibiades, who grew weary of the siege, was absent on new undertakings. He was engaged in completing the subjection of the shores of the Propontis. Selymbria, to the west of Byzantium, was still in a state of revolt. Alcibiades had established an understanding with a party among the citizens, and was awaiting the preconcerted fiery signal. This was given prematurely, so that his troops were not yet in readiness; but he, notwithstanding, penetrated at night-time through the gates, accompanied by thirty men. When inside the city, he observed that the citizens were coming up under arms. To flee he was unwilling, to offer resistance he was unable; nothing could save him but a stratagem. He accordingly caused silence to be proclaimed by a trumpet-signal, and a declaration to be made with a loud voice, that no citizen should suffer harm or hurt. The Selymbrians were convinced that a whole army was within their walls, and commenced negotiations, during which the Athenian troops arrived. After executing this surprise, Alcibiades returned with new supplies of money to the camp, and unhesitatingly confirmed the treaties with Pharnabazus.

Alcibiades at Selymbria. Ol. xcii. 3. (B.C. 409.) Summer.

The prospect of being still able to fulfill his old promise of Persian subsidies was too attractive for him to resist it; and to have Persia for a reserve had always been his highest wish, so as to secure both the humiliation of Sparta and the accomplishment of his own plans. He felt himself engaged in the kind of agency most flattering to his vanity—in the double agency of a general and of a diplomatic negotiator.

In order to spare Pharnabazus, all further attacks upon Abydus were now relinquished; while, on the other hand, the last and hardest task remaining to be accomplished on the Propontis was set about with all possible energy, viz., the capture of the most important bulwark on the Bosporus—of Byzantium. No city was of greater importance for the daily wants of the Athenians, and none was more difficult to take. For the stone walls of the city were of unexampled strength; force was of no avail here: and within the walls a warrior of iron will held sway, who had had time to make his preparations against the approaching danger, and was surrounded by a well-trained body of Peloponnesians, Megareans, and Bœotians. During the whole summer the entire forces of the Athenians lay before the city; the fleet, which met with no resistance, blockaded the harbor side, while the land side was walled off. Thus the Athenians finally succeeded in producing famine in the city. But Clearchus allowed those who bore no arms to die as they might, and inflexibly refused provisions to all who were not among his troops. At last he was, after all, obliged to seek for help from abroad; and secretly left the city for the purpose of procuring money and collecting ships. Of this occasion Alcibiades contrived to take advantage. After establishing a secret connection with the enemies of the hard-hearted governor, he caused the rumor to be bruited about, that the affairs in Ionia demanded his presence, and one morning took his departure with the entire fleet. But on the same evening he returned with all his forces to their previous posts, and unexpectedly raised a terrific tumult and clamor of war in the harbor, so that the whole garrison hurriedly made its way thither, and left the land side unguarded. From the latter Alcibiades, at the hour of midnight, effected his entrance, and occupied the so-called Thracian quarter. The garrison hastened back from the harbor. On the market-

Fall of Byzantium. Ol. xcii. 4. (B C. 409.) End of Autumn.

place the armies met. A regular battle commenced in the open space. At last, Alcibiades gained the victory on the right wing, and Theramenes on the left; the Peloponnesians rushing to take refuge at the altars, were made prisoners; and the Byzantians, who, according to the promise given, were treated with the wisest moderation, had once more become members of the Attic alliance.*

This event formed the key-stone in the great work accomplished in the waters of the Pontus, and completed the frustration of the undertakings commenced there by Mindarus and Pharnabazus, while it secured to Athens the most important sources of supplies. At present nothing more was to be done; for, during the progress of the negotiations in Persia, the result of which was looked forward to with extreme anxiety, it was necessary to abstain from any act likely to irritate the Persians. Although Alcibiades would have rejoiced to have been able to bring with him to his fellow-citizens the treaty of subsidies, ready and complete, yet he could no longer repress his longing to see Athens again; and it seemed necessary to establish perfect clearness and certainty in his relations to his native city, by means of his personal presence within her walls. The entire fleet accordingly assembled at Samos, and while Thrasybulus with fifty ships continued the reduction of the Thracian cities, Thrasylus with the rest sailed in advance to the Piræeus, in order to prepare the arrival of the victor. All the ships were festively decorated; they were laden with spoils and prisoners, ornamented with the fragments of the enemy's triremes destroyed on the Hellespont, and accompanied by about 114 captured ships, which in a long line followed the triumphal procession. Alcibiades himself diverged from the straight route, in order defiantly

Return of Alcibiades. Ol. xcii. 4. (B.C. 408). June.

* Chalcedon, Selymbria, Byzantium: Xen. *Hell.* i. 3; Diod. xiii. 66; Plut. *Alc.* 30.

to sail past the harbors of the Lacedæmonians, and to show to all the world, who was now the ruler of the sea; and after receiving the news of his re-election as general, at last, at the head of his twenty triremes, on which he brought home 100 talents from his most recent predatory expeditions, on the 25th of Thargelion (beginning of June), entered the Piræeus.

It was a day such as Athens had never seen before. The whole town thronged the shore, head succeeding head up the heights of the Munychia; and *one* shout of exultation welcomed the hero on his approach. The timidity with which Alcibiades at first still hesitated, before entrusting himself to his fellow-citizens, proved groundless. The past had been expiated, the troubles of the present were forgotten, party-spirit had vanished in the general rejoicing over the good fortune and prosperity, which the gods had bestowed upon the city in the person of this one man. Reflecting patriots, as well as the multitude, saw in him the saviour of the state, who, endowed with wondrous gifts, was alone able to uphold the power and the honor of Athens against the parties within her walls, and against the enemies of her constitution without. As, after an absence of seven years, he once more placed his foot upon Attic soil, young and old thronged around him, in order to look upon him face to face, to receive his salutation, to touch his robes, and to cast wreaths of flowers before him. In a triumphal procession he was conducted to the city; and by an involuntary movement the multitude pressed in the direction of the Pnyx, in order once more to hear that well-loved voice from the *bema*. In his speech Alcibiades touched very gently on the past. Not to the Athenians, he told them, attached the blame of past evil misunderstandings and errors, but to an unkindly fate, to an envious bad-fortune, which had swayed the city's course. The clouds had now been dissipated, and a new, happy era had arrived. He placed before the eyes

of the citizens the prospects and the tasks awaiting the state; and the civic body proved their absolute trust in him, by not only revoking all the acts passed against him, destroying the stones erected as monuments of his condemnation, completely restoring to him all the property of which he had been deprived, and voting him golden crowns of honor,—but also by naming him general, with unlimited powers by both sea and land, and placing all the resources of the state unconditionally at his disposal. The whole people unanimously laid in his hands the destiny of the city; he was now in possession of a power, such as had scarcely belonged in the same extent even to Pericles himself.*

Celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Ol. xciii. 1. (B. C. 408.) September.

Alcibiades hereupon spent the summer months in active armaments; and in a gentle and peaceful fashion accustomed the citizens to see all public affairs conducted by one hand. Although his new position was too dangerous to allow him to venture an attack upon Decelea, yet he restored to the Athenians the long-missed feeling of security in their own land. For the procession to Eleusis, which had been necessarily omitted for years, could this year, on the 20th of Boeromion (end of September), pass in regular order along the Sacred Road, under the protection of the troops. This was an event in the eyes of the Athenians as encouraging and glorious as the most brilliant victory; and Alcibiades was by this act able to atone for the wrongs which he had formerly committed in the insolence of his youth. The divinities of the Mysteries, Demeter and Persephone, whom the Athenians hailed with especial reverence as their "Two Goddesses," had been appeased.

Thus Alcibiades stood as general-in-chief at the

* Xen. *Hell.* i. 4, 8–20; Diod. xiii. 68 f.; Plut. *Alc.* 32 f. cf. Herbst, *Rückkehr d. Alkibiades* (Hamburg, 1843).

head of the state, which he had saved out of the most helpless situation, which he avenged upon the Persians, Spartans, Bœotians, and Syracusans, as well as upon its own revolted allies, and placed in absolute command over the sea. A surplus was again in existence; the god of wealth had, in consequence of the victories on the Hellespont, once more returned into the treasure-chamber of the Parthenon (for it was thus that Aristophanes symbolically represented the fact in his *Plutus*).*

Alcibiades at the head of the state.

Nothing was wanting to the good fortune which had befallen the city, except a guarantee of its continuance. The most arduous difficulties in Eubœa and Ionia remained unsolved; the moneys were again wasted in the spirit of the democracy, new difficulties were unavoidable, and Alcibiades' position was not sufficiently strong, to admit of his opposing himself to the inclinations of the multitude: fresh sources of money were accordingly indispensable for him. But even of these there was a prospect. Every day he expected news from his friend Mantitheus, who had journeyed with Pharnabazus to Susa. As soon as he could fall back upon the treasures of the Great King, he hoped to become at last in full measure the man whom the state could least spare; then, he hoped at last to achieve for himself the position, which had from the first been the goal of his ambition. The only difference lay in the superior calm of his present efforts and wishes. He had passed beyond the wild follies of his youth, and, having now passed his fortieth year, had become more measured, circumspect, and cautious. The figure of Pericles stood before his eyes; a personal government was more necessary than ever, if the state was to be

* The *Plutus* was first acted under the archonship of Diocles, B.C. 409–8. According to C. Fr. Hermann (*Gesamm. Abhandl.* p. 39), the play was not materially altered in its revised edition.—Cf. Herbst, *z. erst. Plut. d. Ar.* (Appendix to *Schlachtb. d. Arginusen*).

saved. For since the Hermæ trials the civic body had entirely lost the firmness of its previous bearing; law and constitution were utterly impotent; and the city was an arena of contending parties, whose pernicious forces could only be held in check by a royal personage standing above them. Alcibiades was justified in declaring to himself, that his greatness and the preservation of the state were inseparably bound up together.

Alcibiades had visited his native city at the right moment for celebrating his triumph and undisturbedly enjoying the gratitude of his fellow-citizens. New storms were lowering, which were to expose his good fortune to the hardest test. For, even before he returned to Athens, two men had at the same time from different quarters made their appearance on the scene, two foes such as Athens had never met with before; and their appearance signalized the commencement of the last and decisive epoch in the war, which had for a period of twenty-three years, amidst the most eventful changes, desolated Greece.

Relations between Persia and Greece during the latter half of the Peloponnesian War.

Since the commencement of the Decelean war it had become customary to expect the final decision of the Greek feud to arrive from the direction of Persia. After that empire had wholly lost its importance for the history of the Mediterranean states, and had become an inland country, deprived of its best coasts, —a state whose fleets were forced to hide in the most distant harbors,—it had suddenly come forward once more, and had attained to the position of a power upon which the destinies of the Hellenic states were made to depend. Nor had the Persian state recovered from its condition of impotence by means of an internal re-invigoration. After the genuine race of the Achæmenidæ had died out (p. 420), the empire had fallen into worse and worse decay; under Darius Nothus the remoter satrapies separated from it; and in the palace, ruled by women and eunuchs,

there existed no heroic vigor capable of giving a new cohesion to the unwieldy body of the empire. Rather, it was the Greeks themselves, who once more raised the decayed state to the level of a great power; it was they, who again caused it to interfere in the affairs of the Hellenes, from which the heroes of Athens thought to have banished it for ever. The treasury of the Great King was to be the war-exchequer, by means of which one Greek state desired to destroy the other; in order to obtain Persian money, the Spartans renounced their Doric pride, and the Athenians their liberties: and, after the feeling of shame had been once overcome, the embassies on the route from Sardes to Susa succeeded one another with increasing frequency: till at last there was not a single point, upon which all states and all parties, Peloponnesians and Syracusans, Athenians and Argives, oligarchs and democrats, were so thoroughly agreed, as upon this—that the fulfilment of their wishes must come from Persia. Thus, then, Alcibiades, like the rest, after contending with the utmost success against Pharnabazus on the Hellespont, had come in the end to rest his hopes for the crowning success of all the plans of his life upon the embassy which had departed for Susa in the autumn of B.C. 409 (Ol. xc. 4). It was composed of five Athenians and two Argives, who started on the journey in the company of Pharnabazus. But the party was, during its progress, further joined by Lacedæmonians, and by Hermocrates and his brother Proxenus.

Frequent embassies to Susa.

Hermocrates had in the meantime, in consequence of a democratic change in the affairs of Syracuse, been, together with his colleagues, deposed and exiled. These news had arrived immediately after the battle of Cyzicus, and had occasioned the most violent agitation among the citizens. They were so intimately attached by mutual confidence to

Hermocrates.

their commander, that they declared their readiness to lead him back by force of arms to Syracuse. But Hermocrates prevented an open revolt, and persuaded the soldiers to allow the new commanders to assume their office unhindered. Yet at the same time he by no means intended to renounce all prospect of returning to Syracuse. The course of Sicilian affairs was such, that he might count upon an opportunity for restoring his authority at home. In the spring Hannibal had sacked Selinus and Himera (p. 413). The democratic party-leaders, as Hermocrates had foreseen, were unequal to the difficult duties of the times. Therefore he too endeavored to avail himself of the connection established with Pharnabazus (who estimated him at his true value), and doubtless hoped to obtain advantages for his particular purposes at Susa. Pharnabazus apparently intended to submit the whole system of the Persian policy in Asia Minor to a searching examination, and was accordingly glad of the company of Greeks, acting severally from the most different points of view.

Athenian embassy to Susa. Ol. xcii. 4. (B. C. 408.) April.

But all these arrangements, and the many hopes attaching to the embassy, were, before it had quitted Asia Minor, crossed by a totally unexpected event. For when the travellers, after resting for the winter season at Gordium, at the beginning of spring continued their journey through Phrygia, they were met by a numerous and well-appointed convoy; in which they recognized the presence of a royal prince coming down with a numerous suite from Susa—of Cyrus, the second son of Darius and Parysatis. The Spartans accompanying him hastened with a triumphant air to communicate to their fellow-countrymen the results obtained by them at Susa; and Pharnabazus satisfied himself as to the extensive powers of the newly-appointed governor, by which his own were extinguished, and by which his influence upon the rela-

tions between Persia and the Greeks came to an end. He found himself unable to conduct the embassy any further; nay, he was not even permitted to dismiss the envoys to their homes, but was, by the orders of Cyrus, obliged to detain them in Asia, in order to prevent them from giving information to the Athenians of the sudden change in the affairs of Asia Minor, which was originally due to an intrigue woven in the apartments of Parysatis.*

Cyrus, the son of Parysatis.

Since the Persians had once more become an influential power in Asia Minor, it behooved the satraps in those parts to turn the unexpectedly favorable conjuncture of affairs to the best possible account. This Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes, and Pharnabazus had successively attempted to accomplish. But the first had, with the support of the Athenians, revolted; while Tissaphernes had, by his cowardly policy of neutrality, forfeited all the successes obtained. Pharnabazus was a man of far more vigorous action; but he was not capable of coping with an Alcibiades. The campaign in the Hellespont had ended in as complete a failure as the Ionian war; all the subsidies had been fruitlessly wasted; and in the end Pharnabazus seems to have arrived at the conviction, that the only mode of satisfactorily regulating the affairs of Asia Minor was by arriving at an amicable understanding with Athens. Meanwhile, the unsatisfactory results of the vacillating policy of the satraps had attracted the displeasure of the court at Susa; and of this displeasure Parysatis contrived to take account. She was the wife and sister of Darius—the ruling sultana of the palace, who, on account of her cruelties, had been for a time banished to Babylon, but having subsequently attained to greater power than ever, directed the policy of the empire, allowing herself at the

* Cyrus in Asia Minor, ἄρξων πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ καὶ συμπολεμήσων Λακεδαιμονίοις, Xen. *Hell.* i. 4, 1.

same time, after the manner of women, to be swayed by personal preferences and desires. Her favorite son was the talented and ardent Cyrus, whom it was her passionate wish to see crowned with the tiara, in the place of her elder son, upon the throne of the Achæmenidæ. She was able to support his claim to the inheritance by the fact, that among her sons he had been the first-born after the accession of their father to the throne; but she was well aware, that it would be impossible for her to realize her maternal wishes by peaceable means, and accordingly wished him to obtain, as governor, a province in which he might create for himself an army, achieve military glory, and, above all, enlist Hellenic resources in the service of his ends. In Asia Minor a vigorous arm was evidently needed, in order at last to settle affairs there in accordance with the interests of Persia. The satrap's inclinations towards the Athenians were disapproved of, for the latter were, after all, to be regarded as the hereditary foes of the Persian empire; and therefore the repeated complaints of Sparta, and in particular also the most recent embassy, now returning with Cyrus, had met with a favorable reception at Susa.

Cyrus as satrap in Asia Minor.

The youthful Cyrus was eminently adapted for fulfilling the expectations of his mother and of the Spartans: after a long lapse of time he was the first man of mark who had made his appearance among the Persians. He was by nature born to rule, and felt himself destined for great things. He had been able to escape the emasculating influences of court life; physically and mentally vigorous, he had early accustomed himself to exercise his powers day by day in the chase, in military service, and in rural toil, and thus to preserve them at full tension. He was at the same time distinguished by an easy and pleasing demeanor towards others, by a vivacious and enterprising temperament, and was animated by an ardent ambition, compared

with which all other considerations seemed secondary; yet he was prudent enough to conceal his intentions, and to secure in secret the right instruments for the execution of his plans. He hated the Athenians, who had inflicted upon his nation the severest humiliations, hitherto unavenged; on the other hand, he entertained friendly sentiments towards the Spartans, whom he hoped to use as instruments, first, of his vengeance upon Athens, and then again of his own ambition.

So dangerous a foe was the prince, who at that time met the Attic envoys in Phrygia, and even demanded that they should be delivered up to him. But, considering the utter feebleness of the naval power of the Persians, his hostility would not have been particularly dangerous to the Athenians, had not at the same time a man been chosen admiral at Sparta, who was able to exert the resources of his native city in a hitherto unexampled degree; and who welcomed Cyrus as the auxiliary, of whom he stood in need for the destruction of Athens, no less warmly than Cyrus welcomed him as the aptest instrument for the realization of his plans.*

Lysander, the son of Aristocritus, had (probably in the autumn of B.C. 408, Ol. xciii. 1) assumed the command of the Peloponnesian fleet. He was a man who owed everything to himself. For, although his father was descended from the Heraclidæ, yet Lysander was poor, and not even a Spartiate of the full blood: his mother being of non-Doric descent, probably a Helot. He accordingly possessed no rights whatever in the state; and although, together with his half-brother Libys, he enjoyed in full the education of a Spartan, yet he, doubtless, from his child-

Lysander appointed nauarch. Ol. xciii. 1. (B.C. 408.)

* Parysatis and Cyrus: *Anab.* i. 1.—Cyrus κάρανος τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροιζομένων (*Hell.* i. 4, 3), σατραπης Λυδίας τε καὶ Φρυγίας τῆς καὶ μεγαλῆς Καππαδοκίας (*Anab.* i. 9, 7). To this dignity was attached the management of Greek affairs.—Cyrus' φιλία πρός τε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλιν καὶ πρὸς Λύσανδρον ἰδιᾳ. *Hell.* ii. 1, 14.

hood had to undergo various slights. As to birth, he was in the same position as Gylippus; and in the case of both men the legislation of Lycurgus proved its value: since by it the possibility was afforded of talented boys, even when not of the full blood, growing up to become members of the Doric civic body, and thus strengthening the latter by an infusion of new blood (vol. i. p. 218).

Character of Lysander.

The position occupied by Lysander in Spartan society decided the whole development of his character and career. Together with his father's blood, he inherited also the innate pride of a Heraclide, and the obstacles which placed themselves in his path merely served to inflame his ambition, and incited him to redouble his zeal in acquiring everything which helped to form a genuine Spartan. At the same time, he learnt, more thoroughly than his comrades, to act with caution and docility, with pliability and cunning. He learned to command himself, to keep secret his thoughts and plans, to conceal his superiority, to deal with men in accordance with his own interests, without allowing them to observe it, and to pursue his ends with immovable tranquillity and iron firmness. But, at the same time, his mind developed a bitterness, a deep feeling of ill-will, against the existing order of things, and a contempt for the men whom he had been obliged to obey, not without having submitted to much that was hard to bear. He was less fettered by prejudice than those who had been born to the enjoyment of full civic rights, and he perceived with a more independent glance the weak points of the state. His view commanded the political situation of the times; he well understood the other states; and however deeply he hated Athens, yet it was not with that blind hatred, which refuses to acknowledge any strong qualities in an opponent, but, on the contrary, he was able to estimate the strong points of Athens at their true value, and knew that she was only to be overcome by her own weapons.

In Lysander we see Sparta, as she had gradually been transformed in the course of the war itself. This transformation is already perceptible in Brasidas and Gylippus, but more completely in Lysander. For, although there still existed an old Spartan party, which adhered to certain Hellenic traditions, and wished to see the membership of the same race acknowledged even in the persons of the Athenians,—a party which hated the war, because it must necessarily result in the destruction of the Lycurgic political institutions, and because it made the Spartans the henchmen of the Persians; which even regarded a dominion of Sparta over Athens as a result by no means to be desired, and irreconcilable with the true welfare of the state—yet Lysander was the incarnation of the other (*i. e.*, the war) party, which sought the destruction of the Athenian power at any cost, and by any means whatsoever. Accordingly, what still remained of feelings of honor and of moral sense of shame was regarded as belonging to the remnants of an antiquated state of things. Where courage fails to suffice, craft and deceit must be called in; the cunning fox achieves his ends better than the lion; oaths are made to deceive men, as dice are made to delude children. These were the principles avowed by Lysander; and, in proportion to the absence in him of motives of personal desire and love of enjoyment, he was ready, wherever they seemed called for, to apply all the methods of corruption.

Lysander the antitype of Alcibiades.

After having once entered into opposition against the Old Spartan party, he was carried further and further in this direction, and became an opponent of the constitution itself, assuming in all external matters the character of a most anxious adherent of legality, and of a pious devotee towards the religious traditions of Sparta; while in secret he was plotting the overthrow of the most venerable relic of antiquity, of the double throne of the Heraclidæ: be-

cause the latter was the chief obstacle in the way of his ambitious designs. For he wished to make his native city supreme, only in order afterwards to make himself supreme in her. In this point also he was the Spartan antitype of Alcibiades. From him Lysander had learnt the necessity of being a master in military and diplomatic matters, in order to accomplish great objects; the example of Alcibiades had taught him how to deal with the Persians, and how to make the most of the influence of the different political parties. He was talented and versatile, ambitious and ruthless, in the pursuit of his ends, like Alcibiades. He lacked both the genius and the heroic nature of the latter, as well as the noble fundamental elements of his character; but in proportion as he wanted the bold confidence which inspired Alcibiades, he understood how to avoid all premature acts, and craftily to lie in ambush for his enemies, so as to take advantage of their mistakes. In intellectual power Lysander was far inferior to his Athenian antitype, but he far surpassed him in coolness and calm imperturbability, in consistency, self-command, and vigilance.*

Lysander as commander of the fleet.

It was therefore an event of critical importance, when this man was drawn forth from the obscurity of his subordinate position, and chosen commander of the fleet. In this post he was at his proper place. For this office required precisely the very talents which he alone in Sparta possessed. The individual who occupied this position was called upon to employ all means, the use of which was offensive to the Spartans of the old school, and to overcome the ancient aversion of the Dorians from the Persians, and their dislike of interfering in Ionian affairs; it was requisite, that he should possess an intellect capable

* As to the nauarchy of Lysander, see Xen. *Hell.* i. 5, 1—10; Diod. 70; Plut. *Lys.* 3 f. Cf. Note X, Appendix.

both of invention and organization, a statesmanship familiar with foreign affairs, sufficiently pliable to gain and use the indispensable support of foreign power, without at the same time sacrificing the honor of Sparta, and becoming a mere instrument in the hands of foreign politicians. The office of admiral-in-chief was the most independent in the Spartan state; an office, which in itself constituted an innovation and diminution of the rights of the kings, who, though originally alone entitled to command the national armaments, were on principle excluded from this office. No position, therefore, could have been more welcome to a man, the goal of whose ambition was to transform the political system of Lycurgus by means of bold innovations, and to oppose the continuance of hereditary privileges in the state.

At the time when Lysander assumed his office, Sparta absolutely possessed no naval force. He was obliged to create, not only a fleet, but also the pecuniary means for its support. Pharnabazus had indeed, immediately after the unfortunate termination of the campaign in the Hellespont, caused new ships to be built. The forests of Ida were thinned, and the docks at Antandrus, on the coast of the Troad, were in full activity. The inhabitants of the city exerted themselves exceedingly on behalf of the crews, in order to help them to repair their loss in vessels; in return for which the Sicilian sailors aided the citizens in building walls round their city. So intimate an understanding was brought about between them, that it ended in a treaty, by which Syracuse and Antandrus mutually bestowed upon the citizens of each other their civic franchise.* But these armaments had been interrupted by the recent ill-fortune of Pharnabazus, and by the change which had taken place in his policy; and, after collecting as many vessels as possible in Peloponnesus, and subsequently from

* Ἐνεργεσία καὶ πολιτεία Συρακοσίοις ἐν Ἀντάνδρῳ: Xen. *Hell.* i. 1, 26.

the Rhodians, Chians, and Milesians, Lysander was only able to count seventy ships in all, a fleet inferior both in numbers and efficiency to the Attic. Yet he immediately brought the whole naval war into a new stadium, by uniting his forces, and with a ready eye selecting Ephesus as the Spartan head-quarters in Ionia. At Ephesus the influence of Athens had always been weakest (p. 415 f.), and here Lysander was nearest to the court of Susa and its treasures.

Lysander as a party leader.

Furthermore, he was the first, who contrived to turn to account a capital which had hitherto, so to speak, lain idle: viz., the oligarchical parties which had necessarily tended towards Sparta, but which had hitherto been treated by her with an indifference disappointing any manifestation of confidence. The energy of the Greek nation in those times found its chief field of activity in the operations of the different parties. How vast an accession of strength, then, might there not accrue to Sparta, if she energetically placed herself at the head of all oligarchical efforts, and assumed the leadership of this movement, just as Alcibiades had formerly made his native the city centre of all democratic tendencies! (p. 339). Since Sparta had become a naval power, it was possible for her to extend her connection in every direction, and among the parties in every locality, to obtain the greatest results with foreign aid, and to withdraw the last supports from the trembling power of Athens. Brasidas had been the first to adopt these principles of war operations; and of him Lysander was the more fortunate successor. From Ephesus, he established communications with all parties working against democracy and against the influence of Athens, effected a common bond of union between them under himself as their common patron, guaranteed to the leaders perfect success in the accomplishment of their

ambitious schemes, attracted to himself the deserters from the Attic party, wove a net of conspiracies extending over all Greece, while its threads were all gathered in his own hand, and thus made himself master of a secret power, over which, as soon as the hour arrived, he might absolutely dispose.*

His intimacy with Cyrus.

Lastly, he established a close connection with Cyrus, with whom by his versatile skill he contrived to place himself upon a footing which Alcibiades had constantly attempted to reach, but had never actually reached, with Tissaphernes. Moreover, Cyrus was in possession of far vaster means of action than that satrap; he was resolved to support Sparta, in accordance both with the royal orders and with his own inclination; and in Lysander he found a man, to whom he attached himself with the ardor of youthful admiration. Lysander accordingly not only brought about a treaty of subsidies, on which it was possible to rely; but he also contrived to extract from his princely host the promise of a payment in future of four, instead of three obols. Thus the rate of pay was raised one obol (rather more than 1½*d.*) above that which Athens was at that time able to give; and this fact sufficed to rob the enemy's fleet of many of its sailors.†

No combination so dangerous as this had on any previous occasion been formed against Athens. Money, party influence, sagacity and energy, united to effect her ruin; while, to oppose these dangers, there was no dependence for her upon aught else but her general, the victor of so many fights, who now stood with absolute powers at the head of the fleet, and fearlessly opened the war in Ionia.

* Lysander and the Hetæries: Plut. *Lys.* v. 13, 26; Diod. xiii. 70; Vischer, *Alkibiades u. Lysandros*, p. 63.

† Lysander and Cyrus: Xen. *Hell.* i. 5, 6. Revolutionary schemes of Lysander; Aristot. *Pol.* pp. 194, 30; 207, 25.

The enemies of Alcibiades at Athens.

But in this point also Lysander's accession to office was accompanied by unusual good fortune; that in the meantime an important change had taken place in the position of his most dangerous opponent,—the only opponent whom he had reason to fear. Externally, indeed, Alcibiades possessed the highest power which could fall to the share of a citizen; but its real foundations were shaken. The voices of his enemies had been drowned in the rejoicings at his victory, and their efforts had for a time been suppressed; but their ardor had not been weakened, nor had their sentiments changed. Alcibiades, for his part, had done everything to reconcile the different parties. He had advocated the principles of a moderated popular liberty, had vigorously supported the interests of religious worship, and had carried out the election of his official colleagues, which was entrusted to him, in this way: that men of such opposite tendencies as Adimantus, the son of Leucolophides, and Aristocrates (p. 480) were appointed generals in conjunction with himself;—he desired, like Pericles of old, to stand above the conflict of parties. But in vain. The oligarchs hated him as deeply as ever; the democrats cast suspicion upon him; and the priestly party still remained unreconciled. Even during the period of his highest good-fortune the last named party had manifested the greatest obstinacy—as is proved by the example of Theodorus, a priest of the Mysteries, who refused to take off the curse formerly pronounced upon Alcibiades, using the evasive pretence, that the guilty alone had been cursed by him; so that, if Alcibiades were really innocent, neither could the curse affect him.

The same party also took advantage of the circumstance, that the return of Alcibiades had fallen upon the festival of the *Plynteria*. This was the day on which the house of Athene Polias was closed, and the sacred figure

of the goddess taken down from its place by the so-called *Praxiergidæ*, purified in a sea-bath, and clothed in new vestments: on this day the goddess was accordingly, as it were, absent and inaccessible, and the city deprived of her presence, and therefore in mourning, so that it was customary not to engage in public business of any importance on that day. The rejoicings on the occasion of the return of the hero had caused this tradition to be overlooked. The adversaries of Alcibiades charged him with the guilt of this public act of impiety, and talked the credulous multitude into the belief, that it surely amounted to a sign of serious significance; that, on the very day of Alcibiades' return, the divine Protectress of the City had averted her eyes from it.*

Their efforts for his overthrow.

In proportion as the presence of Alcibiades continued to stay the success of these intrigues, because his personality, elevated by the fame of most glorious achievements, exercised its charms upon the Athenians, and called forth their confidence in a higher degree than ever; in proportion as a desire manifested itself among the people, of entrusting its whole fate to the hands of this man, who by means of a vigorous autocracy was to revive the vigor of the state, now hopelessly crippled by the struggles of party spirit; in proportion to the progress of these feelings in the public mind the members of the parties urgently strove to accelerate the departure of the general, on the pretence that he ought not to be detained from further progress in his heroic course, but, really, in order without delay to recommence the old game which had already brought so much trouble upon the state: viz., that of calumniating and abusing the generals in their absence. They had themselves cunningly contributed to raise the expectations of the multitude to the highest pitch. When, therefore, the

* As to the *Plynteria*, see Mommsen, *Heortologie*, p. 427.

news, expected impatiently from day to day, failed to arrive; when in the first instance they were merely informed how the fleet of 100 triremes, with 1,500 heavy-armed troops, and 150 cavalry, which was rapidly to accomplish the re-conquest of Ionia, was besieging Andros, without even being able to take that small island-city; when, hereupon, further news came from Samos, the new head-quarters, that the fleets were lying peaceably opposite to one another, and that Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the Persians: a revulsion speedily took place in public opinion. If he, the invincible, gained no victories, it was plain that it was not his wish to gain any—that he was a traitor, and had been corrupted by the foe, with whose aid he intended to hold absolute sway in Athens. And when finally there even arrived the news of a defeat suffered by the fleet, the enemies of the hero had virtually won their game.

Athenian defeat at Notium. Ol. xciii. 1. (B. C. 407).

In Samos, Alcibiades had acquainted himself with the changes which had occurred in the position of affairs. His attempts to induce Cyrus to alter his views had remained futile. He endeavored to tempt Lysander out of his harbor; but even in this he failed. After the winter had thus been wasted, there remained nothing for him, but to blockade the Spartan fleet with part of his ships, and with his other forces to commence war by land, successively capture the different cities of Ionia, and thus restore the dominion of Athens in those regions, as he had succeeded in restoring it in the Hellespont. The recovery of Ionia for the Athenians was a debt of honor due to them from Alcibiades, whose work its revolt had been (p. 448). He accordingly left the blockading squadron behind at Ephesus, under Antiochus, one of the best of his naval captains, with the strictest orders not to fight on any provocation, while he personally commenced a war of conquest at Phocæa, in which he of course calculated upon opening the

campaign, and rendering success in it easier, by means of a naval victory. But scarcely had he commenced the siege, when the news reached him of an unfortunate sea-fight in the Gulf of Ephesus. Antiochus had allowed his ardor to tempt him incautiously to irritate the enemy, had then been suddenly attacked by Lysander, and had found his fleet unexpectedly involved in a serious conflict, which ended very unfortunately for the Athenians. For Antiochus himself, who had hurried forward, was sunk with his vessel, and the Athenians were obliged to retreat, with a loss of fifteen ships, from their station at Notium to Samos.*

No blame attached to Alcibiades in connection with this mishap; nor was it solely due to Antiochus. For the latter had issued orders to all the ships to hold themselves in readiness for battle; and these orders had not been obeyed. Discipline had evidently become relaxed. The interruption of active war-practice, the sojourn at Athens, and the accession of new troops, had disadvantageously affected the moral condition of the naval force, which had borne itself so excellently in the Hellespont. The lower rate of pay received by the Athenians in comparison with that of the Peloponnesians, the laborious nature of their duties, which were compensated by no spoils of victory, aroused a discontented and disloyal spirit; and, lastly, the enemies of Alcibiades had their adherents in the army itself, who proceeded to acts of open mutiny against the general. Thrasybulus, the son of Thrason, went to Athens to indict Alcibiades. The latter was, according to his accuser, the cause of the slow and unsuccessful conduct of the war; under the very eyes of the enemy he was indulging in luxurious banquets, and surrounding himself with Ionian courtesans, while he made over the command to the most untrustworthy persons, selected from among

* Xen. *Hell.* i. 5, 11.

his boon companions. Moreover, it was added, he was uninterruptedly engaged in negotiations with the Lacedæmonians and with Pharnabazus, the sole object of which evidently was: to cause the army and fleet to pass into the hands of the enemy, and thus to open for Alcibiades himself the road to autocratic rule. This suspicion appeared to derive a confirmation from the fact that, during the campaign in the Hellespont, Alcibiades had acquired as his property certain places which he was proceeding to fortify. This, it was argued, was the first step towards the absolute despotism which it was his desire to establish, and for the same purpose he continued to remain on friendly terms with the satrap ruling on the Hellespont, although the latter had so shamefully deceived all the hopes of the Athenians.

Alcibiades dismissed from office. Ol. xciii. 2. (B.C. 407.)

The prevailing feeling of insecurity added force to every fear of this kind, and when envoys also arrived from the towns of Asia Minor, from Cymæ in particular, who complained of the manner in which Alcibiades carried on the command of the army, his enemies contrived to make so cunning and effective a use of all these charges, that the citizens, who had only recently acknowledged their former treatment of Alcibiades to have been the source of their calamities, and had with feelings of deep shame manifested their repentance for it, now, when the dangers were far greater than before, and when not the slightest atom of proof existed against him, once more put aside their best military hero, after he had, for an unbroken term of four years, held the supreme command, without ever deceiving their confidence. He was for the second time dismissed, in his absence, from the command; and with him his colleagues were expelled from office, on the ground that he had appointed them himself in virtue of the extraordinary powers conferred upon him. He was not sure enough of the army, to resist the orders of the citizens, and retired

to the Chersonesus.* Of the former generals, only Conon and Aristocrates were re-elected. Conon, who still lay before Andros, was invested with the supreme command, and, together with four of his colleagues, Leon, Archestratus, Erasinides, and Aristocrates, proceeded to Samos, where there were now assembled 115 triremes, inclusive of the thirty Hellespontine ships, which had been under the command of Thrasybulus.

Scarcely had Alcibiades resigned the command, when the consequences of what had been done immediately became perceptible. Conon was a man of chivalrous character, and of proved experience as a general. His birth and wealth gave him a similar position in civil society to that of Nicias, and, as in the case of the latter, his sentiments were those of a man of honor and of a loyal adherent to the constitution: he was therefore well worthy of the confidence reposed in him by his fellow-citizens. But he lacked the extraordinary gifts of his predecessor, who, although he could not force a Lysander to allow him the opportunity of brilliant victories, yet, by his sagacity and unwearying spirit of enterprise, had been able, even without receiving money from home, to support a large naval armament and to retain the command of the sea. Conon from the first renounced any similar attempt; he diminished the number of ships to seventy, which he manned with a body selected from the general body of the crews,—a step in itself declaratory of his belief that it was impossible for him to carry on a naval war upon a grand scale. For a series of months he kept up what amounted to nothing but a restless free-booters' war, plundering seaports in the most various directions upon no connected plan. The Peloponnesian fleet had already in-

Conon.

Ol. xciii. 2. (B.C. 406.)

* Dismissal of Alcibiades: Xen. *Hell.* i. 5, 16.

creased its numbers by twenty sail, and, since its income flowed in with regularity, continued to increase.

Callicratidas.

Accordingly, when Lysander's term of office had expired, and he was replaced by Callicratidas, the latter could, before he had won a victory, look upon himself as the ruler of the seas. For, although the Persian subsidies ceased, which Cyrus was only willing to allow to flow in favor of his friend Lysander; although Lysander himself, in order to create every possible difficulty for his successor, had repaid to Cyrus all the money still in hand, under the pretence of its having been only a personal gift to himself; yet the new admiral contrived, not only to retain, but even considerably to increase, the power which had devolved upon him; and this in a manner most honorable to himself. For he indignantly turned his back upon the palace of Sardes, where he had been made to wait like a beggar at the gates, and, instead, aroused an unwonted warlike spirit among the Ionians themselves; so that he was able to assemble at Miletus fifty vessels in the service of the confederacy, which he most actively exercised for offensive warfare: and thus, while unsupported with money from Miletus and Chios, and without the assistance of Persian subsidies, he triumphantly led out to sea a fleet of 140 ships—a fleet such as Sparta had on no previous occasion opposed to the Athenians. Callicratidas presented a most rare union of the high-minded pride of a genuine Spartan with the energy and versatility requisite for a naval commander in Ionia. He there realized what Brasidas had ambitioned in Thrace, and was the first who successfully transplanted to the fleet the resolute and straightforward valor of the Spartans.*

Successes of Callicratidas. Ol. xciii. 2–3. (B.C. 406.)

His efforts were attended by the most brilliant success. On the island of the Chians, to whom, above all, he wished to evince his gratitude, he destroyed the Attic

* As to Callicratidas, see Xen. *Hell.* i. 6, 1.

fortress, upon which depended the re-conquest of the island. He next captured the important island of Teos, and without further delay made for Lesbos, whose cities formed the most valuable supports of the Attic dominion in these waters, and guarded the line of communication between the Ionian Sea and the Hellespont. On the north coast of the island, at Methymna, lay an Attic garrison. It was forced to surrender, before Conon could come to its rescue from the Asiatic coast. It now behooved him at all events to hold Mitylene, and accordingly to endeavor to reach the neighborhood of that city. On his voyage thither a conflict took place Conon was anxious to avoid a regular battle; but, as the ships engaged in close conflict in detached groups, his fleet lost the means of united action. Thirty ships were cut off from the rest, and had to be left to the mercy of the enemy; while Conon, with the remainder, retreated into the harbor of Mitylene (the north harbor, cf. p. 103), and closed up its entrance. But Callicratidas forced his way in, and established so complete a blockade upon both the city and the fleet of Conon, that the latter had to resort to a strategem for despatching two vessels to Athens, in order to announce his desperate situation to the citizens.*

Callicratidas was now in truth justified in assuming that the war was in all essential points at an end: for, in addition to his previous successes, a squadron of twelve ships, which Diomedon was bringing up to the rescue, fell, with the exception of two vessels, into the hands of Callicratidas; and the arrival of any further reinforcements seemed out of the question. He might boast of having, without the aid of the Persians, placed Sparta in complete command of the Ægean; the remnants of the enemy's naval force, together with the best admiral of the Athe-

* Conon blockaded: Xen. *Hell.* i. 6, 16—18; Diod. xiii. 77. Callicratidas thus fulfilled his threat to Conon, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θύλατταν.

nians, were held prisoners by him. The Hellespont had been opened to the vessels of the Spartans and their friends. What was to prevent him from cutting off the last remaining resources of Athens, and forcing the city to capitulate at his discretion? But he had, after all, formed a wrong estimate of the power of Athens.

Fresh armaments at Athens. Ol. xciii. 3. (B. C. 406.)

Even now the citizens were unable to support the idea of renouncing the rule of the sea, and felt enough spirit remaining in them, to venture upon an attempt at saving the city. The critical position of the moment overcame all party differences, and gave rise to the most determined measures; it fired all the inhabitants with an emulative ardor, the results of which surpassed all expectation. It was unanimously determined to risk the last forces of the city, in order once more to create a large fleet, capable of saving Conon, and of opposing the enemy's forces in open battle. The treasures of the City Goddess were unhesitatingly employed as generally as possible for the preservation of the City. All the valuable objects of precious metal in the antecella of the Parthenon, with the exception of one golden wreath, were delivered up to the Hellenotamiæ, and by them forwarded to the mint. Doubtless the other compartments of the Treasury (vol. ii. p. 633) were equally emptied of their contents: and the last remaining capital of the city was risked upon this final venture.* A supply of ships was fortunately still in existence, viz., those captured by Alcibiades, amounting in all to ninety-five; forty-five (those placed in reserve by Conon) lay at Samos. But citizens were wanting to man these ships, although all who could be spared from the defence of the walls were devoted to

* See Kirchoff, *Urk d. Schatzmeister* (Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss. 1864), p. 55. As to gold coins struck during the crisis of the year of Antigenes, archonship (containing a strong alloy), see Boeckh, *P. E. of A.* vol. ii. p. 384 [Engl. Tr.]

this purpose, while even the knights declared their readiness to serve on the triremes. Accordingly, a levy of non-citizens also was made, in pursuance of the precedent of Marathon. Emancipation and the civic franchise were promised to resident aliens and slaves; and thus it came to pass that, with the aid of the Samians and other allies, a fleet of 155 sail was in a month's term ready for service, which was entrusted to the generals who had remained behind in the city, viz., Thrasylus, Protomachus, Aristogenes, and Pericles, the son of the great statesman. It was a levy of all the remaining resources of the state, made by a desperate effort; and, with the feeling that it was now a question of victory or absolute ruin, the last fleet of Athens sailed out to sea.*

Battle of the Arginusæ. Ol. xciii. 3. (B.C. 406. September.

No sooner had the unexpected news reached Callicratidas, than, leaving fifty ships behind in the harbor, in order to keep up the blockade over Conon, he took up a position before the southern promontory of Lesbos, in order, here in the open sea, to meet and destroy the new Athenian fleet; for he was animated by an undoubting confidence of victory. The Athenians, on the other hand, notwithstanding their superior numbers, timidly held to a course in the direction of the mainland; where, opposite the Lesbian promontory, three rocky islets, called the Arginusæ, lie in front of the coast of Æolis. These islands seemed to offer a protection against the danger of being outflanked, and the best-secured position attainable under the circumstances. The centre of the fleet lay close to the islands; while its wings were extended, to the right and left, in a double line of ships, so as to prevent the passage through of the enemy's triremes.

The wisest course for Callicratidas would undoubtedly have been to delay the attack. He had no reason for

* Diod. xiii. 97. Xen. *Hell.* i. 6, 19.

haste, for even Cyrus had again supplied him with money, after he had given such proofs of his efficiency. In the case of the Athenians, on the other hand, any delay involved the most serious dangers: their fleet could not support itself, if it remained inactive, and would accordingly, had the enemy remained quiet, have been forced to attack him under all circumstances, or to disperse in various directions; moreover, it was to be foreseen, that, among crews collected with such haste, the existing unanimity of enthusiasm would not hold out for long. But no warnings and no considerations were able to stop the fiery valor of Callicratidas, although he was aware that no favorable opportunity of attack offered itself to him. For he was obliged to divide his fleet into two divisions, in order to be able to attack the foe simultaneously both on the right and on the left side of the Arginusæ. Callicratidas himself conducted a rapid advance of the right wing; his powerful onset proved absolutely irresistible; his first object being the vessel commanded by Pericles. The two ships struck one against the other; and, in the moment of the collision, Callicratidas, who was impatiently standing at the brink of his deck, fell into the sea. Clearchus, whom he had appointed his successor, was unable to maintain the right wing in its position. At the same time, the left wing, commanded by the Bœotian Thrasondas, also began to give way; and gradually the entire fleet was retreating. But this retreat constituted only the commencement of a complete rout. For now the courage of the Athenians had reached its climax, and their superiority in numbers exercised its full effect. Of 120 Peloponnesian ships, not more than forty-three contrived to save themselves out of the terrible struggle.*

As soon as the victorious fleet had re-assembled on its return from the pursuit, it was resolved with all possible

* Xen. *Hell.* i. 6, 27–38.

speed to execute a surprise upon the blockading squadron off Mitylene, before its commander should have received information of the result of the battle; while the other part of the fleet was ordered, under the command of Theramenes and Thrasybulus, to save the wrecked, and to pick up the dead bodies. But a terrible north-west wind rushing down from Mount Ida made all action impossible; and, when the fleet was at last able to issue from the harbor, it was too late for the accomplishment of either purpose. The storm had swept away all vestiges of the battle; and the enemy's squadron had found time for effecting its escape to Chios. But the main object had been thoroughly accomplished: the Peloponnesian force, which had only recently held irresistible sway over the sea, was destroyed; the blockaded fleet of Conon, the central force of the Attic navy, was saved, and, without having suffered hurt or harm, effected its junction with the victorious fleet.

Results of the battle.

The battle of the Arginusæ was the greatest naval battle which took place in the entire course of the war; 275 ships had been engaged in it, *i. e.*, five more than even in the great naval conflict at Sybota (p. 14). The Spartans were doubly discouraged by the news of the defeat, inasmuch as their highest hopes had followed their hero Callicratidas on his triumphal career. It was to be anticipated, that after this defeat the Persians would again withdraw from co-operation with the Lacedæmonians, since their money-payments, after all, failed to produce any practical results. As to the Ionians, it could not be expected that they would once more show themselves ready to afford effective aid; and the Sicilian allies, the Bœotians and Eubœans, had already done their best. On what then could the hope of better future success be grounded? Accordingly, the peace party once more had the upper hand; and envoys were despatched to

Spartan peace proposals.

Athens, in order to renew the offers which had been made after the battle of Cyzicus. Decelea, the fruitless occupation of which had become a burden to the Spartans themselves, was to be evacuated; and both states were to retain their present possessions. These proposals implied a renunciation of the whole of Ionia on the part of Athens;—doubtless a heavy demand at the present moment, when a strong and victorious fleet lay at Samos, without any enemy to oppose it. It was absolutely impossible for Athens to maintain her fleet, without re-conquering the coasts; and therefore the present proposals amounted to nothing beyond a postponement of the decisive struggle. Again, Athens could gain nothing by delay, while Sparta might employ a truce to excellent purpose, by thoroughly regulating her relations with Persia, and by making ready an armament, before which, in the end, Athens would, after all, have to succumb. Accordingly, by the advice of the same Cleophon, who had already as the spokesman of the civic body advocated the rejection of the proposals of peace (p. 500), they were again rejected on the present occasion. It was determined to carry on the war, until it should be decided once for all; the Athenians, notwithstanding all the changes of fortune, still continuing to look upon themselves as the born masters of the seas.

Rejected by Athens.

Thus the admirable elasticity of the Attic people had, by the exertion of their last resources, succeeded in once more bringing fortune over to their side, and re-establishing the power of their state. On the other hand, they failed to restore to that state that internal order and firm bearing, in default of which the most brilliant victories remained valueless. There no longer existed any civic body to rejoice with one heart in the victory; nay, there existed a party, to which that victory was in the highest

Oligarchical intrigues at Athens.

degree unwelcome; because it afforded so splendid a testimony of the vigor still inherent in the civic body, and therefore thwarted the schemes for the overthrow of the civic constitution. This was the party of the oligarchs, the only party which pursued its hidden course according to a definite and undeviating plan: not discouraged by any defeat, and rendered more furious and eager for vengeance by every loss, it became more thoroughly unconscientious in the choice of its means with every new step which it took. For the purposes of this party, the introduction of a decomposing element into the civic body in the persons of aliens and slaves seemed to be an advantageous event; because it appeared to promise additional chances of success to the intrigues in progress. Nor could anything have been more welcome to that party than the fact, that at this period the democratic system again flourished in the state, and that demagogues such as Archedemus, Cleophon, Cligenes, and others, were again listened to with applause. These were men who one and all lacked all higher culture, being for the most part of foreign origin, and by their rude behaviour contributing to dissatisfy many with the constitution of the city. They were always at hand, whenever there was a chance of persecuting the generals of the state, and, accordingly, as in times past, voluntarily or involuntarily, acted as allies of the oligarchs.

Prosecution of the generals.

The report of the battle, drawn up by the generals by common consent, simply stated, that the storm had made it impossible to save those who had been wrecked; a statement originally proposed —in which Theramenes and Thrasybulus had been mentioned by name, as those who had been charged with taking measures for the purpose—had been omitted, on the motion of Pericles and Diomedon; it being desired to leave no handle for throwing suspicion on any individual per-

sons, but rather, after the manner of faithful colleagues, to charge the entire body with the whole responsibility. But the most effective measures had been taken by the conspirators, to produce the desired state of mind in the people against the day, when the report of the battle was to be publicly read. Instead of the report being listened to with gratitude towards the gods, a furious outbreak of passion ensued immediately upon the mention of the wrecked. Loud invectives were uttered against the generals for having neglected their duty; and the answer which they received to the report of a victory passing the highest hopes was their deposition from office. It was not even thought necessary to wait for their defence. The entire course of the proceedings was characterized by excitement and haste. The *Salaminia* carried to Samos the decree of deposition, and, at the same time, the names of the new generals. Conon alone had been re-appointed, because he had taken no part in the battle.

They are deposed,

Two of the deposed generals at once formed their opinion as to the state of affairs at Athens from these events, and preferred to go into voluntary exile. One had died in Mitylene: the six others, confiding in the justice of their cause, quietly returned to Athens, and made a report by word of mouth in the Council. This body contained both voluntary members of the conspiracy, and others who had been bought over to it. On the motion of Timocrates, a member of the Council, the generals were placed under arrest, and the settlement of the charges against them left to the civic body. This step in itself amounted to an illegal proceeding; the imprisonment of the generals violated the most sacred rights of a citizen; but it served the purpose of the conspirators. For the generals were now unable to make use of their personal authority; while extreme agitation was excited

and six of them arrested.

among the citizens by measures of so extraordinary a character, and a double measure of license secured to those men who were the real authors of the plot. They chose as their spokesman one from whom the generals could least anticipate reproach,—Theramenes.

Theramenes.

The fall of the Four Hundred had surrounded Theramenes with the halo of a liberating hero, and for a long time he enjoyed the utmost popularity among his fellow-citizens. He had been commissioned with the destruction of the bridge, by means of which Eubœa and Bœotia were, in the rear of Athens, so to speak united into a single country: in this undertaking he had failed. Hereupon, however, he had restored the democratic constitutions on the islands; he had taken a creditable part in the conflicts in the Hellespont, and had commanded the Attic squadron at Chrysopolis (p. 502). Yet his ambition and vanity remained unsatisfied; he wished to play the first part, instead of which he found himself unnoticed and of no account: and as this was intolerable to him, and as he was wholly devoid of fixed principle, and was seriously attached neither to the one side nor to the other, he once more passed over to the anti-popular party, and henceforth passionately labored to divest his native city of the advantages gained by her; for he possessed sufficient sagacity to perceive, that nothing short of the most hopeless confusion and extreme pressure of war would induce the citizens to renounce their constitution, and to leave the party of the oligarchs at the helm. And although, in the present case, Theramenes was himself involved to this extent, that if any one was to blame for the death of the wrecked, *he* was the guilty man; yet he was resolved to take advantage of this opportunity for his party purposes, and to requite the considerate kindness evinced towards him by the generals, by appearing as their accuser, and calling them to account for neglect of their religious duties. Athens

had for years been a scene of the unworthiest party intrigues; but that any man should after this fashion turn a bad cause to his own private account, and cast upon others the blame attaching to himself—this was a master-piece of self-seeking intrigue, the success of which enables us to form an idea of the ruinous depth to which the city had fallen.

The trial of the generals. Ol. xciii. 3. (B.C. 406). October.

Evidently the whole attempt once more proceeded upon the calculation, that, while that part of the civic body, in which courage and sense of right still continued to exist, viz., the entire body of men under arms, was absent, the civic body was only composed of a minority, including many aged and feeble persons (p. 468). There was a lack of men to watch over the legality of public proceedings; and thus, at the very earliest stage of the trial, the liberty of defence belonging to the accused was illegally restricted (although only recently Aristarchus (p. 480), who was universally known to have betrayed a frontier fortress to the enemy, had, after falling into the hands of the Athenians, been allowed an unlimited time for his defence). But the generals, who had in the course of a single day recovered the dominion of the sea for Athens, were only permitted briefly to narrate the facts of the case, as if the welfare of the state depended upon not a day being lost in bringing to an end this capital trial. Yet this very statement, brief though it was, and devoid of all adventitious ornament, but borne out by the noble personal bearing of men without a stain upon their fame, afforded an irresistible proof of their innocence. The majority of the citizens were ready to reject the charge; the voting on the point was to commence, and its result could not be doubtful. No other mode of action was left to the conspirators, but, by means of a sudden motion, to have the trial adjourned; they declared that the twilight had already set in, and would cause uncertainty in counting the show of hands in

the voting; but at the same time a resolution was passed, to the effect that on the next day of assembly the Council should bring in a motion, pointing out the law according to which the accused were to be tried. Bail was again refused for the prisoners, in contravention of the fundamental principles of Attic law; and thus their fate was harder, than if the citizens had agreed to adopt the charge in all its severity. So well could the conspirators contrive to convert their defeats into advantages.

In order, then, to make the best of the delay obtained, they took advantage of the circumstance, that in these very days of the month of Pyanepsion (October) fell the festival of the *Apaturia*,—the Attic family festival, when all who were united to one another by the ties of common descent combined for the purpose of common sacrifices (vol. i. p. 407), so that all the feelings of kinsmanship were at this season strongly aroused. Theramenes found in this an excellent opportunity for exciting the citizens and their wives against the generals; and, although it was absolutely impossible to determine how many of the missing had fallen in the fight, and how many might possibly have been saved, had a search been subsequently instituted throughout the field of battle, yet it was now declared to be the fault of the generals, that, on this occasion, every one had to wear the black garb of morning on the Apaturia. Wherefore, the blood of the generals ought to flow, in vengeance for their impious neglect for the most sacred duty incumbent upon men in their office. Thus, by means of a vile abuse of human feelings, a new tempest of passion was conjured up; and when this had risen to a height, the second assembly of the citizens commenced.

It was opened by the reading of a decree of the Council, drawn up by Callixenus, whose name is marked out for lasting shame: for that, against the laws of honor and conscience, he allowed himself to be used as the instru-

ment of the traitorous party. In this decree prosecution and defence were treated as already brought to an end, and the Athenians were called upon to proceed at once to vote on the question: whether the generals had made themselves guilty of a crime by neglecting the wrecked. Any further calm consideration of the state of the case was hereby rendered impossible; the generals were, one and all, to be sentenced without further delay; and not, as was customary, by secret ballot; but, in order that the terroristic influence of the oligarchical party might exercise its force thoroughly, two urns were to be set up—the front urn for those who found the generals guilty, and the back urn for those who acquitted them. Whoever, therefore, passed by the first urn, was looked upon as one who considered neglect of the most sacred duties of religion a matter of no moment, and thus, in the midst of the fanatical excitement prevailing among the people, exposed himself to personal danger. And finally, in order to agitate the feelings of the multitude still more deeply, a man was produced who declared that he had saved himself in a tub, who described the end of his comrades as an eye-witness, and who asserted that they had commissioned him, in case he should see Athens again, to call the generals to account for their impious dereliction of their duty.

Counter-motions of Eurytolemus.

But the side of legal right had also its champions; nor were there wanting men, who, in its defence, made use of that weapon, which was now, if ever, called for, viz., the indictment for proposing an illegal measure (p. 465). It was brought forward by Euryptolemus, the son of Pisianax; and, unless the most sacred ordinances of law were to be broken, this intermediary charge would have to be dealt with in a special judicial trial, before the motion of the Council could be any further proceeded with. But the sole effect produced by this step was to exasperate the people into indignation at this interruption of the proceed-

ings: so that they furiously inveighed against those who wished to hinder them from following their bent. Nay, a certain Lyciscus was allowed to propose, that any objector should be judged with the others as implicated in their guilt; and the *Prytanes* (*i. e.*, the members of the particular section of the Council which happened to have the conduct of public business) (vol. i. p. 409) were desired to pass to the order of the day, leaving aside the counter-accusation, and to call upon the assembly to vote. The Prytanes, with whom rested the responsibility for every violation of the constitution, hesitated; but they were overawed by the savage threats of Callixenus, and gave way, with the exception of a single member of their body, to whom the lot had assigned among the Prytanes the presidency for the day, over the present assembly. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, immovably adhered to his declaration, that no force should make him act against the laws of the city. Meanwhile, Euryptolemus and his associates thought, that they would be able more surely to reach their end in another way. He withdrew the charge of making an illegal motion, and now opposed to the decree of the Senate a counter-proposal, on which he obtained the president's permission to speak. He thus secured an opportunity of speaking in defence of the accused, and of recalling a number of single circumstances, without rudely controverting the despotic will of the multitude. He very sagaciously demanded, that the generals should be judged according to the severest law applying to crimes against the civic body. "But," he observed, "in cases where the life of Attic generals is at stake, no arbitrary and summary method should be followed, of pronouncing sentence upon all at once. It should be remembered, that their personal position with reference to the course of the battle was very different in the cases of the different generals. One of them, Lysias, himself belonged to the number of those who, for a time, drifted about on a wreck in want of help:

how can he be treated in the same way as the rest? All those among the wrecked sailors who were saved, testify on behalf of the generals, that the latter took measures both wise and in accordance with their duty. If these measures failed to accomplish their object, it is proper to charge those, to whom the execution of those orders was committed, with the responsibility of their execution; unless, indeed, stress of weather is to be allowed to count as a sufficient excuse for all parties. For the guilty, I crave no mercy; but how can ye, in so difficult a case of law, deny a legal trial and a regular procedure, which even the acknowledged traitor has a right to claim, to those who have destroyed seventy ships of your enemies, and who have actually saved the state? Unless, then, you desire to play into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, to dishonor your city, and to burden your consciences, accord to the generals a full measure of justice; and fix a day upon which, according to the regular order of procedure, a vote shall be first taken as to the adoption or rejection of the indictment; next, the indictment itself shall be proposed; and, finally, each individual shall be allowed to plead his cause."

End of the trial.

A vote was hereupon actually taken upon this counter-motion, and this vote had a favorable issue. But, hereupon, a new pre-concerted device was put into execution. A delay was suddenly interposed by means of an objection raised by a certain Menecles; this delay was again employed by the conspirators for exciting and overawing the citizens; and thus the effect of the speech of Euryptolemus was lost.

Execution of the generals.

When, accordingly, the interrupted process of voting was resumed, the counter-motion was thrown out, and the original motion of the Council passed; the sentence of death was pronounced, and the generals were handed over to the Eleven for execution. Thus died the son of Pericles and Aspasia, to whom his father had made a fatal gift in

obtaining for him the Attic citizenship (p. 75); and with him Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the thanksgiving-offerings to the saving gods, which they, the generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and repentance which seized upon the citizens, when they had recognized how fearfully they had been led astray by a traitorous faction.*

Progress of the war.

The victory of the Arginusæ remained equally unused in respect to the foreign relations of Athens; nothing resulted from it except the liberation of Lesbos, although Sparta was for the moment left utterly powerless. Cyrus had spent the moneys which he had intended to bestow upon the Peloponnesians, and took no heed of the beaten fleet; and

* Herbst, *d. Schlacht b. d. Arginusen*, p. 17. In this essay the true state of the case, as it results from the account of Xenophon, is brought out in opposition to Grote's attempt to justify the proceedings of the assembly and represent the generals as guilty. As against Xenophon, Diodor. xiii. 101 cannot be regarded as an authority, nor is it admissible to excuse the conduct of Theramenes as self-defence necessitated by the circumstances. Callixenus, imprisoned with four others, escapes during the oligarchic revolution, returns after the fall of the Thirty, and dies of hunger, an object of universal hatred: Xen. *Hell.* i. 7, 5. Lysias, *in Erat*, 36, implies no approval of the sentence, as Freese thinks (*d. Freiheit d. Einzelnen in d. att. Demokr.*, p. 12.

the courage of the Spartans was broken. Eteonicus lay with his ships at Chios, utterly abandoned to his fate, and devoid of all supplies; his soldiers were forced to earn their bread as day-laborers on the fields of the Chians, and, with the approach of winter, were overtaken by the bitterest want; so that they determined to make a sudden attack upon the city of the Chians, in order to obtain clothing and food—a scheme which would have been carried into effect, but for the presence of mind of Eteonicus. But, while the Attic fleet of 180 triremes lay without stirring at Samos, an activity manifested itself in the enemy's camp, the sole object of which was once more to oppose to the Athenians, who had robbed themselves of their most efficient generals, the one man from whom it might be hoped, that he would bring the war to a conclusion.*

Diet at Ephesus.

Lysander had so arranged matters, that during his stay in Asia Minor he had given rise to ambitious hopes among a number of influential personages, the fulfilment of which depended entirely upon himself. Deputies accordingly assembled in Ephesus from all the Ionian cities, among whom the Chians and Ephesians in particular came forward as spokesmen. Under existing circumstances, the Chians were in especial danger; since they had been able only by means of further pecuniary sacrifices, to prevent their being plundered by their own allies. The merchants of Ephesus were anxiously intent upon the conclusion of peace, so as to gain an undisputed command of the lucrative trade with Sardes, which had attained to additional importance as the seat of a viceroy. Accordingly, the cities communicated with Cyrus; and, conjointly with him, they despatched an embassy to Sparta, in order urgently to impress upon the authorities there the necessity of again sending Lysander as admiral to Ionia. There was some difficulty in

* Xen. *Hell.* vi. 1.

acceding to this request, inasmuch as a law of state expressly ordained, that no individual should be allowed to fill that office for a second time. But, as the peace party had become powerless since the rejection of the offers of peace by Athens, and as the means for continuing the war could only come from abroad; as the ten envoys of Cyrus held out the prospect of ample payments, and as the proposals were vigorously supported by the party of Lysander: a way was soon discovered for evading the law. The ephors resolved in December, B. C. 406, or thereabouts, that Aracus should be appointed Nauarch, *i. e.*, admiral, and Lysander merely Epistoleus, *i. e.*, the officer next in command, and in the case of the absence of the admiral, his substitute in the fleet. But in this case the second in command was all in all, Aracus merely furnishing his name as a pretext for the arrangement.*

Lysander appointed Epistoleus. Ol. xciii. 3. (B. C. 406–5.)

Hereupon, with the beginning of the year B. C. 405, the entire course of the war was altered. Lysander had returned to Ephesus, and was again the centre of all the combinations formed by him two years previously; all his partisans, who founded upon him alone their hopes of seeing their services rewarded and their ambition satisfied, gathered around him, in order to take as speedy an advantage as possible of the formidable conjuncture, the endurance of which no man could guarantee. Lysander himself used his utmost endeavors to complete the work which he had begun; he now found himself welcomed on all sides, and acknowledged by the allies as indispensable to them. The fate of Greece lay in his hands. Since he found a most zealous supporter in Cyrus, he was amply supplied with money. The forces were satisfied with the

* Lysander arrived in Asia as ἐπιστολεύς or ἐπιστολιαφόρος towards the close of the winter, B. C. 405–6. Scheibe, *Olig. Umw.* p. 13; Weissenborn, *Hellen.* p. 200.

payment of all the sums remaining due to them; the old troops were newly equipped; fresh reinforcements flowed in; the scattered squadrons were massed together; and a new activity was called forth in the docks at Antandrus (p. 521). The unfavorable reports which arrived at Sardes as to the state of health of the Great King, also operated to the advantage of Lysander; for they determined Cyrus to attach the Lacedæmonian commander as closely as possible to his person, so that he might count without fail upon his assistance in the case of a change in the occupancy of the Persian throne. Cyrus accordingly summoned Lysander to Sardes (about the month of February); where he renewed his promises to him, promised to bring up the Phœnician fleet, named him his vicegerent during his journey into Media, and confided to him his treasure and his revenues. Before the winter had yet come to an end, Lysander returned to the coast, and administered the government in the cities of Ionia in such a manner, as to make it very evident to his friends and his enemies, what they had to expect at his hands.

Lysander at Miletus.

The clearest instance of the policy pursued by him occurred in the case of Miletus. Here, during the period of his removal from the supreme command, the oligarchical party, which hoped to possess itself of the government by his aid, had remained on friendly terms with their opponents; and, to all outward appearance, Lysander testified his perfect satisfaction with this peaceable arrangement. But secretly he most bitterly reproached his partisans, and in every way incited them to make an attempt to gain the upper hand by force. Hereupon, when he knew that all preliminary measures had been taken, he arrived in person at Miletus during the time of the Dionysia; again, in order to reassure the friends of the constitution, he uttered the severest threats against all who should create a disturbance; and, by these deceitful proceedings, not only made

it possible for the overthrow of the democracy to be successfully accomplished, but also caused this event to be accompanied by a massacre, in which the democratic party was virtually annihilated. Those who were able to effect their escape, fled to Pharnabazus; who generously extended his protection to the unfortunate fugitives.*

Lysander in absolute command of the sea. Ol. xciii. 3. (B. C. 405.) Spring.

After completing his armaments, Lysander was, in the spring, ready for battle, and sure of a speedy victory. This time, it was not necessary for him to hold cautiously back in fear of a dangerous adversary; for he was aware of the state of the enemy's fleet, among the commanders of which he numbered fellow-conspirators: he could therefore boldly assert his mastership of the sea, without disobeying the advice of Cyrus, who had urgently exhorted him to abstain from any dangerous venture. He cruised through the sea in all directions; landed at Ægina and in Attica, where he had an interview with King Agis; and then rapidly sailed to the Hellespont, where the fate of Athens was to be decided. He attacked Lampsacus, which was garrisoned by Attic troops; and the wealthy city, together with all its stores, fell into his hands, before the Attic fleet could arrive for its relief.

Position of the hostile fleets in the Hellespont.

The Athenians took up their position opposite Lampsacus, in an open bay, into which flowed the "goat-river" (Ægospotami), at a distance of fifteen stadia from Sestus. This position was of such a nature, that it could only have been selected with the intention of inducing Lysander to leave his excellent harbor, and to venture upon an attack; no situation could have been more un-

* Διονυσίων ὄντων, Diod. xiii. 104, *i. e.* in the month of Anthesterion (Febr.—March). Clinton, *Fast. Hell.* ii. 285. The same spring-festival was celebrated at Ephesus, Teos, Smyrna, Phocæa, and Massilia (Z. *f. Alterthumsw.* 1838, p. 496).

favorable for any protracted stay: for it was wholly unguarded, and without any town near it, whence the troops might have supplied their wants.* They were accordingly forced daily to proceed more than a mile inland, in order to procure the necessaries of life. The fleet, notwithstanding, adhered to its position, though in a condition which, even under the most favorable circumstances, must have crippled any success of war. Opposed to a well-trained and well-supplied force, which unconditionally obeyed the will of a commander as sagacious as he was enterprising, this, the last fleet which Athens was able to send out, was discordant in itself, and split up into parties; its strangely-mixed crews lacking all discipline, coherence, and moral bearing, and being commanded by six generals, who severally pursued utterly different aims. The supreme command was in the hands of the excellent Conon, who, personally, was thoroughly qualified, both by his capacity and the honesty of his intentions, to maintain the honor of the Athenian arms: but he could only depend upon a small minority of his men, upon the best of the Athenian citizens; and his proceedings were crippled by his colleagues, whose want of skill or intentional treason played into the hands of the foe. Among their number was Adimantus, the son of Leucolophides (p. 524), who subsequently dared publicly to accuse Conon of treason.† He belonged to the oligarchs, to whose wishes an Athenian victory was repugnant; and the two generals Menander and Tydeus, were probably members of the same party, which had other adherents in the army; while Philocles was a noisy and thoughtless personage, who was blind to the danger, and despised the foe.‡ Act-

* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1, 20.

† Adimantus: Xen. *Hell.* i. 5, 21; derided by Aristophanes, *Ran.* v. 1513 (cf. Schol.)

‡ Menander, according to Sievers, *Comm.* p. 34, who refers to Thuc. vii. 16 and Xen. *Hell.* i. 2, 16.—Philocles: Diod. xiii. 106.

ing with such colleagues, Conon was obliged to see the power of resistance belonging to his fleet diminish from day to day; he was in a desperate situation; and whoever would use his eyes, could not fail to see the fatal end drawing near.

Alcibiades.

At this crisis, one last hope appeared. Alcibiades once more offered himself as the saviour of the state. He had not remained idle in the Chersonesus; but, in conformity with the natural craving of his heroic character, had here also sought and found an opportunity for brilliant deeds. He had again established a connection with the Thracian tribes (p. 508). Their kings eagerly sought the friendship of the fugitive, who, by the superior force of his personal gifts, had acquired a princely position and considerable treasures. By warring against, and chastising, the savage tribes of the barbarians, he had become a benefactor of the Greek coast-towns. He now arrived from his neighboring property; and offered counsel and aid to the Athenians. Above all, he entreated the generals to pass round the promontory to Sestus, where they would find a protected position, and resources close at hand; while the present necessity of allowing a daily dispersal of the crews, endangered the safety of the entire fleet. He promised them the aid of King Seuthes, and of Mandocus, the chieftain of the Odrysæ, in whom he had awakened sympathy with Athens. It was the first offer of alliance again made to the city in her isolation: an alliance which, on account of the importance of the Hellespont, was of extraordinary value for the naval power of Athens. Finally, Alcibiades undertook, if the command were entrusted to him, to force Lysander to a battle. By opening such prospects as these, he hoped to give rise to a change in the situation, similar to that which he had once called forth in the case of the army at Samos; and he believed it possible that he might thus once more return as a victor to his native city. But the generals rudely rejected the

hand which alone might have been capable of saving Athens, when at the very brink of ruin; and her destiny was accomplished in accordance with the designs of Lysander.*

Battle of Ægospotami. Ol. xciii. 4. (B. C. 405.) August.

After the Athenians had, on four successive days, in vain put out to sea, in order to offer battle to the enemy, and after, subsequently to each return, the crews had with less and less caution dispersed on land: orders were issued, on the fifth day, in the hostile camp, bidding the whole fleet hold itself in readiness for battle, and to proceed to a general attack, as soon as the vessels sent forward to reconnoitre had announced by a signal, that the Attic crews had again gone on land. These orders were throughout executed with the utmost precision. The Peloponnesians, after hurling back the squadron of Philocles, executed an unexpected charge upon the enemy's ships; while at the same time land-troops were sent across to take the Attic entrenchments in the rear. There was not time for a naval engagement, as those among the Athenian ships which were manned were so rapidly driven into a corner that they were wholly unable to move, while the majority were empty, or very imperfectly manned. The victory was most complete,—a victory gained without bloodshed, and without a single loss on the part of the conquering side. Conon alone succeeded in gaining the open sea with eight ships, and the *Paralus* (p. 468). All the other vessels fell into the hands of Lysander, together with 3,000 men; the rest had effected their escape to Sestus. The great body of the prisoners was transported to Lampsacus, and there tried by a court-martial, to which Lysander summoned those of the allies who were present. He thus obtained an opportunity of allowing all the hatred which existed against the Athenians among the Ionians, Bœotians, Megareans, &c., to find

* Alcibiades in the camp: Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1, 25; Plut. *Lys.* 10; *Alc.* 36. Corn. Nepos, *Alc.* 8, is inaccurate.

full vent once more, and of being able to pretend that he was accomplishing the work of vengeance upon Athens in the name and by the orders of the Hellenic nation. The Spartans loved to envelop their most cruel deeds in empty forms of legality. Thus, as formerly, in the case of the Platæans, they now complacently listened to the most unmeasured accusations against the defenceless Athenians, and sentenced them all to death. Philocles indignantly rejected the special examination to which he was to be submitted; and after bathing, and donning a festive robe, bravely preceded his companions to death, expiating by his end his former errors of unskillfulness and vain self-assurance. Adimantus was the single prisoner, whose life was granted him, in return for the services which he had performed to the foe. But the proceeding which, among all the horrors perpetrated at that time on the shores of the Hellespont, most violently offended the feelings of the Greeks, was Lysander's refusal of even a decent burial to the corpses of his victims. This was a savage act, such as had never yet occurred, even in wars between Greeks and barbarians.*

The prisoners sentenced to death. Ol. xciii. 4. (B. C. 405.) Summer.

In Athens itself, a period of gloomy stillness had ensued upon the trial of the generals. Exhausted by the tremendous exertions called for by the equipment of the last fleet, in the absence of the whole of the more

Condition of affairs at Athens.

* As to the date of the battle of Ægospotami, see Note XI. Appendix. The treason of Adimantus (Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1, 32) is attested by Lys. c. *Alc.* p. 548 Dem. xix. 401; and Paus. iv. 17, x. 9; and there is an indication of it in Thuc. ii. 65 (cf. E. Müller, *de Xen. Hist. Gr.* 24, note). His condemnation and the sale of his lands are referred to in an inscription (ap. Rangabé, No. 348), according to Boeckh, *Mondcyklen*, p. 36. *Contra* Kirchhoff, *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1860, p. 238, who dates the document of the *Poletæ* Ol. xci. 3. But the tradition of his treason remains uncontroverted.

vigorous part of the population, the city had to content itself with anxiously awaiting the course of the events, which must soon decide the fate of Athens. The news arriving from the seat of war were not adapted to raise the courage of the citizens. Ionia, the re-conquest of which was the first task incumbent upon the fleet, became more firmly than ever attached to Sparta; and the most dangerous of Athens' enemies united closely, to come forward against her at the same time; while the Athenians had driven into exile, or put to death, the best of their own generals. In the interior of the city, there was an end of all security and tranquillity, and an utter absence of the joyous confidence and courage arising from a clear conscience. Of what avail was it, that the meaning of the villanous game played by the oligarchs had now become manifest; that the public indignation at the discovery found vent in the arrest of Callixenus (p. 541) and of four others, who were to be subjected to a capital inquiry? The oligarchs were, after all, able to protect their partisans, and Theramenes escaped without further hurt; though he failed in his candidature for one of the vacant offices of general. The oligarchic party continued to prevail in the Council. The citizens knew not in whom to place trust. They felt no confidence in their demagogues, Cleophon, Archedemus, and the rest, and as little in the men of the opposite party, whose villany had become palpable. The latter were hated, and the former despised; and yet the civic body fell alternately into the hands of either.

The Legislative Commission.

Attempts were indeed made to reform the existing evils in the administration by means of a variety of measures, so as to recover a firm footing, and to remedy the most crying grievances. For the whole administration of the state had been unhinged by the repeated violations of public law; and it was no longer known at Athens what

proceedings were to be deemed illegal and what permitted by law. It had accordingly been already frequently discussed among the citizens, whether it might not be opportune to submit the entire aggregate of laws, which formed the Attic code since the time of Solon, to a thorough review, in order to remove what was obsolete, and to reconcile what was mutually conflicting.

Nicomachus.

After the fall of the Four Hundred, the execution of this scheme had been determined upon, and a certain Nicomachus had been nominated president of a Commission which was rapidly to accomplish its task (p. 486). Nicomachus was one of those persons of low birth, whose business talents seemed to adapt them to such-like labors; one of the class of scribes, which was very numerous and influential in the Athens of the day;—a man who endeavored to take advantage of the Commission merely for his private purposes, and who was accessible to every kind of bribe. Such was the fellow, to whom the revision of the legislative tables of Solon had been entrusted; and with whom the daily allowances fixed as a remuneration for his labors operated as a quite sufficient reason for not overhurrying them. The Commission was protracted from one year to the other; and the opportunity was made the most of for admitting or expunging laws with criminal license; nay, the conflicting parties even sent information to the Legislative Commission, as to what they desired to be established as the rule of law, in order to serve their purpose in cases at the time *sub judice*. Especial advantage was taken of these abuses by the oligarchs; who, since the Hermæ trials, had unceasingly labored to weaken the public feeling of certainty with regard to the law, and by this means more and more to discredit the ancient constitution.*

* Cf. Lys. c. *Nicomach.* The prosperous career of the fellow is de-

Intellectual impoverishment of Athens.

Under these circumstances, all attempts to restore the welfare of the state by means of legislation could not but end in failure. Nor, in fact, was the present a season for reforming or creating a constitutional system. Intellectual life lay low. The great contemporaries of Pericles had died,—Sophocles, as one of the last among their number, in the same year in which the Athenians had gained their last victory. He loyally shared both good and evil fortune with his fellow-citizens, and refused to accept any invitation, however tempting, to a foreign land. Many others, on the contrary, whose talents and knowledge of their art obtained honorable recognition for them abroad, had long quitted their native city; whose condition inspired them with repugnance. They were satiated with the culture and mis-culture of the Athenians, who had lost their most valuable possessions through sophistry; while they saw in an ideal light the free peoples of the North, fresh, as it were, from the hand of Nature, whose simple and healthy mode of life had preserved to them the piety of the ancient race, and the traditions of ancient wisdom. Most of all was their attention captivated by those regions, in which a new progress of culture hopefully unfolded itself out of the patriarchal habits of the past. Therefore, no place in particular exercised a stronger charm upon the artists, than the capital of Macedonia. Here a fresh and vigorous youthful life prevailed, under the rule (since Ol. xci. 4; B.C. 413) of Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas. During the reign of terror in the times of the Decelean war, Archelaus was calmly regulating the affairs of his kingdom, building roads, founding cities, spreading popular culture, and inviting to his court, at Pella, the most gifted artists and poets. A new Greece

scribed § 27: *καίτοι ἀντὶ μὲν δούλου πολίτης γεγένηται, ἀντὶ δὲ πτωχοῦ πλούσιος, ἀντὶ δὲ ὑπογραμματέως νομοθέτης.*

arose on the further side of Olympus; in Pieria, the home of the Muses, Archelaus established Music games of competition. With envious and longing eyes, the Athenians looked upon him as the happiest among mortals, and accounted even those blessed, who were able to dwell at his court. Among the number of the latter was Euripides, who had discontentedly quitted his native city, and Agathon, the son of Tisamenus, a poet splendidly endowed with gifts both physical and intellectual, who was better able than Euripides to enjoy the pleasures of court life. Thus Athens grew poorer and poorer. Those who remained behind, offered no compensation for those who had taken their departure. Upon the great poets followed poetasters, prolific versifiers: who thought by sophistic versatility to supply the place of genius, and who, devoid of the dignity of sentiment and laborious experience in their art, were solely anxious to create a passing impression in the public, which was itself no longer possessed of the collected judgment, requisite for the appreciation of a work of art consummated by anxious and thoughtful labor.*

Aristophanis Ranæ. Ol. xciii. 3. (B.C. 405.) January.

Comedy was better able to preserve its vigor than tragedy. By virtue of its more pliable nature, comedy was better able to support the unfavorable circumstances of the times, in whose infirmities and defects it found new materials for its use. The Attic comic writers could find no home outside the walls of Athens; and thus, then Aristophanes remained true to his native city, and achieved for himself the distinction of glorifying Athens, and delighting and edifying the minds of her citizens, by the productions of his inexhaustible genius. True, the circumstances of the times no longer allowed him to write come-

* As to the impoverishment of the Attic stage, cf. Ar. *Ran.* v. 192 f. The glories of Pieria are celebrated in Eur. *Bacch.* 565.—Μακάρων εὐωχίαι Ar. *Ran.* 85; cf. Von Leutsch, in *Philol.* ii. p. 32.

dies centring in political questions of the day; from that he was estopped by the prevailing political exhaustion; nor could he himself in the present state of affairs adopt so resolute and bold a line of party action, as he formerly had against Cleon. He accordingly chose his subject for the Lenæa (January B. C. 405; Ol. xciii. 3) from a field on which he might move freely, without exciting new passions in his hearers. For, when shortly before the death of Sophocles news had arrived from Macedonia of the death of Euripides, Aristophanes took this opportunity of bringing on the stage, in his *Frogs*, the god Dionysus, as the representative of the theatrical public of Attica. The great masters of the art are dead or have emigrated, and the stage lies desolate. Therefore, Dionysus has resolved to visit the lower regions, in order to bring back to the city, which cannot live without poets, one of them—and that one the best. And the best is to prove himself such, by his ability (in conformity with the custom of the ancient poets, the teachers of the people—vol. ii. p. 579) to give the most salutary counsel. The exuberant humor of the poet creates a succession of the most diverting scenes, enacted in both the Upper and the Lower regions; strange choruses of frogs alternate with solemn chants of the Initiated, who lead a life of bliss after death; and the spectators are raised above all the anxieties of the present. Not a single word touches the grievous wounds of public life: the main object of the poem being to awaken the reminiscences of the past, to celebrate classic art in the person of the great Æschylus, and to dedicate a loving remembrance to the cherished Sophocles. Yet the poet, while recalling the dead, is not forgetful of the living. He puts words of serious import in the mouth of his chorus. Still, as of old, an avowed enemy of the giddy demagogues, who, like Cleophon, in the intoxication of their insolence, reject all thoughts of peace, and equally the enemy of the unpatriotic and traitorous oligarchs, he admonishes the genuine

citizens, to hold faithfully together in mutual confidence, and not to preserve an endless grudge against those, whom the intrigues of Phrynichus had, without any evil intentions on their own part, implicated in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. The poet is now, as ever, for peace, for without peace there is no hope of salvation for the commonwealth; but this peace must not come from the hands of the conspirators, but must be an honorable peace—based upon unity and concord at home, and upon a vigorous conduct of the war. For this purpose a hero is needed; and the hero exists, but in exile. Thus the entire problem as to the preservation of the state is after all made to depend upon Alcibiades; in whom, whether he be present or absent, the history of Athens constantly centres.

The repentance felt on account of the execution of the generals had been accompanied by a reaction in public feeling with regard to Alcibiades. A longing was again felt for him, the short period of whose presence had been the last term of joy for Athens. "They yearn—they hate him, yet they wish him back," says the poet. There was a lack of the energy requisite for rising above the uncertainty of these half-avowed sentiments, and for overcoming the tendencies working in a contrary sense, by means of an act of vigorous resolution. But there can be no doubt as to the opinions of Aristophanes, and of those who thought with him. For, not without reason, he introduces a detailed description of the celebration of the Mysteries in undisturbed festive enjoyment—a description which could not fail to remind every hearer of the man to whom the last celebration of that kind was due (p. 481); and, again, Æschylus is recognized as the wise poet by answering the question as to what is his opinion of Alcibiades, in the following most significant words:—

Longing for Alcibiades.

> "'Tis best to train no lion in the city:
> But, an ye once have trained him, do his best."

General defection of the allied cities.

A few months afterwards, the Athenians heard, that Alcibiades had once more offered a saving hand to their army; it had been rejected; and the *Paralus*, which brought these tidings (p. 552), was the only vessel, out of a fleet of 160, which returned to the Piræeus. The advent of Lysander himself was expected from day to day. The same terror had returned, which had prevailed after the destruction of the Sicilian fleet; but how small the danger of those days appeared in comparison with that of the present!* But no Lysander came. In his stead, there arrived bands of fugitives from the cities, which were one after the other taken by Lysander,—from Sestus, Byzantium, Chalcedon, and others. He had granted their lives to the Attic garrisons there, on the condition of their immediately betaking themselves to Athens.† Thus the various items of terrible news followed upon one another in rapid succession. Soon it became known, that Lesbos had renounced her allegiance, without offering any resistance; and similarly the Thracian cities. Everywhere, the revolt had been long prepared by secret agreements. Reports, each of which would in other times have sufficed to place all Athens under alarm, succeeded one another from week to week, till they ceased to cause any sensation among the citizens. They were forced to remain listless spectators, while member after member was being torn away from the Attic empire, and one after the other of its resources stopped: while the city became crowded with a multitude of homeless and needy persons, and the want of supplies from abroad increased from day to day. Such was precisely the end desired by Lysander, who was steadily approaching the consummation of his designs. He established Lacedæmonian governors in the conquered

* Athens after the battle: Justin. v. 7; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2, 3.

† Plut. *Lys.* 13; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2, 2.

places, for the safety of which he made them responsible; while he confided the administration to the party leaders of the oligarchs: whose ends were thus accomplished, by their governing their several cities in boards of ten under the authority of Sparta. The ancient inhabitants received back their lands, and the populations expelled by Athens were summoned by public proclamations to return without fear to their homes, to Ægina (p. 62), Scione (p. 198), Melos (p. 319), &c.* This was of course a measure welcomed with applause on all sides; all Hellas did homage to the powerful leader, celebrating him as able, not only to exercise a terrible vengeance, but also to give her inhabitants satisfaction for their ancient wrongs.

Pausanias and Agis besiege Athens. Ol. xciii 4. (B. C. 405–4.)

Thus the day drew nearer and nearer, on which judgment was to be held over Athens herself, after her plunder had been torn from her. This last judgment was to take place under the eyes of all the Greeks; and for this purpose the entire military levy of Peloponnesus was once more called out. King Pausanias (who had two years previously succeeded his father Plistoanax), at the head of all the troops of the auxiliaries of Sparta, pitched his camp in the low district of the Academy, in order to blockade Athens from the west; at the same time Agis (who had now lain at Decelea for not less than nine years) received orders to advance from the north and east sides, it being announced to him that Lysander would shortly appear at the head of 200 ships of war at the mouth of the Piræeus.

After overcoming the first moment of terror, the Athenians had soon recovered their self-command. They had elected new generals, under whose direction they had repaired the walls, taken measures for the defence of the city, and filled up the entrances to the harbors. A large

* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 9.

majority among the citizens was full of patriotic ardor; even now they were animated by the spirit of bravery, which had so often inspired them in the hours of the greatest danger, and by a courageous determination to risk their last means of defence for the honor of the city.

Party manœuvres of the oligarchs.

But the ancient evil also reappeared, the source of which consisted in the existence of a small but united number of citizens, who worked against the honor and independence of the city, and in favor of the foe, whom they needed, in order to establish the sway of their party on the ruins of the democracy. This party, always firmly organized in itself, was ever at hand, to take advantage of every national trouble for its own purposes. As soon as a storm lowered over the city and spread terror in it, this party came forward as a real power. At the present moment, Athens was terrified by the tremendous events which had recently taken place, and was not only weakened as to her means of defence by her great loss of citizens, but also thoroughly shaken in her bearing towards her foes both within and without. The large influx of strangers disturbed and confused the conduct of affairs, while terror was excited by the imminent siege.

And yet, even now, the oligarchs found Athens less easy to deal with than the other places, where, with the aid of Lysander, the democracy was rapidly abolished. In Athens, before the overthrow of the constitution was accomplished, there were needed a series of preparatory measures and insidious party intrigues, in order gradually to make the people succumb, and to undermine the last remnant of confidence still existing in it. It was necessary to strike at the root of the political system, so as to heighten the prevailing confusion; it was necessary to attempt to cripple the constitutional organs of the commonwealth, and to deprive the official authorities of its management, in order to transfer it to the hands of the

conspirators, *i. e.* of the oligarchical clubs. Accordingly, measures were adopted, similar to that of the institution of the *Probuli* on a former occasion (p. 403); the present measures being merely characterized by far greater ruthlessness and determination. The first step in the whole revolution of political affairs was the formation of a Board of Five from among the leaders of the oligarchical associations, a Committee of Clubbists (as we may call it), a kind of Committee of Public Safety, which, in these times of confusion, was to take care of the interests of the commonwealth. Its power was based upon the organization of a party, which acquired additional confidence and power of cohesion from the helplessness and divisions prevailing among the rest of the citizens, and which thus succeeded in further extending its influence in other quarters, and although lacking any official authorization, yet, with the aid of the Council, acquired a certain public authority and a magisterial character.

The Committee of Five.

The obscurity and want of intelligibility attaching to revolutionary proceedings of this kind spring from their essential nature: moreover, we are entirely without any connected information as to the condition of Athens at the time in question. It is, however, probable, that after the defeat of the army the oligarchs raised their heads, that not long afterwards the Board of Five, mentioned above, commenced operations, and that their power grew in proportion as the public difficulties became perceptible. So much is certain: that they gradually attained to so great a power, that they were able to summon assemblies of the citizens, to put aside the constitutional officers of state, above all, the generals, and to bring into their hands the conduct of military measures for the security of the state; in which achievements they were doubtless supported by their following among the Knights, of whom a large part entertained sentiments hostile to the constitution (p. 96).

Finally, we are informed, that the Board of Five dared so boldly to put forward their political leanings, that with a distinct allusion to the political system of Sparta, to which it was their wish to approximate that of their own city, they called themselves, and were also universally called the Five Ephors of Athens.

Law of Patroclides.

In order to increase the power of the party, the popular orator, Patroclides, proposed: that public debtors, and those who had been condemned in public suits, or whose case was still under judgment, those who had formerly been members of the Four Hundred, together with all who had wholly or partially forfeited their civic rights, should be reinstated in their full rights and honors, all previous documents regarding them being at the same time destroyed. So comprehensive an amnesty had only occurred twice in Attic history: once under the archonship of Solon, as the introductory measure to his great work of reconciliation, and again at the time of the battle of Salamis, when it appeared necessary to unite all forces at hand for the preservation of the common country. Both these considerations were on this occasion also urged; and thus the good-will of even the patriotic citizens engaged in favor of this proposal, although it was principally intended to advance the interests of the oligarchs. It would appear that at this period, when revolutionary and conservative measures were indiscriminately applied, the Areopagus, which had only continued to exist as a court for capital cases, was also re-established as a state-magistrature, and, as at the time of the Persian wars (vol. ii. p. 316), invested with extraordinary powers for contributing its share to the preservation of the city.*

* It is improbable, that the oligarchs should have delayed commencing their revolutionary intrigues until some time had elapsed after the battle of Ægospotami. As therefore Lysias, xii. § 43, (the sole authority on the subject) declares the institution of the Ephorate to have been the be-

Blockade of Athens. Ol. xciii. 4. (B. C. 405.) Autumn.

Notwithstanding all these measures, which continually increased the confusion and insecurity prevailing in the state, love of liberty and loyalty to the constitution had not been extinguished among the citizens. Two powers, which it was impossible mutually to reconcile, held sway in the city by the side of one another; the troops marched upon it from all sides; the most fearful dearth of provisions threatened the over-crowded population; and yet the genuine body of the citizens was resolved to defend the independence of the city, in spite of the superior forces of the foe, and in spite of the anti-popular party within the walls.

In the latter part of the Autumn, Lysander had made his appearance before the Piræeus, in order to open the siege in combination with the two land armies. It scarcely admits of doubt, that, had serious measures been at once adopted, Athens in her existing condition might have been speedily taken. But it could be the wish of neither the kings nor Lysander violently to hurry on the fall of Athens, and to afford the citizens an opportunity of proving their heroism in the last desperate struggle; and previous instances remind us of the value, which the Spartans were wont to attach to the circumstance of hostile cities, as it were, voluntarily capitulating to them (p. 129). No power could dispute their prey to the

ginning of these intrigues, I adhere to my former opinion, that the Committee of Clubbists in direction of affairs belongs to the period before the capitulation (similarly Rauchenstein, *Philol.* xv. p. 793, *contra* Frohberger, *Philol.* xiv. p. 320; and G. Lange, *Neue Jahrb.* 1863, p. 217). At the same time, I confess that I see no grounds for any certainty on the subject. As to Critias, see note to p. 576 *infra*. The character of an actual magisterial authority—anticonstitutional, but recognised *de facto*—appears to attach to οἱ καθεστηκότες ἔφοροι, § 76. As to Patrocleides, see Scheibe, *Ol. Umw.* p. 36; *Z. f. Alt.w.* 1842, p. 201; and Boeckh. *P. E. of A.* vol. ii. p. 56 [E. Tr.]. As to the Areopagus, cf. Lysias, xii. § 69; Meier *Rh. Mus.* i. 277; Plut. *Cim.* c. 10.

victors; and they accordingly preferred to leave their adherents within the walls to take the measures which must, without bloodshed, bring about the surrender of Athens. The oligarchs and Lysander had doubtless come to an understanding on the point; the former had undertaken to deliver city and harbors into the hands of the latter, having in return received the same assurances which had been granted and fulfilled to the oligarchs of the other cities.

For this reason, the entire forces were not left before Athens; but during the winter part of the land-army probably took its departure, and only a part of the fleet remained to blockade the harbors, while Lysander with the other part laid siege to Samos. For this island alone adhered steadfastly to its democratic constitution, and, with the exception of Argos, remained the only state in Greece which refused to desert the cause of the Athenians, even when they were reduced to utter impotence, and when association with them entailed naught but danger.*

First negotiations for surrender.

Although, notwithstanding the enemy's guard-ships, a few vessels succeeded in bringing in corn, yet the scarcity of food prevailing in the city rose to such a height, that, soon after the commencement of the blockade, the first assembly of the citizens was summoned for taking into consideration the conditions of surrender. It was resolved to accept what was inevitable, and to acknowledge the hegemony of Sparta; it was agreed to renounce all possessions abroad, and to retain nothing but the Piræeus and the walls. The envoys who conveyed this proposal to Sparta were sent home by the ephors as soon as they met them, on the very frontier of Laconia, at Sellasia (vol. i. p. 213). The walls of the harbors, and those connecting the latter with the city, were the very

* Lysander off Samos: Plut. *Lys.* 14; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3, 6.

foundation of the independence of Athens as against the Spartans, as Themistocles and Pericles had perceived. The answer, accordingly, was couched in these terms: that no question of an agreement could be entertained, unless the bifurcate walls were demolished in an extent of ten stadia.

This answer gave rise to the greatest agitation among the citizens. They could not conceive of an Athens without her walls; if these were razed, the city would be cut off from the sea, and exposed as a defenceless victim to any besieging force. In consequence of this feeling, the fire of the Athenian love of liberty was once more kindled into flames; and, sure of the assent of a large number of honorable citizens in this point, Cleophon was able to menace any one with open violence, who should say a word in favor of such shameful conditions. Although, then, the Spartan authorities held out the prospect of the maintenance of the Attic constitution, and even of the continued possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros to the Athenians: the latter rejected all proposals including a demand for razing the walls; and a civic decree was even passed, which made penal all discussion of this point.

Such was the state of matters within the walls of the unhappy city. On the one side, the impetuosity of a savage demagogue, whose senseless obstinacy cut off all remaining means of preservation, while he was himself unable to point out any mode of rescue; on the other, the crafty leaders of the Lacedæmonian party, who looked with heartless satisfaction upon the troubles rising to a height around them; while those citizens who loved their native city and her laws, without being able to approve the mad vehemence of Cleophon, who were aware that calmness and concord could alone avail the state, constituted too decided a minority, and were too little prepared for a combined course of action, for their patriotism to

prove of any possible use to the commonwealth. The great multitude was under the absolute influence of terror and want, and lay as an instrument, with no will of its own, in the hands of discordant and raging partizans.

Theramenes appointed plenipotentiary. Ol. xciii. 4. (B. C. 410). Autumn.

When, then, no result had been arrived at in the turbulent assembly of the citizens, and all eyes were turned without hope upon the future, Theramenes came forward. He had waited for the moment when any one who could point to even the faintest ray of hope was sure of an eager hearing. In the soft accents of that insinuating eloquence of which he was a master, supported by his reputation as a friend of the people gained in the days of the Four Hundred, he offered to proceed into the presence of Lysander, in order to discover the real intentions of Sparta, and to obtain certain information as to the actual state of the case with regard to the demanded razing of the walls. Theramenes undertook to obtain far more favorable conditions than this, and even held out the prospect of a variety of advantages to be secured by means of a skillful negotiation with Sparta; but at the same time he asked for unconditional confidence and absolute powers.

In vain many thoughtful citizens urged their objections; they guessed his traitorous intentions, and warned the assembly against entrusting their all to the hands of a Theramenes. In vain the Areopagus offered to take the negotiations for peace into its own hands. The large majority of the citizens, whose only anxiety was for peace, were captivated by his speech, and would not relinquish the hopes aroused by it; the conspirators exerted their influence to foster this feeling; and Theramenes received the desired powers.

Hereupon he took his departure to visit Lysander, who at that time probably still lay before Samos. Upon Lysander alone the oligarchs based their hopes, since they could not count upon the kings and the ephors. For the

latter, it will be remembered, had already held out to the envoys of Athens the prospect of leaving her constitution unimpaired; and, indeed the authorities at Sparta had long looked with eyes of suspicion upon the measureless omnipotence of their ambitious general, and upon his imperious sway; they had been already obliged to interfere against him when he expelled the inhabitants of Sestus, and proposed to occupy that important point with men serving on his fleet. They could not possibly regard his policy with favor: since, by everywhere placing his partisans at the helm, he threatened to make himself the absolute master of all Greece. It was, therefore, of double importance for such men as Theramenes to arrive at an understanding with Lysander, and to assure themselves of his support. The other object achieved by the conspirators through this embassy was this: that in the meantime no public assemblies were held at Athens on the question of peace, and that thus the loyal adherents of the constitution were effectually prevented from taking any measure on its behalf. The courage of the citizens exhausted itself during this period of terrible anxiety and weary inaction; while the oligarchs availed themselves of the term of delay to mature all things at Athens for their purposes.*

Death of Cleophon.

Cleophon had unintentionally performed a service to the oligarchs by bringing about the failure of the first negotiations for peace; he had now, however, become an obstacle in their path, and it was necessary to remove him, just as Androcles had been on a previous occasion removed (p. 464). Cleophon was accused of having neglected his military duty, and of having uttered calumnies against the Council

* As to the embassy of Theramenes, see Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 16 ff.; where two missions are distinguished with more accuracy than by Lysias (xii. 68), who neither makes mention of the nine envoys associated with Theramenes.

of the city; for he had dared openly to declare, that the Council was playing the game of the conspirators. He was indicted of high treason, and, although his adherents were still so numerous, that it was not safe to depend upon the sentence of an ordinary jury, the vile Nicomachus (p 555) was employed to supply a law, by which, in contravention of all usage, the members of the Council were to be admitted to take part in the trial—a trial in which the Council was itself the offended party. Thus the desired end was obtained by means of a base infraction of the law; and Cleophon was condemned and executed.*

After this had been successfully accomplished, Theramenes returned, after an absence of more than three months, bringing with him nothing beyond empty excuses for his long delay, for which he declared Lysander responsible, and the answer: that Lysander had directed him to apply to the ephors, in order to learn from them the conditions of peace. Since the matter had once advanced to this stage, nothing remained but to reappoint Theramenes plenipotentiary, and to send him with nine other envoys to Lacedæmon. The sufferings caused by want of the necessaries of life had risen to such a pitch, that it was impossible to engage in any lengthy discussions; the envoys were again detained at Sellasia, and at last summoned to Sparta. Here the final consultations were now held, in the presence of deputies of the confederates. There was no longer any question of negotiations with Athens, but judgment was being held over a vanquished enemy, and the only difference in opinion was as to the severity of the sentence to be pronounced. Corinth and

Second embassy of Theramenes. Ol. xciii. 4. (B.C. 404.) Spring.

Debates on the doom of Athens.

*As to the utterly irregular trial of Cleophon, see Lys. xiii. 12; xxx. 10.

Thebes demanded the destruction of the city which had been the author of so many wrongs;—let its place know it no more, and the land become a sheep walk. The Phocians and others objected to this extreme course; and the milder view prevailed, because it was in the interest of the Lacedæmonian policy to cripple Athens, but not to destroy her. For it was to be anticipated, that in the latter event the arrogance of the Thebans would cause them to regard themselves as a great power, and to oppose themselves to the Spartans. The Delphic Oracle is also said to have added its voice in favor of the preservation of Athens.

Thus Athens received her sentence through a decree of the ephors. The Athenians were to pull down the walls of the harbor and the lines connecting the latter with the city; their dominion was to be limited to Attica; they were to re-admit all exiles, to join the Peloponnesian confederacy, binding themselves to contribute their military contingent, and to perform the other services incumbent upon the confederates of Sparta; and finally to deliver up their vessels of war, according to the more detailed regulations to be fixed by the Spartan commanders. On these conditions the blockade was to be raised.

When Theramenes appeared before the citizens with these conditions of peace and unblushingly proposed their acceptance, all the more patriotic among his hearers were, indeed, indignant at the criminal manner in which he had abused the terrible situation of his fellow-citizens. Angry voices were heard reproaching him with his guilt. But he was only too well aware, that after a five months' siege the question with the people was, not one of constitutional rights, but one of bread, and of bread alone—of their escaping death by famine, to which many had already succumbed. With cutting coldness he replied to his opponents, who reminded him of the deeds of The-

The peace of Theramenes. Ol. xciii. 4. (B.C. 404.) April.

mistocles, that under certain circumstances it might be as meritorious to pull down walls, as under others to build them up. Moreover, he added, the prosperity of a city was not dependent upon walls and fortifications, as was shown by the example of Sparta, which would otherwise be the most unfortunate of states.

Thus it came to pass, that, on the day after the return of the envoys, the conditions of peace were accepted, in the twenty-seventh year after the commencement of the war, in the seventeenth after the peace of Nicias, in the month of April; and the first corn-ships unladen in the Piræeus consoled the famished population of the city for what had taken place.

But even now the oligarchs had not yet reached the goal of their desires, and, therefore, neither was the measure of the humiliations of Athens yet full. She had renounced her independence; her vessels were, with the exception of twelve, delivered up to Lysander; her power was at an end, and the position of the city towards other states decided. But her domestic affairs had not been regulated by the treaty of peace and capitulation: Theramenes having been unable to obtain at Sparta any provision in the sense of his party, except that which ordained the recall of the exiles. For the same reason, the opponents of that party had again taken courage; and the same patriots, who had even in the last assembly given vent to their real opinions, combined more closely, in order if possible to save liberty and law within the walls of the city.

The assembly in Munychia.

How far these plans advanced cannot be demonstrated; but so much is certain: that the oligarchs, whom, after securing the ships, Lysander had again left to manage the internal affairs of the city, recognized the necessity of seizing the persons of the leaders of this adverse movement, before they could proceed finally to regulate the constitution according to

their wishes. Their purposes were served by a freedman of the name of Agoratus, one of those who averred to have taken part in the murder of Phrynichus seven years before, and who had thus acquired a reputation, however ambiguous, for democratic sentiments. He appears to have been forced to bring a statement before the Council, in which he accused a number of honorable men, who had served the state as generals and captains, of a conspiracy against the constitution,—although manifestly no constitution was at the time acknowledged, and only a party government was carried on by arbitrary means for selfish ends. The Council brought the matter before the citizens; an assembly was held in the Piræeus, in the Munychian theatre, in which, under the influence of the oligarchs, sentence of death was pronounced upon the accused. Among the latter the most eminent were Strombichides, an admiral of proved merit, and Dionysodorus: the same honorable men who had opposed Theramenes by the most outspoken expressions of disapproval,—moderate republicans, who were far more odious in the eyes of the oligarchs than the most intemperate demagogues.*

Execution of patriots.

While thus the loyal adherents of the constitution were made away with as traitors, and the little band of courageous patriots dwindled to less and less: the exiles returned to Athens, in consequence of the capitulation concluded through the exertions of Theramenes, and strengthened the ranks of the revolutionists. One of these returning exiles was Critias, the foremost name among all the enemies of the constitution, and the real accomplisher of their long-prepared plans.

Critias, the son of Callæschrus, was one of those characters which need a revolution

Critias.

* As to the order of events (with reference to the several assemblies), see Note xii. Appendix.

to develop and assert themselves. He belonged to one of the noblest and wealthiest families of Athens, which was related to that of Solon, with whom the father of Critias' grandfather (the elder Critias) had been upon terms of intimate friendship. He was distinguished by the hereditary qualities of his house, by a tendency towards all higher interests and a love of science and art, which were supported by great natural talents, and urged on by a strong ambition. All the means of culture offering themselves in Athens were appropriated to himself by the youthful Critias; he studied Protagoras and Gorgias; he entered upon a footing of intimacy with Socrates, and was for years one of the most zealous participators in his conversations. But these conversations exercised upon his character an influence less permanent than even upon that of Alcibiades. For, while the latter was, at all events, really and strongly moved to recognize the greatness of his teacher: the only object of Critias was to learn from Socrates things which he might turn to good account in the pursuit of his schemes of ambition. He wished his skill and knowledge to extend over every department and every subject. He was not satisfied with distinguishing himself as an orator and political author by the wealth of his knowledge, and by a model diction; but wished also to shine as a musician and a poet; and composed, not only elegies on political subjects (according to the precedent set by Solon), but also tragedies—although want of depth and warmth of feeling, as well as of the harmony of the inner life, made it impossible for him to become a true poet. Neither could he become a true philosopher, according to the meaning of the term as it had first fixed itself in the mind of his great teacher. For, notwithstanding all the scientific acquirements and intellectual acumen of Critias, his whole nature failed to attain to order, or to freedom from constant self-contradictions, while his culture remained superficial and dis-

connected: because his mind was too self-seeking, ever to give itself fully up to any one subject. He collected in all quarters what he thought would prove serviceable materials; and thus, in the end, all his culture only served morally to deteriorate him. He became a hypocrite, while he was able to hold the most edifying discussions with Socrates on the virtues of the perfect citizen, without ever taking thought of practising those virtues: inflated by his multifarious knowledge and attainments, he was eager for admiration and influence; and thus, though originally a cold and calculating nature, he acquired a restless, excited, and passionate character, and from lack of inner firmness gave himself up to the most extreme tendencies of party, and spurned all moderation. Thus he advanced in his course step by step, and, in proportion as the sense of right became obscured and the voice of conscience deadened within him, this vain pretender to literary distinction changed into a criminal, who at last shrank from no act, however vile and base.

In the case of a man of this character and development, it cannot astonish us to find his public career uncertain, oscillating, and full of self-contradiction. By birth and sentiment an aristocrat, Critias was doubtless never a friend of the constitution. With the arrogance of a pupil of the Sophists, he despised the people, and inclined towards the party, whose political theories above all aimed at producing a state of things, in which the shop-keepers and artisans should attend to their trade, and leave matters of state to the men of rank and education. It may be assumed that in these views he followed Antiphon, who may also have served him as a model of oratory. Yet Critias was not from the first an adherent of this party, but preserved to himself a position of greater freedom, although his father was one of the most zealous oligarchs (p. 80). Critias seems to have been one of those who attached themselves to Alcibiades, and

accordingly had with the following of the latter, to undergo manifold attacks at the time of the mutilation of the Hermæ (p. 363).*

Critias is not found acting independently of others until after the fall of the Four Hundred; and at that time he was the most vehement opponent of the Tyrants. It was he who preferred an indictment against Phrynichus, even after the murder of the latter, and upon whose motion the remains of the traitor were transported beyond the frontier of Attica (p. 491). With him again originated the popular decree, which ordained the recall of Alcibiades; and the fact of his absence from Athens, after the fall of the same leader, may have been due to his unpopularity at the time, as the proposer of that very decree. It is certain, that, at the time of the battle of the Arginusæ, Critias was an exile, and resided in Thessaly—always very favorable ground for restless partisans. For in Thessaly, already a considerable period before, violent popular movements had broken out; the Penestæ were in a state of revolt against the great landed proprietors (vol. i. pp. 107, 119, 215); nor had the Athenians remained entirely silent spectators of these proceedings. At all events, we are informed that, even before the peace of Nicias, they had sent envoys to Thessaly; one of whom, Amynias by name, was prosecuted for having exceeded his powers by taking part in the disturbances in favor of the tributary peasants. Critias too, displayed a passionate interest in these movements, helped to arm the peasantry, and supported their leader, Prometheus, in his undertakings. Whence it appears, that in Thessaly as well as at home, he encouraged the efforts of such men as seemed by their personal superiority called upon to take into their hands the destinies of States.*

* Critias (φυγὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ δημοῦ, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3, 15) in Thessaly. ii. 3, 36; *Memor.* i. 2, 24.—As to Amynias, cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 1263, *Nub.* 691. His παραπρεσβεία, stigmatized by Eupolis, took place *circ.* Ol. lxxxix.: *Fr.*

Critias after his return from Thessaly.

Critias' stay in Thessaly is said to have exercised a very deteriorating influence upon his character; and it is indeed easy to comprehend, how his intercourse with a ruder people, as well as his participation in various acts of violence, must have more and more obscured his respect for the law and right, his attachment to his native institutions, and the impressions of Socratic virtue which might have still lingered in his mind. Moreover, the personal importance which he was able to assume in Thessaly could not but intensify his vanity, and excite his ambition. In short, he was found to be a changed man, when he returned from the North,—as we must assume, after the capitulation; he was manifestly resolved, no longer to further others in the pursuance of their political designs, but to be himself the man round whom the others gathered, and actually to carry out what had hitherto been invariably attempted at the wrong time, or by mere half-measures. Critias now became the leader that Antiphon had formerly been; and, armed with the experience of previous failures, thought himself called upon to purify his native city, ruined as she was by misfortune, of her perverse ways; and to effect this by all methods of violence, without shrinking from bloodshed or treason, in order thereafter to be able to re-constitute the purified state according to his own principles, and govern it according to his will.

But, before the personal plans of Critias could make themselves manifest, he had to combine with the entire party, anxious for the overthrow of the constitution, and to support the measures designed to prepare the way for the new order of things. He accordingly, immediately after his return, became a member of the directing Committee

Com. ii. 513; C. Fr. Hermann, *Gr. Staatsalt.* § 178, 14.—As to Critias not having been a member of the Four Hundred, see Wattenbach, *de Quadring. Ath. fact.* p. 46.

of the Five Ephors (p. 531), and to his agency it is probably to be attributed that this Committee became more and more the absolute masters of the city; the Council being in their hands, and the civic body overawed. Even men of moderate views allowed themselves to be convinced of the truth of the opinion: that, under existing circumstances, the only chance of safety, for Athens lay in a radical reform of her constitution, and in the adoption of the political institutions of Sparta; thus, *e. g.*, the cousin and junior of Critias, Charmides, the son of Glaucon, a high-minded man deeply devoted to philosophy, also appears on the side of the oligarchs.*

After, then, in the months following upon the capitulation, the revolutionary party had united all its forces, and had rid itself of those men in whom a loyal adherence to the constitution, and a courage sufficient to defend it, might still be expected, the oligarchs proceeded to the completion of their work; for which purpose they procured the support of Lysander in person. He arrived, accompanied by Theramenes, from Samos, which continued the war even after Athens had relinquished it, and at the head of his entire fleet entered the Piræeus, in order to regulate Athens' relations to Sparta, and to see the conditions of the peace carried out to their full extent. He accused the Athenians of having neglected to carry these conditions out in proper time, and accordingly treated the city, as one which had broken a solemn treaty, with arbitrary violence and mocking cruelty. He caused the troops to wear wreaths as if for a festival;

* As to Charmides, see Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4, 19. That the Five Ephors were not from first to last the same persons is also manifest from Lysias, xii. § 43; for the examination of witnesses as to the membership of Eratosthenes is only explicable on the supposition of his having been temporarily one of the number. Thus it is most probable with regard to Critias also, that he was admitted into the Council after his return, as Rauchenstein supposes, *Philol.* xv. 708.

amidst songs and the music of flutes the ships were burnt, and the fortifications pulled down. Immediately afterwards a public assembly of the citizens was summoned, at which Lysander was present.

The last assembly of the people. Establishment of the Thirty. Ol. xciii. 4. (B.C. 404.) Summer.

In this assembly, Dracontidas, a scoundrel upon whom repeated sentences had been passed, brought forward a motion, proposing the transfer of the government into the hands of Thirty persons; and Theramenes supported this proposal, which he declared to express the wishes of Sparta. Even now, these speeches produced a storm of indignation; after all the acts of violence which Athens had undergone, she yet contained men outspoken enough to venture to defend the constitution, and to appeal to the fact, that the capitulation sanctioned by both parties contained no provision as to the internal affairs of Athens. But, hereupon, Lysander himself came forward, and spoke to the citizens without reserve, like one who was their absolute master. He declared the greater severity of the present articles of peace to be the well-merited consequence of the tardiness of the Athenians in the execution of the treaty, and left the assembly to choose between the adoption of the proposed law and the annihilation of the entire community. By such means the motion of Dracontidas was passed; but only a small number of unpatriotic and cowardly citizens raised their hands in token of assent. All better patriots contrived to avoid participation in this vote. Next, ten members of the government were chosen by Critias and his colleagues, ten by Theramenes, the confidential friend of Lysander, and finally ten out of the assembled multitude, probably by a free vote; and this Board of Thirty was hereupon established as the supreme government authority by a resolution of the assembly present. Most of the members of the new government had formerly been among the Four Hundred, and had

therefore long pursued a common course of action. A formula of oath, introduced by Theramenes, comprehensively recited the political principles by which all the members of the new government swore to hold themselves bound. Sparta took the new constitution under her protection; and soon afterwards seven hundred Lacedæmonian soldiers marched into the Acropolis, in order to keep guard over powerless Athens, who had succumbed to her foes, foreign and domestic—to force and to treason.*

Review of the Decelean War.

However deep the shame of the end of the Decelean war, yet there exists no more splendid testimony to the energy of Athens, than the eight years' resistance offered by the city after the Sicilian calamity. Greece, Sicily, and Persia, were allied against the doomed city,—and yet she was not to be overcome by force; her fleet was victorious as soon as it had its right commander; her citizens were full of courage and love of liberty, steadfast, and ready to make any personal sacrifice on behalf of their country. But the whole war was a struggle of despair, because the Athenians had, so to speak, no ground left under their feet; they fought for the preservation of their state, but that preservation depended upon a number of foreign possessions, the permanent recovery of which surpassed their powers; the only remaining strength of Athens lay in her navy, and this was obliged to be self-supporting. The chief care of the generals had always been, how to procure supplies and pay; no connected plan of operations could, therefore, be pursued by them; and the war became a savage, freebooters' war, which widened the gulf between Athens and her former allies, till it became impassable. Money is the main question of the whole Decelean war; and, Sparta being equally without a treasury, the issue depends upon the money of the Great King. For this reason, Alcibiades

* As to the date for the events connected with the final humiliation of Athens, see Note xiii. Appendix.

knew no better expedient for kindling the ardor of his troops before the battle of Cyzicus, than by calling out to them: "The King's moneys are in the hands of the enemy. If you wish to have the one, you must vanquish the other." Athens again and again recovered her naval superiority, but not the supremacy of the sea: which it was impossible for her to secure without a treasure of her own. Hence the aimless character of the fighting, and, notwithstanding the most brilliant victories, a condition of helpless insecurity, from the moment when the Sicilian calamity awakened Athens out of the intoxication of unlimited power.

But even when she had become impoverished, and stood bared of her resources, Athens was not vanquished by her external foes. She fell by her own hand. Even before the Sicilian expedition, the state was shaken to its base by the party divisions within its walls. Party intrigues led Alcibiades to point out to the Spartans the road to Ionia and to the treasury of the King; party intrigues delivered into the hands of the foe the last fleet of the city, and, in the end, the city herself. The victory which terminated the war was a victory of treason.

Not even during the Persian wars was Attic history free from the blot of treasonable sentiments. After the open rupture with Sparta a Lacedæmonian party formed itself, whose efforts were directed to the humiliation of the city. But these intrigues first became a national danger, when the teachings of Sophistry penetrated into Athens. For it was the Sophistic tendency, which mainly contributed to arouse the decomposing forces. This tendency loosened the bonds, which held the hearts of the citizens united into one national will; it taught the rising generation of the city to assert their personal wishes with audacious arrogance, in the face of all tradition and usage, and to despise the virtues of their fathers; it emptied the palæstræ, where of old a sturdy race grew up in common discipline and ex-

ercise; it destroyed faith in the gods, reverence before the law, devotion to home and family, and abhorrence of wrong and of disloyalty. An abundance of the noblest gifts was at hand, but the fine talents given by nature were utterly perverted by abuse; the best intellects became the worst enemies of the commonwealth; education was converted into a poison, consuming the very marrow of the state, and the adversaries of the constitution, who desired to heal the sick state and establish a new aristocracy, a "government of the best," founded upon wealth and culture, were baser, more self-seeking, and more utterly unconscientious, than the most vehement among the demagogues. In sanguinary quarrels the preservative forces of the state, civic virtue, and patriotism wasted away. The adherents of the different parties, instead of any longer joining hands, when the preservation of the state was in question—as Aristides and Themistocles had done before the battle of Salamis,—for the sake of their separate interests sacrificed army and navy, city and harbors, and remained impassive spectators of the ruin of Athens, provided they could take vengeance upon their adversaries.

Sparta, Athens, and the hegemony.

The capture of Athens left Sparta once more the only Great Power, and the mistress of all Greece. The walls, with the construction of which the history of the independence of Athens had commenced, had been razed to the ground; and to all outward appearance it seemed as if the greatness of Athens, founded at Marathon, had been merely a brief interruption of the state of things, which the enemies of the state indicated as the only legitimate one, viz. the subordination of the entire Greek nation under the hegemony of Sparta. But, no more than Sparta had by her own strength vanquished Athens, was the former able to bear away the honor and the advantages belonging to the victor. She indeed still possessed such citizens as Callicratidas,

whose genuinely Hellenic feelings made them prefer peace with Athens to an alliance with Persia; but she after all owed all her successes to means, the use of which exposed her to dishonor and danger. She was incapable of exercising the sway which had fallen to her lot in consequence of the overthrow of Athens; she had come to act in direct contravention of her own constitution; and the victor of Ægospotami was himself the worst enemy of the state of Lycurgus.

Such were the states, which represented the forces of the two main races of the nation at the end of the war. Both had lost their most valuable possessions, both were deteriorated and exhausted. With terrible rapidity the judgment was accomplished, which the Hellenes had by their discord brought down upon themselves; and Herodotus, who was still able from the lofty height of the age of Pericles to look back upon the Wars of Liberation, also lived to lament the misery brought upon Greece by the struggle between the two leading states.

But how vast is the difference between the histories of those two states up to the point of time at which we have now arrived!

From the time of Solon, the history of Greece is in the main a history of Athens. From Athens proceed all the impulses which gave life and significance to the national history; while, on the part of Sparta and the other states, we meet with no independent pursuit of their own aims, with no endeavor to further national objects, and see no forces at work but those of negation and contradiction, no motives operating but those of hatred and bitter jealousy. The Athenians alone sought to replace the obsolete federal statutes, by calling into life a fresh union among the popular forces acting in Greece. They risked life and property in their endeavor to liberate Greece; and their mission of holding the hegemony over it, which Herodotus was the first to proclaim, met with a voluntary recognition on the

part of the states on the further side of the sea. For the first time a Hellenic power had been created, from which the barbarians shrank back in fear. By its side, there was room for the continuance of the Peloponnesian land-power, and for the realization of the beautiful political motto of Cimon: "War against the Persians; peace with the Hellenes." But this realization was made impossible by Sparta, who broke up the Confederation: so that nothing was left for the Athenians, but to throw aside all burdensome consideration for Sparta, freely to follow their own mission, and to constitute their city the centre of Greek power and culture. The policy pursued by Pericles was the only road, in which a healthy continuous development of the national interests was possible. But, however great and immortal were its works during a short series of years of peace, yet it was incapable of offering a guarantee of permanent prosperity to the Athenians. The hostility of the enemies of the city rose with her splendor, and war became inevitable; the completion of the democratic system provoked mutual opposition and anti-constitutional tendencies among the citizens, which undermined the strength of the state; and this strength was finally shaken to its very base by the Plague, which not only crippled the vigor of the Attic population, but also materially contributed to the demoralization of the citizens.

The weak points of the Athenian state.

As to the Attic political system itself, it had remained an artificial structure, lacking due security and the independence which no great power can afford to spare. Attica herself was no longer an essential part of the vast empire; and, moreover, the territory of Attica was wholly insufficient for supplying even the most immediate wants of the population of the city. Hence the necessity of depending upon foreign corn; hence the restless and eager inquiry after new sources of air, and the fatal expeditions to Egypt and Sicily. The one-sided attention paid to maritime affairs

estranged the people from agricultural pursuits, and rendered them incapable of defending their native soil: the Athenians spent their last resources in fighting on account of the cities on the Hellespont and Bosporus, while they left the mountain fastness, which they could see from the city walls, in the hands of the enemy for the space of nine years, without venturing an attack upon it. These evils, involved in a one-sided maritime policy, and unavoidable, if Athens was to rule the sea, could only be counterbalanced by a real amalgamation being effected between Athens and the cities in her alliance. But no such union was actually accomplished. The cities were scattered at too great a distance from one another and from Athens, and they opposed too obstinate a resistance to her, to allow of it; and since, as the Greek civic republics were constituted, there could be no question as to an admission of the allied cities to the enjoyment of the rights belonging to members of the Attic state, the fear of an invincible navy alone held those cities in submission. Hence the naval dominion, for the sake of which Athens had sacrificed the uninterrupted possession of her own country district, was an insecure one, and this so much the more, in that she was indeed able temporarily to drive back, but never to annihilate the Persian power, which lay in wait, in the rear of the allied cities, for any mishap which might befall Athens.

A state whose power rested upon foundations so artificial could, as Pericles perceived, be upheld only by means of the most provident caution, and successfully guided only by the vigorous will of a statesman of commanding mind. Such a one was yet more needed, when Athens had paid the penalty for her desertion of the political principles of Pericles in the loss of her naval dominion, and when the very existence of the state was at stake. It was the mission of Alcibiades to become her preserver; but that mission his own errors, as well as those of his fellow-citizens,

prevented him from fulfilling: and thus the glories of Athens came to an end.

Yet, though those glories endured only for a brief space of time, their significance is one which outweighs the history of centuries. In them the whole wealth of the forces dwelling in the Greek nation first revealed itself; nor can any other age compare itself with this in intellectual energy. The great days of Athens under Pericles were never to return; but they remained a treasure belonging to the nation for all times, not only as a glorious reminiscence which might serve as a consolation in less happy days, but also in the salutary and beneficent effects which they left behind. For, again and again, after-generations found a source of national encouragement in the contemplation of that glorious age; and, accordingly, in the period following upon it, Athens once more became the most important theatre of Hellenic history.

The glories of Athens.

APPENDIX.

Note I. page 12.—This view we are probably justified in advancing in opposition to the supposition of invidious motives actuating Pericles (probably derived from the account of Stesimbrotus of Thasos). Cf. Sintenis ad Plut. *Pericl.* c. 29.—For documents of accounts as to the equipment of the ships for Κόρκυρα (this is the form of the name attested by inscriptions and coins), see Rangabè, *Ant. Hell.* n. 115; Boeckh, *Abh. d. Ak. d. W.* 1846, p. 355; and E. Müller, *de temp. quo b. Pelop. init. cep.* p. 35.

Note II. p. 43.—As to Metichus, see Bergk, *Rel. Com. Att.* p. 11, who ascribes the lines quoted above to Cratinus.—As to Menippus and Pyrilampes, see Sintenis ad Plut. *Pericl.* p. 142.—For the expression Πεισιστρατίδαι νέοι, see Plut. c. 16.—As to Hermippus, *ib.* c. 33.—As to the law of Antimachus, see Bergk, *Rel. Com. Att.* p. 142, and Schmidt's *Zeitschr. f. Gesch.* ii. 201, whose arguments against the participation of Pericles in that law seem to me insufficient.—As to the absence of a parabasis from Cratinus' Ὀδυσσεῖς, see Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* i. p. 93.

Note III. p. 50.—For the prosecution of Phidias, see Brunn, *Gesch. d. gr. Künstler*, i. 167. Cf. Conze (in Gerhard's *Arch. Ztg.* 1865, p. 33) as to the imitations of the relieved work on the shield, on which may be recognized two figures, vaguely corresponding to Phidias and Pericles, as they are described in Plut. *Pericl.* 31.—The Schol. ad Ar. *Pax*, 605, introduces Philochorus as witness for the last events of the life of Pericles: everything depends on the length of the period to which the testimony of Philochorus extends. According to Sauppe (*Tod des Phidias*, in *Götting. Nachr.* 1867, p. 173), he attests the facts, that in B.C. 438 Phidias fled from Athens and repaired to Elis, where he was

charged with peculation, and put to death by the Eleans. E. Petersen (in *Arch. Ztg.* 1867, p. 22) conjectures ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων for ὑπ' Ἠλείων. I cannot conceive myself that the quotation from Philochorus reaches further than the word ποιήσαντος; and I believe that with the words καὶ Φειδίας ὁ ποιήσας a later addition commences. I cannot credit the statement, that Phidias was executed in Elis: some traces of it would have remained in the local traditions of Olympia.—As to the prosecution of Anaxagoras, see Plut. *Pericl.* ed. Sintenis, p. 220; Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* i. 667.—As to that of Aspasia, Plut. *Pericl.* p. 32.—As to Damon, see Meier *Ostrakismos*, p. 186.—The relations between the motions of Hagnon and Dracontides (Boeckh, *P. E.* vol. i. p. 263, E. Tr.) cannot be made out with any degree of certainty. A mitigation in favor of Pericles is supposed to be discoverable in the motion of Hagnon, by Wattenbach, *de Quadrig. factione*, p. 21.

Note IV. p. 56.—The surprise of Platææ falls (ἐν ἱερομηνίᾳ, Thuc. iii. 56) towards the end of the month, four months (according to Krüger's emendation of Thuc. ii. 2) before the close of the archonship of Pythodorus: *i. e.*, calculating precisely, on the last day of Anthesterion, which month began, according to the Attic Octaëteris, on the evening of the 4th April, B C. 431. The new moon fell April 7th; Boeckh, *Mondcyklen*, p. 78. From this event Thucydides dates the succession of the years of the wars, all of which, like the first, he commences with the spring and terminates with the end of the winter.—With reference to the putting to death of the Theban prisoners, Thuc. (ii. 5, 6) appears to doubt the veracity of the excuse put forward by the Platæans.

Note V. p. 75.—A deposition of Pericles is inaccurately spoken of by Plut. c. 35, and Diodor. xii. 38. Cf. Krüger ad Thuc. ii. 65. After Pericles' return from Peloponnesus (about the middle of May), his re-election was frustrated. (The amount of the fine was fifteen or fifty talents: see Plut. c. 35. The name of the accuser is variously given by Idomeneus, Theophrastus, and Heraclides. The account of his domestic troubles, c. 36, is founded on Stesimbrotus.) With the beginning of the Attic year (July, B C. 430) new generals came into office. Into their period of office falls the Peloponnesian expedition to Zacynthus (Thuc. ii. 66), and the execution of the Peloponnesian envoys

(*ib.* c. 67). In the course of the same year took place the extraordinary re-election of Pericles (Phormio in the bay of Corinth; fall of Potidæa). With July, B.C. 429 (Ol. lxxxviii. 4), commenced a new year of office of Pericles; who died in the autumn. A similar view is taken by Grote (vi. 229), the correctness of which has been unsuccessfully disputed by Campe, *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.* lxv. 286.—The name Paralus (p. 71), given to his son by Pericles, had been made the subject of accusations against the latter, Paralus being a Heroic appellative. Suidas, *v.* Περικλῆς.

Note VI. p 187. Fall of the Thracian towns, Thuc. iv. 84—88; of Amphipolis, *ib.* 102 f.—Banishment of Thucydides, Thuc. v. 26. Cf. W. Oncken, *Brasidas u. d. Geschichtsschreiber Thuk. als Stratege vor Amphipolis* in *Hist. Zeitschr.* x. p. 289 ff., who according to Grote and Mure, "reckons the silence of the accused among the numerous indications of the probability of his guilt, which there is nothing to counteract." My counter-arguments are indicated in the text. That Oncken is not justified in doubting the untrustworthiness of the mining districts is clear from the circumstance, that the Thasian colonies revolted immediately afterwards; see Thuc. iv. 167. Surely we may place so much confidence in Thucydides as to assume that he had good grounds for taking up his station at Thasos. Thucydides was condemned in the same way as Eurymedon; see p. 263: cf. Hiecke, *Hochverrath d. Thuk.* (Berlin, 1869).—As to Cleon's share in the banishment of Thucydides, see Jahn's *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1861, p. 685.

Note VII. p. 208.—Peace of Nicias: Thuc. v. 14—20. It was the end of ὁ δεκαετὴς πόλεμος, or ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος, the war after the conclusion of which Thucydides began to write out his history. Ulrich, *d. Benennung d. Pel. Kr.*—As to the interval between the conclusion of the truce and that of the peace (Thuc v. 1), see Weissenborn, *Hellen.*, p. 168; C. Fr. Hermann, *de anno Delphico*, p. 18. After the Pythian games (*Philol.*, i. 703) ensued a *de facto* cessation of arms, succeeded by the negotiations for peace during the winter.—As to the conclusion of the peace, see E. Müller, *de temp. quo b. Pelop. init. cep* p. 22.

Note VIII. p. 221.—As to the revolution at Syracuse, see Herod. vii. 155.—For the chronology of the Dinomenidæ, see Aristot. *Pol.* 230; Bekk. 2d edition. Gelo dies in the eighth year of his Tyrannis; Hiero reigns ten years, and dies Ol. lxxviii. 2 (B.C. 468-7); his accession accordingly falls in Ol.

lxxvi. 1 (B.C. 477-6). See Plass, *Tyrannis*, i. 295. Accordingly Gelo reigns in Syracuse from Ol. lxxiv. 2 (B.C. 484-3), after becoming master of Gela in Ol. lxxii. 2 (B.C. 492-1).—For the semblance of recognition paid to the sovereignty of the people, see Diod. xi. 26; Plass, p. 294.—For Gelo's dislike of the Demus, Herod. vii. 156.

Note IX. p. 225.—As to the power of Gelo, see Herod. vii. 156 f.—As to the reports of the envoys, *ib.* c. 157 f. The metaphor of the spring is said to have been used by Pericles in his funeral oration, by Arist. *Rhet.* i. 7, 34. Kirchhoff (*Abfassungsz. d. Herod. Gesch.* p. 20) assumes that Herodotus imitated the figure. With reference to Cadmus, I certainly adhere to my opinion, notwithstanding Lorenz, *Epicharmos*, p. 62, that he was the son of the same Scythes who, after being expelled from Zancle, died at the Persian court. A few years (*οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον*, Thuc. vi. 4) after the expulsion of Scythes, Anaxilaus, who has in the meantime established himself in a sufficiently strong position in Rhegium, takes possession of the city of Zancle, and in honor of his native country calls it Messana; whereupon Cadmus returns. Herod. vii. 164 draws no accurate distinction between the two catastrophes which befell the city, but indicates the true state of the case by saying of Cadmus, that he took up his abode in the city which had in the meantime been renamed: *κατοίκησε πόλιν* Z. *τὴν ἐς* Μεσσήνην *μεταβαλοῦσαν τὸ οὔνομα*. Cf. Stein ad Her. Siefert, *Zankle-Messana*, p. 15 ff.

Note X. p. 520.—I do not deny the uncertainty in the chronology of these years, the difficulties of which have been most recently pointed out in a year-by-year review of Xenophon's *Hellenica* by Büchsenschütz (*Philologus*, xiv. 508 ff.), who (p. 537) declares it impossible to arrive at any certain result. But, upon the whole, I am obliged, in opposition to the chronology of Dodwell, to agree with Boeckh, Peter, and others, in preferring that of Haackh (*Diss. chronol. de. postr. b. Pelop. annis*, Stendal, 1822; Xen. *Hell.* ed. L. Dindorf, 1853, p. xxxvii.). Least of all will it be possible to disturb this chronology by means of a more accurate dating of the Lacedæmonian nauarchies; with regard to which it is not possible to prove either a regular annual succession (E. Müller, *de Xen. Hist. Gr.* p. 28), or even a limitation by law to a single year And this is easily to be understood, if it is remembered that the nauarchy was not

an ordinary office, that it had no place in the regular organism of the constitution, and was not sharply defined in its functions; whence also the accompaniment of the nauarchs by commissioners, who could even occasionally depose the nauarchs themselves. We meet with nauarchs holding office for several years, without the circumstance being remarked upon as illegal. If, then, the duration of this office was not fixed, the law against its being held twice in succession by the same man was doubly justified. And if, notwithstanding, we hear of *ναυαρχία παρελήλυθεια*, *χρόνος παρεληλυθώς*, &c., these expressions probably refer to the term decreed in each particular case.—The chronology adopted will also most readily admit into its order the events connected with Hermocrates (who was at Himera in Ol. xciii. 1 (B.C. 408-7); see Diod. xiii. 75).

Note XI. p. 555.—The date of the battle of Ægospotami can only be fixed according to that of the capitulation of Athens; which latter was preceded by a siege of from four to five months, and by other events, so that an interval of seven months or thereabouts must be assumed. The battle therefore can scarcely have taken place later than August (Peter, *Zeittafeln*, n. 150). This date is further rendered probable by the circumstance, that the importation of corn from the Pontus was particularly brisk before the storms, which generally interrupted navigation at the first rising of Arcturus in the morning (middle of September), immediately after the harvest, and especially in the month of Metagitnion (Dem. in *Polycl.* § 4). Cf. Weissenborn in *n. Jen. Lit. Z.* 1848, p. 660. Lysander must therefore have been anxious to close the Hellespont at this season.

Note XII. p. 573.—A popular assembly took place on the day after the return of Theramenes (*τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ*, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2, 21). In this the report was made, but the conditions were not accepted, as is clear from Lysias. The severity of the conditions having provoked opposition, a second assembly in Munychia followed where Agoratus named the leaders of the opposition. The third was that in which, the opposition having been silenced, the conditions of peace were accepted. From this must be distinguished the fourth, *ἡ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας* (Lys. xii. 71), where Lysander appeared in person. This chronological order of the last popular assemblies which decided the fate of Athens has been demonstrated by Scheibe (*Olig. Umwälzung*), and has recently been defended,

against Stedefeldt (*de Lysandri Plutarchei fontibus* 1867) by Rauchenstein (N. *Schweiz. Mus.* 1866). Inasmuch as Xenophon only summarily mentions the main events, the contradiction with Lysias is rather apparent than real; nor is it possible to assume the latter to have intentionally misrepresented events which had happened only a year previously, and were known to every one in the city. As to Stedefeldt's counter-argument (p. 12 ff.), that so long a delay of his measures on the part of Lysander is incredible, it must be noted, that, considering the character of Lysander, we cannot know what may for a time have been his secret intentions with regard to the navy and the walls of Athens. Cf. Chr. Renner, *Comment. Lysiac*, p. 11.

Note XIII. p. 580.—There are two principal data for the final humiliation of Athens: viz. the capitulation of the city and the establishment of the Thirty. The former, the document of which is preserved in Plut. *Lys.* 14, took place, according to Plutarch, on the 16th Munychion; and with this date Thucydides closes the war. It commenced on the last of Anthesterion (4th April), B.C. 431 (see Note IV. *ante*), and ended on the 16th Munychion (25 h-26th April), B.C. 404; and therefore, taking together its three divisions—viz. the "First or Ten Years' War," the apparent cessation of arms, and the "Second or Decelean War,"—lasted as Thuc. states (v. 26), twenty-seven years and "not many" (*i. e.* twenty-one) days: Boeckh, *Mondcyklen*, p. 81. A term was fixed for the razing of the walls. This term was not kept; whereupon ensued the second catastrophe, viz. the abolition of the constitution and establishment of the Thirty, accompanied by the destruction of the walls, burning of the ships, and triumphant rejoicings of the "liberated" allies. These events happened a few months after the capitulation. With the end of the summer Lysander returned home, after taking Samos. The debate and voting of the Peloponnesian allies as to the fate of Athens were held at Sparta: Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2, 19: cf. Wesseling ad Diod. xv. 63; Scheibe. *u. s.* p. 43. Possibly the proposals of destroying the city were again repeated in Lysander's camp. Weissenborn, *Hellen.* p. 206.

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